ORAL JUDGMENT (Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH) This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court arises out of an order dated 21.1.2008 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 5939 of 2006, whereby the learned Single Judge has not interfered with the order of learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue dated 31.1.2006 in Revision Case No. 170 of 2004. By the said order dated 31.1.2006 passed in Revision Case No. 170 of 2004, the learned Additional Member Board of Revenue had rejected the pre-emption claim of the appellant on the ground that the purchaser was a landless person and accordingly set aside the original order of the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Daudnagar (Aurangabad) (hereinafter referred to as the DCLR) and the Appellate order of the Additional Collector, Aurangabad, whereby the pre-emption claim of the appellant was sustained. 2. The appellant pre-emptor, was the writ petitioner. Respondent no.5, the vendee and respondent no.6 the vendor in respect to the land in question, were arrayed as Respondents no. 5 and 6 respectively in writ proceeding i.e., C.W.J.C. No. 5939 of 2006. 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the respondent no.6 transferred the plot in question admeasuring 0.9 3/8 decimals of land described in Khata no.3, plot No. 239 in favour of respondent no.5 by sale deed no. 3393 dated 19.6.2000. The sale deed was registered on 19.6.2000 itself. The land is situated in Village Surkhi, P.S. Obra, District Aurangabad. 4. On 16.9.2000 the appellant filed an application before the DCLR claiming preferential right of pre-emption under Section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Ceiling Act, 1961 claiming herself to be an adjoining raiyat, holding land adjacent to the transferred land; by depositing challan of Rs. 16,500/- as the consideration money was of Rs. 15,000/-. She claimed to be an adjoining raiyat on the ground that she had purchased 0.9 3/8 acres of land by a registered sale deed dated 13.5.2000 executed by one Shambhu Mian in her favour. By virtue of the fact that she held the land, which was adjacent to plot in question, she claimed that she was adjoining raiyat of the vended land because she was purchaser for the same plot. By virtue of the fact that she held the land, which was adjacent to plot in question, she claimed that she was adjoining raiyat of the vended land because she was purchaser for the same plot. The learned DCLR vide his order dated 28.1.2003 (Annexure-1 to the writ application) allowed the pre-emption application of the appellant with a direction to the vendee Respondent No. 5 to convey the land in favour of the appellant by executing and registering a document for transfer within a period of one month, else the same would be done through process of the Court. 5. The Respondent no.5 preferred statutory appeal against the order of the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Daudnagar, before the Additional Collector, Aurangabad. The appeal however, was dismissed vide an order dated 3.6.2004 (Annexure-3 to the writ application). The Respondent No.5 thereafter preferred revision application in the Board of Revenue, Bihar which was registered as Case No. 170 of 2004. The Revision Case No. 170 of 2004 was finally allowed by the learned Additional Member Board of Revenue vide his order dated 31.1.2006 primarily on the ground that the purchaser was a landless person, and as such pre-emption application under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Ceiling Act, 1961 would not be maintainable in his case. 6. On perusal of the records, it transpires that Respondent no.5 herein, had taken the plea of being a landless person at the very first instance before the DCLR. There is reference of this fact in the order dated 28.1.2003 of the Deputy Collector Land Reforms. There is however, no adjudication on this aspect by the DCLR. Even the Appellate authority while rejecting the appeal of Respondent no.5 did not consider this aspect and rejected the appeal preferred by Respondent no.5. 7. The second important thing which has been noticed from the record of CWJC No. 5939 of 2006 as well as Letters Patent Appeal that appellant claimed to be an adjoining raiyat on the sole ground that she was the purchaser of 0.9 3/8 acres of land in plot No. 239 (same plot) by registered sale deed No. 1852 dated 13.5.2000. The registered sale deed dated 13.5.2000 however, has not been brought on record to substantiate that she acquired a right to hold the adjacent land for the purpose of cultivating. The registered sale deed dated 13.5.2000 however, has not been brought on record to substantiate that she acquired a right to hold the adjacent land for the purpose of cultivating. There is no averment in the writ application that she had purchased the said land on 13.5.2000 from Shambhu Mian for the purpose of cultivating it. The question of being an adjoining raiyat will arise only if the person can be said to be a raiyat within the meaning of Section 2(k) of Bihar Land Ceiling Act, 1961. As per the said definition ‘raiyat’ means primarily a person who has acquired a right to hold the land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself, or by members of the family or by hired servant and includes also the successor in interest or persons who have acquired such right. 8. The appellant challenged the order of the Additional Member Board of Revenue dated 31.1.2006 by filing CWJC No. 5939 of 2006. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ application mainly on the ground that the writ petitioner no-where specifically stated that finding of the Additional Member Board of Revenue that respondent no.5 was a landless person suffered from an error of record. In view of the said finding of fact the learned Single Judge relying on a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1997 (2) PLJR 287(Nathuni Singh Yadav & another Vs. State of Bihar and others), laying down a law to the effect that the claim of pre-emption will not apply against a landless person, dismissed the writ application. Hence the present appeal. 9. Appearing on behalf of the appellant learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raghib Ashan, assailing the order of the learned Single Judge, submitted that it was contrary to the statutory provisions to say that no pre-emption application could be maintained under Section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Ceiling Act, 1961, if the vendee was a landless person. He has disputed the correctness of the Division bench judgment of this Court in case of Nathuni Singh Yadav vs. State of Bihar and others (supra) and contended that there being no such bar in the Act itself, the appellant was entitled to claim the right of pre-emption. He has disputed the correctness of the Division bench judgment of this Court in case of Nathuni Singh Yadav vs. State of Bihar and others (supra) and contended that there being no such bar in the Act itself, the appellant was entitled to claim the right of pre-emption. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Sheoji Mahto and others vs. The Additional Member Board of Revenue and others, reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 46 (S.C.) to contend that while considering the pre-emption application under Section 16(3) of the Act only three things were required to be looked into, namely, (i) Whether the application was filed in the manner prescribed, (ii) Whether the land in question was agricultural land (iii) Whether the pre-emptor is adjoining raiyat or a co-sharer. He also submitted that the land in question is an agricultural land and not homestead as claimed by respondent no.5 on the strength of recitals in the registered sale-deed. In order to support his contention Mr. Raghiv Ahsan, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2010) 6 SCC 441 . He has further submitted that on his own showing of respondent no.5, his family owned some land and he cannot be described to be a landless person so as to apply the Division Bench judgment in case of Nathuni Singh Yadav vs. State of Bihar (supra), in this case. 10. It seems that when the present LPA was taken up on the question of admission by this Court a plea was taken on behalf of the appellant that in none of the Revenue Laws applicable in the State of Bihar, “landless person” is defined and it was on this question that the present appeal was admitted. 11. Mr. Hemendra Kumar Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent no.5 submits that the plea that respondent no.5 was a landless person was raised at the very first instance which was wrongly left out of consideration by the learned DCLR and the learned Additional Collector. He further contended that Additional Member Board of Revenue rightly placed reliance on a judgment of this Court rendered in Bharat Prasad and another vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in 2005 (2) PLJR 24 . He further contended that Additional Member Board of Revenue rightly placed reliance on a judgment of this Court rendered in Bharat Prasad and another vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in 2005 (2) PLJR 24 . This Court, referring to Clause IV of sub- section 1 of Section 27 of the Act in case of Bharat Prasad (supra) held that a person possessing less than one acre of land, may be treated to be a landless person and pre-emption application against him will not be maintainable. 12. On the basis of the facts mentioned and the rival contentions noted above, three main issues cropped up for consideration in the present appeal. Firstly, whether the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court reported in 1997(2) PLJR 287 requires reconsideration, wherein this Court refused to exercise writ/Letters Patent jurisdiction in favour of the pre-emptor on the following reasoning:- “If a landless purchaser is not allowed the protection it may mean, taking the matter to its logical conclusion, that he cannot acquire any land, for in the event any claim is made by a co-sharer or adjacent Raiyat of the land transferred, he cannot resist the claim as in terms of the provisions, only such persons who are either co-sharers or adjacent Raiyats can resist the claim. This would put him to an unjust and inequitable position.” Secondly, who are the persons who can be described as ‘landless’ to apply the case of Nathuni Singh Yadav (supra) in a pre-emption proceeding? Thirdly, whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, respondent no.5 can be considered to be landless or deserves protection to resist a claim of pre-emption? 13. I am of considered view that the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in case of Nathuni Singh Yadav (supra) needs no reconsideration because any interpretation contrary to what has been laid down in case of Nathuni Singh Yadav (supra) will defeat the very object of enactment of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. 14. In order to deal with the second issue, the Scheme of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land At, 1961 in the background of the purpose of such enactment needs to be looked into. 15. 