Judgment : This Writ Petition is filed for a Certiorari to quash proceedings in S.R.No.115/2009 dated 26.11.2011 of respondent No.1. The petitioner has filed a complaint against respondent Nos.2 and 3, practicing advocates, before respondent No.1, under the Advocates Act, 1961. The said complaint was received by the State Bar Council, respondent No.1 herein, on 17.11.2009. More than one year after receiving the complaint, respondent No.1 has issued notices to respondent Nos.2 and 3 on 20.01.2010 calling for their comments. After considering the comments of respondent Nos.2 and 3, by Resolution dated 13.05.2011 of the General Body of respondent No.1, the petitioner’s complaint was rejected. An order to this affect was passed in proceedings in S.R.No.115/2009 dated 26.11.2011 and signed and communicated by the Registrar, Disciplinary Committee of respondent No.1 to the petitioner. Assailing this order, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. At the hearing, Mr. Srinivas Polavarapu, learned counsel representing Mr. M. Prabhakar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, advanced two submissions; namely (1) that the General Body of respondent No.1 has no jurisdiction to reject the petitioner’s complaint in limini, as it has no option other than referring the same to the Disciplinary Committee, and (2) that in view of expiry of one year period from the date of receipt of the complaint by respondent No.1, the same automatically stands transferred to the Bar Council of India under Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”) and that, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. Mr. Dasari S.V.V.S.V. Prasad, learned standing counsel for respondent No.1, Mr. K. Ratnam, learned counsel for respondent No.2 and Mr. J. Prabhakar, learned counsel for respondent No.3 opposed the above submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel and perused the record. Under Section 35 of the Act, where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee. Under Section 35 of the Act, where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the words “a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct” are with reference to the proceedings initiated by the Council suo motu and that in cases where it has received the complaint against the advocates for their alleged misconduct, the State Bar Council has no discretion to reject the same and that it is bound to refer such complaint to the Disciplinary Committee. In my opinion, this submission has no merit. A careful reading of the provisions of Section 35 of the Act would leave this Court in no doubt that both in cases of complaints filed by aggrieved parties and suo motu initiation of proceedings by it, the State Bar Council’s satisfaction that an advocate has committed misconduct is a sine qua non for reference to the Disciplinary Committee. If the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is to be accepted, General Body of the Bar Council will be reduced to a mere post office in cases where complaints of misconduct are received by it. In such event an anomalous situation would arise where even the most frivolous and vexatious complaints are referred to the Disciplinary Committee tarnishing the image of the advocates. The phraseology of Section 35 of the Act is plain and unambiguous and it admits of only one interpretation i.e., that in either of the two situations, namely, filing of a complaint by an aggrieved party or in case of suo motu initiation of proceedings by the State Bar Council, reference to the Disciplinary Committee would be only on its having reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct. Therefore, the first submission of the learned counsel is rejected. Therefore, the first submission of the learned counsel is rejected. With regard to the second submission of the learned counsel that as the period of one year had expired either from the date of the receipt of complaint by the Bar Council or from the date of issuance of notice by it to respondent Nos.2 and 3, the complaint automatically gets transferred to the Bar Council of India under Section 36B of the Act, the same is equally without any merit. Section 36B of the Act reads as under: “36B – Disposal of disciplinary proceedings – (1) The Disciplinary Committee of a State Bar Council shall dispose of the complaint received by it under Section 35 expeditiously and in each case the proceedings shall be concluded within a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the complaint or the date of initiation of the proceedings at the instance of the State Bar Council, as the case may be, failing which such proceedings shall stand transferred to the Bar Council of India which may dispose of the same as if it were a proceeding withdrawn for inquiry under sub-section (2) of Section 36. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where on the commencement of the Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1973 (60 of 1973), any proceedings in respect of any disciplinary matter against an advocate is pending before the Disciplinary Committee of a State Bar Council, the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council shall dispose of the same within a period of six months from the date of such commencement or within a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the complaint or, as the case may be, the date of initiation of the proceedings at the instance of the State Bar Council, whichever is later, failing which such other proceedings shall stand transferred to the Bar Council of India for disposal under Sub-Section (1).” According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the words “one year from the date of the receipt of the complaint” in sub section (1) are referable to the complaint received by the State Bar Council and not by the Disciplinary Committee. I am afraid, this submission cannot be accepted. The Heading of this provision itself refers to the disposal of the disciplinary proceedings. I am afraid, this submission cannot be accepted. The Heading of this provision itself refers to the disposal of the disciplinary proceedings. A complaint will assume the status of the disciplinary proceedings only after it is referred by the Bar Council to the Disciplinary Committee. Till then, it remains a complaint. Further more, the very opening words of this provision refer to the Disciplinary Committee of a State Bar Council and not to the Bar Council. The words “one year from the date of the receipt of the complaint or the date of initiation of the proceedings” are relatable to the Disciplinary Committee and not to the Bar Council. This construction of this provision fits into the scheme of the Act, as evident from the provisions of Sections 35 and 36B of the Act. Under Section 35 of the Act, as noted above, if the State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct either on a complaint or otherwise, which necessarily means suo motu or through any other source, the State Bar Council will refer the case to the Disciplinary Committee. Section 36B of the Act envisages that one year period shall be reckoned in either of the cases, namely, receipt of the complaint of an aggrieved party and forwarded by the Bar Council to the Disciplinary Committee or the proceedings initiated at the instance of the Bar Council even without a complaint from the date of receipt of the complaint by the Disciplinary Committee, I am, therefore, of the opinion that till such time as the case has not reached the Disciplinary Committee either by way of reference of the complaint of aggrieved party or suo motu proceedings initiated by the Bar Council, the period of one year will not start running. This view of mine is further fortified by Rule 17(2) of the Bar Council of India Rules, which reads as under: “The date of receipt of the complaint or the date of the initiation of the proceedings at the instance of the State Bar Council shall be the date on which the State Bar Council refers the case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee under section 35(1).” Even according to the above-reproduced rule, one year period shall be reckoned from the date of receipt of the complaint by the Disciplinary Committee. For the above-mentioned reasons, I do not find any merit in the Writ Petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. If the petitioner feels aggrieved by the rejection of his complaint by the State Bar Council, he shall be free to file a revision to the Bar Council of India under Section 48A of the Act.