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2012 DIGILAW 820 (SC)

Harish Chandra Singh (Dead) By Lrs. v. Dhananjay Kumar

2012-09-13

G.S.SINGHVI, MUKHOPADHAYA

body2012
ORDER : G.S Singhvi and Mukhopadhaya, JJ. - This appeal is directed against order dated 19.07.2002 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court, whereby he dismissed the second appeal filed by the appellants by observing that no substantial question of law arises for consideration by the High Court. 2. The appellants filed Title Suit No.85/1985 (revised No.269/1987) in the Court of VIII Sub-Judge, Patna (for short, 'the trial Court') for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of lands covered by Survey Plot No.611 (Municipal Survey Plot No.1169) by claiming that it belonged to their predecessor and they were in possession of the same. 3. In the written statement filed by them, the respondents pleaded that the suit property was in their possession since 1942-43; that they have constructed a mud built house and have been residing therein; that the house was reconstructed in the presence of the plaintiffs by spending Rs. 50,000/- and that in the proceedings filed under Sections 144 and 145 Criminal Procedure Code, they were found to be in possession. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues: (I) Whether the suit as framed is maintainable? (II) Whether the plaintiffs have got valid cause of action to file the suit? (III) Whether the suit is barred under the Limitation Act or on the principle of adverse possession? (IV) Whether the suit is barred under the principle of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence? (V) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (VI) Whether the Plaintiffs had subsisting title? (VII) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree as claimed for by them? (VIII) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled any relief or reliefs? 5. After considering the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court dismissed the suit. On the issue of limitation, the trial Court returned a finding in favour of the appellants by simply observing that the defendants cannot be held to be in peaceful possession of the disputed land for 12 years. 6. The lower appellate Court analyzed the entire evidence and concluded that the defendants were in possession prior to 1.4.1972 and held that the suit filed on 12.03.1985 was barred by time. The discussion made by the lower appellate Court on this issue is contained in paragraphs 26-31, which are extracted below: "26. 6. The lower appellate Court analyzed the entire evidence and concluded that the defendants were in possession prior to 1.4.1972 and held that the suit filed on 12.03.1985 was barred by time. The discussion made by the lower appellate Court on this issue is contained in paragraphs 26-31, which are extracted below: "26. From perusal of the impugned judgment it appears that the learned lower court has relied much on Ext. 13, 10 and 11. I have examined Ext. 12 which is in fact does not carry any seal whatsoever and endorsement on this document is dated 1.5.72. Ext. 18 is the report of a police officer in respect of the suit land under section 144 Criminal Procedure Code which appears to me to be of 23.3.72 and it appears that a complaint about the digging of some foundation by the defendants has been made by some men on behalf of the plaintiff as early as on 8.3.72. As such, from the plaintiffs documents it is crystal clear that a hand was laid on the suit land as early as on 8.3.72 by the defendants as per the admission of the plaintiffs themselves. The endorsements relied much by the plaintiff on Ext. 12 is apparently dated 1.5.72 i.e. after the alleged dispute arose. This Ext. 12 does not carry any official seal or endorsement of any officer and cannot be said to be a full proof documents and it appears that the learned lower court has relied much over it where as the defendants have been challenging it. In Ext. 18 I do not find any mention of Ext. 12 although I find mention of certain other documents, one being of 1960-61. As such, it is clear that Ext. 12 was not shown even to the alleged police officer as per Ext. 18. Ext. 19 is before me which goes to show that this is a certified copy of 1972 and it goes to show that the defendants had been claiming the land since before 40 or 45 years of 1962 and in fact made a claim in the year 1962 itself that the landlord Najir Singh took Rs. 150/- from Ram Chandra Rai as Salami and he granted Hukumnama in favour of the petitioner. As such, I find that the story of Hukumnama was set up by the defendant as early as in the year 1962. 150/- from Ram Chandra Rai as Salami and he granted Hukumnama in favour of the petitioner. As such, I find that the story of Hukumnama was set up by the defendant as early as in the year 1962. I have gone through the W.S. and I find that in fact in the W.S. para-10 the same story has been averred by the defendant and as such, I do not find any tangible contradiction in between the averments of Ext.19 para-3 and Ext.10. 27. From the admitted document of the plaintiff it is clear that the defendant has been claiming the land much before 1962 and it appears to me that the claim of the respondent find favored at one point of time with the Anchal Adhikari which is clear from Ext.F/1. To my mind, Ext.F/1 cannot be brushed aside lightly and the learned lower court was not correct in not weighing the exhibit in proper perspective. To my mind, the argument of the respondent-plaintiff that the entire proceeding of F.F.R. Case no. 244 of 60-61 after remand was collusive or manipulated by Bhuwan Rai cannot be accepted rather to my mind, the trial court should have raised a presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act and should have held that the recitals contained in an official record maintained during a judicial and quasi judicial proceeding were true. If the plaintiff wanted to get rid of the same, he should place before the court better material for the same. Hence, to my mind, the approach of the learned lower court in page-21 & 22 of his judgment had no ground. 