14. In order to deal with the second issue, the Scheme of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land At, 1961 in the background of the purpose of such enactment needs to be looked into. 15. From the scheme of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, it will appear that the basic objectives to be achieved by this enactment are:- (a) Fixation of Ceiling Area of land on the appointed date declaring it to be unlawful for any family to hold land in excess of the Ceiling Area. (b) Acquisition by the State Government of the land declared to be surplus i.e. beyond the ceiling area so fixed. (c) Restriction on future acquisition of land, exceeding land held by a person, exceeding in the aggregated the Ceiling area and (d) Disposal of surplus land. 16. Chapter II of the Act deals with Ceiling of land. Chapter IV provides for acquisition of surplus land. Chapter V provides for restriction on future acquisition of the land beyond Ceiling area and Chapter IX deals with the disposal of the surplus land. Other provisions are either ancillary or incidental to these provisions to achieve the object of the Act. 17. The purpose of the enactment of the Act is to minimize inequality in terms of land holding by fixing ceiling area and disposing/ distributing the surplus land among class of people specified in Chapter IX of the Act. Section 27 of the Act reads as follows:- “27. Disposal of surplus land.-(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, (fifty (5) percent of the land) acquired or deemed to be acquired by the State Government under this Act may, subject to rules made in this behalf be settled by the Collector- (i) with landless persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes mentioned in Government of Bihar Revenue Department notification No. A/T-1015/55-1091-R, dated the 7th February, 1956 and no. A/T-3043/61-4523-R, dated the 23rd June, 1962 published in Bihar Gazette, dated the 22nd February, 1956 and 18th July 1962, respectively, of the village in which the land is situated? A/T-3043/61-4523-R, dated the 23rd June, 1962 published in Bihar Gazette, dated the 22nd February, 1956 and 18th July 1962, respectively, of the village in which the land is situated? (ii) with persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes mentioned in the notification referred to in Clause (1), of the village in which the land is situated and not having more than one acre of class III land or its equivalent in area; (iii) With other landless persons of the village in which the land is situate; (iv) With other persons of the village in which the land is situated having not more than one acre of class I land or equivalent area; (v) With persons serving in the Army, Navy or Air Force of the Union of India, or with families of such persons killed in action. (vi) With ex-servicemen of Army, Navy or Air Force of the Union of India, who are resident of the village in which the land is situated: Provided that if, the village in which the land is situated is uninhabited, the land shall be settled with the aforesaid categories of persons of an adjoining village: Provided further that in the district of Santhal Parganas the Collector shall, while making such settlement, follow the principles prescribed for settlement of waste land or vacant land under Section 28 of the Santhal Pargrans Tenancy (Supplementary) (Provisions) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act XIV of 1949): Provided also that the land acquired or deemed to be acquired from sugar factories, to which the provisions of Sub Clause (i) of Clause (a) of sub-Section (2) of Section 29 are applicable may be managed by the State Government directly or in such other manner as may be prescribed ;) (vii) The residue of such land as is left out after settlement with the categories of persons mentioned in clauses (i) to (vi) with persons categories of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes among the repatriates of Bihar origin from Burma.) (1a). The remaining fifty(50) percent of the land acquired or deemed to be acquired by the State Government under this Act shall, subject to Rules made under this behalf, be settled by the Collector with Women belonging to categories mentioned in sub clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) of sub section (1) of Section 27) (2) All arrears of rent in respect of the land so vested and due by the land-holder for any period prior to the date on which the land-holders is, in consequence of such vesting divested of his possession by an order of the Collector under this Act, shall continue to be recoverable from such landholder and may without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be realized by deducting the amount from the compensation payable under this Act to such land-holder. (3) The land settled by the Collector under sub-section(1) shall be heritable but shall not be transferable: Provided that the settlee may enter into a simple mortgage in respect of the land with a society or bank registered or deemed to be registered under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 (B & O Act VI of 1935) or with the State Bank of India or a bank specified in Column 2 of the First Schedule to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (Act 5 of 1970) or with a Company or a Corporation owned by or in which not less than fifty-one percent of share capital is held by the State Government or the Central Government or partly by the State Government and partly by the Central Government, for raising loan for agricultural purposes).” 