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2012 DIGILAW 822 (MAD)

Ramachandran v. Govindasamy(died)

2012-02-15

V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH

body2012
Judgment :- 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court made in A.S.No.22 of 2003 dated 29.4.2004 in setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court by reversing its findings made in O.S.No.598 of 2000 dated 27.8.2000, a suit filed by the plaintiff seeking for the relief of declaration of their title and permanent injunction in respect of item-1 and recovery of possession in respect of item-1 and recovery of possession in respect of item–2 and for the relief of ascertainment of mense profits and to pass decree thereon. 2. The first plaintiff is the appellant and the defendants and the second plaintiff are added as respondents 1 and 2 and on the death of the first respondent, his legal representatives were impleaded as respondents 3 and 4 in the appeal. 3. The case of the plaintiff before the trial Court as stated in the plaint are as follows: The suit schedule properties i.e., the suit items 1 and 2 of the properties were belonging to the plaintiffs ancestrally and the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are enjoying the first item of the suit property jointly and the second item of the suit property, even though belonging to the plaintiffs, was permitted to be occupied by the defendant and accordingly, the defendant was in possession of item 2 of the suit property after constructing a house in the suit property with the permission of the plaintiffs. Originally, the suit S.No.186/7 was having an extent of 41 cents and the first plaintiff's father Kumarasamy Gounder and the second plaintiff's father Krishna Gounder were the owners of the suit property and the patta was also standing in the name of the fathers of the plaintiffs and they were in possession and enjoyment of the said properties by paying kist. Thereafter, Kumarasamy Gounder died 10 years and Krishna Gounder died 15 years prior to the suit. The first plaintiff along with Ganasen, Karthikeyan, Subramanian, his brothers as legal representatives of Kumarasamy Gounder and the second plaintiff and one Vedaian who had gone away from the suit property prior to 30 years were entitled to the suit properties. Thereafter, Kumarasamy Gounder died 10 years and Krishna Gounder died 15 years prior to the suit. The first plaintiff along with Ganasen, Karthikeyan, Subramanian, his brothers as legal representatives of Kumarasamy Gounder and the second plaintiff and one Vedaian who had gone away from the suit property prior to 30 years were entitled to the suit properties. However, the other brothers Karthikeyan and Subramanian were allotted with some other properties belonging to Kumarasamy Gounder and therefore, the first plaintiff and his brother Ganesan and the second plaintiff are the owners of the entire 41 cents. Out of the said land, the brother of the first plaintiff Ganesan sold an extent of 13 1/3 cents on the southern side of the property to one Paneerselvam and the said Paneersevam was in possession and enjoyment of the said property sold to him. The plaintiffs 1 and 2 are now in possession of the balance 27 2/3 cents and are entitled to the said property in common. The defendant is the pangali to the plaintiff and his father Rama Gounder was the brother of one Doraisamy Gounder, the father of Kumarasamy Gounder and Krishna Gounder. A partition in between Doraisamy Gounder and Rama Gounder was effected some 60 years back and the land in the suit survey number was allotted to the said Doraisamy Gounder and thus, the patta stood in the name of Kumarasamy Gounder and Krishna Gounder jointly. The defendant or his father was not having any right in the suit property and the defendant had requested the plaintiffs to permit him to put up construction in second item of suit properties to put up a house for his living with condition that he would vacate the said house whenever it was demanded. Accordingly, 7 cents of land was allotted to him in which, the defendant put up a thatched house and a shed and the remaining 20 2/3 cents were lying on the eastern side to the said item 2 kept by the first plaintiff on behalf of other brothers. The defendant who was permitted to be in possession of item 2 of the suit properties attempted to encroach upon item 1 of the suit property to which the plaintiff raised objection. However, he has got an UDR patta changed in his name. The defendant who was permitted to be in possession of item 2 of the suit properties attempted to encroach upon item 1 of the suit property to which the plaintiff raised objection. However, he has got an UDR patta changed in his name. The plaintiff had applied for cancellation of the said patta but the said application was pending before the Tahsildar, Vedaranyam. The plaintiff sent notice on 26.2.1998 to the defendant seeking for possession of item 2 of the suit properties and also not to interfere with item 1 of the suit properties. However, he has replied falsely and attempted to put fence in the suit properties which was thwarted with the intervention of panchayatdars. Therefore, the plaintiff has sought for permanent injunction and recovery of possession and other reliefs which