JUDGMENT P.R. Ramachandra Menon, J. 1. Exts.P1 and P3 notices issued under the SARFAESI Act, for the amount due under a loan transaction are under challenge in this writ petition, mainly on the ground that it is barred by limitation prescribed under Section 36 of the SARFAESI Act. 2. The sequence of events is as follows: The first petitioner is a partnership firm engaged in the business of Engineering works and the second petitioner is one of its partners. In the course of the business operations, the petitioners approached the respondent Bank for providing a 'Bank Guarantee' in favour of the KSEB and after considering the request, the Bank Guarantee (to an extent of Rs. One lakh on 11.05.1983 and Rs.19 lakhs on 24.06.1983), was given; which was secured on the basis of equitable mortgage created on various items of properties. 3. In view of encashment of Bank Guarantee by the beneficiary concerned and in view of non-satisfaction of the due amount , the liability got mounted up and finally, the Bank filed O.S.No.224/1986 before the Sub Court, Ernakulam for realisation of the due amount. As per the judgment dated 01.01.1991, the Sub Court decreed the suit in favour of the Bank, for Rs.19 lakhs with interest at the rate of 18.5% per annum from 23.06.1984 till the date of the suit and with future interest at the rate of 18% per annum on Rs.14,43,037/-(R.19,00,000 -4,56,962 adjusted by the respondent Bank) till realisation and Rs. One lakh with interest at the rate of 18.5% per annum from 15.10.1984 till realisation. On challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Court, interference was made by a Division Bench of this Court in A.S. 328/1995, whereby the judgment and decree were set aside as per the decision reported in C.S. Company vs. Punjab and Sind Bank (2003 (3) KLT 808). Met with the situation, the respondent Bank approached the Apex Court by filing Civil Appeal 4446 / 2006, which was allowed as per the judgment dated 13.01.2010, setting aside the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court and restoring the original verdict passed by the Sub Court, Ernakulam. It is contended in the writ petition that the matter is pending in Review before the Apex Court as R.P. 661/2012 and that favourable orders are expected . 4. It is contended in the writ petition that the matter is pending in Review before the Apex Court as R.P. 661/2012 and that favourable orders are expected . 4. Coming to the grievance of the petitioners, it is stated that, notwithstanding the existence of the Civil Court decree, the Bank issued Ext.P4 notice under section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act on 18.03.2005, on receipt of which, Ext.P5 statement of objections was preferred . According to the petitioners, no further action was taken by the Bank, presumably accepting the position made clear by the petitioners. But later, the Bank issued Ext. P1 notice dated 22.03.2012 under the very same provision i.e. 13 (2) of the Act, when the petitioner submitted Ext.P2 statement of objections again. However, the Bank conveyed the decision to proceed with the steps under the SARFAESI Act vide Ext. P3 dated 28.05.2012, pointing that the statement of objection was not correct or sustainable, which made the petitioner to approach this Court by filing this writ petition, seeking to set aside Exts. P1 and P3 mainly on the ground that it is barred by limitation . 5. The respondent Bank has filed a statement seeking to sustain the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and also rebutting the plea of limitation. It is pointed out that the decree passed by the Sub Court, though was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court, it was reversed and restored by the Apex Court as per the judgment and decree dated 13.01.2012 and as such, the decree passed by the Sub Court has already got merged with the decree passed by the Supreme Court. Referring to the definition of term 'debt' as defined under Section 2(ha) of the SARFAESI Act, read with Section 2(g) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (in short RDBFI Act), it is pointed out that the liability under the decree is very much a 'debt' and that the proceedings are not barred by limitation. It is also pointed out that the Review Petition preferred before the Apex Court was not by the petitioners, but by the 'guarantor' of a property and that was also dismissed by the Apex Court. It is also pointed out that the Review Petition preferred before the Apex Court was not by the petitioners, but by the 'guarantor' of a property and that was also dismissed by the Apex Court. Reference is also made to the judgment passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 11229 of 2012, preferred by another co-obligant in respect of the same subject matter raising identical grounds, wherein interference was declined. This led to filing of W.A.No.1345 of 2012, which also came to be dismissed on 24.07.2012 and as such, it is contended, that the present writ petition is not liable to be entertained. 6. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Bank in detail. 7. Adv. Mr. Bechu Kurian Thomas, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the only 'explanation' from the part of the Bank is that the amount covered by the civil court decree is also a 'debt' and since it has become final only on dismissal of SLP by the Apex Court in January 2012 it is not hit by limitation. According to the learned Counsel, the said proposition is not at all correct; mainly for the reason that, even if it is presumed as a 'debt', the account has to be declared as NPA, as provided under the Statute and no such declaration has ever been made, after obtaining the decree of the Civil Court , while the account was declared as 'NPA' on 27.09.1985, i.e. much prior to the date of decree . The learned Counsel also submits that the period of limitation as stipulated under Article 62 is '12' years and the money became due when the account was declared as 'NPA' in 1985 and as such, it is now barred by limitation. It is pointed out that the remedy of the Bank is only by way of execution proceedings before the Civil Court. Reference is also made to the definition of the terms 'security interest' and 'default' as given under Section 2(zf) and 2(j) respectively under the SARFAESI Act 8. The learned Counsel for the Bank submits that the idea and understanding of the petitioners as to the meaning of the term 'debt' itself is wrong and misconceived. Reference is made to Section 2(ha)of the SARFAESI Act and 2(g) of RDBFI Act. The learned Counsel for the Bank submits that the idea and understanding of the petitioners as to the meaning of the term 'debt' itself is wrong and misconceived. Reference is made to Section 2(ha)of the SARFAESI Act and 2(g) of RDBFI Act. Finalisation of the proceedings by the Apex Court, on dismissing the SLP 4446 of 2006 and also dismissal of R.P. 661of 2012 is sought to be highlighted, contending that there is no bar of limitation. Dismissal of an identical matter in respect of the same cause of action filed by the co-obligant by way of W.P.