Judgment : 1. This judgment disposes of CCCA No.11 of 1993, CCCA No.117 of 1993 and CCCA No.58 of 2008. CCCA No.11 of 1993 was laid by the plaintiff in O.S.No.309 of 1986 on the file of the IV Additional Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. CCCA No.117 of 1993 is laid by defendant Nos.6 & 7 who are the legal representatives of the 1st defendant being his wife and son. .CCCA No.58 of 2008 is laid by defendants 2 to 4. However, the main fight is between defendants 2 to 4 on the one side and the defendant No.5 on the other side. 2. The facts of the case are that the 1st defendant is the father of the plaintiff and the father of the defendants 2 to 4. The plaintiff laid the suit for partition in respect of Acs.3-50 cents of property standing in the name of the 1st defendant. The schedule properties are situate in Survey Nos.1 to 4, Golkonda Fort. The 1st defendant allegedly acquired the same with the nucleus of the joint family properties. 3. The plaintiff however impleaded the 5th defendant also to the suit. The 5th defendant is the agreement holder from defendants 1 to 4. He was allegedly trying to dispossess the plaintiff from the plaint schedule property, which made it necessary for the plaintiff to array defendant No.5 also to the suit. Curiously, defendant No.5 entered appearance but did not file any written statement. Defendants 1 to 4 laid written statement. They inter alia admitted that defendant No.5 was the holder agreement of sale in respect of the schedule properties and that the agreement had been subsisting. 4. No issue was framed relating to the agreement of sale in favour of the 5th defendant since it was not the issue in controversy. By way of equities, the trial Court held that the property agreed to be sold by defendants 1 to 4 in favour of the 5th defendant be allotted to defendants 1 to 4 in the partition of the properties by metes and bounds. Indeed, the 5th defendant was not a coparcener or otherwise concerned with the property except as the agreement of sale holder. Consequently, the trial Court did not allot any share to the 5th defendant. 5. Accordingly, a preliminary decree was passed. Indeed, the 5th defendant was not a coparcener or otherwise concerned with the property except as the agreement of sale holder. Consequently, the trial Court did not allot any share to the 5th defendant. 5. Accordingly, a preliminary decree was passed. In the preliminary decree, no share was allotted to the 5th defendant, much less the share of defendants 2 to 4. Admittedly, the decree became final. Later, defendants 1 to 5 laid I.A.No.677 of 1989 to pass a final decree in terms of the preliminary decree. In the final decree, the petition schedule property was allotted to defendant No.5. Defendants 1 to 4 were directed to execute a regular sale deed in favour of the 5th defendant. Aggrieved by the judgment, the defendants 2 to 4 laid CCCA No.58 of 2008. 6. Sri A.K. Narasimha Rao, learned counsel for 5th defendant contended that CCCA No.11 of 1993 laid by the plaintiff and CCCA No.117 of 1993 laid by defendants 6 & 7 are liable to be dismissed. Neither the plaintiff nor his counsel is participating in CCCA No.11 of 1993. It would appear that the plaintiff is not interested to prosecute CCCA No.11 of 1993. The same consequently is liable to be dismissed for non-prosecution. 7. It is contended by the learned counsel for defendant No.5 that CCCA No.117 of 1993 also deserves to be dismissed. Late Sri Pattipati Venkateswarulu appeared for defendants 6 & 7 who were the appellants in CCCA No.117 of 1993. Sri Ganga Rayudu, learned counsel representing late Sri Pattipati Venkateswarulu reported that there were no instructions on behalf of defendants 6 & 7. Thus defendants 6 & 7 remained unrepresented. In the ordinary circumstances, CCCA No.117 of 1993 also would be liable to be dismissed. 8. However, Sri Ashok Kumar Agarwal, learned counsel representing the defendants 2 to 4 contended that apart from defendants 6 & 7, defendants 2 to 4 and the plaintiff are also the legal representatives of defendant No.1 and that the plaintiff, defendants 2 to 4 and defendants 6 & 7 are entitled to 1/6th share each in the share of the 1st defendant in the joint family properties and that defendants 2 to 4 thus jointly have half share in the share of the 1st defendant as Class-I heirs of the 1st defendant. He consequently submitted that while determining the share of defendants 2 to 4, the share acquired by defendants 2 to 4 in addition to the share that was already allotted to defendants 2 to 4 in the preliminary decree in O.S.No.309 of 1986 is liable to be computed. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for defendants 2 to 4, any number of final decrees can be passed readjusting the shares of the parties on account of the death and birth of the parties. Consequently, CCCA No.117 of 1993 deserves to be disposed of jointly with CCCA No.58 of 2008. As already pointed out, the primary contest however is in CCCA No.58 of 2008. The curiosity, however, is that the contest is not between sharers of the properties but between some of the sharers in defendants 2 to 4 and a third party in defendant No.5 who is said to be the holder of the agreement of sale from defendants 1 to 4. 9. The learned counsel for defendants 2 to 4 claimed that while the preliminary decree allotted shares to defendants 1 to 4 and the plaintiff, the final decree went further and allotted the share of defendants 2 to 4 to the 5th defendant and further directed the defendants 2 to 4 to execute a regular sale deed in favour of the 5th defendant. It is the contention of the learned counsel for defendants 2 to 4 that the final decree should be in consonance with the preliminary decree and that where the preliminary decree allotted shares to the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4 but did not speak anything about defendant No.5, it would not be just and proper for the passing of final decree as passed by the trial Court. 10. Sri A.K. Narasimha Rao, learned counsel representing the 5th defendant, however, contended that the defendants 2 to 4 themselves sought for passing of final decree in favour of defendant No.5 and that the trial Court was perfectly justified in granting the relief that the defendants 2 to 4 sought for. In the affidavit in I.A.No.677 of 1989 filed by defendant No.2, it was recited that the schedule property be divided into five equal shares and that the share of defendants 1 to 4 be allotted to the 5th defendant. In the affidavit in I.A.No.677 of 1989 filed by defendant No.2, it was recited that the schedule property be divided into five equal shares and that the share of defendants 1 to 4 be allotted to the 5th defendant. Again in the prayer portion, defendant No.2’s affidavit is to the effect that the share of defendants 1 to 4 be allotted to the 5th defendant. The trial Court passed orders as already pointed out, allotting the share of the defendants 1 to 4 to the 5th defendant and directed defendants 1 to 4 to execute sale deed in favour of the 5th defendant in respect of the share of defendants 1 to 4. 11. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the 5th defendant that defendants 2 to 4 do not have any cause of action and that defendants 2 to 4 have been aprobating and reprobating at one and the same time. He submitted that defendants 1 to 4 prayed for allotment of their share in favour of the 5th defendant in the final decree proceedings and that when the Court acted in terms of the prayer of defendants 1 to 4, defendants 1 to 4 have been complaining that the order in the final decree petition is bad. His contention is that the defendants who sought for an order cannot complain when the Court passed orders as sought for by the party whether such order was otherwise permissible or not. 12. Primarily, three questions arise for consideration in the determination of the case viz., (a) whether the final decree shall be in conformity with the preliminary decree or a consent decree can be sought for, which is not in consonance with the preliminary decree, (b) whether the court is bound to pass a final decree in terms of the prayer in the event of no objection from the other side, even if the final decree sought for is not in terms of preliminary decree, and (c) if the trial court passed a final decree as prayed for, albeit the final decree sought for is not in accordance with the preliminary decree, whether the petitioner can question such a final decree in appeal. These questions are interconnected and arise for consideration in this case. 13. These questions are interconnected and arise for consideration in this case. 13. At the outset, I may point out that the appellants in CCCA No.11 of 1993 and CCCA No.117 of 1993 are indeed respondents in CCCA No.58 of 2008. However, the learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 initially claimed that he was not pressing the case against the appellants in CCCA Nos.11 of 1993 and 117 of 1993. While advancing his submissions, Sri Ashok Kumar Agarwal, learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 (appellant in CCCA No.58 of 2008), however, sought relief against the defendants 6 & 7 also contending that defendants 2 to 4 and the plaintiff also are class-I heirs of the first defendant along with defendants 6 & 7 and that the plaintiff, defendants 2 to 4 and defendants 6 & 7 each are entitled to 1/6th share in the share of the first defendant as class-I heirs. Sri A.K. Narasimha Rao, learned counsel for the 5th defendant, on the other hand, contended that where defendants 2 to 4 gave up their claim in CCCA No.11 of 1993 and CCCA No.117 of 1993 through the oral submissions of the learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4, defendants 2 to 4 cannot claim a share in the property of late first defendant. This question, however, was considered to be irrelevant, since the first defendant also allegedly agreed to sell his share of the property to the fifth defendant and that no heir of the first defendant would be entitled to any share as the legal representatives of the first defendant. The answer to this riddle can be found from an examination of the preliminary decree. 