JUDGMENT By this writ-petition, the petitioner has challenged the Charge Sheet dated 1st January, 1988 and has also sought for cancellation of the de novo enquiry initiated in May, 1995 on the ground that it is barred by limitation. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed in 1982 as an Assistant Engineer in the licensing company on probationary basis. As a better offer was received by him from M/s Crompton Greaves Limited, he voluntarily left the services of the licensing company and in fact the licensing company released him which enabled him to take up job with Crompton Greaves Limited. In 1983 after about a year he left Crompton Greaves Limited and sought appointment afresh with the licensing company. Such appointment was granted on terms and conditions setout in the letter of appointment wherein it has been categorically stated that the appointment was a fresh appointment. While in service, after about 5 years in 1988, a Charge Sheet was issued wherein certain charges were disclosed and the petitioner was called upon to answer to such charges. A reply was also given and in 1995 a de novo enquiry was sought to be initiated. The said was challenged on the ground of delay and when the Enquiry Officer expressed his intent to continue with the enquiry de novo, this writ-petition was filed and orders sought. The de novo enquiry in 1995 was after a period of 12 years and on the ground of delay alone as held in AIR 1990 SC 1308 disciplinary proceedings be quashed. Reliance has also been placed on 1999 (3) SCC 666 for the proposition that once an employee has retired from service, no departmental proceedings can be continued against him as the said is treated as having lapsed. Therefore, as the petitioner had left the services of the company which was accepted by the licensing company and his rejoining was a fresh appointment, therefore, the disciplinary proceedings initiated is without jurisdiction and be set aside. 3. Counsel for the licensing company submits that in the writ-petition the petitioner has admitted that he had left the services of the licensing company and therefore a lien does not come to an end but is to continue on his rejoin in October, 1984. 3. Counsel for the licensing company submits that in the writ-petition the petitioner has admitted that he had left the services of the licensing company and therefore a lien does not come to an end but is to continue on his rejoin in October, 1984. The terms and conditions on which the petitioner rejoined in 1984 stated that for seniority purposes he would be treated as a new entrant and his past services would not be protected. Rule 16(11) of the Licensing Company’s Regulations as amended in 1986 defines an employee to mean a person in the service of the Board. The petitioner was admittedly an employee of the licensing company and therefore the licensing company was entitled to issue a Charge Sheet in relation to his past services. Non-treatment of seniority was by way of punishment. De novo enquiry was directed by the new incumbent as the records were misplaced due to shifting of office. It was in 1995 that an objection was raised which objection is nothing but an after thought as the petitioner had participated in the proceedings initiated in 1988. Having participated and examined witnesses the petitioner has acquiesced in the proceedings and waived his right to object. The decisions relied on by the petitioner will not apply to the facts of the case as in 1999 (3) SCC 666 there was no specific provision in the subject regulations for deducting sum. Similarly in AIR 1990 S.C. 1308 the petitioner challenged the authority to initiate departmental enquiry before participating therein. Such is not the case here. In fact, in the decision reported in 1995 (2) SCC 570 application of the balancing process has been advocated and directions were given for expeditious disposal of the enquiry with consequential directions. Therefore, similar directions be also given in the instant case. 4. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the petitioner was initially appointed with the licensing company in 1982. In 1983 when better prospects beckoned, he left the services of the licensing company. On the basis of the petitioner’s request he was released from service and it is only thereafter that he could join his new posting. One is not aware of the reasons, which led the petitioner to return to serve the licensing company, but nonetheless he did return and he was welcomed by the licensing company. On the basis of the petitioner’s request he was released from service and it is only thereafter that he could join his new posting. One is not aware of the reasons, which led the petitioner to return to serve the licensing company, but nonetheless he did return and he was welcomed by the licensing company. In fact, the return was pursuant to an application filed in April, 1984. The said application was considered and thereafter the letter of appointment was issued in October, 1984. This letter of appointment is of some