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Gauhati High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 794 (GAU)

Kanak Sen Deka v. Jagadish Patgiri and Anr.

2012-06-26

I.A.ANSARI

body2012
1. With the help of this application, made under section 482, Cr.PC, the petitioner, namely, Sri Kanaksen Deka, who is accused No. 3 in the complaint filed by the opposite party No. 1 herein, namely, Dr. Jagdish Patgiri, which has given rise to Complaint Case No. 2436C/2008, has sought for quashing of the said complaint, as a whole, and the order, dated 6.5.2008, passed, in the said Complaint. Case, by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate (Sadar) No. 2, Kamrup, Guwahati, taking cognizance of the offences, under sections 417 and 420, IPC, read with section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957 ('the Copyright Act') and directing issuance of processes against the accused, named therein, including the present petitioner. 2. I have heard Mr. A. Adhikary, learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, and Mr. A.M. Bora, learned counsel for the complainant-opposite party No. 1. I have also heard Mr. Z. Kamar, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam. 3. The case of the complainant may, in brief, be described as under : (i) The complainant is a professor of Philosophy in Cotton College and a renowned author of Assamese literature inasmuch as he has authored several, books, including compilation and editing works, besides his own literary creations. The complainant has a long relationship with the Assam Sahitya Sabha (hereinafter referred to as the 'Sabha'). At the relevant point of time, accused No. 1, namely, Sri Satish Chandra Chowdhury, was Vice-President of the Sabha, accused No. 2, namely, Dr. Pradip Bhuyan, was Joint Secretary of the. Sabha, accused No. 3, (i.e., the petitioner herein) was the President of the Sabha, accused No. 4 being the proprietor of a publishing house, at Dhemaji, namely, Kiran Prakash, where the book, which has been subject-matter of controversy, in the complaint, was printed and published. (ii) While the complainant was involved in the affairs of the Sabha, he was entrusted by the Sabha to edit and compile the Fifth Edition of a book, namely, 'Asom Sahitya Sabhar Bhasanabali', which was to include the speeches of the Presidents of the Sabha for the period commencing from the year 1973 and ending in the year 2005, including the life history of the President concerned with added responsibility given to the complainant to be the author of the life history of the President concerned. While entrusting the work, as described hereinbefore, the accused persons had assured the complainant that the book, in question, would be published in the name of the complainant and the complainant could enjoy all the rights pertaining to the publication of the book. The complainant was also assured that he (the complainant) would receive honorarium for the work, which he would be doing. (iii) Though the accused persons, with fraudulent and dishonest intention to deceive the complainant, had entrusted him with the work, as described above, the complainant remained wholly unaware of the same. The complainant, being a person devoted to literary works, immediately, took up the work, so entrusted to him, and put his best efforts in compiling and editing the book, in question, as well as in writing the life history of each of the Presidents of the Sabha for the period, in question, along with critical appreciation thereof. (iv) After having put in much hard work, the complainant completed the work, so entrusted to him, and, thereafter, an order was placed, on 12.9.2004, with M/s. North East Printers, Guwahati, for printing (DTP) of the book, in question. In the printing order, so issued by the Sabha, it was clearly mentioned that the complainant was the author of the book. This apart, in the Annual Report, dated 16.2.2006, submitted by the General Secretary of the Sabha; for the period for 2004-2005, a specific mention had been made about, the book, in question, which was to be authored and edited by the complainant. (v) By putting hard work and taking pain, the complainant completed the proof reading of the book and approved the same for final publication by making an endorsement, on 7.10.2005, in this regard, reflecting therein that the book contained the complainant's own literary creations. On 7.9.2006, a meeting of the Publishing Committee of the Sabha was convened, wherein discussions were held regarding the progress of the works of publication of several books including the book, in question, and minutes of the said meeting were accordingly recorded. On 7.9.2006, a meeting of the Publishing Committee of the Sabha was convened, wherein discussions were held regarding the progress of the works of publication of several books including the book, in question, and minutes of the said meeting were accordingly recorded. (vi) As the book, in question, was not published as per the schedule, the complainant became anxious and, upon enquiry, he came to learn that the accused persons, named in the complaint, in furtherance of their common intention to cheat the complainant, had deliberately deleted the complainant's name as the editor of the book and had also deliberately deleted the editorial note, which the complainant had written and which was to be incorporated in the book. (vii) On coming to learn about such actions of the accused, the complainant wrote to the accused