14. In the suit (in O.S.No.309 of 1986), defendants 1 & 2 filed joint written statement. Defendants 2 to 4 claimed that they acquired properties with their hard work, without any help from the first defendant. More relevant for the purpose of the present dispute is the admission of defendants 1 and 2 on behalf of the defendants 1 to 4 (in the written statement) that the fifth defendant was an agreement holder of the shares of defendants 1 to 4. The second defendant, who examined himself as DW.2, admitted in his evidence that defendants 1 to 4 entered into an agreement of sale with the fifth defendant and that agreement of sale had been subsisting. The second defendant, who examined himself as DW.2, admitted in his evidence that defendants 1 to 4 entered into an agreement of sale with the fifth defendant and that agreement of sale had been subsisting. The trial court, which decreed the suit, divided the plaint schedule properties into five equal shares with the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4 taking one share each. The trial court, however, directed that the property sold (sic) by the defendants 1 to 4 to the fifth defendant should be allotted to the share of defendants 1 to 4 in the final decree of partition by meats and bounds. It is true that the fifth defendant is not the vendee but is only the agreement holder. This aspect, in fact, is clarified in the judgment itself. The learned trial judge held that the land was sold to the fifth defendant, but clarified that the sale was through an agreement of sale. At any rate, it is the case of everyone that the fifth defendant is the agreement holder of the plaint schedule property and not the vendee. 15. Admittedly, no appeal was preferred by the defendants 2 to 4 from the judgment and decree in O.S.No.309 of 1986. The learned counsel for the fifth defendant submitted that the defendants 2 to 4 are bound by the decree dated 28.12.1988, as no appeal was preferred from the same by the defendants. For that matter, no appeal was preferred by anyone from the judgment in O.S.No.309 of 1986. Consequently, the judgment and preliminary decree in O.S.No.309 of 1986 on the file of the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, dated 28.12.1988 has become final. The learned counsel for the fifth defendant contended that the decree indeed is in consonance with the judgment. The contention of the learned counsel for the fifth defendant is that the land sold by the defendants 2 to 4 to the fifth defendant through an agreement of sale shall be allotted to the share of defendants 2 to 4, in the final decree. 16. Class-I heirs of the first defendant did not point out that the property sold to the fifth defendant should be allotted to the defendants 1 to 4. The decree did not speak about the first defendant at all. 16. Class-I heirs of the first defendant did not point out that the property sold to the fifth defendant should be allotted to the defendants 1 to 4. The decree did not speak about the first defendant at all. The decree is to the effect that the property sold by the defendants 2 to 4 to the fifth defendant should be allotted to the defendants 2 to 4. 17. However, in pursuance of the preliminary decree, the defendants 1 to 4 along with the fifth defendant filed I.A.No.677 of 1989 seeking for a final decree. The sole plaintiff was arrayed as the sole respondent in I.A.No.677 of 1989. The orders passed in I.A.No.677 of 1989 are the orders, which have been questioned by the plaintiff (in CCCA No.11 of 1993), by the defendants 6 & 7 (in CCCA No.117 of 1993) and by the defendants 2 to 4 (in CCCA No.58 of 2008). The only party, who did not prefer appeal from the orders in the final decree petition in I.A.No.677 of 1989, is the fifth defendant. The contest, however, now is between the defendants 2 to 4 on the one side and the fifth defendant on the other side. Nobody contested the case on behalf of the plaintiff in C.C.C.A.No.11 of 1993 and on behalf of the defendants 6 & 7 in C.C.C.A.No.117 of 1993. So far as CCCA No.58 of 2008 is concerned, the fifth defendant contends that the very appeal is not maintainable where the final decree was passed as prayed for by the defendants 1 to 5. 18. When the final decree petition was filed in I.A.No.677 of 1989 before the learned IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, a petition in I.A.No.568 of 1993 was filed by the defendants 2 to 5. The affidavit was sworn to by the fifth defendant. By then, the first defendant was no more. Consequently, the wife and the daughter of the first defendant, who are defendants 6 & 7, were arrayed as respondents 2 & 3 in I.A.No.568 of 1993. 