JUDGMENT Hon’ble Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J. By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged two orders dated 16th October, 2007 and 30th November, 2007 respectively. By the first mentioned order, respondent No.2 being the Managing Director of Uttarakhand Road Transport Corporation has held that order of punishment dated 22nd February, 2007 is null and void and without jurisdiction and remanded the matter for taking fresh decision to the respondent No.4 who has passed the second mentioned order being the order of dismissal. The fact leading to the filing of the writ petition could be marshalled from the pleadings as follows: - 2. At the material point of time, the petitioner being Conductor in Bus No. U.A.7L-4051 was discharging his duty on board the said vehicle. The said vehicle, while it was being plied from Kathgodam to Chandigarh on 6th May, 2006, it was detected by the Assistant Traffic Inspector that some passengers are found to have been travelling without tickets issued to the passengers in the said vehicle, even some tickets were also manipulated. Therefore, chargesheet was issued to hold inquiry, by the Assistant General Manager, Uttarakhand State Road Transport Corporation, Rudrapur. One Mr. Jai Bhagwan Sharma was appointed as Inquiry Officer and charges levelled against the petitioner were found to be proved by the Enquiry Officer. Accordingly the petitioner was held guilty. On acceptance of the report, the disciplinary authority, being the appointing authority, imposed punishment withholding of seven increments, and also passed order of forfeiture of salary during suspension period. It is pertinent to mention that the petitioner was suspended during the disciplinary proceedings. 3. The aforesaid order of punishment has not been challenged in this writ petition rather it has been accepted by necessary implication by the petitioner. I have noticed the averment made in paragraph 10 of the writ petition wherein it is mentioned that the petitioner has not challenged the said order of punishment either before the appellate authority or before the revising authority, therefore, order dated 22nd February, 2007 passed by the respondent No. 3 has become final. 4. Respondent No. 2 in purported exercise of its power under Regulation 69 A called for the records su moto, and after having gone through the records, he viewed that the punishment order was not passed by the competent authority as the same was issued by the Assistant General Manager in Charge. 4. Respondent No. 2 in purported exercise of its power under Regulation 69 A called for the records su moto, and after having gone through the records, he viewed that the punishment order was not passed by the competent authority as the same was issued by the Assistant General Manager in Charge. Thus, by the impugned order dated 16th October, 2007, he remanded the matter to the respondent No.4. In between the period from the date of passing order dated 22nd February, 2007 and that of impugned order dated 16th October, 2007, the fresh power was delegated to the respondent No.4 describing him as appointing / punishing authority. Thereafter, the respondent No.4 passed order of dismissal. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of remand passed by the respondent no.4 is without jurisdiction as the punishment order does not relate to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank which are the pre-conditions to exercise such power. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on un­reported decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court rendered in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 1140 of 2009, (Rajeev Agarwal Vs. Uttarakhand Transport Corporation Ltd. and other). The ratio laid down in the said judgment appears to be very clear upon interpretation of Regulation 69 A. However, it is not clear whether factual aspect is identical with this matter or not. This judgment may not be relevant absolutely to this case and should be discussed little later. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents drawing my attention to paragraph 2 in the counter affidavit submits that regular Assistant General Manager is the competent authority to issue charesheet as well as to impose punishment. The first order of punishment was not issued by the regular Assistant General Manager but Assistant General Manager in Charge. Therefore, the respondent No. 2, Managing Director being the revisional authority having noticed this illegality in passing order of punishment, su moto remanded the matter to the competent authority for taking fresh decision after recalling earlier order of punishment. 7. Thereafter, the Divisional authority the respondent No. 4 who was empowered to become the punishing authority in the case of the petitioner after appreciating all evidence and facts, passed order of dismissal. 8. 7. Thereafter, the Divisional authority the respondent No. 4 who was empowered to become the punishing authority in the case of the petitioner after appreciating all evidence and facts, passed order of dismissal. 8. In view of the aforesaid narration of fact in the pleadings and contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears to me that the following issues are involved in this case. 1. Whether the Assistant General Manager in Charge is competent to impose order of punishment dated 22nd February, 2007 or not. 2. If so, whether the revising authority has any jurisdiction to call for the records under Regulation 69 A or not. 3. Whether the power of delegation conferred upon the respondents No. 4 at the intervening period is lawful valid for this purpose by taking decision in this matter. 