Judgment Heard both sides. 2. The respondent was acquitted by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nanded from the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Aggrieved by the said order, present appeal is preferred by the original complainant. Complainant's case in short is as under : 3. That he and respondent had a long standing friendship for a period of more than 10 years. The respondent is proprietor of gold shop. On 20/10/1999, the appellant approached the respondent for purchase of gold. At that time, he advanced an amount of Rs. 40,000/-to the respondent. The respondent promised him to hand over the gold on or before 10/11/1999 but could not fulfill the promise. Ultimately, on 10/11/1999, when the appellant approached the respondent, he passed the cheque for Rs. 40,000/-. Thereafter, the appellant presented the cheque to the bank. The same was dishonoured, therefore, the appellant again approached the respondent, who told the appellant to again put the cheque for encashment. In these circumstances, appellant again presented the cheque on 6/1/2000. The same however, was dishonored by the bank for the reasons "insufficient funds", therefore, within the prescribed period, the notice was issued, same was served and within prescribed period, complaint came to be filed. 4. Before learned J.M.F.C. the appellant has examined himself. The learned trial Court however, disbelieved his case on the ground that counter foil of the cheque filed by the complainant himself shows the date of issuance of cheque as 8/3/1996 while according to the complainant himself, the cheque was issued on 3/12/1999. However, the learned trial Court disbelieved the case on the ground that if as per the appellant's request the respondent was unable to supply gold on 10/11/1999, there was no occasion to issue cheque on 8/3/1996. The next of the reasons given by the learned trial Court are that the banker is not examined and the handwriting on the counter foil as well as on the cheque are of the complainant. In these circumstances, learned trial Court observed that the presumption that the cheque was passed for legally enforceable liability has been rebutted in the present case and in these circumstances, the respondent came to be acquitted. 5. Mr. M.S. Nilwant holding for Mr.S.B. Talekar, Advocate submits that the counterfoil has nothing to do with the passing of the cheque. In these circumstances, learned trial Court observed that the presumption that the cheque was passed for legally enforceable liability has been rebutted in the present case and in these circumstances, the respondent came to be acquitted. 5. Mr. M.S. Nilwant holding for Mr.S.B. Talekar, Advocate submits that the counterfoil has nothing to do with the passing of the cheque. Further the date as shown in the counterfoil is not relevant for the purpose of finding date over the cheque according to him. The learned trial Court has unnecessarily taken wrong view of the matter and on technical grounds acquitted the respondent. 6. On the other hand, Mr. P.G. Godhamgaonkar, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 i.e. original accused submitted that the very fact that only one counterfoil of the two different cheques have been issued by the respondent are found in the custody of the complainant and produced by him, would itself go to show that the story of advancing money for the purpose of purchase of gold is false one. He further submits that the very date over the counterfoil in the handwriting of the complainant himself would show that the cheque was passed by the respondent no.2 accused on 8/3/1996, however, the complainant as per his convenience put the date, amount and other necessary details in the cheque without there being any real transaction between the parties. According to him, the defense of the accused no.2 respondent that the cheques were issued only to assist the appellant financially is thus probabalised. In these circumstances, presumption has been rebutted in the present case. No interference be made in the ultimate decision of the learned trial Court. On the basis of these submissions, following points arose for my consideration : [I] Whether the presumption as provided by Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for the discharge of any debt or other liability is rebutted in the present case? My finding to the said point is in the affirmative. Appeal is therefore, dismissed for the following reasons : 7. My finding to the said point is in the affirmative. Appeal is therefore, dismissed for the following reasons : 7. Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on which learned counsel for the appellant has relied vigorously, runs as under : "139 -Presumption in favour of holder -It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability." 8. There is no doubt that unless contrary is proved, the presumption as canvassed by learned counsel would arise merely upon passing of cheque in favour of the holder. 9. It is however, to be borne in mind as explained by an eminent jurist "presumptions are bats in law, they fly in the twilight but vanish in the light on facts." 10. The idea of presumptions is developed in law as an instrument of convenience to alleviate the party from proving certain facts. Presumptions in a way are exceptions to the general rule of burden of proof that the party who pleads a fact has to prove the same. It may be that the facts may be so ancient or so intermingled with each other that it would be difficult for a party relying over the same to lateron prove the same. Presumptions attached to the execution of ancient document or a presumption that a property though in the name of a member of Hindu Undivided family in certain circumstances can be held to be a co-parcenery property are but few examples in this regard. Some times in order to facilitate the smooth flow of commerce, the presumption as is provided in Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, may be created. The presumption in a given case may decide as to on whom the burden of proof lies. 11. Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act places burden of proof on the person who issues the cheque to prove that the cheque was not issued for any debt or other liability. 12. In the present case, what I find is that the appellant complainant not only himself filed one counterfoil, but two counterfoils of the cheque book which in ordinary course of business ought to have been in the custody of the respondent accused. 12. In the present case, what I find is that the appellant complainant not only himself filed one counterfoil, but two counterfoils of the cheque book which in ordinary course of business ought to have been in the custody of the respondent accused. The blanks filled in the counterfoils are admittedly in the handwriting of the appellant complainant himself. Further , admittedly, so far as present cheque is concerned, counterfoil in question is dated 8/3/1996. According to the appellant complainant, the transaction of present cheque is of the year 1996. It is therefore, reasonable to believe that no one would pass a cheque in the year 1993 by anticipating the transaction that would take place after three years. Further, not only the blank spaces in the counterfoils but blank spaces in the cheque are admittedly also in the handwriting of the complainant himself. 13. No other oral or documentary evidence than the statement of the complainant before the Court is on record to corroborate his case. In these circumstances, the respondent accused has successfully rebutted the presumption as arisen in view of the provisions of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In these circumstances, the reasonings of the learned J.M.F.C. needs no interference. The appeal is therefore, dismissed without any order as to costs.