No. 3, (i.e., the petitioner herein), on 17.2.2007, enquiring from him about the matter. As nothing was forthcoming from the accused No. 3, the complainant enquired, vide his letter, dated 25.2.2008, about the matter from the printer, namely, M/s. North East Printers, to whom the work of printing of the book, in question, had been, initially, entrusted. In reply to the query, so made, Sri Baharul Islam Choudhury (who is named as witness No. 2 in the complaint) of M/s. North East Printers informed the complainant that all the literary works, relating to the book, submitted by the complainant, had been taken away from M/s. North East Printers by the accused persons. Sri Choudhury also informed the complainant that from the very beginning, the accused persons had the intention to cheat the complainant and it is with such intention that it had been decided by the accused to change the name of the author of the book once the book was authored and edited by the complainant. (viii) Without disclosing their real intention at the time of entrusting the complainant with the work of compilation and writing, as mentioned above, the accused had, thus, cheated the complainant. In fact, the accused persons had approached the said Sri Choudhury and asked him to delete the name of the complainant from the book and also asked to insert the names of the accused Nos. 1 and 2, in place of the complainant's name as the author and editor of the book. In fact, the accused persons had approached the said Sri Choudhury and asked him to delete the name of the complainant from the book and also asked to insert the names of the accused Nos. 1 and 2, in place of the complainant's name as the author and editor of the book. The said Sri Choudhury further told the complainant that the editorial note; written by the complainant, had also been asked to be replaced by a separate editorial purported to have been written by accused Nos. 1 and 2; but, when the said Sri Choudhury refused to accede to such illegal demands of he accused persons, the entire work of printing was taken away from M/s. North East Printers by the accused persons. (ix) Thereafter, in the first week of March 2008, an advertisement was published in a journal, namely, Gorioshi, advertising the book, in question. In order to deceive the complainant, the said advertisement mentioned the name of the complainant as compiler and editor of the book. The advertisement had been published in furtherance of the common intention, which the accused had, to cheat the complainant. On 8.3.2008, the book, in question, was published, by the accused No. 4, showing the names of the accused Nos. 1 and 2 as the editors. On going through the book, the complainant found that, apart from replacing the editorial, which had been written by the complainant, the entire book had been published as had been authored by the complainant. The complainant being the editor of the book as well as the author of the life history of the Presidents, as mentioned hereinbefore, he is the creator of the original literary works as well as the investor of labour, skill and capital and, therefore, the complainant legally held, and still holds, the copyright in respect of the said literary works and, deleting the name of the complainant from the book, in question, as the author and the editor, and, then, publishing the same in the name of the accused Nos. 1 and 2, is clearly an act of infringement of the copyright of the complainant in respect of such portion of the literary works, which are the original literary creations of the complainant, as defined under the Copyright Act, 1957. 1 and 2, is clearly an act of infringement of the copyright of the complainant in respect of such portion of the literary works, which are the original literary creations of the complainant, as defined under the Copyright Act, 1957. (x) Broadly in tune with the above allegations, made in the complaint the complainant also made his statement, which was recorded by the learned Court below, under section 200, Cr.PC; and, then, having found that a prima facie case had been made out against the accused persons, including the present petitioner, under sections 417 and 420, IPC, read with section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957, for violating section 15 thereof, the court directed issuance of processes by the impugned order, dated 6.5.2008, aforementioned. 4. It has been contended, on behalf of the accused-petitioner, that the complaint, in the present case, docs not contain ingredients of commission of any offence and, hence, the learned court below could not have taken cognizance of offences aforementioned nor could it have directed issuance of processes against the accused-petitioner and others. It is also submitted, on behalf of the accused-petitioner, that the complainant had no copyright in the present case and there has been no violation, contravention or infringement of the copyright of the complainant inasmuch as the copyright, in the present case, was held by the various Presidents, whose speeches have been published. Referring to section 17(cc) of the Copyright Act, 1957, it has been contended by Mr. Adhikary, learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, that section 17(cc) of the Copyright Act, 1957, makes it clear that if any address or speech is delivered in public, the person, who has delivered such address or speech, or if such person has delivered such address or speech on behalf of any other person, then, such other person shall be the first owner of the copyright therein notwithstanding the fact that the person, who delivers such address or speech, or, as the case may be, the person, on whose delivers such address or speech is delivered, is employed by any other person, who arranges such address or speech or on whose behalf or promises such address or speech is delivered. 