19. I.A.No.568 of 1993 is more or less a reaction of the fifth defendant to the report of the Commissioner appointed in the final decree petition. The fifth defendant sought for allotment of three shares out of the five shares in his favour. The three shares are the shares of defendants 2 to 4. 19. I.A.No.568 of 1993 is more or less a reaction of the fifth defendant to the report of the Commissioner appointed in the final decree petition. The fifth defendant sought for allotment of three shares out of the five shares in his favour. The three shares are the shares of defendants 2 to 4. In this petition, the fifth defendant did not seek for four shares including the share of the first defendant. It was specifically contended that when the first defendant was no more, that ‘D’ portion of the Commissioner’s plan was tentatively allotted to the first defendant, through orders in CMP No.13950 of 1993 in CCCA No.11 of 1993 and that leaving aside the shares of the plaintiff and the first defendant, the remaining shares, therefore, deserve to be allotted to the fifth defendant. The curiosity in this petition is only with reference to two facts. First, the affidavit was sworn to by the fifth defendant. Secondly, the fifth defendant sought for allotment of three shares only constituting the shares of defendants 2 to 4. The petition is conspicuously absent with reference to the shares of the plaintiff and the first defendant. 20. I may refer to the affidavit in I.A.No.677 of 1989. The affidavit for passing of final decree was sworn to by the second defendant. It would appear that the first defendant was also alive by then. It was averred in para-3 of the affidavit that the preliminary decree allotted the shares of defendants 1 to 4 to the fifth defendant. The prayer also is that the shares of defendants 1 to 4 be allotted to the fifth defendant. The real controversy is with reference to this affidavit filed by the second defendant. If the affidavit was filed by the fifth defendant as in I.A.No.568 of 1993, perhaps the affidavit could have been dumped as self-serving affidavit. It is not the fifth defendant who filed the affidavit. The second defendant himself filed the affidavit during the lifetime of the first defendant. In the affidavit, it was indeed recited that the preliminary decree allotted the shares of defendants 1 to 4 to the fifth defendant. This averment is incorrect. I had already referred to the preliminary decree. It is not the fifth defendant who filed the affidavit. The second defendant himself filed the affidavit during the lifetime of the first defendant. In the affidavit, it was indeed recited that the preliminary decree allotted the shares of defendants 1 to 4 to the fifth defendant. This averment is incorrect. I had already referred to the preliminary decree. The preliminary decree, which may be recapitulated, is that the land be partitioned into five equal shares and that the land agreed to be sold by the defendants 2 to 4 to the fifth defendant be allotted to the share of defendants 2 to 4 in the final decree. Although the first defendant was alive by then, there is no reference to the share of the first defendant in the preliminary decree. Germane for the purpose of the present case is the fact that the preliminary decree directed for allotment of shares to the defendants 2 to 4. The trial court never directed for allotment of the shares of defendants 2 to 4 to the fifth defendant directly. 21. While such was the preliminary decree, in the affidavit accompanying the petition for passing the final decree, the second defendant claimed as if the court ordered passing of a final decree in favour of the fifth defendant in respect of the property to be allotted to the defendants 2 to 4. I, therefore, make it clear that the prayer in the final decree petition is not in accordance with the preliminary decree. However, a final decree was passed in terms of the preliminary decree ordering 3/4th share of the plaint schedule property admeasuring Ac.3.20 guntas in favour of the fifth defendant as constituting the share of the defendants 2 to 4. The defendants 2 to 4 turned round now and contend that the final decree is not in terms of the preliminary decree and claim that the final decree, as awarded by the court, is not sustainable. 22. The learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 contended that the petition was mistakenly drafted to pass a final decree in favour of the fifth defendant and that the defendants 2 to 4 in fact seek for a final decree in terms of the preliminary decree. 23. 