JUDGMENT : Girish Chandra Gupta, J. This appeal is directed against a judgment dated 28th February 2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track 3rd Court, Sealdah, in Sessions Trial No. 2 (12) of 2005 corresponding to Sessions Case No. 5 (11) 2005 (State of West Bengal vs. Binod Kumar Shaw and two others) by which the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused persons of the offences punishable under Sections 304B/498A/406 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 thereof. The State has preferred this appeal. The facts and circumstances of the case briefly stated are that within four years of marriage Santra Shaw, aged about 23 years, mother of a male child aged less than two years, died and her dead body was recovered from a pond near her matrimonial home on 27th February 2004. A written complaint was lodged instantaneously at the place of occurrence alleging, inter alia, continuous torture, both physical and mental, by the husband and the parents-in-law, due to failure on the part of the party of the complainant to give them a jeep agreed to be given at the time of marriage. The case of defence is that the victim was a patient of paranoid schizophrenia and was prone to commit suicide. 2. Mr. Sanyal, learned Advocate appearing for the State took us through the evidence, both oral and documentary, and contended that the learned Trial Court ignored the relevant evidence; disbelieved the witnesses on trivial or no ground, demonstrated utter lack of judicial scrutiny into the evidence adduced by the parties; imputed motives to the witnesses, insincerity to the police and recorded the order of acquittal which no one properly instructed in law exercising power judicially would have done. 3. Mr. Biplab Mitra, learned Advocate appearing for the de facto complainant adopted the submissions of Mr. Sanyal and added that gross miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the impugned judgment and order. 4. Mr. Moitra, learned Advocate appearing for the accused/respondents disputed the submissions made by Mr. Sanyal and Mr. Mitra. According to him the learned trial Court, who had the benefit of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, after appreciating the evidence delivered a well reasoned judgment and this Court should refrain from interfering with the same. Mr. 4. Mr. Moitra, learned Advocate appearing for the accused/respondents disputed the submissions made by Mr. Sanyal and Mr. Mitra. According to him the learned trial Court, who had the benefit of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, after appreciating the evidence delivered a well reasoned judgment and this Court should refrain from interfering with the same. Mr. Moitra submitted that absolute assurance of the guilt of the accused is necessary before an order of acquittal can be interfered with. He in support of his submission relied upon the judgment in the case of Dhanna, etc. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 10 SCC 79 , wherein the following view was expressed:- Though the Code does not make any distinction between an appeal from acquittal and an appeal from conviction so far as powers of the appellate court are concerned, certain unwritten rules of adjudication have consistently been followed by Judges while dealing with appeals against acquittal. No doubt, the High Court has full power to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent conclusion whether the appeal is against conviction or acquittal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the appellate court has to bear in mind: first, that there is a general presumption in favour of the innocence of the person accused in criminal cases and that presumption is only strengthened by the acquittal. The second is, every accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt regarding his guilt and when the trial court acquitted him, he would retain that benefit in the appellate court also. Thus, the appellate court in appeals against acquittals has to proceed more cautiously and only if there is absolute assurance of the guilt of the accused, upon the evidence on record, that the order of acquittal is liable to be interfered with or disturbed. (Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa, Caetano Piedade Fernandes v. Union Territory of Goa, Daman & Diu, Tota Singh v. State of Punjab, Awadhesh v. State of M.P. and Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan.) 5. Mr. Moitra submitted that the order of acquittal cannot be reversed if the view taken by the trial Court was a reasonably possible view. He in support of his submission cited the case of Dharampal vs. State of U.P. reported in 1981 (Supp) SCC 20 wherein the following view was taken:- 4. Mr. Moitra submitted that the order of acquittal cannot be reversed if the view taken by the trial Court was a reasonably possible view. He in support of his submission cited the case of Dharampal vs. State of U.P. reported in 1981 (Supp) SCC 20 wherein the following view was taken:- 4. It appears that there was a party faction in the village and the accused belonged to one rival faction, the, deceased being in the opposite camp. On January 20, 1968 at about 7.30 p.m. when complainants Giri Lal and Baljit were returning from the court and reached the village at 7.30 p.m., the appellants surrounded them and assaulted complainant Giri Lal with lathis. FIR was lodged at the police station and after the usual investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted. The trial court after considering the evidence on its intrinsic merits found that in view of the party faction and the night being a dark one, it was not possible for the complainants to identify the accused. The trial court accordingly acquitted the appellants. Thereafter, the State filed appeal before the High Court which reversed the judgment of the trial court after believing the three eyewitnesses, namely Giri Lal, Baljit and Anand Swarup. The High Court did not accept the finding of the trial court that identification was not possible because the High Court thought that the witnesses being known persons, even though they had assaulted from behind, they could have been identified by the complainants and the other witness. The High Court found that all the three eyewitnesses were reliable and, in spite of enmity between the parties, there was no reason to distrust the testimony of these witnesses. On the other hand, the trial court had given good and cogent reasons for disbelieving the eyewitnesses, one of them being that these witnesses were not only inimical but belonged to the same group to which the complainant belonged and had been continually deposing in all cases for the complainant. Another reason given by the trial court was that, although some independent witnesses appeared on the scene, they were not at all produced by the prosecution. The trial court also laid stress on the circumstance that the definite case made out by the complainant Giri Lal in the FIR was that he was assaulted by a spear. Another reason given by the trial court was that, although some independent witnesses appeared on the scene, they were not at all produced by the prosecution. The trial court also laid stress on the circumstance that the definite case made out by the complainant Giri Lal in the FIR was that he was assaulted by a spear. In the course of the evidence, however, the witnesses sought to make improvement by changing their statements and stated that the complainant was assaulted by a lathi which had an iron rod attached to it, i.e. phuli. The High Court on the question of weapon has merely conjectured that the complainants may not have noticed the exact nature of the weapon. We find overselves unable to agree with the conclusion of the High Court because villagers can certainly distinguish between a lathi and a spear. It is obvious that in court the witnesses were made to depose that the appellant was not armed with a spear because medical evidence destroyed the case of the complainant that he was injured by spear and the injuries found on the person of the complainant could be given only by a blunt weapon like lathi. Secondly, on the question of identification also the High Court finds that though the night was dark, yet it speculated that it might have been possible for the complainants and witness to identify the appellants. Here also, with due respects we do not agree with the High Court. The learned Trial Court has pointed out that the occurrence took place at 7.30 p.m., almost two hours after the sunset when the night was absolutely dark. It was also found by the trial court that from the calendar it appears that the moon would be visible only at 9 p.m. Thirdly, the trial court pointed out that the first blow given by the assailant on the head would naturally render the complainant unconscious and he would therefore not be able to identify the assailants. Another important fact which the High Court failed to notice was that Giri Lal in his statement before the police did not name Dharam Pal or the other appellant at all but merely said that he was assaulted by some badmashes. Another important fact which the High Court failed to notice was that Giri Lal in his statement before the police did not name Dharam Pal or the other appellant at all but merely said that he was assaulted by some badmashes. Here also, the High Court speculated that as the appellants were not persons of good character, by using the word badmash the complainant must have referred to the appellants only. This argument also is based purely on speculation. If the complainant actually knew and identified the appellants, there was no reason for him not to name them before the police. The fact that the complainant did not name the appellants clearly shows that he was not able to identify the appellants. Taking the case of the prosecution or the reasoning of the High Court at its highest, it cannot be said that in view of the circumstances and the darkness, the possibility of mistake in identifying the assailants cannot be reasonably excluded. Furthermore, it is well settled that even if the High Court may not have agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court, if the view taken by the trial court was reasonably possible, that would be no ground to reverse the order of acquittal. In the instant case, even accepting the reasoning of the High Court at its face value we are not in a position to hold that the view taken by the trial court was not reasonably possible. 6. Mr. Moitra submitted that the Appellate Court cannot interfere merely because it would have taken a different view had it been the trial Court. He in support of his submission referred to the judgment in the case of Bhaiyamiyan @ Jardar Khan and Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 6 SCC 394 , wherein the following view was taken:- 8. At the very outset we must remark that the High Court's interference in an appeal against acquittal is somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the trial court was possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial court, it might have taken a different view. In other words, if two views are possible and the trial court has taken one, the High Court should not interfere in the judgment of the trial court. In other words, if two views are possible and the trial court has taken one, the High Court should not interfere in the judgment of the trial court. 7. Mr. Moitra submitted that an order of acquittal should not be interfered with even if the Court believes that there is some evidence pointing the finger at the accused. He in support of his submission relied upon the judgment in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Naresh @ Ram Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 , wherein the following view was taken:- 20. Before we discuss the evidence on record, we must bear in mind the scope of interference with an order of acquittal. An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the Court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused. This Court has dealt with the scope of interference with an order of acquittal in a number of cases. 8. Mr. Moitra submitted that unless there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under challenge is perverse the Appellate Court shall not interfere. He in support of his submission relied on the judgment in the case Babu Vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 4 Crimes 119, wherein the following view was taken:- 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P., Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar, Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P., Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., Budh Singh v. State of U.P., State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh, S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, Arulvelu v. State, Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ram Singh v. State of H.P.) 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. 9. Mr. Moitra submitted that if two views are possible the view favourable to the accused should be adopted. He in support of his submission referred to the judgment in the case of Sanjiv Kumar vs. State of Punjab reported in 2009 (16) SCC 487 wherein the following view was taken:- 26. It cannot be lost sight of that the conviction of the appellant is based on the presumption drawn against him. There is no direct evidence to prove that he had administered any poisonous substance to the deceased. In all probability she had committed suicide. Ultimately, it is a matter of appreciation of evidence, and while we cannot say that the case of the prosecution is proved to be untrue, it is equally possible on the basis of the evidence on record to take the view that the defence case may also be true. Thus, applying the well-established principle that if on the basis of the same evidence, two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused should be preferred, we allow this appeal giving the benefit of doubt to the appellant. 10. Mr. Thus, applying the well-established principle that if on the basis of the same evidence, two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused should be preferred, we allow this appeal giving the benefit of doubt to the appellant. 10. Mr. Sanyal, learned Advocate for the State, as regards scope of the Appellate Court's power, referred to the judgment in the case of Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu Vs. John David, (2011) 5 SCC 509 , wherein the following view was taken:- 29. In Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) this Court held as follows: (SCC pp. 29-30, para 27) 27. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the appellate court while dealing with appeals, particularly against an order of acquittal : (i) There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (ii) The appellate court in an appeal against acquittal can review the entire evidence and come to its own conclusions. (iii) The appellate court can also review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. (iv) While dealing with the appeal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. (v) An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are 'compelling and substantial reasons' for doing so. If the order is 'clearly unreasonable', it is a compelling reason for interference. (vi) While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities, it can reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion. (vii) When the trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts, etc. (vii) When the trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts, etc. the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial court depending on the materials placed. 