Minor Sumita Chakraborty v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
2012-01-19
ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, SOUMEN SEN
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. The appellants have attained majority. 2. Let such attainment be recorded. 3. They are given liberty to pursue their appeal in their independent capacity. 4. The applications, being CAN 8935 of 2011 and CAN 239 of 2012 are disposed of accordingly. 5. We have heard Mr. Biswarup Biswas, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Arabinda Kundu, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, Insurance Company on the appeal. 6. Mr. Biswas contends that the Tribunal erred in not awarding interim interest and interest on judgment on the awarded sum. The Tribunal also did not assign any reason while denying interest to the claimants. 7. Opposing the appeal, Mr. Kundu, however, submits that rash and negligent driving was not proved. He refers to the decision of the Tribunal in issue No. 2, where discrepancy of the vehicle number was noted. Mr. Kundu submits that although the Insurance Company did not prefer any appeal, they are entitled to take this plea and attack the judgment as a whole, in terms of Order XL Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Mr. Kundu relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Panna Lal Vs. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1963 SC 1516 . To support of his submission, Mr. Kundu refers to paragraph 14 of the said decision. On merits, Mr. Kundu relied on another case of the Apex Court in the case of Eshwarappa @ Maheshwarappa & Anr. Vs. C.S. Gurushanthappa & Anr., reported in (2010) 8 SCC 620 . He submits that in the said decision the Apex Court awarded interest from the date of the judgment and order of the Tribunal hence, this Court should follow the same procedure, if at all interest is awarded. 9. We have considered the rival contentions in the instant appeal. The appellants have come up only on the limited issue that the amount should carry interest. 10. The judgment and award of the Tribunal is accepted by both the parties, as neither of the parties preferred appeal on that score. The appeal on the limited ground of denial of interest cannot widen the scope of the appeal so mush as that the entire judgment could be attacked by the respondent. Mr. Kundu relied on paragraph 14 of the decision in the case of Panna Lal (Supra). The same is quoted below:- “14.
The appeal on the limited ground of denial of interest cannot widen the scope of the appeal so mush as that the entire judgment could be attacked by the respondent. Mr. Kundu relied on paragraph 14 of the decision in the case of Panna Lal (Supra). The same is quoted below:- “14. The whole argument is based on the assumption that the plaintiff could by filing a cross-objection under O. 41 R. 22, C.P.C., have challenged the trial Court’s decree in so far as it dismissed the suit against the defendants other than the State. We are not, at present advised, prepared to agree tht if a party who could have filed a cross-objection under O. 41 R. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not done so, the Appeal Court can under no circumstance give him relief under the provisions of O. 41 R. 33 of the Code. It is, however, not necessary for us to discuss the question further as, in our opinion, the assumption made by the High Court that the plaintiff could have filed a cross-objection is not justified.” 11. If we look to the said decision and read it as a whole, we would find that the entire subject issue was different and the issue before us was not the issue before the Apex Court. While dealing with such issue the Apex Court observed as above. 12. We failed to appreciate how the said ratio would apply in the instant case, where the parties after agreeing to the said decision of the Tribunal could question the propriety of the same. The Insurance Company has already accepted the award and deposited the awarded amount. The submission of Mr. Kundu, on that score is, thus, rejected. 13. On the question of interest, we are of the view that the decision in the case of Eshwarappa @ Maheshwarappa (Supra) did not decide the question at all. The Apex Court considered the appeal on the applicability of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. While dealing with principal issue, the Apex Court ultimately came to conclusion that the claimant was entitled to compensation for Rs. 25,000/- and passed order accordingly. While doing so, the Apex Court granted 6% interest from the date of the order of the Tribunal.
While dealing with principal issue, the Apex Court ultimately came to conclusion that the claimant was entitled to compensation for Rs. 25,000/- and passed order accordingly. While doing so, the Apex Court granted 6% interest from the date of the order of the Tribunal. Such order could not be treated as a ration decided to be applied for denying interim interest, which is granted as per the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. We have carefully perused the judgment and order of the Tribunal. We do not find any reason while denying the interest. 15. We may refer to Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, wherein the Tribunal is empowered to award simple interest at the rate and the period subject to the discretion of the Tribunal. 16. The appeal, thus, succeeds and is allowed. The appellants would be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% p.a. on the from May 02, 1997, being the date of filing the claim petition till May 03, 2011, being the date of deposit before the Tribunal. 17. The Insurance Company would calculate the interest and pay the same to the respective claimants in the same proportionate as before. The amount should be paid through account payee cheques to be sent to the claimants on their respective recorded address. 18. The appeal is disposed of without any order as to costs. 19. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties, on priority basis.