22. The learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 contended that the petition was mistakenly drafted to pass a final decree in favour of the fifth defendant and that the defendants 2 to 4 in fact seek for a final decree in terms of the preliminary decree. 23. The learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 thus claimed that there was a mistake of fact in the averments relating to the passing of the final decree. The averments in para 3 of the affidavit and the relief portion of the affidavit are consistent with each other. However, it is not the preliminary decree as alleged by the defendants 2 to 4. Was it a bona fide mistake, a clerical mistake or a mistake of one nature or the other at all? As DW.2, the second defendant contended in the suit that the agreement between the fifth defendant and the defendants 1 to 4 had been subsisting. He did not, however, depose that the share of defendants 1 to 4 be allotted to the fifth defendant in the final decree. The first defendant, who deposed as DW.1, was more elaborate in pointing out that the property that is agreed to be sold to the fifth defendant by the defendants 1 to 4 be allotted to the defendants 1 to 4 in the final decree, so that the interest of the fifth defendant does not stand damaged. Nowhere did defendants 1 to 4 contend prior to I.A.No.477 of 1993 that the property to the extent of the share of defendants 1 to 4 (or defendants 2 to 4 for that matter) be allotted to the fifth defendant. It may be recalled that the fifth defendant was not a sharer in the property. The defendants 1 to 4 and the plaintiff were entitled to 1/5th share each in the property. The first defendant and later defendants 6 & 7 came on record claiming that they are the legal heirs of the first defendant. In any event, the fifth defendant has no role to play in the shares of the property. His involvement with the property is as the holder of an agreement of sale. However, the defendants 2 to 4 are very clear in their affidavit in I.A.No.677 of 1993 that their share be directly allotted to the fifth defendant. In any event, the fifth defendant has no role to play in the shares of the property. His involvement with the property is as the holder of an agreement of sale. However, the defendants 2 to 4 are very clear in their affidavit in I.A.No.677 of 1993 that their share be directly allotted to the fifth defendant. The learned counsel for the fifth defendant contended that the defendants 2 to 4 are estopped from going back on their own pleadings. The defendants 2 to 4 have not filed any additional affidavit at any point of time clarifying their stand that their prayer in I.A.No.677 of 1993 was on account of any bona fide mistake. They did not bring it as a preliminary point before the appellate court to rectify the mistake. They merely claim now, for the first time that the averments in I.A.No.677 of 1993 were a mistake of fact. I wholly agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the fifth defendant that the defendants 2 to 4 cannot now go back on their claim. They have never made any attempt to rectify the prayer in the affidavit accompanying the petition for passing of a final decree. It is not open for them now to try to claim that the defendants 2 to 5 never sought for a final decree in favour of the fifth defendant. Thus, more or less, the principles of estoppels prevent defendants 2 to 4 from contending contrary to their pleadings. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the fifth defendant that where defendants 2 to 4 cannot contend that their pleading in I.A.No.677 of 1993 is incorrect, when a final decree was passed in terms of the prayer, defendants 2 to 4 cannot question the same. 24. The learned counsel for the fifth defendant placed reliance upon Jai Kishan v. Mumtaz Begum (1984) 4 SCC 623 . It was a case where the landlord sought for the eviction of the tenant from a non-residential premises for bona fide requirement. The trial court, the appellate court as well as the revisional court accepted the plea of the landlady. The tenant indeed had alternative accommodation. It was a case where the landlord sought for the eviction of the tenant from a non-residential premises for bona fide requirement. The trial court, the appellate court as well as the revisional court accepted the plea of the landlady. The tenant indeed had alternative accommodation. When the tenant preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, the tenant sought to show that the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Rent Control Act, 1961 would not be applicable to the facts of the case on the ground that the tenant would be estopped from raising such a contention. It is urged by the learned counsel for the fifth defendant that defendants 2 to 5 cannot now turn round and claim that their pleading was incorrect, that the pleading in fact contained clerical mistake and that the same deserves to be rectified. As already pointed out, where the fifth defendant slept over the pleading in I.A.No.677 of 1989 till today, the defendants 2 to 4 certainly are estopped from contending that the pleadings are typographical mistake or an inadvertent mistake and that the intention of the defendants 2 to 4 is to seek for a final decree in terms of the preliminary decree. 