ORDER : The order impugned in this revision is the order passed by the Taluk Land Board, Ottappalam dated 31.3.2003, which concluded the proceedings initiated under sub-section (9A) of Section 85 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 ("KLR Act" for short) as per order dated 30.5.1992. 2. Rama Iyer, in pursuance of the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 ("KLR Act" for short) filed a return on 11.12.1972 before the Taluk Land Board regarding the excess lands held by him. The Taluk Land Board, by order dated 29.5.1975 in C.C. No. 102 of 1973 directed surrender of 8.71 acres of land out of 16.87 acres held by the said Rama Iyer. The excess land was also taken over on 26.9.1975. Subsequently on 4.11.1975, his son filed a petition before the Taluk Land Board and contended that the lands taken over were liable to be returned to the legal heirs, since Rama Iyer died before the passing of the order by the Taluk Land Board and no notice was issued to the legal representatives. The Taluk Land Board refused to consider the application by its order dated 10.1.1976 and held that there was absolutely no requirement to reconsider the order of the Taluk Land Board on 29.5.1975. Against this, the legal heirs of the deceased Rama Iyer filed C.R.P. No. 461 of 1976. The above C.R.P. was heard along with O.P.No.4930 of 1976, filed by one of the sons of Rama Iyer, and the matter was remanded by order dated 8.11.1976. This Court found that no orders were passed on the return filed by the said Rama Iyer by the Taluk Land Board till the death of the declarant on 9.1.1975. The order passed on 29.5.1975 was against the deceased declarant without notice to the legal heirs. In the said circumstance, the Civil Revision Petition as also the Original Petition were allowed, setting aside the original order of the Taluk Land Board dated 29.5.1975 as also the order passed on 10.1.1976 refusing to consider the objections filed by the legal heirs; and the matter was remanded back to the Taluk Land Board. 3. In the said circumstance, the Civil Revision Petition as also the Original Petition were allowed, setting aside the original order of the Taluk Land Board dated 29.5.1975 as also the order passed on 10.1.1976 refusing to consider the objections filed by the legal heirs; and the matter was remanded back to the Taluk Land Board. 3. On remand, the matter was taken up by the Taluk Land Board, which, by order dated 25.9.1979, dropped further proceedings in the case; since the properties held by the declarant devolved on the legal heirs on his death, which was prior to the passing of the order on 29.5.1975. In such circumstance, the Tahsildar, Ottappalam was directed to release the land to the legal heirs of the declarant under intimation to the Taluk Land Board. The lands were then released back to the legal heirs of the original declarant by virtue of the order dated 25.9.1979. 4. The revision petitioners 1 to 4 and 18 to 20 are the purchasers of various extents of properties from the legal heirs of the deceased declarant, Rama Iyer. Such purchases were effected after 25.9.1979 and before 30.5.1989, more specifically in the early 80s. There is no dispute that the purchases/sales were made after 1979, i.e., after the orders of release dated 25.9.1979, since the legal heirs could have made the sale only after the lands were released to them. In any event, there is nothing in the impugned order of the Taluk Land Board or the order dated 30.5.1992 re-opening the matter under sub-section (9A) of Section 85 of KLR Act to show that any of such purchases were made prior to 1979 and when the properties were in the possession of the Government. Revision petitioners 5 to 17 and 21 to 26 were cultivating tenants under the original declarant, who, according to the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, obtained valid Purchase Certificates from the Land Tribunal. 5. Sri. R. Sreehari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, would contend that Section 85(9A) of the KLR Act was inserted by Act 16 of 1989 with effect from 30.5.1989. The proviso to sub-section (9A) specifically provides a limitation of three years from the date of coming into force of Act 16 of 1989, for reopening any case on the grounds provided under sub-section (9A). The proviso to sub-section (9A) specifically provides a limitation of three years from the date of coming into force of Act 16 of 1989, for reopening any case on the grounds provided under sub-section (9A). The proceedings having been taken on 30.5.1992, though only with a delay of one day, the limitation provided under the proviso acts with full vigour and hence the order is beyond time. It is also contended that with respect to the revision petitioners who had obtained valid Purchase Certificates from the Land Tribunal under the KLR Act, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Ahmmed Kutty v. Mariakutty Umma, 2000 (1) KLT 829 (SC), applies squarely. The Purchase Certificates cannot be overturned by the Taluk Land Board; nor can the Taluk Land Board ignore the same, since it is conclusive proof of the purchase. With respect to the other revision petitioners who had purchased the various extents of lands from the legal heirs of late Rama Iyer, after obtaining release of the land from the Government; it is