JUDGMENT :- THOTTATHIL B. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. 1. This revision by the State raises the question whether the impugned order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is perverse, unreasonable and against law inasmuch as the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not interfering with the decision of the first appellate authority which reduced the gross profit rate on IMFL sales to 36 percent for the period from 1.4.2008 to 30.9.2008, when the assessee had admitted 60.40 percent of gross profit on such sales from 1.10.2008 onwards. 2. Supporting the appeal, the learned Government Pleader argued that the Tribunal has essentially passed a non-speaking order without considering the questions raised before it. He points out that the Tribunal is not precluded from deciding issues of facts as may be relevant and proceeded to argue that the first appellate authority egregiously erred in law in trimming down profit rate on IMFL sales to 36% from 1.4.2008 to 30.9.2008 while the assessee had admitted the profit rate to be at 60.40% from 1.10.2008. 3. The learned senior counsel for the respondent argued that no substantial question of law arises for decision in this revision and the findings of facts are such as are available on the records. It is thus pointed out that no interference is called for in this revision. 4. The assessee has a three star bar attached hotel with all amenities. For the first half of the assessment year 2008-2009, the profit conceded by the assessee was at 22.25% only, whereas the conceded profit for the second half was 60.40%. The assessee had no explanation for the vast difference in the profit during the two half years. The Intelligence Squad had recovered 22 (twenty two) business slips relating to two days – 11.8.2008 and 12.8.2008. Subsequent scrutiny revealed that there was under valuation on the sale of IMFL. The assessee admitted the same and compounded the offence on payment of Rs.1,47,500/-. The assessment order was issued adopting the profit of IMFL at 60% for the whole year, also noticing that for the year in question the rate for compounding adopted by the Government was 170%, assuming that the average gross profit on IMFL sales in bar hotels was 70%. 5. The first appellate authority, for reasons stated in Annexure B, upheld the rejection of the return and the best judgment assessment. Accordingly, it found that the assessment order is valid. 5. The first appellate authority, for reasons stated in Annexure B, upheld the rejection of the return and the best judgment assessment. Accordingly, it found that the assessment order is valid. However, it proceeded to state as follows: “But the 60% gross profit added back to the purchase value of IMFL to the whole year is found to be not in order. On verification of the sale bills issued from 1.4.2008 to 31.9.2008 revealed that the actual gross profit conceded was at 36% but accounted only at 22.35%. The sales suppression has been admitted by the dealer and the offence is compounded departmentally. Certain other excess and shortage of IMFL is also detected. But from 1/10/2008 to 31/3/2009 the dealer voluntarily conceded 60% gross profit on IMFL sales. But the assessing authority added back 60% gross profit to the whole year is found to be unsustainable in law. The assessing authority has detected any other purchase or sales suppression from 1.4.2008 to 31.9.2008 on verification. The sales suppression was detected for the above period and the assessing authority has no authority to extent the gross profit to the whole year. No material evidences are proved that the dealer has sold IMFL at 60% for the period from 1.4.2008 to 31.9.2008. In the above circumstances the assessing authority is directed to add back 36% gross profit from 1.4.2008 to 31.9.2008 and 60% gross profit from 1.10.2008 onwards and modify as per rules.” 6. The appeal of the Revenue in the aforesaid regard, was decided by the Appellate Tribunal without specifically stating any reason whatsoever. The order of the Appellate Tribunal, till its penultimate paragraph, contains only descriptions of the facts; the findings of the subordinate authorities and the grounds raised. The conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal and whatever little reason, if at all there is any, that it gave to affirm the decision of the first appellate authority is contained in the penultimate paragraph of Annexure c order which reads as follows: “Considering the entire records as well as the facts and circumstances of the case the order passed by the first appellate authority is correct and no interference is necessary. So the appeal fails and it is only to be dismissed. The cross objection filed by the respondent/assessee has also no merit and has to be dismissed. These points answered accordingly.” 7. So the appeal fails and it is only to be dismissed. The cross objection filed by the respondent/assessee has also no merit and has to be dismissed. These points answered accordingly.” 7. For one thing, the first appellate authority’s order, as already noted and quoted in paragraph 5 above, mentions no reason at all for pegging the escaped profit of IMFL sales to be at 36% from 1.4.2008 to 31.9.2008. Without starting any reasons, the first appellate authority could not have interfered with the assessment order. Bereft of reasons being expressed, the order of the first appellate authority was itself liable for interference as one being illegal. Be that as it may, the Tribunal also stated no reasons while it confirmed the decision of the first appellate authority. Reasons are the links between the actual conclusions and the materials on which those conclusions are based. They disclose how the mind is applied to subject matter for a decision. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinion and reasons recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. Reasons form the elixir of adjudicatory process and the resultant decision. In the zone of judicial function, reasons are to be stated for the decisions. This is obligatory in terms of the provisions that govern the judicial institutions, called the courts. In administrative and quasi-judicial sector, erudite scholars and precedents are repeatedly quoted to drive home the cardinal requirement that decisions in those sectors which affect rights of parties should disclose reasons. See Union of India v. M.L. Capoor [AIR 1974 SC 87]. The Tribunal is vested with such jurisdiction as would entitle it to go into the issues of facts, in cases which warrant that. It is the last authority in the hierarchy that would speak, if necessary, even on facts. The non-disclosure of reasons by the Tribunal is fatal to the decision that it renders, especially it being the last fact finding authority. This is the crux of the decision of this Court in Kalika Hotel and Bar Amballur v. State of Kerala [2012 (3) KHC 85]. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that the first appellate authority’s decision pegging the gross profit at 36% from 1.4.2008 to 31.9.2008 and the decision of the Appellate Tribunal confirming it are rendered without stating any reasons. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that the first appellate authority’s decision pegging the gross profit at 36% from 1.4.2008 to 31.9.2008 and the decision of the Appellate Tribunal confirming it are rendered without stating any reasons. They are, therefore, non-speaking, cryptic and hence arbitrary and liable to be set aside. 8. We are not impressed by the reliance placed by the senior counsel for the assessee on Kalika Hotel and Bar Amballur (supra) to state that we may remit this case to the assessing authority. In that case, order of remand was made by this Court since the assessing officer did not independently consider the materials recovered by the Intelligence Officer. An occasional sale, for a high gross profit, detected by the Intelligence Officer was adopted for the whole year in that case. Here, while the assessee conceded 22.25% gross profit till 3.9.2008, the gross profit conceded for the rest of the year was 60%. Making reference to Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar [(2003) 11 SCC 519], Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union [(1971) All ER 1148(CA)] and Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree [1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)], it was noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in SAIL v. STO [(2008) 9 SCC 407] that reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, it becomes lifeless. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before court. The affected party has the right to know why the decision has gone against him. Spelling out reasons for the order made is a cardinal requirement. By practice adopted in all courts and by virtue of judge-made law, the concept of reasoned judgment has become an indispensable part of basic rule of law and, in fact, is a mandatory requirement of the procedural law. that the orders passed by the authorities showing proper application of mind is among the twin ingredients of the principle of natural justice; the other being the right to opportunity of being heard before the adverse order is issued. that the orders passed by the authorities showing proper application of mind is among the twin ingredients of the principle of natural justice; the other being the right to opportunity of being heard before the adverse order is issued. Such rule being applicable to administrative authorities and quasi-judicial authorities, the distinction between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority is practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned orders – See CCT v. Shukla & Bros. [(2010) 4 SCC 785], wherein Their Lordships proceeded to say that reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases. Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons for a decision, furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty and helps in the observance of law of precedent. When reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assurance that the process of correction is in place and working. It is the requirement of law that correction process of judgments should not only appear to be implemented but also seem to have been properly implemented. Reasons for an order would ensure and enhance public confidence and would provide due satisfaction to the consumer of justice under our justice dispensation system. With the passage of time, the Right to Information Act, 2005 is in place. The Tribunal is an authority constituted by a law made by the State Legislature. It is, therefore, “public authority” as defined in Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. Section 4(1)(d) of that Act provides that every public authority shall provide reasons for its administrative or quasi judicial decisions to affected persons. Therefore, the legal right to be told the reasons for an administrative or quasi-judicial decision is now the statutory right of any person affected by such decision of a public authority. 9. The question now is whether we should remit this case for reconsideration by the Tribunal or back to the assessing authority for consideration de novo. We are of the view that the decision making process in relation to the questions of facts in hand also involve a substantial question of law. 9. The question now is whether we should remit this case for reconsideration by the Tribunal or back to the assessing authority for consideration de novo. We are of the view that the decision making process in relation to the questions of facts in hand also involve a substantial question of law. If a particular set of affairs is shown to have existed at a particular point of time, it is permissible for a statutory authority or adjudicating authority, including a court or tribunal to presume that the same state of affairs prevailed or held the field for a reasonable period of time before or after such situation is shown to have existed. This is in tune with the common course of human conduct and common course of business conduct. Section 114 of the Evidence Act which is nothing but pearls of common sense, advises that regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, the existence o any fact which the court or adjudicating authority thinks likely to have happened, can be presumed. Illustration (d) to that section clarifies that a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which such things or state of things usually cease to exist, is still in existence. Presumption as to such continuity off existence is not confined to operate only from the point of time at which a thing or state of things has been shown to be in existence. Such a presumption can be drawn also in relation to a period before a thing or state of things is shown to be in existence. Such presumption is abundantly available in relation to the facts of this particular case. Applying such permissive presumption, the first appellate authority and the Tribunal ought to have reasonably fixed the gross profit of IMFL sales from 1.4.2008 to 31.9.2008 at any rate, not less than 50%, i.e., 10% less than what was shown voluntarily by the assessee for the period from 1.4.2008 to 31.9.2008. In the result, this revision is ordered answering the question of law by stating that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not interfering with the decision of the first appellate authority to the extent fond above. In the result, this revision is ordered answering the question of law by stating that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not interfering with the decision of the first appellate authority to the extent fond above. It is further found that in not having rendered a decision with reasons, the Tribunal acted illegally and has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in that regard and the impugned order issued by it is vitiated by perversity. Resultantly, this revision is ordered, instead of making a remand, directing that the addition back of gross profit from 1.4.2008 to 31.9.2008 as per the orders impugned would be at 50% gross profit instead of 36%. No. costs.