30. Therefore, one of the settled positions of law as to how the court should deal with an appeal against acquittal is that, while dealing with such an appeal, the appellate court has no restriction to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded. On such review, the appellate court would consider the manner in which the evidence was dealt with by the lower court. At the same time, if the lower court's decision is based on erroneous views and against the settled position of law, then such an order of acquittal should be set aside. 31. Another settled position is that, if the trial court has ignored material and relevant facts or misread such evidence or has ignored scientific documents, then in such a scenario the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial court. 11. We shall bear in our mind the settled principles of law governing the power of the Appellate Court in examining the order of acquittal. 12. At the outset it is necessary to identify the witnesses. PW 1, a brother of the deceased, is the de facto complainant. PW 14 is another brother of the deceased. PW 3 is the father of the deceased and PW 13 is the mother of the deceased. PW 2 is a near relation of the accused persons. PW 22 is also a relation of the accused but she turned hostile. PWs.5 and 20 are the Autopsy Surgeons. PW 6 is the doctor who declared the victim 'brought dead'. PW 15 is a Scientist attached to the Forensic Science Laboratory. PW 8 is the darowan of the Rajbari. PWs.9, 10 and 11 are seizure witnesses. PW 19 is an executive officer of the State Civil Services who conducted the inquest. PW 18 is the first I.O. who recorded the statement of the PW 1 at the place of occurrence on the basis of which Kashipur PS Case No. 27 dated 27th February 2004 was started. PW 23 is a common relative. Rest of the witnesses are official witnesses requiring no specific mention. PW 18 is the first I.O. who recorded the statement of the PW 1 at the place of occurrence on the basis of which Kashipur PS Case No. 27 dated 27th February 2004 was started. PW 23 is a common relative. Rest of the witnesses are official witnesses requiring no specific mention. On behalf of the defence DW 1 Dr. Sujit Chakraborty was examined. 13. The learned Trial Court at the outset in its judgment summarized the position in law as regards the charge u/s 304B IPC as follows:- Before delve deeper into the materials on record, it is contextually apposite to mention the main ingredients of the offence punishable u/s 304B of the I.P.C. (a) That the death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injury or the death occurs otherwise than under normal circumstance. (b) That the aforesaid fact spring within seven years of her marriage. (c) That soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative and (d) Such cruelty or harassment was done with the demand for dowry. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that section 113B of the Evidence Act makes a departure from the ordinary rule of onus of proof and direction is given to draw a presumption as regard dowry death, if it is shown that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment for any demand of dowry. Keeping an eye to the afore discussed principles, if we scan the evidence, then we find that Santra shaw died other than the normal circumstance and she died with seven (7) years of her marriage. In the instant case evidence and surrounding circumstance disclose that the death of the Santra Shaw was suicidal. 14. Evidently the ingredients (a) & (b) of an offence u/s 304B of the Indian Penal Code were present even according to the aforesaid analysis of the law made by the learned trial Court. 15. Mr. Sanyal however sharply commented upon the fact that the learned Trial Court proceeded on the premise that the victim had committed suicide. 16. It is not in dispute that the victim was given in marriage to the accused Binod according to Hindu Rites on 13th February, 2000. It is also not in dispute that at the time of marriage dowry both in cash and kind was given. 16. It is not in dispute that the victim was given in marriage to the accused Binod according to Hindu Rites on 13th February, 2000. It is also not in dispute that at the time of marriage dowry both in cash and kind was given. Police seized cash memos vide seizure list dated 27th February 2004 ext.15 which go to suggest that various articles including ornaments were purchased for nearly a sum or Rs. 1 lakh Cash money amounting to a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs according to the witnesses of the prosecution was paid which was also not disputed. Her dead body was noticed floating on 27th February, 2004 in the nearby pond of rajbari by P.W.23 Rajendra a relation of both the parties. He informed the police about the same. P.W.23 accompanied the dead body to the hospital where she was declared 'brought dead' by Dr. Misra. (P.W.6) He also issued a death certificate which is ext.2. The victim admittedly at the time of her death had a less than two years old male child. The child after the death of his mother has been and still is in the custody of the accused persons. 17. P.W.5 Dr. Karmakar and P.W.20 Dr. Das jointly performed the post mortem examination. According to them the death was due to the effect of drowning and injuries noted in the post mortem report. The injuries were fresh. Dr. Karmakar in his cross-examination deposed that if an injury is caused within 12 hours then it is termed fresh. Several injuries were found between the gluteal (buttock) and sacral (hip) region. The inquest was conducted by P.W.19 Mr. Mondal an executive officer of the State civil services. 18. He deposed as regards the injuries found by him as follows:- No external injury was visible from the outside excepting bleeding is discharged from the nose and muddy sign on both hands. I held inquest in presence of Santosh Kr. Shaw (brother of the deceased) and Rajendra Prosad Gupta (maternal uncle of the deceased) and I advised for Post Mortem Examination. I did not inquest the dead body stripping of the wearing apparels of the dead body. 19. Cross-examination of the P.W.19 was declined. 20. Bloodstains were detected in the wearing apparel of the deceased by the PW 15 Dr. Mrs. Sipra Roy, Senior Scientific Officer of the Forensic Science Laboratory. I did not inquest the dead body stripping of the wearing apparels of the dead body. 19. Cross-examination of the P.W.19 was declined. 20. Bloodstains were detected in the wearing apparel of the deceased by the PW 15 Dr. Mrs. Sipra Roy, Senior Scientific Officer of the Forensic Science Laboratory. She deposed, inter alia, that "blood was detected in the contents of items marked A and D". The packet 'D', according to her, contained "(i) one multi coloured printed sari bearing brownish stains almost all over and very little muddy stains, (ii) one orange coloured petticoat bearing brownish stains and muddy deposits almost all over, (iii) one pink coloured blouse bearing brownish stains all over and muddy deposits at places." 21. The cross-examination of Dr. Mrs. Sipra Roy is limited to these four sentences indicate below:- There is no note in my report that I received the Serologist report. It is enclosed in my report. Disintegrated means the composition of blood groups were totally destroyed or damaged. Blood group could not be detected in item No. A and D which I sent to Serologist. 22. PW 20 Dr. Das deposed during cross-examination that "a dead body floated on the water after 24 hours of drowning". The dead body was noticed floating by the PW 23 at about 10-10.30 A.M. It appears from his evidence that he had come to know about the same because his son, who was playing at the roof of his house, shouted from there. 23. The pond in which the dead body was floating was situated in a Rajbari which was surrounded by 3 meters high boundary walls as was found by the Sub-Inspector of the Calcutta Police (P.W.21) who deposed as follows:- I entered into the Rajbari through gate which was opened by the employee of this Rajbari. The height of boundary wall of premises No. 57/6 B.T. Road is 3 metre. Rajbari tank is situated 60 metre away from the premises No. 57/6 B.T. Road. The depth of Rajbari Tank in middle portion at the time of my measurement was 2.6 metres. The depth of place of drowning at the time of my measurement was about 1.35 metre. The Rajbari tank and garden is surrounded by a boundary wall. The height of boundary wall is 3 metre. 24. The depth of Rajbari Tank in middle portion at the time of my measurement was 2.6 metres. The depth of place of drowning at the time of my measurement was about 1.35 metre. The Rajbari tank and garden is surrounded by a boundary wall. The height of boundary wall is 3 metre. 24. Cross-examination of the PW 21 is restricted to the following few sentences which are set out in extenso:- The boundary wall covers tank, garden and Rajbari. The height of boundary wall was measured from inside. There is a garden at the western side of the premises No. 57/6 B.T. Road. It is not a fact that without holding proper measurement I prepared these sketch maps. 25. From the deposition of PW 8, darwan of the Rajbari, it appears that the pond in the Rajbari was not accessible to the public in general. The examination and the cross-examination of the PW 8 are both set out herein below:- I am a Gatekeeper (Darwan) of Rajbari. Prosenjit Dutta is my employer. I am employed there since last 35 years. The entire estate of Prosenjit Dutta including tank measuring about four Bighas. There is no school in Raj Bari compound. There is three gates in Rajbair compound. All the gates are remained under lock and key. The estate of Prosenjit Dutta is known as Raj Bari. On 27.2.2004 a deadbody was found in our tank. Police asked me to open the gate. There is no access of general public in Raj Bari Tank. Cross-examination:- I have no personal knowledge about the incident. 26. As regards the height of the boundary wall of the Rajbari in which the pond in question was situated there is corroborating evidence adduced by the PW 2 who deposed that the pond is accessible only through the gate which always remained under lock and key. 27. PW 7 deposed that the Rajbari was surrounded by high wall and it was not possible for anyone to enter the Rajbari without the permission of Raj family. We already have noticed from the evidence of the PW 21 that he had entered the Rajbari for the purpose of investigation after the gate-keeper had opened the door. 28. The evidence, indicated above was ignored by the learned Trial Court altogether. We already have noticed from the evidence of the PW 21 that he had entered the Rajbari for the purpose of investigation after the gate-keeper had opened the door. 28. The evidence, indicated above was ignored by the learned Trial Court altogether. He proceeded on the basis that the victim had committed suicide, whereas on the basis of the evidence discussed above the following conclusions can safely be drawn. (a) The victim had a less than two years old male child. (b) The child admittedly was with his mother and after her death is in the custody of the accused persons. (c) Regard being had to the human conduct and in the absence of any suggestion to the contrary it can safely be presumed u/s 114 of the Evidence Act that a child less than two years old cannot easily be separated from his mother. He is also expected to be a suckling baby. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in the case of Kali Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 , wherein the following view was taken:- The Court may, of course, presume, as mentioned in Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The illustrations mentioned in that Section, though taken from different spheres of human activity, are not exhaustive. They are based upon human experience and have to be applied in the context of the facts of each case. The illustrations are merely examples of circumstances in which certain presumptions may be made. Other presumptions of a similar kind in similar circumstances can be made under the provisions of the Section itself. Whether or not a presumption can be drawn under the Section in a particular case depends ultimately upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down. Human behaviour is so complex that room must be left for play in the joints. It is not possible to formulate a series of exact propositions and confine human behaviour within strait-jackets. The raw material here is far too complex to be susceptible of precise and exact propositions for exactness here is a fake. Human behaviour is so complex that room must be left for play in the joints. It is not possible to formulate a series of exact propositions and confine human behaviour within strait-jackets. The raw material here is far too complex to be susceptible of precise and exact propositions for exactness here is a fake. (d) According to the evidence of the Autopsy Surgeon (PW 20) the dead body of the victim could not have floated on the water before 24 hours of drowning. The dead body was noticed at around 10.30 A.M. on 27th February 2004. Therefore the drowning is not likely to have taken place later than 10.30 A.M. on 26th February, 2004. Had the deceased been separated from her child at 10 a.m. of 26th February 2004 the child was likely to have prevented her from doing so. If she gave the child a slip it would soon thereafter look for the mother and in that case the family members would have known that she was not at home. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that she parted with her child while he still was asleep and that could be anytime between the morning of 26th February 2004 and the intervening night of 25/26th February 2004. The probability is highly in favour of the victim having had separated from her child during the intervening night of 25/26th February 2004 regard being had to the fact that she also needed some time to contact the aforesaid injuries in her private parts which it is difficult to believe were contacted in the broad daylight and there is dependable evidence indicated above to show that the Rajbari is not accessible to the members of the public nor could any one enter the Rajbari, except through the maingate, without permission. The boundary walls were 3-meter high. 29. Therefore by the morning of 26th February 2004 the accused persons had definite knowledge that the deceased was not at home. There is no explanation, whatsoever either by way of suggestion to the witnesses of the prosecution or by any statement during examination u/s 313 CrPC by the accused persons to indicate as to what attempt, if any, did they make to find out the victim. Lack of any explanation by the accused person is a grave circumstance. There is no explanation, whatsoever either by way of suggestion to the witnesses of the prosecution or by any statement during examination u/s 313 CrPC by the accused persons to indicate as to what attempt, if any, did they make to find out the victim. Lack of any explanation by the accused person is a grave circumstance. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in the case of Rajalal Singh vs. State of Jharkhand reported in 2010 (3) SCC 539 : 2007 (15) SCC 415 wherein the Apex Court opined that "even if Gayatri committed suicide, it was obviously because she was extremely unhappy, and unless her husband gave a satisfactory alternative explanation for the suicide we have to take it that it was the persistent demand for dowry which led her to suicide". 30. From the evidence of the PW 1 it appears that On 26.2.04 after 12.00 O'clock night two employees of the accused persons came to our house and enquired about my sister thereafter they left the place. at about 3.00 O' clock morning my brother Rabi Kr. Shaw went to the house of the accused persons and he saw house of the accused person is under lock and key. 31. There is no cross-examination directed against the aforesaid evidence of the PW 1 except that " I do not know whether the accused persons lodged a diary at police station on 26.2.2004 over the fact of missing of my sister." 32. The diary allegedly lodged with the Police on 26th February, 2004 was neither produced nor was any of the police officer who came to depose in this case asked to enlighten the court about the same. The aforesaid information furnished by P.W.1 is corroborated by the following statement made by the P.W. 1 in the written complaint "yesterday dt. 26/27.02/2004 at 12.45 a.m. two lads came and asked me. "Have your sister came here?" I said. "No". Apprehending something had happened. I searched for her at place like Samar Sarani, Radio Lane, Bishwanath Park till three O'clock at night on a by-cycle but I could not find her. Then I sent my brother Rabi to the in - laws' house of my sister. But came back and said. "Their house is under lock and key". 33. "No". Apprehending something had happened. I searched for her at place like Samar Sarani, Radio Lane, Bishwanath Park till three O'clock at night on a by-cycle but I could not find her. Then I sent my brother Rabi to the in - laws' house of my sister. But came back and said. "Their house is under lock and key". 33. Rabi referred to in the written complaint is P.W.14 he deposed in that regard as follows:- On the night of 26th my elder brother told me two persons came from the house of the accused persons and asked about Santra Shaw. Thereafter my elder brother asked me to search my sister. Accordingly, I went here and there but I could not find my sister and on the next date I went to the house of the accused persons and saw the house of the accused persons is under lock and key. 34. There is no cross-examination directed against this part of the evidence of the P.W.14. This part of the evidence of P.W.14 has also been corroborated by P.W.1 who deposed that " at about 3.00 O' clock morning my brother Rabi Kr. Shaw went to the house of the accused persons and he saw house of the accused persons is under lock and key." 35. There is no cross-examination directed against the aforesaid deposition of P.W.1 either. We can therefore safely arrive at a finding that after the injured victim had to their knowledge gone under water, the accused persons without informing anything to any one of her near relations stealthily escaped from their house with the child. It is in this background that we have to consider whether the victim committed suicide. 36. It is not possible for a woman of 5 ft. 2 inch height, as would appear from the post mortem report, to scale the wall unaided even if she tried to do so. If she had attempted and suffered the injury appearing in her body she would in that case have been dissuaded from pursuing the course. The opinion of the autopsy surgeon P.W. 5 and P.W.20 is that the cause of death was drowning and the injuries. Had the injuries been superficial in nature, they could not have been ascribed to have contributed to the death of the deceased. The opinion of the autopsy surgeon P.W. 5 and P.W.20 is that the cause of death was drowning and the injuries. Had the injuries been superficial in nature, they could not have been ascribed to have contributed to the death of the deceased. P.W.5 during his examination-in-chief deposed that "such type of injury may be caused due to dragging, due to fall on irregularly and rough surface. Possibility of unconscious usually does not occur." 37. P.W.20, co-autopsy surgeon, deposed that "the injury which I found on the body of Santra Shaw at gluteal region and sacral region that may be caused if any one dragged her upon a rough surface against her will. That type of injury may be caused if the victim is naked. That type of injury may also be caused over wearing apparels. There was more than one mark of injury on the body of the victim." 38. We already have noticed from the evidence of P.W.15 the Scientific Officer of the Forensic Science Laboratory that the wearing apparels of the victim were blood stained. We also have noticed from the evidence of P.W.19 the Executive Officer of the State Civil Services that the dead body was bleeding from the nose. From the aforesaid evidence the inference which can be drawn is that either the victim was assaulted black and blue in her sensitive private parts and was thereafter thrown into the pond or that she was forcibly dragged and thrown into the pond of which the accused persons had full knowledge and that was the reason why they escaped from their residence without informing anyone in the family of the parents of the victim. 39. The learned Trial Court brushed aside the submissions made on behalf of the prosecution in that regard as follows : On careful perusal of the written argument it is crystal clear that the ld. P.P.-in-charge based his argument upon imagination and hypothesis and his argument wander wide from the charge and makes the prosecution case bizarre Ld. P.P. In-charge in his written argument in page-6 argued that "The matrimonial house of Santra Shaw is far away from Rajbari tank and that tank was well protected by the Darwan as well as surrounded 3 (three) meters big high wall. P.P. In-charge in his written argument in page-6 argued that "The matrimonial house of Santra Shaw is far away from Rajbari tank and that tank was well protected by the Darwan as well as surrounded 3 (three) meters big high wall. It may be presumed, as the case rest on circumstantial evidence Santra Shaw became unconscious condition after the injury inflicted upon her back and thereafter she thrown away in Raj Bari Tank and for that cause of death of Santra Shaw was due to drowning injuries." If that be the argument of Ld. P.P. in-charge then prosecution case falls between two stools and prosecution itself bid adue the charge against the accused persons and in support of his argument besides wild imagination there is no evidence and till the end, prosecution is groping in the dark. Other limbs of argument has no root in the record and of vacillating character. 40. The learned Trial Judge was clearly wrong in proceeding on the basis that the submissions made on behalf of the prosecution that the accused persons were or might have been instrumental in killing the victim would amount to jettisoning the charge u/s 304B of the Indian Penal Code. When the accused persons u/s 304B of the Indian Penal Code can be punished in case they are deemed to have caused the death, can it be said that they shall escape punishment u/s 304B of the Indian Penal Code if it can be shown that they may have in fact caused or abetted the death? 41. The theory of suicide has been adopted by the learned Trial court on the basis of the following reasoning appearing at page Nos.14-16 of the judgement :- From the evidence of D.W.1 and Exhibit-A series (A 1 to 15) it is crystal clear that the Santra shaw was a patient of Paranoid Schizophrenia. Evidence of P.W.1 and Exhibits-A series disclose that Santra Shaw was treated by the D.W.-1 who is a practisng psychiatrist. He treated by the D.W.1 who is a practising psychiatrist. He treated her from 30.3.2002 to 12.2.2004 and it further appears from his evidence that the ailment of Santra Shaw was such a nature that she was hospitalised at Little Hut Nirikshan Kendra, Kaikhali. On behalf of the prosecution this witness was cross examined in two different dates. Ld. He treated by the D.W.1 who is a practising psychiatrist. He treated her from 30.3.2002 to 12.2.2004 and it further appears from his evidence that the ailment of Santra Shaw was such a nature that she was hospitalised at Little Hut Nirikshan Kendra, Kaikhali. On behalf of the prosecution this witness was cross examined in two different dates. Ld. P.P. In-charge on 1.2.2004 by filing a petition prayed for adjournment and in that petition stated that adjournment may kindly be given to ascertain the genuinity of the evidence of D.W.1 what he deposed, prayer of the prosecution was allowed and Ld. P.P. In-charge again cross examined the D.W.1 on 18.2.2006. In spite of that nothing has been elicited or pointed out by the prosecution which may cast doubt about the veracity of his evidence. It is settled principle of law that the evidence of defence witness is not to be ignored by the Court, like other witness his evidence has to be decided on the touch stone of the reliability, credibility and trustworthiness. In this instant case I find no animus of the doctor to adduce false evidence, exhibit-A series gives an impression of its genuinity. On the contrary the argument as put forward by the Ld. P.P. on the point of A series as well as veracity of the D.W.1 is nothing but hopeless and baseless. Be that as it may, from the evidence of the D.W.1 it is oozing out that in case of schizophrenia there is disrupted thought process, preception, cognition and social behavior. In case of paranoid schizophrenia delusion and hallucination will be present and paranoid schizophrenic patient is prone to commit suicide. Condition of the schizophrenic patient changes time to time. Schizophrenic patient usually gives less indication about his next behaviour. His mode of action is unpredictable. When schizophrenic patient is under treatment at that time he may commit suicide. Suicide is a major cause of death among patient of schizophrenia. So the chance of committing suicide by Santra Shaw due to her mental illness i.e. schizophrenia cannot be ruled out. On the contrary I have a great doubt about the veracity of the key prosecution witnesses. They all suppressed the fact of mental illness of the Santra Shaw. From the very beginning of trial question was put to them to that effect but they plead ignorance. On the contrary I have a great doubt about the veracity of the key prosecution witnesses. They all suppressed the fact of mental illness of the Santra Shaw. From the very beginning of trial question was put to them to that effect but they plead ignorance. P.W.1 in his evidence stated that he does not know whether his sister was psychiatric patient or not or any psychiatric treatment was given to her. P.W. 3 stated that his daughter was mentally fit, she was never treated by any doctor but exhibit-A series falsify his evidence P.W.13 stated in her evidence that she did not know whether the Santra Shaw was a psychiatric patient or not and she had no knowledge whether the accused persons treated her daughter for a pretty long time. She does not know whether the accused persons spent two and half lakh rupees for treatment of Santra Shaw. So from these evidence it is clear that these witnesses tried to dodge the question put to that effect. Besides that the totality of the circumstances indicates that, having full knowledge about the mental illness of Santra Shaw prosecution has tried to suppress that fact and anticipating that such type of question may arise and to show the mental fitness of Santra Shaw prosecuting party produced and proved the Mark Sheet of W.B Council of Higher Secondary Education other wise seizure production of exhibit-6 was unnecessary and irrelevant to this case with reference to charge. More over exhibit-6 proves nothing because her dysfunction of mind i.e mental illness started long after the Higher Secondary Examination. Suppression of this vital fact of mental illness makes the probative force of the evidence of P.W.1,3 and 13 sterile and exaggeration and suppression of the vital fact not only affect the testimony of the P.Ws but also genuinity and authenticity of the prosecution case. 42. The assurance expressed by the learned Trial Court as regards the evidence of the D.W.1 including the prescriptions collectively marked Ext. A coupled with the caustic remarks as regards the credibility of the witnesses of the prosecution and branding them as liars who, according to him, suppressed the truth does not disclose that the learned Trial Court applied Judicial mind or scrutinised the evidence adduced by the parties dispassionately. A coupled with the caustic remarks as regards the credibility of the witnesses of the prosecution and branding them as liars who, according to him, suppressed the truth does not disclose that the learned Trial Court applied Judicial mind or scrutinised the evidence adduced by the parties dispassionately. The 15 prescriptions collectively marked Ext.A cannot be relied upon for the following reasons:- (a) The original prescriptions, to begin with, were not produced from proper custody. The prescriptions in the normal course of events should have been in the custody of the accused persons. The prescriptions were however produced by Dr. Sujit Chakraborty (D.W.1) without any explanation whatsoever as to how did he come to possess them. Reference in this regard may made to the following deposition of D.W.1. All these prescriptions are written by me and it bears my handwriting and signature (Let these prescriptions be marked as Exts.A series. The prescriptions were tendered on 1st February, 2006. The order sheet dated 1st February, 2006 does not furnish any other information which to be precise reads as follows:- Accused persons are present in Court on C.B. On behalf of the accused one witness Dr. Sujit Chakraborty is present in Court. He is examined in chief. He proves prescriptions which are marked Exbt.A series and cross-examined in part. At this stage ld. P.P. in charge by filing a petition prays for an adjournment as because he has to verify these documents. Prayer is considered and allowed. Fix 18.2.2006 for further cross-examination. Accused as before. (b) The prescriptions were not proved in accordance with law. They were marked Ext."A" series on the basis of following deposition of the D.W.1 which is by no means enough for reasons to be discussed hereafter. All these prescriptions are written by me and it bears my hand writing and signature (Let these prescriptions be marked as exbt-A series). The deposition of the witness during his examination-in-chief that the patient was under his treatment during the period between 30th March 2002 and 12th February 2004 does not go to establish that these prescriptions (collectively marked exbt. 'A') were contemporaneously prepared nor does that establish that the 15 prescriptions contained in Ext.A series truly or faithfully reflect the physical and mental condition of the victim. (c) The witness identified the accused Binod and deposed that it is the accused Binod who took the victim to his chamber. 