Judgment V.K. Ahuja, J. This is a regular second appeal filed by the appellants under section 100 C.P.C. against the judgment and decree, dated 22.2.2001, passed by the learned District Judge, Kullu, vide which he affirmed the judgment and decree, dated 31.5.2000, passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Lahaul & Spiti at Kullu, dismissing the suit of the appellants for permanent prohibitory injunction. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellants, hereinafter also referred to as the plaintiffs, filed a suit for permanent injunction as against the respondents, hereinafter also referred to as the defendants. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that the land measuring 15-1-0 bigha, as detailed in the plaint, was owned and possessed by Shri Sahib Ram, Hari Singh and Indru, predecessor-in-interest of the defendants. The aforesaid land was sold by these persons in favour of Shri Jai Ram, deceased, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, for a sale consideration of Rs.3000/-. It was alleged that a sale deed was executed on 21.4.1966 and possession was also handed over by the vendors to vendee Shri Jai Ram. A mutation was also sanctioned and attested in favour of Jai Ram vide mutation No.1106 and 1133 dated 17.11.1966. The suit land was sold by Jai Ram in favour of plaintiffs No.2 to 4 and Smt.Bindro Wati. Smt. Bindro Wati had expired and her share has been inherited by plaintiff ownership and possession and plaintiffs’ father was shown in possession of less area of land. Hence, the aforesaid entries in the revenue record are illegal. It was alleged that defendants were forcibly trying to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit land, hence the suit filed by the plaintiffs. 3. Defendants pleaded that Jai Ram, deceased, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, was a forest lessee and a clever person, whereas the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants were illiterate and simpleton rustic person. It was submitted that on the basis of the forged and fictitious sale deed, Jai Ram visited the suit land and tried to take possession of the suit land since no sale deed was executed in favour of Jai Ram. It was also pleaded that Jai Ram had purchased only one bigha of land out of the suit land and there was no sale deed in respect of entire suit land. It was also pleaded that Jai Ram had purchased only one bigha of land out of the suit land and there was no sale deed in respect of entire suit land. Defendants also claimed to have become owners by way of adverse possession since 21.4.1966 when the sale deed was executed. They also pleaded that the mutations attested on the basis of the sale deeds are illegal and no two mutations can be attested in regard to the sale deed and as such the sale deed was not binding upon the plaintiffs. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court: No.1. It was alleged that the defendants and their predecessor-in-i nterest, in connivance with revenue officials, got changed the entries in the column of “i. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for? OPP ii. Whether the suit is not maintainable as alleged? OPD iii. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction as alleged? OPD iv. Relief.” 5. Parties led their evidence and the learned trial Court vide its impugned judgment, decided issues No.1 and 2 as against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants and consequently dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the learned District Judge vide his impugned judgment upheld the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs have filed the present second appeal. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 7. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants were that the suit was filled for injunction and once it has been proved that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land, they were entitled to the relief of injunction or in the alternative for possession. It was also submitted that the defendants never challenged the sale deed executed about more than 30 years ago and they never pleaded that no sale consideration has passed or that the sale deed was invalid, but both the courts below have wrongly held that the sale deed was not valid one and no consideration has passed which findings are contrary to the pleadings of the defendants. 8. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents had supported the impugned judgments for the reasons given therein supplementing them by the submissions that the suit was not maintainable since the defendants were in possession and as such there is no merit in the appeal, which is liable to the dismissed. 9. During the course of arguments, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that in grounds of appeal before the learned District Judge, no such plea was raised against the findings recorded that no sale consideration has passed or that the sale was not valid and this plea cannot be taken for the first time before this Court since no substantial question of law was framed in that regard. 10. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the decision rendered in Bachhaj Nahar versus Nilima Mandal,AIR 2009, Supreme Court 1103, in which the following observations were made: “In the appeal filed against dismissal of suit for declaration of title and injunction wherein no plea as to availability of easementary rights was raised, the high Court could not while rejecting the plea of the plaintiffs that they were owners of the suit property, grant the relief of injunction in regard to an easementary right by assuming that they had an easementary right to use the schedule property as a passage. The grant of such relief by converting a suit for title into a suit for enforcement of easementary rights is violative of fundamental rule that a Court cannot make out a case not pleaded. The Court should confine its decision to the question raised in pleadings. Nor can it grant a relief which is not claimed and which does not flow from the facts and the cause of action alleged in the plaint.” 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellants had submitted that substantial questions of law were framed and as such the findings of the learned courts below can be set aside under those substantial questions of law. 12. Present appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law: “1.Whether the Courts below have mis-interpreted and mis-appreciated documentary evidence on record? 2. Whether the lower appellate Court was right in drawing adverse inference against the appellants for non-production of the persons who were dead at the relevant time?” 13. 12. Present appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law: “1.Whether the Courts below have mis-interpreted and mis-appreciated documentary evidence on record? 2. Whether the lower appellate Court was right in drawing adverse inference against the appellants for non-production of the persons who were dead at the relevant time?” 13. On appraisal of the record of the case, it is very much clear that the defendants in their written statement never took up any such plea that no sale consideration has passed or that the sale deed in question was invalid for any such reason. They also did not file any suit for the last over 30 years for declaration that the sale deed in question was not valid and binding upon them, though the sale deed was executed on 17.11.1966. They have pleaded in their written statement that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, namely, Jai Ram tried to forcibly take the possession of the suit land under the sale deed, which clearly shows that they had the knowledge that a sale deed had been executed on which the said vendee Jai Ram was relying and they could have filed a suit, but they slept over the matter and did not take any such plea by filing a separate suit or by setting up a counter claim in the present suit. 14. Apart from the above, a perusal of the judgment passed by the learned trial court shows that it was observed as under: “………..Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the plaintiffs have taken the shelter behind these dead witnesses regarding the payment of the sale consideration and execution of the sale deed in favour of aforesaid Shri Jai Ram. Even if, the aforesaid witnesses were dead, the plaintiffs should have produced the copy of the account maintained by the aforesaid witnesses in respect of the sale consideration………………..” 15. When the appeal came up before the learned District Judge, in regard to payment of sale consideration etc., he observed as under: “Aforesaid evidence adduced by the plaintiffs reflects that at the time of execution, registration of the sale deed, no consideration was paid by the vendee to the vendors. Consideration was paid in advance through agent Roda Ram who has not been examined. Account was maintained by Bishan Dass, who again for reasons known to the plaintiffs stands withheld from the court. Consideration was paid in advance through agent Roda Ram who has not been examined. Account was maintained by Bishan Dass, who again for reasons known to the plaintiffs stands withheld from the court. These two were the most material witnesses to enfold the case of the plaintiffs. But without any cause withheld. Hence it can be presumed under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that had plaintiffs produced them, would not have supported their case, so withheld. In such circumstances, it can be assumed that no consideration as mentioned in the sale deed for the suit land was ever paid. In coming to such conclusion I am fortified from the circumstances that the vendors while getting sanctioned mutation No.1106 simply admitted selling a fraction of suit land and resultantly mutation was sanctioned qua such fraction and not the entire suit land.” 16. Thus, it is clear from the above discussion that both the courts below have proceeded on wrong assumption that they were required to give findings in regard to the sale consideration or the validity of the sale deed when there were no such pleadings of the defendants that the sale deed was not valid and binding upon them and no sale consideration was paid and both the courts proceeded to discuss the evidence in detail and at their own came to the conclusion wrongly when the plea had not been taken in the written statement and no issue had been framed in regard to the validity of the sale deed on non-payment of the sale consideration. Therefore, both the courts below proceeded on wrong assumption and gave findings on the point which was never challenged. 17. Coming to the plea that this plea was never taken by the plaintiffs challenging the conclusions drawn by the learned trial Court when the appeal was filed before the learned District Judge, It is clear that the plaintiffs were not challenging any observations made or conclusions drawn in regard to the sale deed for which there was no issue and they were only challenging the findings vide which the relief of injunction was not granted in their favour. Thus, in view of the fact that there were no specific issue or any findings under any of the issues holding that the sale deed was not valid which could not have been challenged by the plaintiffs in this manner, though the appeal was filed challenging the findings recorded by the learned District Judge. It was also pleaded in the grounds of appeal that no material issues were framed including the issue as under: “i) Whether the sale deed dated 21.4.1966 executed by Sahib Ram etc. in favour of Jai Ram is the result of fraud as alleged? OPD ii) Whether the defendants have become owners of the suit land by adverse possession as alleged? OPD” 18. Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiffs had challenged the findings of the learned trial Court and had specifically pleaded that these issues were not framed but still findings were given by both the courts below which is incorrect. 19. In the written statement filed by the defendants, they had pleaded that in case the sale deed is held to be valid, the defendants have become owners of the suit land by way of adverse possession since they did not deliver any possession of the suit land to the plaintiffs or their predecessor-in-interest. It was never pleaded as to how the possession is adverse as against the plaintiffs or from which day it has become adverse as against the true owners. It is required to be specifically pleaded as to since when the possession of the defendants became adverse as against the true owners. Once the possession was not taken by the plaintiffs as pleaded by them or they never delivered the possession to the plaintiffs, how the possession became adverse since it was a permissive possession and has never been converted into adverse possession as against the true owner. The plea of the adverse possession also leads to the inference that the defendants admitted that the ownership rights stood transferred to the plaintiffs and they held the possession as against the true owners which was adverse for over 12 years which plea was never specifically taken. 20. The plea of the adverse possession also leads to the inference that the defendants admitted that the ownership rights stood transferred to the plaintiffs and they held the possession as against the true owners which was adverse for over 12 years which plea was never specifically taken. 20. The learned Appelalte Court did not examine this question and held that when the vendees never came in possession, how the possession of the defendants became adverse as against the true owner and, therefore, the findings of both the courts below in this regard are not sustainable in the eye of law. A perusal of Ext.P-4, Jamabandi for the year 1963-64, shows that the land was entered in the ownership and possession of Sahib Ram etc. and there is a reference to the sale deed executed in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, namely, Jai Ram. In the jamabandi for the year 1969-70, Ext.P-5, in the column of possession, there is an entry that Sahib Ram vendor and Jai Ram vendee in possession. 21. Coming to the plea as to how the mutations were attested, it is for the revenue authorities to explain at the time of attestation of the second mutation as to why the second mutation was attested. It appears that one of the vendors was not present and this procedure was adopted by the Revenue Officer to enter two mutations but the mutation does not confer any title which had been proved by the plaintiffs by proving the sale deed in question and the revenue entries support them in this regard. 22. In view of the above discussion, it is very much clear that no issue was framed that the defendants have become owners by way of adverse possession or there are findings in that regard and the plaintiffs were proved to be in possession and, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief of injunction in their favour restraining the defendants from interfering in their possession over the suit land. Therefore, the findings recorded by both the courts below are liable to be set aside, which are set aside accordingly, and the suit of the plaintiffs for injunction stands decreed. 23. The appeal stands allowed accordingly. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.