may be decreed as prayed for. 4. The objections raised by the defendant in the form of written statement before the trial Court would be thus: The averments made in the plaint are not correct. The land in suit S.No.186/7 was enjoyed by the defendants father Rama Gounder after the partition he had with his brother. The father of the defendant namely Rama Gounder had three brothers namely Doraisamy Gounder, Chokka Gounder and kunju Gounder. The first plaintiff was the son of Kumarasamy Gounder. The second plaintiff was the second son of Krishna Gounder who are the sons of Doraisamy Gounder. The father of the defendant Rama Gounder was allotted 20 cents in S.No.186/7. The defendant has agricultural field on the northern side of the suit property. The survey number belonging to the said field is S.No.174/9. The defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the said field along with his land in S.No.186/7. The father of the defendant Rama Gounder was in possession and enjoyment of 80 kuzhis in the suit survey number since he was already in possession of 60 kuzhis allotted in the partition and 20 kuzhis of land given by the said Kumarasamy Gounder to Rama Gounder. Rama Gounder died some 30 years ago. Doraisamy Gounder also died prior to the death of Rama Gounder In the suit survey number, 80 kuzhis of land was enjoyed by Rama Gounder and thereafter by the defendant. The defendant is also living in the house located in the suit survey number. Rama Gounder died some 30 years ago. Doraisamy Gounder also died prior to the death of Rama Gounder In the suit survey number, 80 kuzhis of land was enjoyed by Rama Gounder and thereafter by the defendant. The defendant is also living in the house located in the suit survey number. The brother of the first plaintiff Ganesan was not having any right in the land in suit survey number. The averment that the plaintiffs have permitted the defendant to be in 7 cents of lands in suit survey number are incorrect. In the 80 kuzhis of land in the suit survey number, there are 8 mango trees yielding fruits. The averment that kist have been made by Kumarasamy Gounder and Krishna Gounder is not true. The averment that the Ganesan, brother of the first plaintiff sold 7 cents of lands to one Paneerselvam is not true and the boundaries mentioned in the document are also not correct. The defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property for over 60 years. The averment that the defendant was disturbing the possession of the plaintiff in item-1 of the suit properties and the plaintiff thwarted the same are not true. The plaintiff did not come to Court with true facts. The plaintiffs have no right title in the suit property. The defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the first item of the property and therefore, the suit has to be dismissed. 5. The trial court had framed necessary issues on the basis of the pleadings and entered trial. After appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial court had decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff as prayed for without costs. Aggrieved upon the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the defendant preferred the appeal before the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.22 of 2003 . The lower Appellate Court heard the arguments of both sides and had come to the conclusion of allowing the appeal after setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. The suit filed by the plaintiff was consequently dismissed. 6. Aggrieved on the reversal judgment passed by the first appellate Court, the plaintiff has come forward with this second appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court. 7. The suit filed by the plaintiff was consequently dismissed. 6. Aggrieved on the reversal judgment passed by the first appellate Court, the plaintiff has come forward with this second appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court. 7. On admission of this Second Appeal, this Court had formulated the following substantial questions of law for consideration in this appeal. "1.) When the defendant himself admitted that he is not in possession of the first item of the suit schedule of property and one Vedaiyan built up a house and the same is not supported by any registered document, whether the first appellate Court is right in holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief? 2.) When admission is a best piece of evidence as per the Indian evidence Act, whether the first appellate Court is justified in rejecting the same on the ground of 'slip of tongue'?" 8. Heard Mrs.Shymala, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.K.Ramachandran, learned counsel for the respondents. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit in her arguments that the lower appellate Court had unnecessarily interfered with the well considered judgment of the trial court and the reasons given by the first appellate Court are not sustainable. She would further submit that the declaration of title to the plaintiffs in the suit properties was very much established through evidence and the defendant had also admitted in his cross examination that he is ready to hand over vacant possession of item – 2 of the suit property However, the first appellate Court, had termed it as slip of tongue and the judgment of the trial court was unnecessarily set aside. She would also submit that the entire properties in S.No.186/7 was belonging to the families of both plaintiffs and the defendant and the plaintiffs father namely Kumarasamy Gounder and Krishna Gounder were given with a land in S.No.186/7 for an extent of 41 cents and the same was established through various documents in Exs.B1 to B3 and Exs.A1, A7 and A8 and these documents being from old documents dealing with properties by mortgage and sale, they would certainly show the title and right of parties concern. She would further submit that there would not be any title deed for the ancestral properties but it would have been presumed through documents relating to the transaction in respect of the properties but the first appellate Court had unnecessarily interfered with the well considered judgment of the trial court without any valid reason. She would further submit that the admission of the defendant that he was not in possession of item 1 of the suit property would lead to the presumption that the defendant has no case for objecting the possession of the plaintiff in the suit property. She would further submit that the admissions given by the defendant coupled with the documents produced on either side would clinchingly prove the title of the plaintiffs but it was erroneously decided that the plaintiffs did not prove their title. She would also submit that the admission given by the D.W.2 that he would hand over item-2 of the suit schedule was considered as slip of tongue even though D.W.2 did not speak about the said admission in his re examination which would show the biased attitude of the first appellate Court. She would also submit that the admission given by D.W.2 is the best evidence but it was simply rejected by the first appellate Court as slip of tongue which is not sustainable in law. She would therefore request the Court to interfere and set aside the judgment of the first appellate Court and to restore the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent would submit in his argument that the plaintiff who has come forward with a suit for declaration of his title must establish the title to the suit property and when the plaintiff failed to prove that he was entitled to the suit property, no relief can be granted either declaration or injunction or recovery of possession in respect of the suit property. He would further submit in his argument that the first appellate Court had promptly applied its mind and had distinguished the documents relied upon by the trial court and had come to the correct conclusion that the plaintiff did not prove his title and there is no necessity to interfere with the finding of fact by the first appellate Court. He would further submit in his argument that the first appellate Court had promptly applied its mind and had distinguished the documents relied upon by the trial court and had come to the correct conclusion that the plaintiff did not prove his title and there is no necessity to interfere with the finding of fact by the first appellate Court. He would further submit in his argument that Exs.A7 and A8 and Exs.B1 and B2 which were the documents related to mortgage would not conclude the title in favour of the plaintiff. He would further submit that the alleged admission given by D.W.2 would not confer title to the plaintiff since the said evidence given by D.W.2 should have been considered along with other answers and the evidence of D.W.2 if read fully, it would not show any admission but it would only a slip of tongue as rightly pointed out by the first appellate Court. He would also submit that when the plaintiff was not able to prove his title, no declaration can be granted. Similarly, there cannot be any injunction nor any recovery of possession in the absence of title found in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, he would request the Court to confirm the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court and to dismiss the second appeal. 11. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments advanced on either side. 12. The suit was filed by the plaintiffs who are the appellants and the second respondent herein for declaration of their title to the suit properties items 1 and 2 and for permanent injunction against the defendant in any way disturbing the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs in respect of item-1 and for recovery of possession regarding item-2 of the suit properties after removal of the super structure put up therein and also for mense profits to be fixed, after relegating it to a separate enquiry in favour of the plaintiff. The said suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed as prayed for by the trial court. While finding the suit decreed in favour of the plaintiff, the trial court had discussed various documents produced by the plaintiffs as Ex.A1, A7 and A8 and Ex.B1 , B2 and B3. The said suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed as prayed for by the trial court. While finding the suit decreed in favour of the plaintiff, the trial court had discussed various documents produced by the plaintiffs as Ex.A1, A7 and A8 and Ex.B1 , B2 and B3. However, the said judgment and decree were set aside