'A') were contemporaneously prepared nor does that establish that the 15 prescriptions contained in Ext.A series truly or faithfully reflect the physical and mental condition of the victim. (c) The witness identified the accused Binod and deposed that it is the accused Binod who took the victim to his chamber. Name of the husband or the name of the father of the patient has not been indicated in any of the prescriptions. None of the fifteen prescriptions contain the residential address of the patient. The prescription dated 24th September 2003 contains an endorsement "Patient not seen. Reported only by Bijay Kumar Shaw (brother)". (d) The prescriptions dated 24th September 2003, 11th October 2003 and 17th November 2003 contain an endorsement that patient was not seen and medicines were prescribed on the basis of reporting but the doctor did not in his deposition disclose the fact that medicines were prescribed by him at least on three occasions without seeing the patient. (e) The prescription dated 16th July 2003 contains an advice that the patient should be hospitalized at Little Hut Nirikhan Kendra, Kaikhali. No document was produced to show that the victim was ever hospitalized for any psychiatric ailment. (f) Not one cash memo was produced to show that the medicines prescribed in the Ext. "A" series or any part or portion thereof was ever purchased. (g) Except for prescription dated 30th March 2002, all the prescriptions contain the following code no. "KOL/230602/05". The doctor did not explain as to what did the patient code number and in particular 05 indicate which prima facie goes to show the year of registration of the patient. All that he deposed in that regard is "I started using code number in respect of each patient from 9th June 2002 for keeping records of the patient. I have not brought those records before this court today. I keep the record of the patient in my personal computer." (h) The first prescription dated 30th March 2002 contains an interpolation. The date originally in all likelihood was written 20.4.2002. Thereafter the same was corrected to read 30th March 2002. The same page contains another entry dated 6th April 2002. If the original entry was 20th April 2002 then the second entry could not have been dated 6th April 2002. In the second entry it is stated that the patient was not seen. Thereafter the same was corrected to read 30th March 2002. The same page contains another entry dated 6th April 2002. If the original entry was 20th April 2002 then the second entry could not have been dated 6th April 2002. In the second entry it is stated that the patient was not seen. The medicines were prescribed on the basis of the report. (i) All the fifteen prescriptions covering a period of nearly two years contain the age of the victim to be 23 years. The victim, according to the death certificate (exbt.2) was 23 years old on 27th February 2004. The accused Binod was present when the victim was declared brought dead by the PW 6. The information appearing in the death certificate can reasonably be presumed to have been furnished by the accused Binod. Except for the accused Binod no other family member was identified by the DW. Therefore the age appearing in the prescriptions was presumably either disclosed by the accused Binod or in his presence by the victim. It is difficult to believe that the accused Binod was not aware that the victim was not 23 years old on 30th March 2002. The aforesaid incongruities are only consistent with the probability that all the prescriptions were prepared in one sitting long after the death of the victim for the purpose of propping up a false defence. (j) It is alleged in the prescription dated 24th September 2003 that the medicines were prescribed without seeing the patient and on the basis of reporting made by the brother Bijay. The doctor did not depose any such thing. Had the D.W. really prescribed medicines on the basis of reported version of Bijoy, a brother of the victim, in that case when the brothers were in the witness box they were bound to have been suggested that Bijoy, a brother of the victim, had taken active part in the psychiatric treatment of the victim. But that was never done. Whether the victim had any brother by the name Bijoy is also unknown (k) Besides describing the symptoms of Schizophrenia and the tendency of a patient of that kind all that he deposed during his examination-in-chief is as follows:- I am a Private Medical Practitioner. I have passed M.B.B.S and D.P.M. I am practising since 1994 as psychiatrist. I am practising at Arham Clinic, 70 Chittaranjan Avenue and other place. I have passed M.B.B.S and D.P.M. I am practising since 1994 as psychiatrist. I am practising at Arham Clinic, 70 Chittaranjan Avenue and other place. I treated one Santra Shaw, age about 23 years, w/o Binod Kr. Shaw. She was under my treatment since 30th March 2002 to 12th Feb 2004. Santra Shaw was a patient of Paranoid Schizophrenia. She was taken to my chamber by the accused Binod Shaw. (Witness identifies the accused Binod Shaw in dock). I examined the Santra Shaw on 30.3.02 for the first time and on examination it appears to me that she was suffering from schizophrenia disorder. On 16.7.03 I advised immediate hospitalization at Little Hut Nirikshan Kendra, Kaikhali. I advised so for the reasons as the patient defaults in taking drugs, acute exaggeration, refusing clinical examination and medicine. She was admitted to Little Hut Nirikshan Kendra, Kaikhali and I treated her at there. Patient Santra Shaw was taken to me for her examination for the last time on 12.2.04. On that day, on examination of the patient, it appears to me she improve her condition but she complained of headache. 43. During his cross-examination he admitted as follows:- I can not say whether Santra Shaw stated to me that she was a student of Vidyasagar College and passed Higher Secondary Examination or not. I have not brought the bed-head ticket in respect of Santra Shaw of Nirikshan Kendra, Khaikali. I can not say how many days Santra Shaw was admitted at Nirikshan Kendra, Khaikali. I cannot say whether father and mother of the patient came to my chamber or not. There is no note in history sheets whether I examined father and mother of the patient or not. I have not kept any photograph of Santra Shaw or signature of Santra Shaw in history sheets or any special features relating to identification of Santra Shaw. I have passed Medical Examination (MBBS Course) from Calcutta Medical College. There is no note in history sheets of Santra Shaw that she has self destructing impulse. I do not know whether medicine which I prescribed for Santra Shaw was purchased or not? It is not a fact that the Exhibits 'A' series does not relate to the treatment of Santra Shaw. It is not a fact that the accused Binod Shaw procured these prescriptions for the purpose of this case. I do not know whether medicine which I prescribed for Santra Shaw was purchased or not? It is not a fact that the Exhibits 'A' series does not relate to the treatment of Santra Shaw. It is not a fact that the accused Binod Shaw procured these prescriptions for the purpose of this case. There is no note in prescription dated 12.2.2004 (Exhbt. A) whether Santra Shaw is married or unmarried. There is no note about the residential address of Santra Shaw. There is no note in my prescription who brought Santra Shaw to me. But in my personal record there is such note. Patient complained before me about her depression. As such it is evident from the prescription that she was able to speak at the time of my examination. There is no note in my prescription about duration of my examination. There is no note in my prescription that the patient had/has a tendency to commit suicide. If at the time of examination there would be any abnormal behaviour, I must note it. I verbally gave advice to the patient party to keep the patient in safe condition. It is not a fact that I did not examine Santra Shaw on 12.2.04. It is not a fact that the prescriptions relating to treatment of Santra Shaw are manufactured documents in connivance with the accused persons. There is no note in prescriptions that the relatives of Santra Shaw reported me that Santra Shaw had a tendency to commit suicide. 44. For the reasons indicated above we are of the opinion that the prescriptions were not duly proved nor do the prescriptions depict the mental or physical condition of the victim. These prescriptions, we are inclined to hold, have been manufactured in the year 2005 which is why the registration number is KOL230602/05 whereas the victim died in 2004. That is the reason why the DW1 did not explain as to what did the figures "05" signify. That is also the reason why not one cash memo was produced, why were not the records of the hospital produced; why were PWs not suggested that Bijoy, a brother of victim, was involved in the treatment. The age of the victim was copied from Ext.2 (death certificate) for the purpose of this case in one sitting. That is also the reason why not one cash memo was produced, why were not the records of the hospital produced; why were PWs not suggested that Bijoy, a brother of victim, was involved in the treatment. The age of the victim was copied from Ext.2 (death certificate) for the purpose of this case in one sitting. Had the victim been a mental patient this fact would have been brought to the knowledge of the police by the accused Binod or his mother the accused Kamala. They were arrested by the police on 27th February 2004 and were released on bail on 20th May 2004 pursuant to an order of the High Court granting them bail. The third accused Kalika Prasad was arrested on 4th February 2005 after warrant of arrest was repeatedly issued. He was granted bail on the selfsame day he was arrested. On the basis of search warrant issued by the learned Magistrate the matrimonial home of the victim was searched. The documents regarding her education were found by the police and were seized but no such prescription was found by them as would appear from the seizure list dated 3rd April 2004 marked exhbt.4. The records reveal that on 3rd March 2004 the accused Binod led the police to the room where he used to live. The room was searched but nothing was found and a nil seizure list was prepared which was duly signed by the learned ACJM on 4th March 2004. The records further reveal that another room occupied by the accused Binod was also searched by the police being led by the accused Binod but nothing was found and a nil seizure list was prepared. It was also signed by the ACJM on 4th March 2004. The mere fact that the prescriptions were marked Ext.1 does not establish that the contents thereof are true and correct. The DW did not as a matter of fact depose that the contents of Ext.A were true or correct or that the same were made in the usual course of business or in the discharge of professional duty or that the Ext.A truly or correctly contained the physical or mental condition of the patient. 45. In the case of Sait Tarajee Khimchand and Others Vs. 45. In the case of Sait Tarajee Khimchand and Others Vs. Yelamarti Satyam alias Satteyya and Others, (1972) 4 SCC 562 , the following view was expressed:- The mere marking of an exhibit does not dispense with the proof of documents. It is common place to say that the negative cannot be proved. 46. In the case of Ramji Dayawala and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Invest Import, (1981) 1 SCC 80 , the Apex Court opined as follows:- Undoubtedly, mere proof of the handwriting of a document would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the facts stated in the document. If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. 47. In the case of Om Prakash Berlia and Another Vs. Unit Trust of India and Others, AIR 1983 Bom 1 , it was held that the documents are also required to be proved like any other fact. To be precise the following views were expressed:- The act requires, first, the production of the original document. If the original document is not available, secondary evidence may be given. This is to prove what the document states. Upon this the document becomes admissible, except where it is signed or handwritten, wholly or in part. In such a case the second requirement is, under S. 67, that the signature and handwriting must be proved. Further, where the party tendering the document finds it necessary to prove the truth of its contents, that is, the truth of what it states, he must do so in the manner he would prove a relevant fact. As the cases of Bishwanath Rai Vs. Sachhidanand Singh,); Madholal Sindhu ( AIR 1954 Bom 305 ); and Mr. D. Mohammed Yusuf and Another Vs. D. and Another, AIR 1968 Bom 112 ) indicate, this is generally done by recalling the author of the document. 48. In the case of Probhat Chandra Kanrar and Others Vs. Sm. As the cases of Bishwanath Rai Vs. Sachhidanand Singh,); Madholal Sindhu ( AIR 1954 Bom 305 ); and Mr. D. Mohammed Yusuf and Another Vs. D. and Another, AIR 1968 Bom 112 ) indicate, this is generally done by recalling the author of the document. 48. In the case of Probhat Chandra Kanrar and Others Vs. Sm. Rani Bala Kanrar and Others, AIR 1989 Cal 202 , this Court citing an earlier judgment of a Division Bench held that in deciding the genuineness of documents "the important consideration should be whether they were acted upon or not". We have already indicated that the defence did not produce even one cash memo to show that any medicine pursuant to any of the 15 prescriptions contained in Ext 'A' was ever purchased by them. There is as such no question of acting upon them. 49. Mr. Sudipto Moitra, learned Advocate appearing for the accused-respondents addressed the Court on 11th November 2011, 14th November 2011 and 15th November 2011. The hearing was not however concluded. When we called upon Mr. Moitra during his submissions to explain the aforesaid factors concerning the evidence of the doctor examined on behalf of the defence and the prescriptions produced by him, Mr. Moitra submitted that he would not rely upon the prescriptions. However on 16th November 2011 he changed his stand before concluding his submission and submitted that the prescriptions collectively marked exbt. 'A' series had duly been proved, according to him, and his clients were relying upon them. 50. We have indicated our reasons why the prescriptions were not proved in accordance with law. We are also of the view that the prescription ext.A series were prepared by the accused persons in unholy alliance with the DW 1 Dr. Chakraborty in order to put up a false defence. The learned trial Judge was wrong in opining that "In this instant case I find no animus of the doctor to adduce false evidence. Exhibit-A series gives an impression of its genuinity. On the contrary the argument as put forward by the ld. PP on the point of A series as well as veracity of the DW 1 is nothing but hopeless and baseless." 51. The opinion expressed by the learned Trial Judge only goes to show that he did not apply his judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. PP on the point of A series as well as veracity of the DW 1 is nothing but hopeless and baseless." 