importance as it has categorically been stated therein that the petitioner was being given a fresh appointment. The word, ‘fresh appointment’ denotes ‘new appointment’ which is not in continuation of any past service. In fact, the licensing company granted ‘fresh appointment’ to the petitioner on a temporary basis for a period of one year and it was categorically mentioned in para 1 that he may be treated as a new entrant and that seniority of his past services would not be protected. What else would be needed in proof of the petitioner being engaged afresh. The petitioner was also to execute a stamped agreement in the prescribed form stating therein that he was agreeable to serve the Board for a minimum of 5 years. Therefore, it was a new contract, which was being executed between him and the licensing company. In para 5 of the letter of appointment it has been categorically stated that the petitioner was being appointed ‘afresh’. Therefore, it goes without saying that the appointment of the petitioner was in no way connected to his past service, and was in terms, and spirit a new appointment. In fact, when the petitioner in 1993 left the services of the licensing company, the jural relationship between him and his employer came to an end. Therefore, the initiation of departmental proceedings in 1988 for certain acts of alleged misconduct in 1982-83 is unjustified from the inception. It is true that he participated but when the licensing company lacked jurisdiction to proceed against him, the said proceedings was non est right from the start. A pertinent question arises in the facts of this case. What if the petitioner had not sought for fresh appointment with the licensing company. In that circumstances, would the licensing company have been able to proceed against him, the answer would be ‘No’. A pertinent question arises in the facts of this case. What if the petitioner had not sought for fresh appointment with the licensing company. In that circumstances, would the licensing company have been able to proceed against him, the answer would be ‘No’. It is by some unexplained circumstance that the petitioner sought for fresh appointment, but that will not permit the licensing company to visit him with his misdeeds of the past. Although counsel for the licensing company has sought to submit that under Rule 16(11) of the 1986 Rules the petitioner is an employee and therefore proceedings could have been initiated against him. It is true that the petitioner was an employee of the licensing company for the period 1982-83 and thereafter 1984 onwards. But one cannot close one’s eye to the fact that there was a break-in-service and that snapped the jural relationship between the employer and the employee and the employer cannot take advantage of the re-engagement of the petitioner without considering the break-in-service. It is true that a de novo enquiry was initiated in 1995 and it is at that time that the objection with regard to jurisdiction was raised but the question with regard to inherent lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and though belated, was rightly raised. 5. Accordingly, the principles of acquiescence and waiver cannot come to the aid of the licensing company and for all the said reasons, the Charge Sheet dated 1-1-1988 and the de novo enquiry of 1995 are quashed and set aside. 6. In view of the reasonings above the decisions reported in 1995 (2) SCC 570 has no application. Therefore, this writ-petition succeeds. 7. W.P. 8557 (W) of 2001 was filed for extension of benefits under the Career Advancement Scheme. The representations made are of 2000 and addressed to the Secretary of the Licensing Company. In view of the 2003 Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, it is quite possible that the Secretary is no longer the authority to consider such issues. 8. 7. W.P. 8557 (W) of 2001 was filed for extension of benefits under the Career Advancement Scheme. The representations made are of 2000 and addressed to the Secretary of the Licensing Company. In view of the 2003 Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, it is quite possible that the Secretary is no longer the authority to consider such issues. 8. In view of the judgment delivered in C.O. 20585 (W) of 1995 the petitioner is directed to file a representation with the appropriate authority, namely, the Director, H.R., West Bengal State Electricity Company Limited (W.B.S.E.D.C.L.) within one week from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order passed this day and on receipt, the same will be considered in accordance with law within four weeks thereafter after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and by passing a reasoned order. In case, the Director, H.R. of W.B.S.E.D.C.L. is inclined to reject the petitioner’s application, reasons in that event be communicated to the petitioner within a week thereafter. 9. With the aforesaid direction, this application is disposed of. Urgent certified photocopy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.