5. In the present case, therefore, contends Mr. 5. In the present case, therefore, contends Mr. Adhikary, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the complainant was not the author of the speeches, in question, inasmuch as the Presidents of the Sabha, who had delivered the speeches, in question, were the authors of the speeches and they were the first owners of the copyright of their respective speeches or addresses and that the petitioner's entire foundation of the case, in this regard, is misconceived in law. This apart, points out. Mr. Adhikary, learned counsel, that it is the Sabha, which, according to the complainant, had entrusted him with the work, in question, and, hence, the present petitioner could not have been made an accused inasmuch as the present petitioner merely occupied the post of the President of the Sabha, at the relevant point of time, and could not have been, thus, proceeded against. 6. Furthermore, according to Mr. Adhikary, the dispute, if any, between the parties concerned, was out and out a civil dispute and the dispute, therefore, could not have legally become the foundation for lodging criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner. 7. Controverting the submissions, made on behalf of the accused-petitioner, Mr. Bora, learned counsel for the complainant-opposite party No. 1, points out that though the speeches, which the Presidents of the Sabha had delivered from time-to-time, made the persons, who had delivered the speeches, the authors thereof and it was the President concerned, who was the first owner of the copyright in respect of the speech, so delivered by him, the fact remains that the life history of each of the President concerned, with critical appreciation thereof, had been authored by the complainant and the same were, therefore, the literary work of the complainant and, thus, the complainant being the creator thereof of the literary work, which he had so done, could not have been published in the name of accused Nos. 1 and 2 without the consent of the complainant and, with regard to publishing of the literary works of the complainant, in respect of which the complainant had the exclusive copyright, the accused had, by withdrawing the work of printing of the book, in question, from M/s. North East Printers in the manner as has been described in the complaint, clearly violated section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and the accused Nos. 1 and 2, along with accused No.3, who is the present petitioner, were, therefore, liable for prosecution under section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957. 8. Section 17(cc) of the Copyright Act, 1957, is not, according to Mr. Bora, attracted to the facts of the present case inasmuch as while the addresses or speeches, which had been delivered by the Presidents, were not the works of the complainant and he had no copyright for the same; but the writing as well as the act of editing the life history of each of the President concerned, being the work, which the complainant had done, were, undoubtedly, the literary works of the complainant and, therefore, he had the copyright in respect of the works, so done, and the copy night, which the complainant had stood clearly infringed by the acts of the accused persons. 9. In the present case, points out Mr. Bora, the Sabha has not given any license to those, who published the book, in question, and, hence, the complainant can maintain the complaint, when he has been, by a well laid design, deceived by the accused persons and it was not necessary for the Sabha to make the complaint. Moreover, the accused persons, having converted the literary works of the complainant to their own use, had committed dishonest misappropriation thereof and are, therefore, liable for punishment under section 403, IPC too. 10. While considering the present application made under section 482, Cr.PC., it needs to be noted that the law, with regard to quashing of criminal complaint, is no longer res integra. A catena of judicial decisions has settled the position of law on this aspect of the matter. I may refer to the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , wherein the question, which arose for consideration, was whether a first information report can be quashed under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The court held, on the facts before it, that no case for quashing of the proceeding was made out. Gajendra gadkar, J, speaking for the court, observed that though, ordinarily, criminal proceedings, instituted against an accused, must be tried under the provisions of the Code, there arc some categories of cases, where the inherent jurisdiction of the court can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. Gajendra gadkar, J, speaking for the court, observed that though, ordinarily, criminal proceedings, instituted against an accused, must be tried under the provisions of the Code, there arc some categories of cases, where the inherent jurisdiction of the court can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. One such category, according to the court, in R.P. Kapur (supra), consists of cases, where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises and it is a matter merely of looking at the FIR or the complaint in order to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases, said the court, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused. From the case of R.P. Kapoor (supra), it becomes abundantly clear that when a look into the contents of a complaint shows that the contents of the complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted to be true in their entirety, do not disclose commission of offence, the complaint shall be quashed. Similarly, where an FIR does not disclose commission of an offence, the FIR has got to be quashed. 