51. The opinion expressed by the learned Trial Judge only goes to show that he did not apply his judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned trial judge acted arbitrarily on inadmissible evidence and held that the near relations of the victim had suppressed the facts as regards the alleged mental illness of the victim Santra Shaw. He was wrong in opining that the ignorance pleaded by the witnesses as regards the mental illness of the victim was falsified by the ext. 'A' series. It did not occur to him that the Ext.-A series themselves were false. It is strange that it did not occur to the learned Trial court that no one purchases medicines without a cash memo or that hospitalization of a patient is always backed by documentary evidence or that the suggestion given to the father of the victim (P.W.3) that the accused person had spent 21/2 lakh of rupees over a period of 21/2 years for treatment of the deceased for psychiatric ailment was not at all proved by any legal evidence. The learned trial Court made a grievous error in accepting the version of the defence on the basis of inadmissible evidence. 52. The learned Trial Court ignoring the evidence on record opined that the death was suicidal. The Autopsy Surgeon did not depose that it was a case of suicide. PW 20 deposed that "death was caused due to asphyxia" which could very well have been homicidal. The fact that the accused persons did not explain the facts as to when and how did the victim contact the injuries and got drowned in the pond in the Rajbari and the steps taken by them after they became aware that the victim was not at home including the handling of the suckling baby and their disappearance from their residence an adverse inference against them has to be raised. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in the case of Collector of Customs, Madras and Others Vs. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in the case of Collector of Customs, Madras and Others Vs. D. Bhoormall, (1974) 2 SCC 544 , wherein the following view was taken:- The other cardinal principle having an important bearing on the incidence of burden of proof is that sufficiency and weight of the evidence is to be considered- to use the words of Lord Mansfield in Blatch v. Archar (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at p.65 "according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove, and in the power of the other to have contradicted". Since it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible for the prosecution to prove facts which are especially within the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden. Smuggling is clandestine conveying of goods to avoid legal duties. Secrecy and stealth being its covering guards, it is impossible for the Preventive Department to unravel every link of the process. Many facts relating to this illicit business remain in the special or peculiar knowledge of the person concerned in it. On the principle underlying Section 106, Evidence Act, the burden to establish those facts is cast on the person concerned and if he fails to establish or explain those facts, an adverse inference of facts may arise against him, which coupled with the presumptive evidence adduced by the prosecution or the Department would rebut the initial presumption of innocence in favour of that person and in the result prove him guilty. As pointed out by Best in 'Law of Evidence' (12th Edn. Article 320, page 291), the "presumption of innocence is, no doubt, presumptio juris: but every day's practice shows that it may be successfully encountered by the presumption of guilt arising from the recent (unexplained) possession of stolen property," though the latter is only a presumption of fact. Thus the burden on the prosecution or the Department may be considerably lightened even by such presumption of fact arising in their favour. However, this does not mean that the special or peculiar knowledge of the person proceeded against will relieve the prosecution or the Department altogether of the burden of producing some evidence in respect of that fact in issue. It will only alleviate that burden to discharge which very slight evidence may suffice. 53. Mr. However, this does not mean that the special or peculiar knowledge of the person proceeded against will relieve the prosecution or the Department altogether of the burden of producing some evidence in respect of that fact in issue. It will only alleviate that burden to discharge which very slight evidence may suffice. 53. Mr. Moitra, learned Counsel appearing for the accused-respondent drew our attention to the judgment in the case of Behram Khurshed Pesikaka Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 123 , wherein the Apex Court opined as follows:- In a criminal case unless the prosecution proves a contravention of a provision that is legally enforceable and valid, it cannot succeed. No onus is cast on the accused to prove that his case falls under that part of the section which has been held unenforceable. The High Court was in error in placing the onus on the accused to prove that he had consumed alcohol that could be consumed without a permit merely on proof that he was smelling of alcohol. In our judgment, that was not the correct approach to the question. The bare circumstance that a citizen accused of an offence u/s 66(b) is smelling of alcohol is compatible both with his innocence as well as his guilt. It is a neutral circumstance. The smell of alcohol may be due to the fact that the accused had contravened the enforceable part of Section 139b) of the Prohibition Act. It may well be due also to the fact that he had taken alcohol which fell under the unenforceable and inoperative part of the section. That being so, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that the alcohol of which he was smelling was such that it came within the category of prohibited alcohols and the onus was not discharged or shifted by merely proving a smell of alcohol. The onus thus cast on the prosecution may be light or heavy according to the circumstances of each case. The intensity of the smell itself may be such that it may negative its being of a permissible variety. Expert evidence may prove that consumption in small doses of medicinal or other preparations permitted cannot produce the smell or a state of body or mind amounting to drunkenness. The intensity of the smell itself may be such that it may negative its being of a permissible variety. Expert evidence may prove that consumption in small doses of medicinal or other preparations permitted cannot produce the smell or a state of body or mind amounting to drunkenness. Be that as it may, the question is one of fact, to be decided according to the circumstance of each case. It is open to the accused to prove in defence that what he consumed was not prohibited alcohol, but failure of the defence to prove it cannot lead to his conviction unless it is established to the satisfaction of the judge by the prosecution that the case comes within the enforceable part of Section 13(b), contravention of which alone, is made an offence under the provisions of Section 66 of the Bombay Prohibition Act. 54. This judgment had its peculiar facts and circumstances that "smelling of alcohol was compatible both with the accused's innocence as well as his guilt". But in the case before us the conduct of the accused/respondents indicated above including fabrication of false defence in collusion with Dr. Chakraborty and the other attending circumstances are not compatible with the innocence of the accused. 55. Mr. Moitra then referred to the judgment in the case of Shah Guman Mal Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, wherein the judgment in the case of Behram Khurshid Pesikaka was considered and the following view was expressed:- The matter was considered at great length in the case of Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay where this Court holding that Section 106 could not be construed to place the onus on the accused to prove the prosecution case, observed as follows: Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be construed to mean that the accused has by reason of the circumstance that the facts are especially within his own knowledge to prove that he has not committed the offence (see Attygallo v. King, also In re Kanakasabai Pillai). It is for the prosecution to prove that he has committed the offence and that burden is not in any manner whatsoever displaced by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. These observations were made with respect to the peculiar facts of that case. It is for the prosecution to prove that he has committed the offence and that burden is not in any manner whatsoever displaced by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. These observations were made with respect to the peculiar facts of that case. It appears that what had happened in that case was that the appellant was found to be guilty of an offence under the Prohibition Act and the only evidence to prove his guilt was that he was smelling of alcohol. This Court held that it was for the prosecution to prove the contravention of the provisions of the Prohibition Act and to prove further that a particular intoxicant which was a liquor under the Act, was consumed by the accused and merely because the accused knew that he had taken (which was a matter within his knowledge) could not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving that the liquor consumed was an intoxicant as defined under the Act. It is, therefore, clear that the observations made by this Court regarding the interpretation of Section 106 of the Evidence Act would not apply to the facts of the present case. In the case of Issardas Daulat Ram v. Union of India this Court, after discussing the admitted circumstances of the case, found that the relevant pieces of evidence would prove the guilty knowledge of the accused. That was a case which arose u/s 178-A of the Sea Customs Act and this Court observed as follows: If the gold now in question had been imported earlier it would be extremely improbable that the gold would remain in the same shape of bars and with the same fineness as when imported after the passage of this length of time. It was precisely for this reason that at the stage of the enquiry before the Collector the principal point which was urged on behalf of the appellants was to deny that the seized gold was of foreign origin and it is the nature of the defence that accounts for the order of the Collector dealing almost wholly with the consideration of that question. In order to reach his finding about the gold being smuggled the Collector has referred to the conduct of the appellants.... These were undoubtedly relevant pieces of evidence which bore on the question regarding the character of the gold, whether it was licit or illicit. In order to reach his finding about the gold being smuggled the Collector has referred to the conduct of the appellants.... These were undoubtedly relevant pieces of evidence which bore on the question regarding the character of the gold, whether it was licit or illicit. Learned Counsel is, therefore, not right in his submission regarding the absence of material before the Collector to justify the finding recorded in para 6 we have set out earlier. 56. In the aforesaid case the judgment in the case of Behram Khurshid Pesikaka (supra) was explained and the conduct of the accused, it was held, provided proof of his guilty mind which he had failed to explain. 57. Mr. Moitra also drew our attention to the judgment in the case of P. Mani Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 3 SCC 161 , wherein the Apex Court opined that it was for the prosecution to prove the involvement of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. He drew our attention to paragraph 10 of the judgment which reads as follows:- 10. We do not agree with the High Court. In a criminal case, it was for the prosecution to prove the involvement of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt. It was not a case where both, husband and wife, were last seen together inside a room. The incident might have taken place in a room but the prosecution itself has brought out evidences to the effect that the children who had been watching television were asked to go out by the deceased and then she bolted the room from inside. As they saw smoke coming out from the room, they rushed towards the same and broke open the door. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, to which reference was made by the High Court in the aforementioned situation, cannot be said to have any application whatsoever. 57. This judgment is distinguishable on facts because the evidence adduced by the prosecution itself demonstrated lack of involvement of the accused. 58. For the reasons discussed above we are of the opinion that the victim did not commit suicide. Her death, was homicidal with the active connivance of the accused persons, within four years of marriage. 59. The next point of substance is whether the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand for dowry. Her death, was homicidal with the active connivance of the accused persons, within four years of marriage. 