(C) No..11229 of 2012 and dismissal of W.A.No.1345 of 2012 arising therefrom, is also pressed into service. 9. With regard to the nature of liability or the sequene of events, there is no dispute. The term 'debt' as defined under Section 2(ha) of the SARFAESI Act reads as follows: " (ha) "debt" shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (g) of section 2 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993)." In turn, reference becomes necessary to Sec. 2(g) of the RDBFI Act, defining the term 'debt', which reads as follows: "(g) "debt" means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on , and legally recoverable on, the date of the application. " Definitions of the term 'default' and 'security interest' under Section 2(j) and 2(zf) are also extracted for convenience of reference. " Definitions of the term 'default' and 'security interest' under Section 2(j) and 2(zf) are also extracted for convenience of reference. "(j) "default" means non-payment of any principal debt or interest thereon or any other amount payable by a borrower to any secured creditor consequent upon which the account of such borrower is classified as non-performing asset in the books of account of the secured creditor." 2(zf): "security interest" means right, title and interest of any kind whatsoever upon property created in favour of any secured creditor and includes any mortgage, charge, hypothecation, assignment other than those specified in section 31. 10. It is true that the Bank had issued Ext. P4 notice under Section 13(2) earlier, in response to which, the petitioner submitted Ext. P5 objections . Opening paragraph of Ext.P5 is relevant, which hence is extracted below: "We are in receipt of the notice referred to as (1) above, purported to be issued under section 13(2) of the Securitisation Act. At the outset itself it is brought to your attention that the notice referred as (1) above amounts to contempt of the judgment in A.S. 328/1995 on the files of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala and unless the notice is withdrawn we will be compelled to initiate appropriate proceedings for contempt of Court. It is also evident from your notice that you have willfully suppressed the judgment in A.S. 328/1995 with malafide motives. The willful suppression is unbecoming of Bank of your stature. 11. Obviously, when the Bank proceeded with the steps under the SARFAESI Act earlier, setting aside of the decree passed by the Sub Court, Ernakulam as per the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in A.S. No.328 of 1995, was projected as the 'trump card', contending that, if any further proceedings were pursued under the SARFAESI Act, based on Ext. P4 notice, it would virtually amount to 'Contempt of Court proceedings', since no decree was in existence and hence no 'debt'/liability as well. It was in the said circumstance, that the Bank waited further, finally obtaining a favourable verdict from the Apex Court, whereby the SLP 4446 of 2006 was got decreed on 13.01.2012, intercepting the verdict passed by the Division Bench and restoring the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Court. 12. It was in the said circumstance, that the Bank waited further, finally obtaining a favourable verdict from the Apex Court, whereby the SLP 4446 of 2006 was got decreed on 13.01.2012, intercepting the verdict passed by the Division Bench and restoring the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Court. 12. During the course of hearing, it was conceded by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that 'R.P. 661 of 2012', (which is also cited by the petitioner to intercept Ext.P1/P3 notice) preferred before the Apex Court, has been dismissed. It was after getting favourable verdict from the Apex Court that the Bank issued Ext.P1 notice, followed by Ext.P3 clarification, in response to Ext. P2 statement of objection filed by the petitioner, making it clear that there was no impediment in proceeding with further steps in view of the decree restored by the Apex Court. As such, the contention of the petitioner that the Bank, having abstained from enforcing Ext.P4 notice issued under section 13(2) earlier, cannot issue any further notice under the same provision by way of Ext.P1 is not correct or sustainable. 13. In view of the definition of the term 'debt' as given under Section 2(ha) of the SARFAESI Act, read with 2(g) of RDBFI Act, the amount covered by the decree also forms a 'debt'. The only question is whether the account has been declared as 'NPA' and whether such exercise has to be pursued again/repeated, even after obtaining a decree, when the account admittedly stood declared as 'NPA' as early as in the year 1985. The only requirement to proceed with the steps as contemplated under Section 13(4) is issuance of a notice under Section 13(2) pursuant to declaration of the account as 'NPA'. Even otherwise, if the proposition mooted by the petitioner is accepted, the account may have to be declared as 'NPA' after every round of litigation, if there is any intervening verdict against the Bank, which is not at all correct or necessary. The fact that the account was declared as 'NPA' as early as 27.09.1985 stands conceded and as such, no further declaration is necessary. The fact that the account was declared as 'NPA' as early as 27.09.1985 stands conceded and as such, no further declaration is necessary. Since the liability to be cleared to the Bank got crystallised and finalized only by virtue of the verdict passed by the Apex Court on 3.01.2012, this Court finds that there is absolutely no merit or bonafides in the contentions raised by the petitioner, referring to the plea of limitation. The writ petition fails and the same is dismissed accordingly.