25. Indeed, defendants 2 to 4 did not contend that the pleadings are the offshoot of fraud so much so they can be sought to be set aside. Needless to state that fraud vitiates every proceeding. At the same time, fraud can be sought to be set-aside within one year from the date of detection of fraud. In the present case, it is not urged by the defendants 2 to 4 that the affidavit of the second defendant in I.A. No.677 of 1989 was hit by fraud. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 is that the affidavit was incorrectly drafted with reference to the relief portion. Where the relief portion had not been rectified at any point of time, the defendants 2 to 4 cannot now turn round and contend that their prayer is incorrect and that the relief granted in terms of the prayer was unjustified. 26. Referring to Section 97 CPC, the learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 contends that the final decree passed as sought for by the defendants 2 to 4 cannot now be questioned by them. 26. Referring to Section 97 CPC, the learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 contends that the final decree passed as sought for by the defendants 2 to 4 cannot now be questioned by them. Section 97 CPC adumbrates that any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree cannot question the same in an appeal from a final decree when no appeal was preferred from the preliminary decree. Admittedly, no appeal was preferred by anyone from the preliminary decree. The learned counsel for the fifth defendant contends that defendants 2 to 4 cannot question the final decree where they have not questioned the preliminary decree. It may be noticed that defendants 2 to 4 are not contending that the preliminary decree was invalid. Their contention, on the other hand, is that the final decree passed in I.A.No.677 of 1989 was not in terms of the preliminary decree and that the same, therefore, is liable to be set aside. I, therefore, hold that Section 97 CPC has no application to the present facts of the case. 27. The learned counsel for the fifth defendant submitted that the final decree passed was virtually a consent decree and that no appeal would lie therefrom. Section 96 (3) CPC debars an appeal from a consent decree. The learned counsel for the fifth defendant urged for the dismissal of the appeal in limini on the ground that the appeal is against a consent decree and that the same is prohibited by Section 96 (3) CPC. He also contended that the advocate for the defendants 1 to 5 is one and the same which factor establishes that there was no conflict of interest among the defendants 1 to 5 till the filing of the present appeal. His claim is that defendants 2 to 4 became greedy in view of escalation of prices of immovable property and resisted the final decree that was passed through the impugned order. He also submitted that the orders in I.A.No.568 of 1993 in I.A.No.677 of 1989 in O.S.No.306 of 1986 have not been challenged and that in the absence of challenge of the orders in I.A.No.568 of 1993, this appeal is not maintainable. I.A.No.568 of 1993 seeks for allotment of three shares of the plaint schedule property in favour of the fifth defendant constituting the shares of defendants 2 to 4. However, I.A.No.568 of 1993 was filed in I.A.No.677 of 1989. I.A.No.568 of 1993 seeks for allotment of three shares of the plaint schedule property in favour of the fifth defendant constituting the shares of defendants 2 to 4. However, I.A.No.568 of 1993 was filed in I.A.No.677 of 1989. The orders in I.A.No.563 of 1993 stand merged with the orders in I.A.No.677 of 1989. I, therefore, consider that albeit defendants 2 to 4 did not question the orders in I.A.No.563 of 1993, they nevertheless are entitled to the question the same in their challenge against the orders in I.A.No.677 of 1989. 