59. The next point of substance is whether the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand for dowry. We would like to tabulate the evidence in that regard which is as follows:- (a) PW 18, a Sub-Inspector of Police, deposed that after lifting the dead body from the water he recorded the statement of Santosh Kumar Shaw. The statement was read over to him and after the maker of the statement admitted the same to have been correctly written he signed the statement. On the basis of that statement a case was started by the Kashipur PS u/s 304B/34of the Indian Penal Code. From that statement, it appears, that at the time of marriage Rs. 2 lakh cash along with other dowry were given and a jeep was promised to be given within six months. When the jeep could not be given within the agreed time all the three accused persons started beating the victim and torturing her mentally. In order to buy time a sum of Rs. 15,000/- was given and further time for six months was granted. Since the jeep could not be given even within the extended time a further sum of Rs. 40,000/- was given. The accused persons waited for another six months. When the vehicle was not given to them and the PW 1 finally told them that he was unable to give the promised jeep, the accused persons increased the intensity of torture about which the PW 1 was kept informed by his sister the victim herein. The accused persons did not allow the PW 1 to meet his sister nor did they permit the victim to perform the rites of rakhi nor would they send the victim to her father's house. About twenty days before the incident, the PW 1 had gone to the house of the accused persons with an invitation to attend his brother's marriage ceremony. Not only that they did not accept the invitation but they also told him that until and unless the jeep was given the victim or her husband would not attend any of their functions. Not only that they did not accept the invitation but they also told him that until and unless the jeep was given the victim or her husband would not attend any of their functions. About 12/13 days prior to the incident the victim over telephone had informed the PW 1 that the accused persons were beating her severely. She requested him to take her away. He rushed to her matrimonial home accompanied by Rajendra and offered a sum of Rs 1,50,000/- but they refused to accept anything less than Rs. 2,50,000/-. In the night of 26th/27th February 2004 two boys came from the house of the accused persons enquiring about the victim. Apprehending that something might have gone wrong he himself went out to find his sister. He also sent his brother Rabi (PW 14) to do so. The victim was not found. Rabi reported that the house of the accused persons was under lock and key. On 27th February in the morning they again had searched. At around 11 A.M. he received a call from Rajendra Prasad Gupta (PW 23) and in pursuance thereof he went to the gate of Rajbari and found the dead body of his sister lying in the stair of the pond. Police personnel were also present. He identified the dead body and his statement was recorded. P.W.1 During his deposition deposed about the dowry paid at the time of marriage and the jeep promised to be given. He also deposed about the torture because they had failed to give the promised jeep to the accused person. He also deposed about a mediation in pursuance whereof payment of a sum of Rs. 15,000/- and further payment of a sum of Rs. 40,000/- were made. But the ultimate omission on their part to give a jeep to the accused exposed the victim to continuous torture by the accused persons. He also deposed about what transpired when he had gone to invite them. He also deposed about the visit of 2 of the employees of the accused persons in the night of 26th February, 2004 inquiring about the victim. He also deposed about the fact that upon search the house of the victim was found under lock and key. In sum and substance the deposition of the P.W.1 in Court is fully corroborated by the written complaint lodged by him. He also deposed about the fact that upon search the house of the victim was found under lock and key. In sum and substance the deposition of the P.W.1 in Court is fully corroborated by the written complaint lodged by him. There is no denial of the deposition of the P.W.1 that the accused persons used to beat the victim. There is no denial of the deposition of the P.W.1 that from time to time payments were made amounting to a sum of Rs. 15,000/- and 40,000/- in order to gain time for the purpose of making over the jeep. There is no denial of the deposition that 2 employees of the accused persons called at the house of the P.W.1 inquiring about the victim in the night of 26th February, 2004. There is no denial of the fact that the house of the accused persons in the night of 26th / 27th February, 2004 was found under lock and key. 60. Mr. Moitra, learned Counsel appearing for the accused-respondent criticising the evidence of the PW 1 submitted that even assuming that the victim was harassed in connection with a demand of jeep but the evidentiary value of the deposition of the PW 1 was shaken by the fact that the aforesaid allegation was not made by him in his statement u/s 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 61. We are unable to attach any importance to the submission for the simple reason that the PW 1 is the de facto complainant. He made a statement at the place of occurrence which was recorded by the police on the basis of which the case was started. The statement made by him has been marked exhibit 1. In the aforesaid statement made u/s 154 CrPC the PW 1 has referred to the harassment both mental and physical meted out to the victim in connection with the omission on their part to meet the demand of jeep agreed to be given at the time marriage. A statement u/s 161 is made subsequent to the statement made in the written complaint and therefore a statement u/s 161 CrPC cannot have greater value. The fact that the statement has elaborately been made extempore at the place of occurrence provides greater assurance than any statement u/s 161 CrPC because in such a case there can be no improvement. A statement u/s 161 is made subsequent to the statement made in the written complaint and therefore a statement u/s 161 CrPC cannot have greater value. The fact that the statement has elaborately been made extempore at the place of occurrence provides greater assurance than any statement u/s 161 CrPC because in such a case there can be no improvement. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in the case of Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 , wherein the Apex Court opined that:- Only such omissions which amount to contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. 62. Previous statement would include a statement made in the written complaint. 63. Reference may also be made to the judgment in the case of Alamgir Vs. State (NCT, Delhi), (2003) 1 SCC 21 , wherein the Apex Court opined as follows:- Admittedly, this piece of evidence was not available in the statement of the witness u/s 161 CrPC, but does it take away the nature and character of the evidence in the event there is some omission on the part of the police official? Would that be taken recourse to as amounting to rejection of an otherwise creditworthy and acceptable evidence the answer, in our view, cannot but be in the negative. 64. Mr. Moitra then contended that the deposition of PW 1 is that on 13th February 2004 he went to the matrimonial home of his sister but surprisingly he did not even meet his sister. 65. The learned Counsel has missed the fact that the PW 1 deposed that the accused persons did not allow the victim to meet any of her brothers or the parents. Therefore the reason why the PW 1 did not meet the sister is more than clear. The learned Counsel also has missed the fact that during cross-examination it was not even suggested to the PW 1 that he had untruly deposed that the victim was not permitted to meet her brothers or her parents. 66. Therefore the reason why the PW 1 did not meet the sister is more than clear. The learned Counsel also has missed the fact that during cross-examination it was not even suggested to the PW 1 that he had untruly deposed that the victim was not permitted to meet her brothers or her parents. 66. The third submission made by Mr. Moitra with regard to the evidence of the PW 1 was that the deposition of the PW 1 as regards his visit on 13th February is not in conformity with the contents of the written complaint. In support of his submission he drew our attention to the fact that in the written complaint he alleged that "about 20 days ago I went to the in-laws house of my sister with the invitation card in order to invite them but Kaliprasad and my sister's mother-in-law did not allow me to meet my sister". 67. From the witness box he deposed as follows :- On 13.2.2004 I went to invite the accused persons in connection with marriage of my brother but the accused persons again put forwarded their demand of jeep and stated to me they will consider about the acceptance of the invitation after handing over the jeep. 68. Mr. Moitra contended that the written complaint was lodged on 27th February 2004. If he had gone to invite the accused persons twenty days before then the possible date of visit was 7th February 2004 but the deposition in Court is that he visited the matrimonial home of the victim to invite the accused persons on 13th February. He therefore contended that the evidence of the PW 1 was not reliable. 69. We are unable to accept this submission. The mathematical precision sought for by the learned Counsel is not required because it was not disputed by the defence nor was the PW 1 suggested that he had never been to their house to invite the accused persons to attend the marriage of one of his brothers nor is it their case that they had no occasion to refuse to accept the invitation. The object of Court is to arrive at the truth. The object is not to find excuses for the purpose of recording an order of acquittal. The object of Court is to arrive at the truth. The object is not to find excuses for the purpose of recording an order of acquittal. The House of Lords in the case of Sritland v. Director of Public Prosecutions reported in 1944 (2) All ER 13 (HL) opined that a judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty person does not escape. This was applied by the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Karnail Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 271 . 70. Mr. Moitra contended that it is not the case of the prosecution nor did the PW 1 depose that the sum of Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- were paid as part payment on account of the jeep allegedly agreed to be given at the time of marriage. 71. He is quite right. But he missed the fact that according to the PW 1 a sum of Rs. 15,000/- was paid for the purpose of buying a CD Player and a sum of Rs. 40,000/- was subsequently paid when the torture was intensified in order to buy time. It has never been the case of the prosecution that these were part payments. These payments were required to be made because the party of the complainant had failed to give the jeep which they had promised to give within six months after the marriage. 72. Lastly criticizing the evidence of PW 1 Mr. Moitra contended that on 13th February at about 11.30 P.M. in the night PW 1 allegedly visited the matrimonial home of the victim to save his sister from torture and he tendered a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-. PW 1 deposed that he was accompanied by one Rajendra. The aforesaid Rajendra according to Mr. Moitra was not examined. 73. We are unable to accept this submission either. During cross-examination the PW 1 deposed as follows:- I know Rajendra Prasad Shaw s/o Motilal Shaw. I know Narnarayan Singh and Ramkaran Pattak. I stated about the factum of torture to Rajendra Prasad Shaw who is neighbour of the accused persons. 74. Rajendra, son of Motilal, is the PW 23. He is also a neighbour of the accused persons. During cross-examination the PW 1 deposed as follows:- I know Rajendra Prasad Shaw s/o Motilal Shaw. I know Narnarayan Singh and Ramkaran Pattak. I stated about the factum of torture to Rajendra Prasad Shaw who is neighbour of the accused persons. 74. Rajendra, son of Motilal, is the PW 23. He is also a neighbour of the accused persons. He was not suggested during his cross-examination that he had never visited the house of the accused persons accompanied by the PW 1. PW 1 during his cross-examination referred to Rajendra Prasad Shaw, son of Motilal Shaw. The PW 23 from the witness box disclosed his name to be Rajendra Prasad Gupta, son of Motilal Gupta. Shaw and Gupta are the surnames often used interchangeably. The fact that the defence did not suggest to the PW 23 that he had never visited the house of the accused persons accompanied by the PW 1 therefore becomes very important. It is PW 23 who had noticed the floating body in the pond which is in the vicinity of the matrimonial home of the victim. 75. Criticizing further the evidence of the PW 1 Mr. Moitra submitted that the evidence of the father, the mother and the son with respect to the allegation that a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- was tendered on 13th February 2004 in lieu of a jeep which the accused persons refused to accept and demanded a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/-, according to him, is highly doubtful because the near relations gave contradictory versions with regard thereto. 76. We however are unable to find any contradiction. The evidence of the PW 1 in that regard is as follows:- Feeling the urgency of the situation, on the same night at about 11.30 p.m. we went to the matrimonial home of my sister with one Rajendra who is my maternal uncle. At that time I took Rs. 1,50,000/- to their house and told them to take that very amount and allow my sister to go to marriage ceremony but the accused persons told me to give them Rs. 2,50,000/-. I requested them to accept Rs. 1,50,000/- and after the marriage of my brother I will give them rest Rs. 1,00,000/- i.e. the entire price of the jeep. As they did not accept that very amount so we came back. 77. 2,50,000/-. I requested them to accept Rs. 1,50,000/- and after the marriage of my brother I will give them rest Rs. 1,00,000/- i.e. the entire price of the jeep. As they did not accept that very amount so we came back. 77. The evidence of the father (PW 3) in that regard is as follows :- In the evening my son went to the house of the accused persons with a cash of Rs. 1,50,000/- and requested the accused persons to receive the amount and allow my daughter to go to marriage ceremony but they did not accept and asked for Rs. 2,50,000/- 78. The evidence of the mother the PW 13 in that regard is as follows:- Once my son give them Rs. 1,50,000/- as price of jeep but they did not accept it and they asked my son Santosh Shaw to give them entire price of the jeep. 79. Criticizing the evidence of the PW 1 Mr. Moitra further contended that it is difficult to accept that the brother of the victim on 13th February had known that the victim was being tortured but he did not take any step until death of the victim. 80. This submission has not impressed us because it is not the case of the PW 1 that the victim was tortured for the first time on 13th February 2004. She was continuously tortured. The party of the complainant has been from time to time buying time from the accused persons by paying money in driblets to bring about an intermission of the torture. PW 1 in his statement u/s 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stated that "considering the prestige of our family we did not want to go to police in this matter and that is why we did not inform it even in the local PS". During cross-examination he deposed that he had not informed the police. 81. Mr. Moitra contended that the PW 1 in his written complaint did not refer to the telephone call received by him from the victim about which he deposed in the Court. Mr. Moitra, we are sorry to say, did not notice the following sentence in the written complaint. About 12/13 days ago my sister told me over telephone. "Brother, why don't you come to my house? Why don't you meet me? These people beat me severely. 82. Mr. Moitra, we are sorry to say, did not notice the following sentence in the written complaint. About 12/13 days ago my sister told me over telephone. "Brother, why don't you come to my house? Why don't you meet me? These people beat me severely. 82. The witnesses in the Courtroom cannot in any event be expected to represent the entire story in the form of a drama or a movie because a drama or a movie is enacted by professional actors with the assistance of skilled directors and scriptwriters amongst others skilled professionsal. 83. Mr. Moitra then submitted that the father of the victim did not refer to any phone call allegedly received by the PW 1. 84. We are unable to attach any importance to this fact. The phone call was received by the PW 1 and he has referred to the phone call both in his deposition and in the written complaint. The father may have missed but because of this omission it is difficult to disbelieve the evidence of the PW 1. 