by the first appellate Court by raising suspicion that the plaintiffs have to prove their title and then only they are entitled for permanent injunction and recovery of possession and other reliefs. The documents produced on the side of the plaintiffs in Exs.A1,A7 and A8 are not disputed by the defendant. Similarly, the documents produced in Ex.B1 to B3 were also not disputed by both the parties. As far as document Exs.A7 and A8 are concerned, they were executed in the year 1927 and 1940 respectively. Ex.A7 was a mortgage deed executed by Doraisamy Gounder in respect of various properties including S.No.186/7, an extent of 41 cents. There is no dispute that the said property in S.No.186/7 is part and parcel of the suit property. Similarly Ex.A8 is also a mortgage deed executed by Kumarasamy Gounder and his sons Karthikeyan, Subramanian, Ramachandran, (the first plaintiff) and Ganesan in favour of one Rama Gounder in respect of certain properties including S.No.186/7 for an extent of 20 cents within definite boundaries. Ex.B1 is the mortgage deed executed by Kumarasamy Gounder and his minor sons including the plaintiff on 14.12.1936 in respect of various properties including 21 cents in S.No.186/7 within the definite boundaries. Ex.B3 is also the mortgage deed executed by the defendant and his father Rama Gounder on 23.7.1944 in respect of certain properties including the land in S.No.186/7 measuring an extent of 20 cents on the northern side. Similarly, Krishna Gounder, the brother of Kumarasamy Gounder executed a mortgage deed on 14.12.1936 in respect of certain properties including the land in S.No.186/7 measuring an extent of 20 cents. 13. The relationship of parties have been categorically admitted on either side. There is no dispute that Doraisamy Gounder and Rama Gounder were brothers. Rama Gounder's son is Govindasamy Gounder. Doraisamy Gounder had two sons namely Kumarasamy Gounder and Krishna Gounder. Kumarasamy Gounder's sons are the plaintiffs and three other persons namely Karthikeyan, Subramanian and Ganesan. The second plaintiff Thirumalai and Vedaian are the sons of Krishna Gounder. There is no dispute that Doraisamy Gounder and Rama Gounder were brothers. Rama Gounder's son is Govindasamy Gounder. Doraisamy Gounder had two sons namely Kumarasamy Gounder and Krishna Gounder. Kumarasamy Gounder's sons are the plaintiffs and three other persons namely Karthikeyan, Subramanian and Ganesan. The second plaintiff Thirumalai and Vedaian are the sons of Krishna Gounder. Therefore, there is no dispute in respect of the relationship between parties. The branches of (1) Kumarasamy Gounder, (2) Krishna Gounder and (3) Rama Gounder are stated to have right in the properties comprised in S.No.186/7. The said three branches had devolved from their fathers namely Doraisamy Gounder and Rama Gounder. The execution of mortgage deeds would certainly show the proprietary right of any party to mortgage the properties comprised therein. The properties comprised in S.No.186/7 was stated to be admittedly the ancestral properties of both plaintiffs and defendant. It has been pleaded in the plaint that partition had taken place in between the ancestors some 60 years back. It could be perceived from the mortgage deeds that are Exs.A7 and A8 and B1 to B3, which have sequences in chronological order. The execution of the mortgage deeds would go to show that Doraisamy Gounder had executed a mortgage deed in Ex.A7 and Rama Gounder and his son, the defendant executed another mortgage deed in Ex.B2 in respect of their properties allotted to them in the partition. Similarly, the other mortgage deeds would also go to show the proprietary rights of the executants derived from partition to mortgage the properties in favour of third parties. Therefore, it could be safely conclude that the first plaintiff's father Kumarasamy Gounder and the second plaintiff's father Krishna Gounder and the defendant's father Rama Gounder had independent rights in the properties comprised in S.No.186/7 with definite boundaries. Kumarasamy Gounder, Krishna Gounder and Rama Gounder along with their sons have separately dealt with the properties and those properties are not one and the same but with different and definite boundaries. On calculating the extent of the said property gathered from Exs.B1, B2 and B3 , we could see that Kumarasamy Gounder's branch was entitled to an extent of 21 cents in S.No.186/7 as per Ex.B1. The branch of Krishna Gounder was entitled to 20 cents in S.No.186/7 as per Ex.B2. The branch of Rama Gounder, the defendant is entitled to 20 cents in S.No.186/7 as per Ex.B3. The branch of Krishna Gounder was entitled to 20 cents in S.No.186/7 as per Ex.B2. The branch of Rama Gounder, the defendant is entitled to 20 cents in S.No.186/7 as per Ex.B3. Those documents were produced by the defendant. As per the boundary recitals, in those documents, we could see that Ex.B3 land belonging to the defendant's branch was located on the northern part of S.No.186/7. The property in S.No.186/7 belonging to Krishna Gounder and Vedaian was located on the eastern part of S.No.186/7. The property belonging to Kumarasamy Gounder branch is located on the southern side of defendant's property and western side of Krishna Gounder's property. Therefore, the total