submitted that they are entitled to protection under Section 7E of the KLR Act. 6. Smt. Susheela R. Bhatt, learned Special Government Pleader (Revenue), per contra, would contend that the order passed on 30.5.1992 was preceded by a notice intimating the legal heirs as provided under sub-section (9A) and that, necessarily, would save the order from being set aside on the ground of limitation as provided in the proviso. It is the contention of the learned Special Government Pleader, with respect to the Purchase Certificates, that even in accordance with the Supreme Court decision if the same has been obtained by way of fraud or collusion, the same can necessarily be reviewed and fresh proceedings taken under sub-section (9A). The purchasers of the legal heirs claiming protection under Section 7E; had a remedy under Section 106B of the KLR Act, which was inserted by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Act 21 of 2006). Any person claiming deemed tenancy under Section 7E ought to apply within such time and in such manner, as has been prescribed, to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area, for a certificate of title in respect of the land held by such deemed tenant, is the contention of the State. Any person claiming deemed tenancy under Section 7E ought to apply within such time and in such manner, as has been prescribed, to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area, for a certificate of title in respect of the land held by such deemed tenant, is the contention of the State. No such application having been filed by any of the revision petitioners who claimed under a sale deed executed by the legal heirs of Rama Iyer, this Court cannot confer any rights flowing under Section 7E, since the same would be overstepping the limits under Section 103 of the KLR Act and assuming a jurisdiction which is not specifically conferred by the statute to this Court, contends the Special Government Pleader. 7. Sub-section (9A) of Section 85 is extracted hereunder:- "(9A) Power of Taluk Land Board to review its decision.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963), or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any judgement, decree or order of any Court or other authority, the Taluk Land Board may, if it is satisfied that its decision under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) or sub-section (9) requires to be reviewed on the ground that such decision has been made due to the failure to produce relevant data or other particulars relating to ownership or possession before it, or by collusion or fraud or any suppression of material facts the Taluk Land Board may review such decision after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and pass such orders as it may think fit: Provided that the Taluk Land Board shall not reopen any such case after the expiry of three years from the date of coming into force of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1989". 8. The first contention to be dealt with is the plea of limitation raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners. On going through the order dated 30.5.1992, wherein the Taluk Land Board prima facie, purportedly recorded its satisfaction under sub-section (9A), specifically speaks about notice having been taken against the legal heirs of the late declarant on introduction of sub-section (9A) of the KLR Act. On going through the order dated 30.5.1992, wherein the Taluk Land Board prima facie, purportedly recorded its satisfaction under sub-section (9A), specifically speaks about notice having been taken against the legal heirs of the late declarant on introduction of sub-section (9A) of the KLR Act. However, since the legal heirs were residing outside the State, the order speaks of notice having been taken in Malayalam daily "Mathrubhoomi" and the English daily "Express" respectively on 20.3.1992 and 19.3.1992. By the said notices, the legal heirs were directed to appear on 27.3.1992 before the Taluk Land Board. It was on non-appearance of the legal heirs that the order dated 30.5.1992 was passed. Going by a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Balan v. State of Kerala, 2006 (4) KLT 229 (F.B.), the limitation as per the proviso to sub-section (9A) is not for passing a final order, but only for the issuance of a notice. The notice contemplated under sub-section (9A) as was noticed earlier, has been issued within three years as stipulated in the proviso. In any event, going by the dictum laid down in Haru Das v. State of W.B., AIR 1972 SC 1293 , the order, in any event, cannot be said to be delayed or barred by limitation, since the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day of that date is to be excluded. In such circumstance, the plea of limitation set up by the revision petitioners fail and the same is rejected. 