85. The learned Trial Judge disbelieved the evidence of the P.W.1 for the following reasons : On careful scrutiny of their evidence, it appears that the P.W.1 has made exaggeration, embroidered and developed the story in all material particulars to give credible look to prosecution case. From the evidence of P.W.18 it appears that he never stated to the police that his sister over telephone told him that on failure to keep their promise accused persons mercilessly beat her by gagging her mouth putting clothes. At the time of beating, accused Kaliprasad Shaw used to catch hold the legs of his sister accused Kamala Devi used to catch hold the hands of his sister and accused Binod beat his sister, at the very first instance. Besides that I find contradiction in every ferrule of the evidence. 86. P.W.18 during his cross-examination deposed as follows :- It is a fact that P.W.1 Santosh Kumar Shaw never stated to me that we gave ornaments and other accessories valued about Rs. 3 lakhs. Besides that I find contradiction in every ferrule of the evidence. 86. P.W.18 during his cross-examination deposed as follows :- It is a fact that P.W.1 Santosh Kumar Shaw never stated to me that we gave ornaments and other accessories valued about Rs. 3 lakhs. It is a fact that P.W.1 Santosh Kumar Shaw never stated to me that at the time of beating accused Kali Prasad Shaw used to catch hold the leg of my sister, accused Kamala Devi used to catch hold the hands of my sister and putting clothes in her mouth and accused Binod Shaw hit my sister. It is a fact that P.W.1 Santosh Kumar Shaw never stated to me that he stated to Police that accused persons demanded jeep as a dowry. 87. The learned Trial Judge did not notice the fact that the case of the P.W.1 that at the time of marriage besides Rs. 2 lakh in cash other dowries were given was amply proved by the cash memos seized by the Police and produced by the defacto complainant for an aggregate sum of Rs. 1 lakh approximately. As regards payment in cash the evidence of P.W.1 remained uncontradicted and was also corroborated by P.Ws.2, 13 and 14. The learned Judge did not notice the fact that the deposition of the P.W.1 that the accused persons used to beat his sister was specifically mentioned in the written complaint ext.1. The role played by each of the accused persons at the time of assault is a matter of detail and the omission thereof is not fatal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments in the case of Narayan vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) and the judgment in the case of Alamgir vs. State (NCT) (supra). The learned Judge did not take into account the mental condition of the elder brother of the victim who made a statement in front of the dead body of his sister which had blood stained wearing apparels on her body; blood was oozing out of her nostrils. The learned Judge did not notice the fact that in Ext. 1 reference to the jeep agreed to be given has been made at least in 10 places. The learned Judge did not notice the fact that in Ext. 1 reference to the jeep agreed to be given has been made at least in 10 places. The finding of the learned Trial Court that the P.W.1 exaggerated, embroidered and developed the story is not based on any particulars discussed in the judgment nor does such bald finding disclose dispassionate appreciation of the evidence on record, to say the least. 88. P.W.2 Ram Surat, a nephew of the accused Kaliprasad and also a neighbour of the accused persons, deposed that he saw the victim in the house of the accused persons weeping. Upon enquiry the victim informed that the accused persons were misbehaving with her because she could not fetch dowry as demanded by them. 89. P.W.3 the father of the deceased corroborated the evidence of the P.W.1. There is no serious cross-examination of the P.W.3 either as regards the demand of dowry or as regards the torture inflicted upon the victim. 90. Criticizing the evidence of the PW3 Mr. Moitra contended that the evidence of the father as regards torture upon the victim is scanty. We are unable to accept the submission. 91. The learned Trial Judge disbelieved the evidence of the P.W.3 for the following reasons :- P.W.3 no where stated that the amount was given to meet the demand of the accused persons and P.W.3 without any ambiguity and categorically admitted that they gave it voluntarily. 92. The learned Trial Judge obviously failed to notice the following evidence of P.W.3 :- As because as per their demand we could not give them a jeep. So the accused persons after 5 or 6 months of marriage of my daughter started committing torture upon my daughter. They needling all the times to my daughter and abused my daughter referring her parents and brother. My daughter informed me about the same over telephone. We several times went to the house of the accused persons. I hold the legs of the accused Kamala Devi and Kaliprasad Shaw requested them not to commit torture upon my daughter and I further ensured them. We will give them jeep. I sent Rs. 15,000/- through my son and my son gave them that very money. But the accused persons did not change their behavior. Again I sent Rs. I hold the legs of the accused Kamala Devi and Kaliprasad Shaw requested them not to commit torture upon my daughter and I further ensured them. We will give them jeep. I sent Rs. 15,000/- through my son and my son gave them that very money. But the accused persons did not change their behavior. Again I sent Rs. 40,000/- through my son to the accused persons after receipt of money they, for a few days behaved well with my daughter but subsequently they again subjected my daughter to cruelty. 93. P.W. 3 nowhere deposed that anything was given voluntarily as wrongly recorded by the learned trial Judge. It is the P.W.13 mother of the deceased who during her cross-examination deposed as follows:- We voluntarily gave cash of Rs. 2,00,000/-, ornaments and other valuable amounting Rs. 3,00,000/-. 94. The learned Trial Judge failed to realize that the victim was being tortured both physically and mentally not because the money which had already been given. The torture was in connection with a demand which had remained outstanding as regards which she deposed in the cross-examination as follows:- I stated to police that when my daughter visited our house she told me that the accused persons creating pressure upon her to fetch a jeep from our house. I stated to police that my son Santosh Shaw went to the house of the accused persons and Rs. 1,50,000/- handed over to the accused Kaliprasad Shaw but they did not accept it and asked my son to give entire price of the jeep. 95. The learned Trial Judge obviously was wrong in finding that the evidence of P.W's 3, 13, and 14 was contradictory or that the same did not inspire any confidence or that the same was not dependable. P.W.14 another brother of the deceased reiterated the whole case deposed by the P.W.1, 3 and 13. During his cross-examination the P.W.14 deposed that the victim had not called at her father's house for a year prior to her death which is a clear pointer to show the conduct of the accused persons. The learned Trial Judge did not take into consideration the fact that the P.W.13 the mother of the deceased resided most of the time at the native place. The learned Trial Judge did not take into consideration the fact that the P.W.13 the mother of the deceased resided most of the time at the native place. P.W.13 had in fact deposed both in her examination-in-chief and in her cross-examination that the accused persons had been creating pressure upon the victim to fetch the jeep. P.W.3 deposed that the accused persons were torturing the victim which we already have quoted above but the learned Trial Judge did not take any notice of that. The learned Trial Judge did not take into account the evidence of the independent witnesses. P.W.2, a near relation of the accused persons, we already have discussed, personally saw the victim weeping in her matrimonial house because the accused persons were misbehaving with her because she had failed to bring the desired dowry. 96. Mr. Moitra contended that the evidence of the mother (PW 13) and the brother (PW 14) as regards torture is also scanty. PW 13 the mother of the victim deposed as regards torture as follows :- My daughter frequently telephoned us and asked us to give them a jeep as because the accused persons creating pressure upon her. At Jaunpur, at our native village we received information that my daughter was killed and her dead body is floating in the water of the Raj Bari Tank. The accused persons did not allow my daughter to come our house, they did not talk with the Santra Shaw. They asked Santra Shaw to fetch a jeep from our house. I usually stay at my native village. 97. PW 14 the brother of the victim deposed in that regard as follows :- But at the time of marriage we could not give them a jeep as they demanded. For that reason accused persons causing torture upon my sister and asked her to fetch a jeep from our house as dowry. Kaliprasad Shaw and Kamala Devi are father and mother of the accused Binod Shaw. They are present in court. (witness identifies the accused person on dock) Once my brother gave Rs. 15,000/- to the uncle of the accused as price of C.D. player. Thereafter my elder brother again gave the accused persons Rs. 40,000/- but the accused persons did not change their behaviour. 98. PW 1 was interacting with the accused persons. The mother usually resided at Jaunpur which she has deposed. 15,000/- to the uncle of the accused as price of C.D. player. Thereafter my elder brother again gave the accused persons Rs. 40,000/- but the accused persons did not change their behaviour. 98. PW 1 was interacting with the accused persons. The mother usually resided at Jaunpur which she has deposed. The PW 1, it appears, was in the control of the household of the party of the complainant. Therefore it is he who was dealing with the matter. Besides the near relations other witnesses were examined who also corroborated the case of the prosecution both as regards the demand of dowry and the torture. 99. The P.W.4 a neighbor of the accused Kali Prasad, deposed as follows :- Santra Shaw expired. After 5/6 months of the marriage of the accused Binod with Santra dispute started. I do not know for what reason dispute cropped up. I have seen that the accused persons drove Santra shaw from their house and shut down the door of their house from Inside. I noticed it from my shop. Once or twice I mediated in their dispute. 100. P.W.7 deposed as follows:- Accused persons put forwarded their demand of jeep to Basant Lal Shaw but they could not give the jeep. Basant Lal Shaw gave Rs. 15,000/- and prayed for time. Over that issue two or three times 'salish' were held in the business place of the accused Kali Prasad Shaw. Sher Bahadur Singh presided over the 'salish' besides that myself, Hira Shaw and other persons were present. My house is situated 100 meters away from the house of the accused Kaliprasad Shaw. Accused persons on failure to give jeep they drove away the Santra Shaw from their house I have seen it. 101. From the evidence, discussed above, it has been firmly established that the accused persons constantly put forward and kept on repeating their demand for the jeep which the brothers and parents of the victim did not or could not meet. They kept on taking time. They also made payments both for the purpose of extension of time to give the jeep as also to save the victim from torture. When the P.W.1 declared that he was not in a position to give the jeep, the situation was aggravated. They kept on taking time. They also made payments both for the purpose of extension of time to give the jeep as also to save the victim from torture. When the P.W.1 declared that he was not in a position to give the jeep, the situation was aggravated. The accused persons did not permit thereafter the P.W.1 to see the victim nor was the victim allowed to go to her parents' house. From the evidence of P.W.14 we have ascertained that the victim did not go to her fathers house during the period of one year before her death. The torture of the victim in connection with a demand for dowry has thus been adequately proved. The learned Trial Judge was wrong in opining that "considering the all aspect I can not reconcile with the argument of the Ld. P.P. in-charge that the suicide of Santra Shaw was the result of torture and prosecution fails to prove any nexus of suicide with the demand of jeep." 102. Mr. Moitra contended that there is nothing to show that "soon before her death" the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. He in support of his submission drew our attention to the judgment in the case of Sham Lal Vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 9 SCC 759 , wherein the Apex Court refused to hold the accused guilty of an offence u/s 304B. He drew our attention to paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 which read as follows :- 11. It is imperative, for invoking the aforesaid legal presumption, to prove that "soon before her death" she was subjected to such cruelty or harassment. Here, what the prosecution achieved in proving at the most was that there was persisting dispute between the two sides regarding the dowry paid or to be paid, both in kind and in cash, and on account of the failure to meet the demand for dowry, Neelam Rani was taken by her parents to their house about one and a half years before her death. Further evidence is that an attempt was made to patch up between the two sides for which a panchayat was held in which it was resolved that she would go back to the nuptial home pursuant to which she was taken by the husband to his house. This happened about ten to fifteen days prior to the occurrence in this case. This happened about ten to fifteen days prior to the occurrence in this case. There is nothing on record to show that she was either treated with cruelty or harassed with the demand for dowry during the period between her having been taken to the parental home and her tragic end. 12. In the absence of any such evidence it is not permissible to take recourse to the legal presumption envisaged in Section 113B of the Evidence Act. That rule of evidence is prescribed in law to obviate the prosecution of the difficulty to further prove that the offence was perpetrated by the husband, as then it would be the burden of the accused to rebut the presumption. 13. The corollary of the aforesaid finding is that the appellant cannot be convicted of the offence u/s 304B IPC. But this would not save him from the offence u/s 498A of the IPC for which there is overwhelming evidence, particularly of PW 3, Bhagwan Dass, who heard from his daughter, which evidence is admissible u/s 32 of the Evidence Act, besides his own direct dialogue with the appellant and his father. As the trial court and the High Court found his evidence reliable, we hold that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the offence u/s 498A of IPC. 103. This judgment in our opinion does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. In the case before Their Lordships the fact that the victim was subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with a demand for dowry was a matter of the past. The victim had gone to her parental house and stayed there for about a year and a half. She came back to the matrimonial home on the basis of a decision of the Panchayat. Their Lordships recorded "There is nothing on record to show that she was either treated with cruelty or harassed with the demand for dowry during the period between her having been taken to the parental home and her tragic end". In the facts of the case it could be said without the fear of contradiction that the dowry related harassment or cruelty was a stale and concluded affair. Whereas in the present case the harassment and cruelty in connection with the demand of a jeep was a continuing affair. 