28. I have examined Ext.2 series of the plaintiffs and it appears from the recitals of Ext.2/A that the lands in and around the land referred to in Ext.2/A have developed as home stead land and a number of persons have made their houses in and around the land and as such, there is evidence on record coupled with the evidence of the defendants that in and around 1962 the lands in question were a part of P.M.C. and habitats have started cropping up in and around the disputed land and as such, there is clear cut probability that the defendants must might have constructed their houses around that period and the story propounded by the defendant fitted in the recitals of plaintiffs own document on Ext. 2/A. To my mind, in the face of these recitals plaintiffs case that up to 1972 & 73 the land was being cultivated by them was not possible and was not convincing. It appears that the vendors of Ext.2 series in fact vended the lands for the purpose of building houses on it which is clear from the recitals of Ext.2 series of the plaintiff. To my mind, the learned lower court did not go into the documents relied by the plaintiffs and should have dealt the matter with more cautious approach. Even if I hold that the reliance placed on the Ext.2 by the learned lower court in respect of finding in favour of plaintiff was based on Ext.2 and Ext.2/A were not admissible as per the law relied by the defendants, the same Ext. can be pressed against the plaintiffs being based on documents relied by them. However, no law was brought to my knowledge wherein recitals of boundaries in and parties' document are all together inadmissible. Moreover, the defendants also tried to establish that these recitals go to show that there were houses in or around the vicinity and the lands were being used as home stead land and as such, the objection of the defendants that the reliance on Ext.2 by the lower court was wrong is not sustainable. However, on the facts and circumstances of the case it is clear that at one time the suit land were of Najir Singh and the recital in these sale-deeds showed the name of Najir Singh. I think it cannot be proof that Najir Singh was in possession on the date of the said deed specially when it has been admitted that Najir Singh died much prior of the making of these documents. These documents are of 1960's whereas Najir Singh is said to have been died in the year 1948. However these documents go to prove that the suit land or the vicinity around it is being used as home stead land in the year 1960 and around that and as such, these exhibits support the probability of the defendants case that the lands were being used for home stead purpose. 29. Added to it is the Ext.C of the defendants and Ext.A series which go to show that in fact there was a house over the suit land. 30. 29. Added to it is the Ext.C of the defendants and Ext.A series which go to show that in fact there was a house over the suit land. 30. As a matter of fact, the fact that there is a house on the suit land has been admitted by the plaintiff witnesses themselves and P.W.1 para 2,4, P.W.3 para 3 & 6 and P.W.4 para 2 & 6 and P.W.7 (Plaintiff) para-6 all go to show and establish that there is a house over the suit land which consists of so many rooms and the defendants are residing therein. 31. When I place this admitted position of the plaintiffs to the pleadings of the plaintiff set out in para-16 of the plaint wherein the plaintiff asserted that the final order in respect of Section 145 proceeding was passed on 31.3.73 and the plaintiffs were dispossessed on 1.4.73. It is very curious to my mind that the plaintiff has not pleaded in what manner the plaintiffs were dispossessed by the defendants. This is not the case of the plaintiff at any stage, that the house has been built during the pendency of the suit or after 1973. The plaintiffs have not given or pleaded in what way the defendant dispossessed the plaintiff rather the admitted position arising out of the plaintiffs own witnesses is that in or around the year 1972 itself there existed a house on the suit land. Coupled with it, I find that P.W.7 in para-6 has given the date of his dispossession as 1.4.72. There is clinching evidence on record to show that there was a house Built of brick in or around 1972 on the disputed house and as such, there is convincing evidence on record that the defendants were in possession in the year 1972 by building a brick built house at the site. The evidence of the defendant also go to support this and I find that this is almost undisputed fact coming out of the evidence of the P.Ws. and the evidence of D.Ws. as well as the exhibits of defendants that there was a house at the disputed land in the year 1972 and the defendant were residing in that." 7. The evidence of the defendant also go to support this and I find that this is almost undisputed fact coming out of the evidence of the P.Ws. and the evidence of D.Ws. as well as the exhibits of defendants that there was a house at the disputed land in the year 1972 and the defendant were residing in that." 7. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, though not required by law, adverted to the findings recorded by the two Courts on the issue of limitation and held that the finding reached by the lower appellate Court was correct and the judgment of reversal did not give rise to any question of law. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants at length and carefully perused the record. 9. In our opinion, the lower appellate Court did not commit any error by recording a finding that the suit filed by the appellants on 12.3.1995 was barred by time because the evidence produced by the parties clearly established that the respondents were in possession of the suit property prior to 1.4.1972 and the High Court rightly observed that no substantial question of law arises for its consideration. 10. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.