18. This is to be noted that the words and the figure “fifty(50) percent of land” as falling in sub-section 1 of section 27 of the Act have been substituted in place of “ all land” by an amendment vide Act 11 of 2009. By the same amending Act 1 of 2009 sub-section 1(a) has been inserted which provides for settlement of remaining 50 percent of surplus land so acquired by the State Government with women belonging to categories (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-section 1 of Section 27. 19. By the same amending Act 1 of 2009 sub-section 1(a) has been inserted which provides for settlement of remaining 50 percent of surplus land so acquired by the State Government with women belonging to categories (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-section 1 of Section 27. 19. The Scheme of the Act, therefore is such, for the purpose of settlement of surplus land acquired by the State Government, as to carve out a class of persons who fall within the categories (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-section 1 of Section 27. The legislative intent to carve out such category of persons is re-inforced by the amendment brought in 2009 in Section 27 by Act 11 of 2009 which provides for distribution of remaining 50 percent surplus land among women belonging to categories (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-section 1 of Section 27 leaving other categories falling in (v), (vi) and (vii). Persons falling in these four categories are, in fact object of this socio-economic legislation whom the legislature has considered to be deprived in terms of land holding making then entitled for settlement of land in their favour out of land declared surplus and acquired by the State Government. 20. In the background of these statutory provision the question which requires consideration is as to whether persons eligible for settlement of surplus land, as part of the scheme of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 on the basis of having no land or very small holding need protection to resist claim of pre-emption under Section 16 (3) of the Act. In my opinion, the provisions as contained in section 16(3) of the Act has to be read as a part of the whole Scheme of the Act and it cannot be read in isolation of other provisions in the Act. 21. It is well established principles of statutory interpretation that the provisions of the Act should be construed in order to remedying the mischief and not in a manner which frustrates the very purpose of it. 21. It is well established principles of statutory interpretation that the provisions of the Act should be construed in order to remedying the mischief and not in a manner which frustrates the very purpose of it. If interpretation of Section 16(3) of the Act is given such an interpretation as to pre-empt landless person or a person with very small holding from purchasing a land as he cannot resist the claim of pre-emption by an adjacent raiyat, it will create anomaly and absurdity and the whole purpose of the Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 shall stand frustrated. 22. The purposive construction of a Statute is an established rule of statutory interpretation and this doctrine has elaborately been dealt by the Apex Court in case of U.Co. Bank Vs. Rajinder Lal Capoor reported in (2008) 5 SCC 257 , paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 of which read thus:- “26. It is now a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the Court must give effect to the purport and object of the Act. Rule of purposive construction should, subject of course to the applicability of the other principles of interpretation, be made applicable in a case of this nature. 27. In new India Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Nusli Neville Wadia 7 this Court held (SCC pp.296-97, paras 51-54) “51(50)……. With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that literal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the Court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/author. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled, which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfill its constitutional obligations as held by the Court inter alia in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. 52(51). Barak in his exhaustive work on ‘Purposive Construction’ explains various meanings attributed to the term ‘purpose’. It would be in the fitness of discussion to refer to Purposive Construction in Barak’s words: “Hart and Sachs also appear to treat ‘purpose’ as a subjective concept. Barak in his exhaustive work on ‘Purposive Construction’ explains various meanings attributed to the term ‘purpose’. It would be in the fitness of discussion to refer to Purposive Construction in Barak’s words: “Hart and Sachs also appear to treat ‘purpose’ as a subjective concept. I say „appear? because, although Hart and Sachs claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in the legislator’s shoes, they introduce two elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the non-rebuttable presumption that members of the legislative body sought to fulfil their constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted reasonable.” (Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, (2007) at p. 87.) 