104. In the facts of the case it could be said without the fear of contradiction that the dowry related harassment or cruelty was a stale and concluded affair. Whereas in the present case the harassment and cruelty in connection with the demand of a jeep was a continuing affair. 104. He also drew our attention to the judgment in the case of Kaliyaperumal and Another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2004) 9 SCC 157 . He drew our attention to paragraphs 4 and 5 which read as follows :- 4. Section 304B IPC deals with dowry death which reads as follows : 304B. Dowry Death- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation - For the purpose of this sub-section 'dowry' shall have same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 5. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption u/s 113B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon before' used in Section 114. Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. 105. In the aforesaid case conviction of two accused person for an offence punishable u/s 304B IPC was upheld. Insofar as the burden of the prosecution to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death is concerned, it can be pointed out that the case of the defence is not that the victim died a natural or an accidental death. The cause of death is a combination of the injuries and drowning. The victim was in the custody of the accused persons. The cause of death is a combination of the injuries and drowning. The victim was in the custody of the accused persons. They have not offered any explanation which may even remotely suggest that she may have died an accidental death. The evidence discussed above leave no manner of doubt that they actively connived in causing death of the victim. The facts and circumstances for the purpose of attracting the applicability of Section 113B of the Evidence Act have been fully established. The accused persons can safely be deemed to have caused the death of the victim in connection with a demand for a jeep agreed to be given at the time of marriage. Refusing to do so would amount to consciously allowing the guilty persons to escape and thus abdicating the duty entrusted with Court. 106. Mr. Moitra drew our attention to the judgment in the case of Vikramjeet vs. State of Punjab reported in 2006 (12) SCC 306 for the proposition that special knowledge is not enough to fasten liability upon the accused. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Only when the prosecution case has been proved the burden in regard to such facts which was within the special knowledge of the accused may be shifted to the accused for explaining the same. Of course, there are certain exceptions to the said rule e.g. where burden of proof may be imposed upon the accused by reason of a statute. 107. This judgment has to be read in the context of its facts. What had happened was that all the witnesses of the prosecution turned hostile. The learned trial Judge observed that the accused "having not been able to prove its case, the prosecution case should be accepted. In our opinion, the approach of the leaned Sessions Judge was not correct. The High Court also appeared to have fallen into the same error." 108. No elaborate reasoning is required to show that the facts and circumstances in the aforesaid were altogether different. In our opinion, the approach of the leaned Sessions Judge was not correct. The High Court also appeared to have fallen into the same error." 108. No elaborate reasoning is required to show that the facts and circumstances in the aforesaid were altogether different. Their Lordships in the case of Collector of Customs, Madras vs. D. Bhoormul (supra) quoted with approval the views of "Lord Mansfield in Blatch v. Archar (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at p.65 "according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove, and in the power of the other to have contradicted". Since it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible for the prosecution to prove facts which are especially within the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden. 109. He also drew our attention to the judgment in the case of Durga Prasad and Another Vs. State of M.P., (2010) 9 SCC 73 . He drew our attention to paragraph 16 which reads as follows :- 16. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are inclined to allow the benefit of doubt to the appellants having particular regard to the fact that except for certain bald statements made by PWs 1 and 3 alleging that the victim had been subjected to cruelty and harassment prior to her death, there is no other evidence to prove that the victim committed suicide on account of cruelty and harassment to which she was subjected just prior to her death, which, in fact, are the ingredients of the evidence to be led in respect of Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872, in order to bring home the guilt against an accused u/s 304B IPC. 110. In the above case the marriage was solemnised as a part of community marriage due to poverty of the parties. In the name of claim of dowry it was alleged that the demand was made for a fan. "There is no other evidence regarding the physical and mental torture" except that of the mother and brother of the deceased. Even their evidence was nothing more than "certain bald statements". Admittedly no dowry was given during the marriage. Therefore this judgment has no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of the case. 111. "There is no other evidence regarding the physical and mental torture" except that of the mother and brother of the deceased. Even their evidence was nothing more than "certain bald statements". Admittedly no dowry was given during the marriage. Therefore this judgment has no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of the case. 111. We already have discussed our reasons why it cannot be said that the victim committed suicide. We are not unmindful of the fact that irrespective of whether the death was suicidal or homicidal within the statutory period if the other ingredients are proved a charge u/s 304B of the Indian Penal Code shall stand established. What has aggravated the situation is the fact that the death was not suicidal. Active involvement of the accused persons in the death of the victim preceded by torture and cruelty due to omission on the part of her parents and brothers to give the jeep promised to be given at the time of marriage has clearly been established. Presumption u/s 113B is attracted in any event. The learned Trial Judge failed to realize the importance of the fact that the victim was an educated woman. He held that " prosecuting party produced and proved the mark sheet of W.B. Council of Higher Secondary Education otherwise seizure production of exhibit-6 was unnecessary and irrelevant to this case with reference to charge." He did not realize that the victim had passed out Higher Secondary Examination in 2nd Division. She was also a student of B.Sc Part-1 in the Vidyasagar College as regards which we have uncontradicted evidence of P.W. 2 which has further been corroborated by ext.4 which is a seizure list which goes to show that the police had seized the admit card of the victim of the of the Part-1 examination of B.Sc. The fact that the victim was an educated woman is a pointer as regards her mental faculties. 112. The learned Trial Judge did not notice the fact there is uncontradicted evidence on the record to show that the accused persons had escaped from their residence and their house was found under lock and key in the night of 26 and 27th February, 2004. He gave importance to the fact that the P.W.6 Dr. Misra deposed that the body of the deceased was brought dead by the accused Binod amongst others. 113. He gave importance to the fact that the P.W.6 Dr. Misra deposed that the body of the deceased was brought dead by the accused Binod amongst others. 113. The learned Trial Judge on that basis held that "so the argument as advanced by the Ld. P.P. in-charge as regard post occurrence conduct of the accused persons that the accused persons fled away after the occurrence has no leg to stand on and the evidence of P.W.6 and exhibit-2 negate the contention of the prosecution." This finding of the learned Trial Judge is contrary to the evidence discussed above. On the top of that he did not notice the fact that on 27th February, 2004 the accused had been arrested by the police. The dead body was removed by the police after recording the statement of the P.W.1 which has been marked ext.1 on the basis of which police case was started. It is quite possible that after the statement of the P.W.1 was recorded the accused Binod was informally taken into custody and he accompanied the police when they took the dead body to the hospital. Our view finds support from the fact that the P.W.23 did not depose that when the floating body was noticed the accused Binod was present. Nor did the P.W.18 who reached the P.O after being telephonically informed by the P.W.23 depose that upon reaching the P.O. he found the accused Binod present at the spot. 114. We are surprised that the learned Trial Judge held that "P.W.20 in his evidence categorically stated that such type of injury may be caused if any one slided by the side of tank and he further opined that type of injury may be caused over wearing apparels. So the probability factor echoes in favour of the defence version." 115. The finding of the learned Trial Judge is based on a clear misreading of the evidence of the P.W.20 who deposed as follows :- the injury which I found on the body of Santra Shaw at gluteal regions and sacral region that may be caused if any one dragged her upon a rough surface against her will. That type of injury may be caused if the victim is naked. That type of injury may also be caused over the wearing apparels. There was more than one mark of injury on the body of the victim. 116. That type of injury may be caused if the victim is naked. That type of injury may also be caused over the wearing apparels. There was more than one mark of injury on the body of the victim. 116. The P.W.20 it would appear from the aforesaid passage initially deposed that the type of injury found on the heap and buttock of the victim could be caused if the victim were dragged while she was naked. P.W.20 thereafter added that the victim could also have suffered the injury if she were dragged with her clothes on. The learned Trial Judge proceeded on the basis that the injury found on the body of the victim could have been caused by the wearing apparels but he never took into account the fact that both the P.W.5 and P.W.20 who had conducted the Post Mortem examination were of the opinion that the death was due to the combined effect of injuries and drowning. It did not occur to the learned Trial Court that the accused persons during their examination u/s 313 CrPC offered no explanation whatsoever except for reiterating that the victim was a mental patient as regards which neither is there any evidence nor the parents' nor the brothers of the victim nor any of her family members knew anything. Assuming that she was a mental patient, the accused persons in that case were expected to be more alert about her movement. In that case they could not have ignored the disappearance of the victim from their house. In that case they would have been all the more concerned about her safety and would have asked everyone in the neighbourhood including her parents whether the victim was with them. They would not in that case have slipped away from their residence as they did without informing any one about anything. It was suggested to the P.W.1 that a missing diary was made but the same never saw the light of the day. It did not occur to the learned trial Court that the accused persons were liable to disclose where they had been on 26th February, 2004 and the steps taken by them after they found the victim missing from their custody. The accused Kaliprasad stated during his examination u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that he had spent Rs. It did not occur to the learned trial Court that the accused persons were liable to disclose where they had been on 26th February, 2004 and the steps taken by them after they found the victim missing from their custody. The accused Kaliprasad stated during his examination u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that he had spent Rs. 2 1/2 lakhs for her treatment of insanity but not a single cash memo showing expenditure of 1 rupee was produced by him. The evidence adduced by the defence witness Dr. Chakrabarty is wholly unreliable for reasons already discussed. 117. We are for the reasons discussed above convinced that the judgment and the order of acquittal are clearly wrong and not sustainable. Charges u/s 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 were proved beyond any reasonable doubt. The accused respondents are as such convicted of the offences punishable u/s 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 118. During the hearing we enquired of Mr. Moitra as regards the quantum of punishment in the event we were inclined to hold the accused/respondents guilty. Mr. Moitra submitted that the Court should be lenient considering the future of the minor son of the deceased. 119. Considering the gravity of the offence and the cruelty with which the deceased was put to death we are of the considered opinion that the highest punishment provided for by Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code should be awarded for ends of justice. They cannot have any claim for leniency on the ground of the child whose mother was done to death so cruelly. His maternal grandparents are there to look after him. 120. The appeal is thus allowed. The accused/respondents are therefore sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. They are directed to surrender forthwith to serve out the sentence. No separate sentence u/s 498A of the Indian Penal Code is however awarded. 121. The appellants are directed to surrender forthwith to serve out the sentence. In case they do not do so within 4 weeks from date the learned Trial Court shall take coercive measure to secure their presence. 122. Lower Court Records with a copy of this judgment be sent down to the learned trial Court forthwith. 121. The appellants are directed to surrender forthwith to serve out the sentence. In case they do not do so within 4 weeks from date the learned Trial Court shall take coercive measure to secure their presence. 122. Lower Court Records with a copy of this judgment be sent down to the learned trial Court forthwith. Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be delivered to the learned Advocates for the parties, upon compliance of all formalities.