9. When I notice, the first order dated 22nd February, 2007, I do not find the order was passed by Assistant General Manager in Charge. It appears from the said order that it was passed by the Regular Assistant General Manager. Therefore, plea taken in the order of remand of the respondent No. 2, apart from his own statement in his own order, there is no corroboration by any record that it was passed by the Assistant General Manager in Charge not by regular Assistant General Manager. In my view, in absence of supporting document mere statement should not be accepted to hold first order of punishment in 2007 was not passed by the regular Assistant General Manager. 10. In any view of the matter, Assistant General Manager in Charge cannot be said an incompetent person to pass order of punishment. There is no dispute that regular Assistant General Manager is competent to impose punishment as it could be found from the Regulation 9 being the definition. Clause (vi) defines the competent authority which reads as follows: “”Competent Authority” means the Board or an authority who is competent to exercise any or all of the powers under these regulations or on whom powers in respect of any or all the powers have been delegated by the Board;” 11. This language mentioned in the said definition is clear that Assistant General Manager in Charge is having all powers of regular Assistant General Manager. In this case nothing has been shown that the Assistant General Manager in Charge having restricted power. This language mentioned in the said definition is clear that Assistant General Manager in Charge is having all powers of regular Assistant General Manager. In this case nothing has been shown that the Assistant General Manager in Charge having restricted power. In absence of clearly legal provision, I think presumption is that Assistant General Manager in Charge is having power to discharge all functions of regular Assistant General Manager. 12. Therefore, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that Assistant General Manager in Charge was not competent to pass earlier order of punishment. 13. I am of the opinion that exercise of power by the respondent No.2 calling for records as mentioned in Regulation 69 A is without jurisdiction as this could be done only in case of order of punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and anything short of the same does not authorize to exercise such power. I therefore, set out Regulation 69 A : “69. A. Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations the Chairman or in his absence the Managing Director of Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport may, on its own motion, or otherwise, call for the record of any case relating to dismissal, removal and reduction in rank decided by any of the authorities subordinate to him in exercise of powers conferred by these Regulations and - (a) confirm, modify or reverse the order passed by such authority or (b) direct that a further enquiry be held in the case, or (c) reduce or enhance the penalty imposed by such order, or (d) made such other order in the case as it may deem fit. Provided that if enhancement in the penalty imposed where by any such other order, the employee concerned, shall be given opportunity of showing cause against the proposed enhancement. Provided that if enhancement in the penalty imposed whereby any power on its own motion, or otherwise, shall not call for the record beyond the period of three months from the date of order in appeal.” 14. On careful perusal of the same, according to me, this power can be exercised su moto otherwise only when the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in ranks is required to be reviewed. Otherwise not. Undoubtedly he has plenary power to pass any order as he may deem fit. On careful perusal of the same, according to me, this power can be exercised su moto otherwise only when the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in ranks is required to be reviewed. Otherwise not. Undoubtedly he has plenary power to pass any order as he may deem fit. Therefore, order of remand can be passed and this cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. But the pre condition is that the said order must relate to the dismissal, removal and reduction in rank, the same was sine quo non. 15. It appears that the learned Single Judge in the case referred to above has concluded the same legal position as I have done it. 16. Therefore, the order of revising authority, impugned before me, is null and void. Obviously, the order of dismissal passed by the respondent No.4 on the strength of the aforesaid order of remand is also without jurisdiction and this defect of jurisdiction can not be cured by the subsequent order of delegation. It is not disputed that Assistant General Manager was the competent person. There was no warrant to depute fresh punishing authority only for this case. According to me, if the Assistant General Manager in Charge was not competent, the matter ought to have been sent to the regular Assistant General Manager and should not have been delegated to any superior officer. 17. Therefore, the writ petition succeeds. Both the orders are set aside. However, it is clarified that first order of punishment has been accepted and the same is hereby accepted by the court to be a valid one. 18. There will be no order as to costs.