11. As a corollary to what has been discussed above, it is also clear that if the contents of the complaint disclose commission of offence, such a complaint cannot be, ordinarily; quashed nor can an FIR be, ordinarily, quashed if the FIR discloses commission of a cognizable offence. 12. Laying down the scope of interference by the High Court in matters of quashing of FIR or complaint, the Supreme Court, in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajanlal and Others, (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335, laid down as follows : - "102. 12. Laying down the scope of interference by the High Court in matters of quashing of FIR or complaint, the Supreme Court, in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajanlal and Others, (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335, laid down as follows : - "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under article 226 of the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code, which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration, wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines of rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases, wherein such power should be exercised : (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegation in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned act (under which criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance of the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal private grudge." 13. In the case of Bhajan lal (supra), the Supreme Court gave a note of caution, on the powers of quashing of criminal proceedings, in the following words : "103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." (emphasis is added). 14. 14. It is clear from a close reading of the principles laid down, in the case of R.P. Kapoor (supra) and Bhajanlal (supra), that broadly speaking, quashing of a First Information Report or a complaint is possible (a) when the allegations made, in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely as true, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (b) when the uncontroverted allegations, made in the FIR or complaint and evidence collected in support of the same, do not disclose the commission of any offence and/or make out a case against the accused; and (c) when the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable that on the basis of such absurd and inherently improbable allegations, no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 15. In other words, when the allegations, made in an FIR, disclose commission of a cognizable offence, such an FIR cannot, ordinarily, be quashed by relying upon some other materials on which will depend the defence of the accused, for, in such cases, truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR or the probability of the defence plea can be determined only by effective investigation or at the trial. 16. However, in Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Kiley and Others, (2011) 3 SCC 351 , the Supreme Court has made it clear that it is not an absolute rule of law that the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under section 482, Cr.PC, or, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under section 397, Cr.PC, cannot, under any circumstances, look into the nature of public document or such materials, which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in order to ascertain if the criminal prosecution should or should not be allowed to proceed. In fact, the Supreme Court has also made it clear, in Harshendra Kumar D. (supra), that no greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person, than dragging him in a criminal case. In fact, the Supreme Court has also made it clear, in Harshendra Kumar D. (supra), that no greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person, than dragging him in a criminal case. The Supreme Court has, therefore, held, in Harshendra Kumar D. (supra), that the High Court, fell into grave error in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted documents relating to the appellant's resignation from the post of director of the company, which, if looked into, would have made it clear that the appellant's resignation from the post of director of the company was much before the cheques had been issued by the company. The relevant observations, which appear, in this regard, at paragraphs 25 and 26, in Harshendra Kumar D. (supra), read as under : "25. In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case where trial is yet to take place and the matter is at the stage of issuance of summons or taking cognizdnce, materials relied upon by the accused, which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond suspension or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 482 or for that matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 397 of the Code. It. is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an inquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents - which are beyond suspension or doubt - placed by the accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if the accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage. 26. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a person. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage. 26. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a person. No greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case. In our opinion, the High Court, fell into grave error in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted documents relating to the appellant's resignation from the post of Director of the company. Had these documents been considered by the High Court, it would have been apparent that the appellant has resigned much before the cheques were issued by the company." (emphasis is supplied) 17. From the law laid down in Harshendra Kumar D. (supra), it becomes clear that when the High Court is approached for quashing of a criminal prosecution in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under section 482, Cr.PC, or in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 397, Cr.PC, the High Court has to bear in mind that criminal prosecution affects the liberty of a person and there can be no greater damage done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case. There is, therefore, no absolute bar, on the High Court's power, to take into consideration any uncontroverted document, which may have come on record, for the purpose of arriving at a decision as to whether a criminal prosecution should or should not be allowed to continue and, if the court, on the basis of any public or uncontroverted document, comes to the conclusion that allowing the criminal prosecution to proceed, in such a case, would amount to abuse of the process of the court, the High Court has the duty to quash such a proceeding. 18. It is, no doubt, true that while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under section 482, Cr.PC, or its revisional jurisdiction, under section 397, Cr.PC, where a complaint or FIR is sought to be quashed, it is not proper, on the part of the High Court, to consider the defence of the accused or enquire into the correctness or veracity of the accusations made against the accused. Nonetheless, in appropriate cases, if, in the face of the documents placed by the accused, which are beyond suspicion or doubt, the accusations against the accused cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if the accused is asked to face trial, for, if it is so done, it would amount to denial of justice and would be tantamount to preventing justice from being done. This would be nothing short of abuse of the process of the court. 19. Coupled with the above, there is no doubt that an FIR or a complaint may be quashed if the same is found to be actuated by mala fide - See Hira lal and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 13 SCC 89 or if the FIR or the complaint makes accusations, which are so absurd or inherently improbable that no reasonable man would accept the allegations, made in the FIR or the complaint, as the case may be, as true and/or in a case, where the FIR and/or the complaint, as the case may be, is lodged as a counterblast - See M.N. Ojha and Others v. Alok Kumar Srivastav and Others, (2009) 9 SCC 682 . The FIR or a complaint may even be quashed, when the same is used as a weapon of harassment or persecution - See State ofKarnataka v. L. Muniswamy, AIR 1977 SC 1489 ; but an FIR or a complaint, shall be quashed, as held in Bhajanlal (supra), very sparingly and with great circumspection and that too, in the rarest of rare cases. 20. In the light of the law with regard to the quashing of complaint, as discussed above, it becomes the duty of the court to examine the contents of the complaint, in question, assuming the same to be true and, then, determine if any offence is prima facie found to have been committed by the accused-petitioner and, if so, then, neither the complaint, in question, can be quashed nor can the direction, given by the impugned order, dated 6.5.2008, to issue processes against, amongst others, the present petitioner, can be interfered with. 21. 21. If the contents of the complaint, in the present case, are assumed to be true, which this court is bound, in law, to assume as true, then, it clearly follows that the complainant, being the author of the life history, along with critical appreciation thereof, of the Presidents of the Sabha, as aforementioned, was the author of the said works and was, therefore, the first owner of the copyright thereof inasmuch as the author of a work, in the light of the provisions of section 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957, shall be the first owner of the copyright. Mr. Bora, learned counsel, is, therefore, correct in his contention that, in the case at hand, reference to section 17(cc) is not really relevant inasmuch as the complainant has not contended that he holds the copyright, over the addresses or speeches of the Presidents, because, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Adhikary, learned counsel, section 17(cc) makes it clear that if any address or speech, delivered in public, the person, who has delivered such address or speech, or if such person has delivered such address or speech on behalf on any other person, such other person shall be the first owner of the copyright therein notwithstanding that the person, who delivers such address or speech, or, as the case may be, the person, on whose behalf such address or speech is delivered, is employed by any other person, who arranges such address or speech or on whose behalf or premises such address or speech is delivered. 