ORDER This writ petition was filed by one Sheo Prasad (now deceased) on 19.10.2006 for the following reliefs:- (A) For quashing the office order no.452 contained in memo no.271 dated 11.02.2006 (Annexure-9) of the writ petition by which petitioner has been awarded 4 punishments in contemplation of departmental proceeding. (B) For giving a direction to pay all consequential benefits after quashing the impugned order. (C) Any other relief/reliefs which the Hon’ble Court deem fit and proper. 2. Against order dated 10.02.2006 passed by the Board, the original petitioner had filed an appeal on 18.05.2006 and the said appeal was rejected on 15.01.2007 by the Chairman of the Board much after filing of this writ petition on 19.10.2006. Hence the original petitioner filed I.A. No.5682 of 2008 for adding a further relief to the writ petition, which is as follows:- “(D) For quashing the order contained in memo no.90 dated 15.01.2007 (Annexure-12) by which the appeal petition contained in Annexure-11 of the writ petition, preferred by the petitioner against the order of punishment had been rejected.” 3. During the pendency of this writ petition the original petitioner died on 29.03.2008 and his heirs and legal representatives filed I.A. No.5681 of 2008 for being substituted in his place. Considering the financial implication in the instant case, the said interlocutory application was allowed by a Bench of this Court on 31.03.2009 substituting the heirs of the original petitioner, namely his two sons, a widow and a daughter as substituted petitioners. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the original petitioner was Account Assistant and was transferred as such from Electric Supply Division, Dhanbad to Electric Supply Sub-Division, Chas (Rural) vide memo dated 27.12.1997. While the original petitioner was working there, memo dated 14.11.2000 was issued by the Department suspending the petitioner on the allegation of financial irregularities for which a departmental proceeding had been initiated. In the said proceeding an enquiry was held and a report dated 29.01.2005 was submitted by the Enquiry Officer against the said original petitioner merely on the statements of Bacchu Ram and Satya Narain Prasad only, who were the immediate bosses of the petitioner being Executive Electrical Engineer and Assistant Electrical Engineer, respectively. 5. In the said proceeding an enquiry was held and a report dated 29.01.2005 was submitted by the Enquiry Officer against the said original petitioner merely on the statements of Bacchu Ram and Satya Narain Prasad only, who were the immediate bosses of the petitioner being Executive Electrical Engineer and Assistant Electrical Engineer, respectively. 5. After the said enquiry a show-cause notice dated 19.09.2005 was issued by the Disciplinary Authority along with proposed punishment, in response to which the petitioner submitted his detailed reply on 18.11.2005 but the Disciplinary Authority passed order dated 10.02.2006 and punished the original petitioner by stopping four increments in salary and stopping promotion for three years and holding original petitioner not to be entitled to any emoluments for the period of suspension except subsistence allowance and denying the petitioner any beneficial/contract post till his retirement. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners stated that against the said order of punishment, the original petitioner filed an appeal raising all the points, but it was dismissed by the appellate authority on 15.01.2007. Learned counsel for the petitioners claimed that there was no application of mind either by the Disciplinary Authority or by the appellate authority as neither the Disciplinary Authority considered the grounds taken by the petitioner in the second show-cause nor the appellate authority considered the points taken by the original petitioner in the memorandum of appeal and they merely passed their orders repeating the findings of the Enquiry Officer without arriving at any finding of their own. 7. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court and one decision of the Patna High Court, namely in case of S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, reported in (1990) 4 Supreme Court Cases 594; in case of G.Vallikumari vs. Andhra Education Society and others, reported in (2010) 2 Supreme Court Cases 497; and in case of Komal Tiwary vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 2008 (2) P.L.J.R. 363 . 8. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners also averred that the enquiry report was based merely on the evidence of two officers, namely Bacchu Ram and Satya Narain Prasad, but the said persons were immediate bosses of the original petitioner and similar negligence had been alleged against them also, hence their evidence could not cut much ice, whereas the other three witnesses of the Department also said nothing important or reliable for the instant case, but in spite of that the Enquiry Officer relied on them and the report of the Enquiry Officer was accepted not only by the Disciplinary Authority but also by the appellate authority. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners claimed that the original petitioner had heart problems which started on 08.04.1998 after his transfer to Chas and subsequently operation of his heart was done on 01.07.2003 and finally he died on 29.03.2008, hence in the said circumstances, there was no question of the original petitioner having committed any offence as alleged against him. He further claimed that after the transfer of original petitioner to Chas, the authorities had taken additional work of Cashier, Bill Collector, Assistant Superintendent and Head Clerk from him in spite of the fact that in the entire period he had only one assistant as his clerk. Hence if the authorities had any suspicion of financial irregularities against the original petitioner there was no question of petitioner being given such additional authority/work. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners finally argued that by the impugned orders four punishments were imposed upon the petitioner, although neither the allegations levelled against him were serious nor any loss had occurred to the respondent-Bihar State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board” for the sake of brevity) due to any act of the original petitioner. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-Board and its authorities submitted that even if the Enquiry Officer found other employees involved, it would not exonerate the petitioner of the charges levelled against him, specially when the Enquiry Officer had given his finding after considering the entire facts of the case and the materials/evidences available on the record and hence no illegality can be attributed to the said enquiry report. 12. 