53(52). In Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Maddula Ratnavalli 9 this Court held : (SCC p.90, para 22) “22. Parliament moreover is presumed to have enacted a reasonable statute (see Breyer, Stephen (2005): Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, Knopf (Chapter on Statutory Interpretation, p.99 for “Reasonable Legislator Presumption”). 54(53). The provisions of the Act and the Rules in this case, are, thus required to be construed in the light of the action of the State as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. With a view to give effect thereto, the doctrine of purpose construction may have to be taken recourse to. (See Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Brij Mohan 10.)” 28. All the regulations must be given a harmonious interpretation. A Court of law should not presume a casus omissus but if there is any, it shall not supply the same. If two or more provisions of a statute appear to carry different meanings, a construction which would given effect to all of them should be preferred. (See Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. V. Essar Power Ltd.).” 23. In my opinion, it will create an anomalous situation if Section 16 (3) of the Act is not read with Section 27 of the Act so as to protect certain class of persons from the preferential right of the adjoining raiyats under Section 16 (3) of the Act. (See Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. V. Essar Power Ltd.).” 23. In my opinion, it will create an anomalous situation if Section 16 (3) of the Act is not read with Section 27 of the Act so as to protect certain class of persons from the preferential right of the adjoining raiyats under Section 16 (3) of the Act. In order to effectuate the primary object of the Act, in my opinion, persons having no land or having land below the area as prescribed under Section 27 of the Act should have the protection from such preferential right of pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Act. I am of the considered view that in order to achieve the primary object and the purpose of the Act, the persons who come within the purview of Clause (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (1a) of Section 27 of the Act deserve such protection and the word “landless” does not need any précise definition. 24. In the present case land possession certificate issued by the Circle Officer has been brought on record as Annexure-1 to this appeal in order to contend that respondent no.5 is in fact not landless. This document appears to have been relied upon by the Respondent no.5 before the learned Additional Member Board of Revenue in order to contend that he did not have land other than the land admeasuring .9 3/8 decimals. If the said land possession certificate is to be taken into account, the family of respondent no.5 possessed land, admeasuring . 9 ¾ (.6 decimals + 3/4 decimals) on the date when he purchased the land in question. 25. It is to be kept in mind that one acre is equal to 100 decimals and if Annexure-1 is to be taken into account, the family of respondent no.5 possessed .9 ¾ decimals which is one-tenth of an acre. 26. No document was brought on record to substantiate that respondent no.5 possessed any land individually. The learned Additional Member Board of Revenue came to a conclusion after examining the said land possession certificate that respondent no.5 was a landless person. The appellant did not challenge this question of fact before the learned Additional Member Board of Revenue. 27. 26. No document was brought on record to substantiate that respondent no.5 possessed any land individually. The learned Additional Member Board of Revenue came to a conclusion after examining the said land possession certificate that respondent no.5 was a landless person. The appellant did not challenge this question of fact before the learned Additional Member Board of Revenue. 27. Respondent no.5 in paragraph 3 to the counter affidavit in writ proceeding made following specific averment to the following effect which was not controverted by the appellant:- “That the Respondent no. 5 is the very poor person and got Red Card holder and their five son namely (1) Surajmal Paswan (2) Binod Paswan (3) Manoj Paswan (4) Rohit Paswan and (5) Nitu Paswan are dealing in the same plot belongs to the father of the petitioner. During the separation of the property the land come in the share of the father of the petitioner i.e. Baijnath Paswan and his two brothers Bhawsagar Paswan and Baran Paswan. Except, that the Respondent No.5 family had no other lands and Respondent no.5 having big family.” 28. There is another aspect of the matter. The appellant herself is said to have purchased the land admeasuring .9 3/8 acres on 13.5.2000 in plot No. 239 which is adjacent to the land transferred. The writ petition lacks pleading to the effect that he had purchased the said land for the purpose of cultivating. In the absence of such averments or the sale-deed dated 13.5.2000 she cannot be treated to be raiyat within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. 29. I have not gone into the question relating to dispute over the nature of the land as I am of the view that respondent no.5 being a landless person in the light of discussion hereinabove, deserves protection in order to resist preferential claim of pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Act. The view taken by this Court in the case of Bharat Prasad & another Vs. The State of Bihar & others (supra) is the correct view which has been relied upon by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 30. In view of the above, I find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without costs.