9. The next contention is with respect to the proceedings taken under sub-section (9A). Subsequent to lands being released to the legal heirs of the original declarant, various extents were sold to a number of persons. There is no whisper either in the order dated 30.5.1992 recording the prima facie satisfaction or the impugned order dated 31.3.2003, of any ground as specified in sub-section (9A). Subsequent to lands being released to the legal heirs of the original declarant, various extents were sold to a number of persons. There is no whisper either in the order dated 30.5.1992 recording the prima facie satisfaction or the impugned order dated 31.3.2003, of any ground as specified in sub-section (9A). Sub-section (9A), as is extracted above, shows that any decision of the Taluk Land Board taken under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) or sub-section (9) could be reviewed if the Taluk Land Board is convinced of such requirement on grounds of such earlier decision having been made, more particularly: (i) due to the failure to produce relevant data or other particulars relating to ownership or possession before it, (ii) collusion, (iii) fraud, or (iv) any suppression of material facts. While the learned counsel for the revision petitioners strenuously canvasses the position that none of these grounds have been found in the order, the learned Special Government Pleader would contend that the order specifically speaks of the decision having been made due to the failure to produce relevant data and also suppression of material facts. To buttress this contention, the learned Special Government Pleader takes me through the impugned order. 10. After obtaining report from the authorities under the Act, the Taluk Land Board finds that the sale of properties were made after the declarant's death on 9.1.1975. No sale is noticed having been made before release of the lands taken over, to the legal heirs. It is also found that: On recording such finding, the Taluk Land Board has considered certain documents produced by some of the revision petitioners and found that all of these transactions were invalid. The above finding is highlighted on behalf of the State to contend that there is a clear finding of suppression of relevant facts. It is also contended that there is failure to produce relevant data or other particulars relating to ownership or possession and that the Taluk Land Board in ordering release of the lands by order dated 25.9.1979 did not apply the law properly. 11. This Court many a time considered the scope and ambit of sub-section (9A). It is also contended that there is failure to produce relevant data or other particulars relating to ownership or possession and that the Taluk Land Board in ordering release of the lands by order dated 25.9.1979 did not apply the law properly. 11. This Court many a time considered the scope and ambit of sub-section (9A). George v. State of Kerala, 1992 (2) KLT 160 , was a case in which proceedings were reopened under sub-section (9A) for the reason that the decision taken by the Taluk Land Board was without proper verification of the land and documentary evidence and on the further ground that a water channel which was granted exemption earlier, was not an item liable to be exempted under the provisions of the KLR Act. A learned Single Judge of this Court found that a reading of the above section would show that the decision granted by a mistaken notion of law cannot be brought within the purview of sub-section (9A) of Section 85. In fact, the decision in George's case (supra) was referred to by another single Judge in State of Kerala v. Sivasankaran Nair, 2001 (3) KLT 408 and it was reaffirmed that a decision arrived at by the Board by mistaken notion of law cannot be brought within the purview of Section 85(9A) and only in cases specifically referred to in sub-section (9A) can there be a reopening. The judgment in Sivasankaran Nair's case (supra) also considered the issue of limitation and held that the order for re-opening should be passed before the expiry of three years, to save limitation. Since there were conflicting decisions on this aspect of learned single Judges of this Court and also Division Bench, the issue was referred to a Full Bench, which is cited earlier in this judgment (Balan's case). It is pertinent that the said Full Bench overruled Sivasankaran Nair's case (supra), but specifically on the point of limitation alone, holding that it is not the order that has to be passed before the period of limitation, but the requirement is only for initiation of proceedings, i.e., issuance of notice. 12. With respect to the contention regarding the Purchase Certificates obtained by revision petitioners 5 to 17 and 21 to 26, the contention that the same is obtained by fraud or collusion taken up by the State before this Court is without any basis. 12. With respect to the contention regarding the Purchase Certificates obtained by revision petitioners 5 to 17 and 21 to 26, the contention that the same is obtained by fraud or collusion taken up by the State before this Court is without any basis. Neither the order of the Taluk Land Board dated 30.5.1992 recording satisfaction for proceeding under sub-section (9A) nor the impugned order dated 31.3.2003 speaks of any fraud or collusion in the grant of such Purchase Certificates. In fact, the order deals with only certain sale/title deeds of some of the revision petitioners herein and does not at all look into any of the Purchase Certificates issued by the Land Tribunal. The factum of Purchase Certificates having been obtained by the said revision petitioners has also not been disputed. 