extent of 61 cents in S.No.186/7 as described in the plaint schedule showing the northern boundary as the defendant will represent the 21 cents in Ex.B3. The balance 41 cents in S.No.186/7 are shown in Ex.B1 and B2. In the said 41 cents, from the branch of Kumarasamy Gounder, an extent of 13-1/3 cents were sold to one Paneerselvam as per Ex.A1. The lower Court was very much harped upon the properties sold to Paneerselvam and was not relying upon the plaintiff's case that it should not have been located on the southern side of the suit property. No doubt, the survey number mentioned in Ex.A1 is S.No.186/7 and the extent mentioned is 13-1/3 cents. The evidence of D.W.1 would go to show that the property located on the southern side of the suit property measuring an extent of 13 1/3 cent was sold by the plaintiff's brother to one Paneerselvam was correct. His evidence would go to show that he had no objection for that. When the defendant had admitted that the property sold by the brother of the first plaintiff to one Paneerselvam in respect of the property lying on the southern side of the suit property, the first appellate Court should not have doubted regarding the said transaction. That was the main reason, the first appellate Court had wrongly perceived the evidence and interfered with the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. That was the main reason, the first appellate Court had wrongly perceived the evidence and interfered with the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. When this evidence of DW.1 is applied with the location of the suit property with the help of Exs.B1 to B3, it could be presumed very clearly that the first plaintiff and his brothers on one hand and the second plaintiff on the other hand are collectively entitled to the balance 27-2/3 cents in S.No.186/7. There is no dispute that item 1 of the suit property is a vacant site. It had been suggested that Vedaiyan had put up construction in the said property. There is no other evidence to show that there was a building in the said property on the date of filing of the suit. When the documents and evidence produced before the trial court would go to show that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are entitled to 27-2/3 cents in S.No.186/7, the evidence of P.Ws that item 1 of the suit properties measuring 20-2/3 cents and item 2 measuring 7 cents are the said properties proved to have belonged to the plaintiffs. The boundaries also tally with the said description mentioned in Exs.B1 to B3. 14. At this juncture, I have to consider the finding reached by the learned first appellate court that the admission of the first defendant that item-2 property should have been handed over to the plaintiffs, could be correct or a slip of tongue. On a careful perusal of the admission of DW.1 in his evidence adduced on 07.08.2003. He had categorically admitted that " TAMIL’. This admission was given by the defendant after giving yet another admission that the patta given to plaintiffs under UDR scheme was very much known to him. Apart from that, he had also given no objection for the document Ex.A7, a mortgage deed executed by Duraisamy Gounder on 03.01.1997 in respect of 41 cents in S.No.186/7. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant was that the said admission must have been read with subsequent evidence given by DW.1, since the suggestion that item 2 of suit property should have been handed over to the plaintiffs was rightly denied by him. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant was that the said admission must have been read with subsequent evidence given by DW.1, since the suggestion that item 2 of suit property should have been handed over to the plaintiffs was rightly denied by him. However, when we go through the entire evidence of DW.1, it could be seen that a panchayat was said to have been held to hand over item-2 of the suit properties by him to the first plaintiff. Considering all these things, I could see that the grant of permission by the plaintiffs to put up a house in item-2 of the suit properties as pleaded and spoken by the plaintiffs could be probable and true on the basis of the evidence given by DW.1. Apart from that, DW.1 had admitted that UDR patta was given in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of item-1 also. Therefore, the findings of the trial court that the plaintiffs have established their title to the suit properties by virtue of Exs.B1 to B3, the documents produced by the defendant found to be sound and well considered. The admission given by DW.1 regarding handing over of possession of item-2 of the suit property was not explained in re-examination by DW.1 as a slip of tongue, but it was considered by the first appellate court as slip of tongue, which cannot be a correct perception of admissions as per the Law of Evidence. Therefore, the findings reached by the first appellate court for interfering with the judgment of the trial court are not in accordance with evidence and would not depict a correct assessment of right of parties to the suit properties. Consequently, the questions of law formulated in this appeal are decided in favour of the appellants. 