12. Learned counsel for the Board further stated that if the Disciplinary Authority agrees with the report of the Enquiry Officer, he is not required to give details of his own findings. He similarly averred that if the appellate authority was agreeing with the order of the Disciplinary Authority there was no occasion for him to give his independent findings, specially when it did not find any illegality in the impugned order. 13. Finally learned counsel for the respondent-Board and its authorities argued that the actions taken by the authorities are legal, valid and proper and no interference is required from this court. In this connection he relied upon two decisions of the Apex Court in case of National Fertilizers Ltd. and another vs. P.K. Khanna, reported in (2005) 7 Supreme Court Cases 597 and in case of Sub-Divisional Officer, Konch vs. Maharaj Singh, reported in (2003) 9 Supreme Court Cases 191. 14. From the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and the materials on record, it is quite apparent that proceeding was initiated against the petitioner by issuance of notice, whereafter enquiry was held and even thereafter notice for show-cause was issued by the Disciplinary Authority, whereafter the original petitioner submitted his show-cause and the Disciplinary Authority passed its order. Even after the appeal was filed by the petitioner, the appellate authority passed its order after giving proper opportunities to both the parties. In the aforesaid circumstances, this court does not find any procedural error in passing of the impugned orders except the point raised by the petitioner with respect to non-consideration of the claims of the original petitioner and the materials on record. 15. Hence the main point involved in this case is absolutely different, namely the legality or otherwise of the order of the Disciplinary Authority in merely relying upon enquiry report without considering the objection raised against it by the petitioner and arriving at no independent finding. The same objection has been raised against the appellate order also which reiterated the order of Disciplinary Authority without considering the points raised in memorandum of appeal and without arriving at any independent finding. 16. The same objection has been raised against the appellate order also which reiterated the order of Disciplinary Authority without considering the points raised in memorandum of appeal and without arriving at any independent finding. 16. This point has been considered in various decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this court, including the case of S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, reported in (1990) 4 Supreme Court Cases 594 in which the Apex Court had held as follows:- “35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency.” “36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.” “37. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The Committee expressed the opinion that “there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise” and that “where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity”. (p. 80) Prof. (p. 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that “natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice”. (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th edn. p. 548.) In Siemens Engineering Co. case this Court has taken the same view when it observed that “the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process”. This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a judge in his own cause, and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India wherein it has been held : (SCR pp. 468-69 : SCC p. 272, para 20) “The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely : (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must he held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice.” 17. Similarly in case of G.Vallikumari vs. Andhra Education Society and others, reported in (2010) 2 Supreme Court Cases 497, the Supreme Court had held as follows:- “19. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice.” 17. Similarly in case of G.Vallikumari vs. Andhra Education Society and others, reported in (2010) 2 Supreme Court Cases 497, the Supreme Court had held as follows:- “19. In his order, the Chairman of the Managing Committee did refer to the allegations levelled against the appellant and representation submitted by her in the light of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, but without even adverting to the contents of her representation and giving a semblance of indication of application of mind in the context of Rule 120(1)(d)(iv) of the Rules, he directed her removal from service. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the order of punishment was passed by the Chairman without complying with the mandate of the relevant statutory rule and the principles of natural justice. The requirement of recording reasons by every quasi-judicial or even an administrative authority entrusted with the task of passing an order adversely affecting an individual and communication thereof to the affected person is one of the recognized facets of the rules of natural justice and violation thereof has the effect of vitiating the order passed by the authority concerned.” “20. A careful reading of the Tribunal’s order shows that though it did not find any procedural infirmity in the enquiry against the appellant, the order passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee was nullified only on the ground of violation of Section 8(2) of the Act read with Rule 120(2) of the Rules inasmuch as permission of the Director was not obtained before removing the appellant from service. The High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and indirectly restored the order passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee because it was of the view that Section 8(2) is not applicable to the minority institutions. Neither the Tribunal nor the Division Bench of the High Court dealt with and decided the appellant’s challenge to the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and her plea that the extreme penalty of removal from service imposed on her was not justified because she was not found guilty of any serious misconduct.” 18. Neither the Tribunal nor the Division Bench of the High Court dealt with and decided the appellant’s challenge to the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and her plea that the extreme penalty of removal from service imposed on her was not justified because she was not found guilty of any serious misconduct.” 