22. It is to be borne in mind, while considering the rival submissions, made on behalf of the parties concerned, that a person, who infringes, without any license, the copyright of another person, becomes liable for prosecution under the penal provisions of section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957. At the same time, what is of utmost importance to note is that the complainant has claimed that the life history of the Presidents concerned, which he had written, have been published by the accused Nos. 1 and 2 with the aid and assistance of the present petitioner, who was, at the relevant point of time, President of the Sabha. At the same time, what is of utmost importance to note is that the complainant has claimed that the life history of the Presidents concerned, which he had written, have been published by the accused Nos. 1 and 2 with the aid and assistance of the present petitioner, who was, at the relevant point of time, President of the Sabha. The allegations which the complainant has so made, may or may not be true; but it cannot be denied that this court has to proceed by assuming the accusations, made by the complainant, to be true and, when the allegations, made in the complaint, are assumed to be true, it becomes abundantly clear that the complaint, in question, does disclose that the complainant was the author of the life history of the Presidents concerned, which have been published in the book, in question, and thought the complainant held the copyright in respect of his literary works, his right has been infringed by the accused exposing them to prosecution under section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957. 23. In the present case, it is also worth pointing out that as far as the complainant's allegations, with regard to the violation of his copyright is concerned, the claim, if assumed to be true, entitles the complainant to make the complaint and the fact that the Sabha has not made any complaint, would not take away the complainant's right, to set into motion criminal prosecution against the accused persons for violation of the complainant's copyright, which the complainant alleges to have been infringed as mentioned above. 24. Situated thus, when the complaint, in question, does make out commission of offence, particularly, under section 63 of the Copyright Act, the complaint cannot be quashed and this revision, therefore, must fail. Though Mr. 24. Situated thus, when the complaint, in question, does make out commission of offence, particularly, under section 63 of the Copyright Act, the complaint cannot be quashed and this revision, therefore, must fail. Though Mr. Adhikary has referred to the cases of Hriday Ranjan Prasad Verma and Others v. State of Bihar and Another, (2000) 4 SCC 168 , Anil Mahajan v. Bhor Industries Ltd. and Another, (2005) 10 SCC 228 , V. P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 361 , and Dalip Kaur and Others v. Jagnar Singh and Another, (2009) 14 SCC 696 , to show that the complaint, in the present case, does not disclose commission of any offence of cheating, the fact remains that the allegations, made in the complaint, if assumed to be true, which this court is bound to assume, in the light of the law already discussed above, the complaint clearly disclose commission of offence, particularly, under section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957. 25. Considering the fact that the complaint, in question, does make out a prima facie case for taking of cognizance and for issuing process for the offence allegedly committed under section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957, the complaint, in question, cannot be quashed. This position would not change even if the complaint is found to have not made out any case of cheating. Therefore, it would, now, remain for the learned Court below to determine, on the basis of the evidence, which may be adduced by the parties concerned, as to what offence(s), if any, have been committed by the accused-petitioner and his co-accused and, if it is found, on the basis of the evidence, which may come on record, that the complainant has failed to make his case, as warranted by law, the consequences, as warranted by law, would automatically follow in the form of discharge or refusal, as the case may be. 26. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this court does not find that the petitioner has been able to make out, at this stage, any case for quashing of the complaint, in question, by invoking this court's power under section 482, Cr.PC and/or 483, Cr.PC. This application, made under section 482, Cr.PC, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 27. This application, made under section 482, Cr.PC, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 27. The learned court below is hereby directed to proceed with the case expeditiously and dispose of the same in accordance with law inasmuch as the complaint was made as far back as in the year 2008. 28. With the above observations and directions, this Criminal Revision stands disposed of. _____________