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2012 DIGILAW 816 (PAT)

Urmila Devi v. State of Bihar

2012-06-16

AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH

body2012
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.:–Heard Mr. Pramod Manbansh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Jha, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 and Mrs. Indu Bala Pandey, learned A.P.P. for the State. 2. This Criminal Revision application is directed against the judgment and order dated 27.02.2007 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Begusarai in Maintenance Case No. 34M of 1999 by which the petition filed by the petitioner seeking maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) from the opposite party no. 2, has been dismissed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per the petitioner she was married initially to one Ashok Das on 15.06.1991. Thereafter it is the case of the petitioner that she was called by the opposite party no. 2 on a false pretext that her mother was ill and finally taken to Deoghar where marriage was performed of the petitioner with the opposite party no. 2 on 25.06.1991 after which they started living together as husband and wife from 30.06.1991 in the matrimonial house. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a son was also born out of this wedlock on 20.11.1992 and initially things were going well but in the year 1996, the petitioner brought her to her naihhar and started demanding Rs. 20,000/- dowry to take her back. When the same was refused the opposite party no. 2 is said to have assured the petitioner and her father that he would take her back once he gets Government service as presently he could not afford to maintain her, being unemployed. The opposite party no. 2 thereafter got a job in the Accountant General Office, Ranchi but refused to take the petitioner with him and the petitioner came to know that he was planning to get married and therefore, filed the maintenance case in the year 1999. 4. The case was earlier admitted on 06.04.2010 and the lower court records were called for. The same have since been received. 5. Learned counsel has taken the court through the deposition of the witnesses and has relied on Exhibits 1 and 2 which are the medical certificate and bill with regard to treatment of the petitioner at Nazerath Hospital, Mokama in which the opposite party no. 2 has been shown to be the husband of the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel has taken the court through the deposition of the witnesses and has relied on Exhibits 1 and 2 which are the medical certificate and bill with regard to treatment of the petitioner at Nazerath Hospital, Mokama in which the opposite party no. 2 has been shown to be the husband of the petitioner. In cross-examination, the petitioner has stated that she had divorced her first husband i.e., Ashok Das. Altogether four witnesses have been examined by the petitioner including herself in which the facts stated and plea taken in the application filed for maintenance has been supported. On behalf of opposite party no. 2, 7 witnesses were examined who have variously said that the petitioner was married to two other persons and was currently residing with her brother-in-law (bahnoi), namely, Asharfi Ram. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order impugned submitting that the only ground for dismissal of the petition filed for maintenance by the court below was that the alleged marriage of the petitioner with the opposite party no. 2 was null and void from the very inception on account of the fact that at that time the first husband of the petitioner was alive and thus the petitioner was not legally competent to marry the opposite party no. 2. Learned counsel has assailed this ground stating that in a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code, the court cannot go behind the marriage and declare it to be null and void which has to be done in a separate proceeding. In a case under Section 125 of the Code, it is sufficient that there be a presumption of relationship of marriage between the parties. It is further submitted that the High Court in revision, where there is a negative finding of the court below on the point of marriage and parentage of the child, is empowered to re-evaluate evidence since negative finding has evil consequences on the life of both the child and the woman. It is further submitted that the burden and standard of proof for a plea of subsistence of an earlier marriage requires clear and strict proof the onus for which lie on the husband to discharge by tendering satisfactory evidence. He submits that Section 125 of the Code proceeds on the basis of a de facto and not de jure marriage. It is further submitted that the burden and standard of proof for a plea of subsistence of an earlier marriage requires clear and strict proof the onus for which lie on the husband to discharge by tendering satisfactory evidence. He submits that Section 125 of the Code proceeds on the basis of a de facto and not de jure marriage. The nature of proof of marriage required for a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code need not be so strong or conclusive as in a criminal proceeding to establish the offence under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, since the object of Section 125 of the Code is to afford a swift remedy and determination by the Magistrate as to the status of the parties which is subject to a final determination of the civil court. It is further submitted that when the husband denies that the applicant is not his wife, all that is required in a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code is whether the evidence led raises a presumption that the applicant was the wife of the respondent and that would be sufficient of the Magistrate to pass an order granting maintenance. For the said proposition learned counsel has relied on the decision in the case of Pyla Mutyalamma Vs. Pyla Suri Demudu, reported in (2011) 12 Supreme Court Cases 189. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly held in the case of Chand Patel Vs. Bismillah Begum, reported in (2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 774 that the marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cannot be void ipso jure from its inception and a decree would have to be obtained from the competent court declaring the marriage to be void and so long as such declaration is not made, the marriage will continue to subsist. 8. Learned Counsel for the opposite party no. 2, on the other hand, submits that Sections 5 (i), 12 and 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which deals with the conditions for a Hindu Marriage, Voidable Marriages and Divorce respectively, clearly stipulates that even if it is taken to be true that the petitioner was married to the opposite party no. 2, still on the basis of admitted facts the marriage becomes void and in the absence of a valid marriage, no maintenance is payable to the petitioner. 2, still on the basis of admitted facts the marriage becomes void and in the absence of a valid marriage, no maintenance is payable to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 further submits that he has married in the year 2000 to a different lady which was his first marriage after denying that he was ever married to the petitioner. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Sarswati Devi Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2006 (1) PLJR 468 for the proposition that any order under Section 125 of the Code can be made only where the marriage is legal and in a case where the marriage is void, no maintenance can be granted under Section 125 of the Code. Learned counsel has also taken this Court to the statement of the witnesses to contend that she was earlier married to two other persons and presently living with a third person and thus, it is submitted that her conduct itself raises bonafide doubts with regard to the case being sought to be made out. Learned counsel has also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pyla Mutyalamma (supra) for the proposition that the marriage has to be legal between the parties and in the present case since the same is lacking, there cannot be any question of granting maintenance. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, by way of reply, submits that the decision relied upon by him are very clear and of a later date by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the decision rendered in the case of Sarswati Devi (supra) therefore, cannot be held to be a good law now. Learned counsel also submits that a petition was filed both on behalf of the petitioner as well as her minor son and the court below has also not taken that aspect of the matter into consideration. It is further submitted that there has not been any serious attempt at denying the parentage of the son of the petitioner which would clearly indicate that some sort of relationship did exist between the parties. It is further submitted that there has not been any serious attempt at denying the parentage of the son of the petitioner which would clearly indicate that some sort of relationship did exist between the parties. It is stated that once a relationship had existed, even if the marriage does not strongly confirm to the standards, the petitioner is entitled to get maintenance having lived and cohabited with the father of her child, i.e., opposite party no. 2. 11. Having considered the rival contentions and after going through the order impugned and taking into consideration the materials on record, this Court finds substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The court below has misdirected itself by deciding the validity of the marriage holding it to be null and void from its very inception which was not the correct approach and the same was not an issue called upon for adjudication in the proceeding under Section 125 of the Code. However, the court was justified in going into that aspect with a view to satisfy itself whether there was any semblance of cohabitation of the parties as husband and wife and the marriage. In the present case, this Court finds that sufficient materials came during the trial to show that there was a marriage and that the parties did cohabit. The past connection between the parties has also come out that they were known to each other and thus the contention of the opposite party no. 2 in his deposition that he did not know the petitioner stands falsified since his sister was married to the brother of the petitioner since before. 12. Upon considering the matter in totality, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled for grant of maintenance for herself and she was also entitled for maintenance for her son till he attains the age of majority. Accordingly, the order impugned passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Begusarai in Maintenance Case No. 34M of 1999 dated 27.02.2007 is set aside. This Court having held the entitlement of the petitioner for maintenance for herself and her son till the age of majority, the actual quantification of the amount is left to the court below which shall decide the same. This Court having held the entitlement of the petitioner for maintenance for herself and her son till the age of majority, the actual quantification of the amount is left to the court below which shall decide the same. The court shall undertake the exercise of arriving at a fair amount of maintenance considering the facts and circumstances of the case after giving due opportunity of hearing to the parties and in accordance with law. It is needless to say that the quantification shall be with effect from the date of filing of the maintenance case and shall continue for the petitioner whereas it will be only till attaining the age of majority of her son. 13. Let the petitioner approach the court below alongwith a copy of this order and the court shall thereafter proceed as per the directions given in this order. 14. As an interim measure, the opposite party no. 2 shall be liable to pay Rs. 2,000/- to the petitioner till final decision with regard to the quantum of maintenance is fixed by the court below. This interim amount shall be subject to the final quantification of the amount by the lower court. 15. This application accordingly stands allowed to the extent indicated above.