18. A division Bench of this court had also dealt with a similar matter in case of Komal Tiwary vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 2008 (2) P.L.J.R. 363 in which it had held as follows:- “11. It is thus manifest on a perusal of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court that all authorities exercising quasi-judicial functions must conform to the principles of natural justice and are duty bound including the appellate authority with which we are presently concerned, to ensure that their order must disclose consideration of all materials on record, consideration of the contentions advanced before him, and acceptance or rejection of one or the other supported by reasons. This should not be taken to mean that they are expected to produce orders akin to judgments of courts. One of the most important factors warranting this proposition of law is that their orders are subject to challenge before superior courts and are unable to examine the validity of the reasons or the circumstances which weighed with the authorities while passing the order. The learned appellate authority in the present case has brought about such a situation and has to be set aside.” “13. Before we part with the records, we must bring it to the notice of the Director General of Police, Bihar, and other authorities of the Bihar Police Force that, in view of the pattern of litigations coming up before this court, the departmental proceedings in the Police Department are quite often conducted in a perfunctory manner. Subject to exceptions, no effort is made by the inquiry officer, by the disciplinary authority, by the appellate authority, or the revisional authority, to consider the materials on record, and assign reasons to accept or reject one or the other piece of evidence and the contentions. It speaks of a general propensity towards abdication of essential duties and functions in departmental proceedings, perhaps to avoid the work involved in it. This state of affairs must be avoided.” 19. It speaks of a general propensity towards abdication of essential duties and functions in departmental proceedings, perhaps to avoid the work involved in it. This state of affairs must be avoided.” 19. From the aforesaid decisions and the other decisions of courts of law, which were relied in the aforementioned decisions, the principle laid down in this regard is quite clear that while exercising quasi judicial functions the administrative authority must record reasons for its decision of rejecting the claim of the person concerned which would not only exclude chances of arbitrariness but would also ensure a degree of fairness in the process of decision making irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. The reasons in such orders may not be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law but it must show that the authority had given due consideration to the points raised by the person concerned and it assumes greater proportion where the order was being passed at the original stage, which in this case is the Disciplinary Authority. 20. In the instant case, the record clearly shows that the original petitioner filed his show-cause objecting to the findings of the enquiry report giving elaborate grounds with respect to the factual aspect and evidence as well as the propositions of law. But the Disciplinary Authority while passing its impugned order dated 10.02.2006 did not at all consider the grounds raised by the original petitioner nor it discussed the evidence on record and merely affirmed the enquiry report prescribing the punishment as proposed by the Enquiry Officer. 21. Furthermore, when the impugned order dated 10.02.2006 passed by the Disciplinary Authority was challenged by the petitioner in an appeal as provided under the law stating the grounds on which the impugned order was being challenged on the basis of facts, evidence and provisions of law, the appellate authority had a duty cast upon him to consider those grounds, especially when the Disciplinary Authority had failed to do so but the appellate authority rejected petitioner’s appeal by its impugned order dated 15.01.2007, which is a replica of the order of the Disciplinary Authority and in that also the grounds raised by the original petitioner and the materials on record had not been considered at all. 22. 22. In the said circumstances, it is quite apparent that both the Disciplinary Authority and the appellate authority neither made any independent application of mind nor dealt with and decided the petitioner’s challenge to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on his plea that the punishment imposed upon him was not justified because no serious allegation had been levelled against the petitioner nor any loss had accrued to the respondents. Moreover, the petitioner had been implicated merely on the evidence of his two immediate bosses, who were also involved in the case and hence the authorities were required to deal with the matter more cautiously to see as to whether the petitioner being a lower employee is not being made a scapegoat. 23. So far reliance of learned counsel for the respondents on a decision of the Apex Court in case of National Fertilizers Ltd. and another vs. P.K. Khanna, reported in (2005) 7 Supreme Court Cases 597 is concerned, the facts thereof are completely different to the facts of the instant case as in that case the Disciplinary Authority had quoted the contents of the charge sheet, the deposition of witnesses as recorded by the Enquiry Officer, the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the explanation submitted by the employee and had passed an order concurring with the reasoning and conclusion of the Enquiry Officer, but in the instant case the authorities have completely failed to consider the objection and explanation submitted by the employee with respect to the charges levelled against him. 24. The other decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents is in case of Sub-Divisional Officer, Konch vs. Maharaj Singh, reported in (2003) 9 Supreme Court Cases 191 but the said decision is only with respect to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is supervisory in nature and not appellate and hence the High Curt is not justified in reappreciating the evidence adduced in disciplinary proceeding to alter the findings of the Enquiry Officer. This court does not intend to do so and hence the said decision is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. 25. This court does not intend to do so and hence the said decision is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. 25. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case and the settled principles of law, the impugned order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 10.02.2006 (Annexure-9) as well as the impugned order of the appellate authority dated 15.01.2007 (Annexure-12) cannot be sustained in law and are hereby quashed and the matter is sent back to the Disciplinary Authority to decide the show-cause filed by the petitioner against the enquiry report in accordance with law and the observations made hereinabove expeditiously after giving an opportunity of placing their case to the petitioners. 26. With the aforesaid observations/directions this writ petition is allowed.