13. The contention of the learned Special Government Pleader that any person who claims to be a deemed tenant under Section 7E, has to approach the Land Tribunal under Section 106B seems to be correct. However, before going into whether such deemed tenancy has to be established; what is to be looked into is the legality of initiation of proceedings under sub-section (9A). What exactly is the ground on which the Taluk Land Board has satisfied itself for initiating such proceedings? 14. I have conscientiously looked into the order dated 30.5.1992, which purportedly recorded satisfaction for initiation of proceedings under sub-section (9A). After detailing the proceedings that had taken place in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, the Taluk Land Board details the efforts taken for the service of notice in paragraph 4. The operative portion of the order is extracted below: "The Taluk Land Board discussed the case on 30-5-1992 and decided to set aside the orders passed by the Taluk Land Board on 25-9-1979 and to proceed afresh vide directions contained in Hon. High Court of Kerala judgment in CRP-4561/76 & OP-4930/76-C. Fresh enquiry on the petition filed by Mahadevan dated 4-11-1975 will be made through the Authorised officer and based on the merits of the report, the matter will be proceeded further. The SDT will file a detailed report on the petition filed by late V.M. Mahadevan dated 4-11-1975 and furnish the status of the properties as on 1.1.1970 and now within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order. The SDT will file a detailed report on the petition filed by late V.M. Mahadevan dated 4-11-1975 and furnish the status of the properties as on 1.1.1970 and now within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order. A copy of this order will be published at notice Board of the Village Office, Ananganadi, Notice Board of the Taluk Land Board, Ottapalam and also at notice Board of the Taluk Office for the notice of the concerned parties as the whereabouts of the legal heirs are not known to the Taluk Land Board". 15. For one, the grounds for initiation of proceedings under sub-section (9A) are grounds which are available for setting aside the earlier order, i.e., the order dated 25.9.1979. The order dated 25.9.1979 was one passed on remand from this Court. What the Taluk Land Board noticed therein was that though the proceedings were taken against the original declarant, before the passing of the order directing surrender of excess land; the declarant had died. The land having devolved upon the legal heirs of the declarant upon the death of the declarant, the proceedings were dropped. There is absolutely no suppression of relevant facts or failure to produce relevant data in the earlier proceeding. The facts on which the Taluk Land Board proceeded to pass the order dated 25.9.1979 cannot at all be disputed. Fraud or collusion has never been raised either in the order dated 30.5.1992 or in the order dated 31.3.2003. The satisfaction as recorded in the order dated 30.5.1992 is merely mechanical and is only for the reason of introduction of sub-section (9A). The mere fact that sub-section (9A) has been introduced to the Act does not confer the Taluk Land Board with the authority to review its earlier orders. Review can be only on satisfaction of the Taluk Land Board, with respect to the specific grounds as spoken to by the sub-section. There is not a word much less finding of satisfaction of any such ground in the order dated 30.5.1992. The order dated 31.3.2003 also does not speak of any such grounds having been found with respect to the earlier order dated 25.9.1979. The finding as extracted in vernacular above is also contrary to facts. There is not a word much less finding of satisfaction of any such ground in the order dated 30.5.1992. The order dated 31.3.2003 also does not speak of any such grounds having been found with respect to the earlier order dated 25.9.1979. The finding as extracted in vernacular above is also contrary to facts. The vernacular extract, translated, means that while the return was pending enquiry before the Taluk Land Board, the said fact was suppressed and the legal heirs sold the lands. For one, what is relevant in sub-section (9A) is suppression of material facts from the Taluk Land Board and not the vendees. Again, when the sale was entered into by the legal heirs, there was absolutely no proceeding before the Taluk Land Board, the lands having been released to the legal heirs on 25.7.1979. In such circumstance, this Court does not see any reason to go into whether the deemed tenants were liable to approach the Land Tribunal under Section 106B. The proceedings taken by the Taluk Land Board under sub-section (9A), according to the State, is without properly understanding the provisions of law. Geoge's case (supra) stares the State in its face. Mistaken notion of law cannot be brought within the purview of sub-section (9A) of Section 85. Neither the notice nor the order dated 30.5.1992 or the impugned order dated 31.3.2003 discloses any fact leading to the grounds stipulated under sub-section (9A). The order of the Taluk Land Board in C.C. No. 102 of 1973 dated 31.3.2003, purportedly made in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (9A) of Section 85 of the KLR Act, cannot be sustained for the reasons stated above. The said order is set aside and the above Civil Revision Petition is allowed with costs throughout.