28. The learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 inter alia contended that defendants 2 to 4 executed GPA (General Power of Attorney) in favour of the fifth defendant on 25.04.1989 and the first defendant executed GPA in favour of the fifth defendant on 03.05.1989. The fifth defendant paid ` 30,000/- to each of the defendants 1 to 4 constituting 50% of the agreed amount and that the balance was due from him by the date of the final decree petition. The defendants 2 to 4 claimed that more than 50% of the sale price was due from the fifth defendant to the defendants 2 to 4 and that in any event, the fifth defendant cannot ask for the specific performance of his agreement of sale directly or indirectly in the proceedings in O.S.No.309 of 1986. He further contended that the GPA in favour of the fifth defendant was revoked on 11.07.1994 and that execution of sale deed in favour of the fifth defendant simply does not arise. He distinguished I.A.No.568 of 1993 as second final decree petition. In any event, it is a petition by the fifth defendant and not by the defendants 1 to 4. He raised the question that even the GPA as it stood prior to the cancellation did not authorize the fifth defendant to sell the land without prior consent of the defendants 1 to 4. It may be recalled that this court passed orders in CMP No.39 of 2008 restraining the fifth defendant from alienating the schedule property till the disposal of CCCA No.58 of 2008. 29. He placed reliance M. Ayyana v. M. Jaggarao AIR 1977 SC 292 .The Supreme Court observed in that case that a final decree in a partition suit could not amend or go behind the preliminary decree on any matter determined by the preliminary decree. 29. He placed reliance M. Ayyana v. M. Jaggarao AIR 1977 SC 292 .The Supreme Court observed in that case that a final decree in a partition suit could not amend or go behind the preliminary decree on any matter determined by the preliminary decree. On the strength of this view, it is contended by the learned counsel for the defendants 2 to 4 that the orders in I.A.No.677 of 1989 are against the preliminary decree and that they are liable to be set aside. 30. It is evident that the preliminary decree directed for allotment of one share each to the defendants 1 to 4 and the plaintiff and further held that in view of the agreement of sale by the defendants 2 to 4 in favour of fifth defendant, defendants 1 to 4 should be allotted the property agreed to be sold by them to the fifth defendant in the final decree of the partition suit by meats and bounds. As against this preliminary decree, the final decree was a direction to defendants 2 to 4 to execute a sale deed in favour of fifth defendant in respect of defendants 2 to 4. The final decree obviously and evidently is not in conformity with the preliminary decree. The final decree, however, was passed in accordance with the prayer of defendants 2 to 4. Would it be justified to set aside the final decree in such circumstances is the real question. 31. Evidently, a court is entitled to pass a decree as envisaged by law if any side has made out its case. A court is not entitled to and is not expected to pass a decree for the asking on the ground that the other side have no objection. The court shall examine whether the decree sought for is permissible or otherwise. I am afraid that there is no justification in contending that the defendants 2 to 4 sought for a final decree and that the same was granted so much so defendants 2 to 4 cannot question the same by way of an appeal. Any aggrieved party can prefer an appeal under Sections 96 and 97 CPC. Even if the judgment/order of the court is in accordance with the relief sought for, it is not open for the court to pass such a relief in the final decree in the absence of a preliminary decree. Any aggrieved party can prefer an appeal under Sections 96 and 97 CPC. Even if the judgment/order of the court is in accordance with the relief sought for, it is not open for the court to pass such a relief in the final decree in the absence of a preliminary decree. Where there is a conflict between the preliminary decree and the final decree, the final decree becomes enforceable to the extent it is in consonance with the preliminary decree only and not otherwise. 32. The defendants 2 to 4 indeed sought for the cancellation of the final decree in I.A.No.677 of 1989. Where the final decree as passed by the court is not permissible, it is liable to be set aside when an appeal is preferred therefrom. The defendants 2 to 4 are therefore entitled to ask for setting aside of the final decree on the ground that it is not in terms of the preliminary decree. 33. Accordingly, the appeal in CCCA No.58 of 2008 is allowed. The final decree passed in I.A.No.677 of 1989 is set aside. The trial court shall be at liberty to pass final decree in terms of the preliminary decree on a fresh application by either side. In the peculiar circumstances of the case where the defendants 2 to 4 are questioning the decree passed in accordance with their prayer, both sides shall bear their respective costs. CCCA Nos.11 of 1993 and 117 of 1993 are dismissed for default, as no one represented the appellants therein. On the oral representation of the learned counsel for the defendant No.5 that D-5 has been in possession of the properties since 1983, both sides in defendants 2 to 4 on the one side and defendant No.5 on the other side are directed to maintain status quo, for a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by D-5 to enable other side to move for a final decree.