15. Under such circumstances, I have no hesitation to interfere and set aside the findings of the lower appellate court in reversing the judgment of the trial court. It is held in the judgment of Hon'ble Apex court reported in (2007) 4 SCC 163 (Chinthamani Ammal vs. Nandagopal Gounder and another) that the facts decided by the trial court should not normally be disturbed by the first appellate court unless there is a grave error in the said finding. It is held in the judgment of Hon'ble Apex court reported in (2007) 4 SCC 163 (Chinthamani Ammal vs. Nandagopal Gounder and another) that the facts decided by the trial court should not normally be disturbed by the first appellate court unless there is a grave error in the said finding. The relevant portion found in para 19 runs as follows: "19.) In Madholal Sindhu v. Official Assignee of Bombay (AIR 1950 FC 21) it was observed: "It is true that a judge of first instance can never be treated as infalliable in determining on which side the truth lies and like other tribunals he may go wrong on questions of fact, but on such matters if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at, the appeal court should not lightly interfere with the judgment." 16. The judgment of this Court reported in (2007) 1 MLJ 499 (Kamireddi Sattiaraju and Kamireddi Mangayamma(died) ..Vs.. Kandamuri Boolaeswari) would also be helpful for the present case. The dictum laid down by this Court would be thus:- "27.) In the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2002 (2) LW 399 (supra), the Supreme Court has set out the legal position as under in paragraph 15: "15.) Granting of specific performance is an equitable relief, though the same is now governed by the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. These equitable principles are nicely incorporated in Section 20 of the Act. While granting a decree for specific performance, these statutory guidelines shall be in the forefront of the mind of the Court. The trial Court, which had the added advantage of recording the evidence and seeing the demeanour of the witnesses considered the relevant facts and reached a conclusion. The appellate Court should not have reversed that decision regarding these facts, and, in our view, the appellate Court seriously flawed in its decision. The trial Court, which had the added advantage of recording the evidence and seeing the demeanour of the witnesses considered the relevant facts and reached a conclusion. The appellate Court should not have reversed that decision regarding these facts, and, in our view, the appellate Court seriously flawed in its decision. Therefore, we hold that the respondent is not entitled to a decree of specific performance of the contract." 28.) In the light of the above decision of the Supreme Court in 2002 (2) LW 399 (supra), when we consider the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, we are of the view that the trial Court, which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of P.W.1 in the course of recording the evidence and in whose opinion, the claim of the respondent/plaintiff was not to have been lightly interfered with by the learned Single Judge." 17. This view is also followed in the judgment of this Court reported in 2010 -2 – LW – 851 (Manoharakumari..vs. Anitha and another) "28.) Observing that when the finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial court in appraisal of evidence is erroneous, in 2008 (3) CTC 528 (Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi), in the Supreme Court held as follows:- "25.) .... the Appellate Court is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding recorded by the trial Court on oral evidence. It should not forget that the trial Court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and therefore, trial Court's conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the Appellate Court possesses the same powers as that of the original Court, but they have to be exercised with proper care, caution and circumspection. When a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial Court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial Court in appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well-established principles of law or unreasonable." 18. When a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial Court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial Court in appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well-established principles of law or unreasonable." 18. In the present case, the interference of the first appellate court in the well considered judgment of the trial court is not in consonance with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and therefore, the judgment and decree of first appellate Court are liable to interfered and set aside. 19. In view of the discussions held above, I am of the view that judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court are liable to be interfered as it did not perceive the evidence properly, but perversely, and therefore, the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs is allowed. 20. In fine, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are restored. There shall be no order as to costs in this appeal. 21. Six months time is granted for vacating the premises in Item No.2 of the suit property and to hand over possession of the same to the plaintiff.