BARIN GHOSH, C.J.— (Oral) Delay Condonation Application No. 13563 of 2011 Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent does not object to the application made for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. We have considered the averments made in the application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal and being satisfied therewith, allow the application. 2. Admit. By consent of the parties, the appeal is taken up for hearing in today’s list. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 4. Respondent – petitioner was working as Senior Assistant and was eligible to be promoted to the post of Head Assistant. He was promoted to the post of Head Assistant sometimes in 2007. He declined to be so promoted. There is no dispute that since 1996 until even now, there is a policy that an employee, as that of the petitioner, can decline to be promoted. Up to 10th June 2009, the policy provided that an employee, as that of the petitioner, may decline to be promoted for three times and, if he has declined to be promoted for the third time, he shall not be considered for promotion in future. On 10th June 2009, the policy was altered and, in terms thereof, an employee, as that of the petitioner, became entitled to decline to be promoted only two times and, if he has declined to be promoted for the second time, he would lose his right to be considered for promotion in future. By an order dated 8th December 2009, it was held out to the petitioner that he has declined to be promoted once in 2007 and, again in 2008. This holding out was the subject matter of challenge in the writ petition. In the writ petition, petitioner contended that he was promoted on 3rd December 2008, whereupon he was not relieved to enable him to join the promoted post. This fact was not denied in the counter affidavit. Therefore, the premise in the order dated 8th December 2009, that the petitioner declined to be promoted for the second time is factually incorrect. The impugned order dated 8th December 2009, therefore, is not sustainable. There is one more aspect of the matter on the premise whereof the writ petition has been disposed of. Therefore, the premise in the order dated 8th December 2009, that the petitioner declined to be promoted for the second time is factually incorrect. The impugned order dated 8th December 2009, therefore, is not sustainable. There is one more aspect of the matter on the premise whereof the writ petition has been disposed of. In that regard, we have rendered a judgment and order today in connection with Special Appeal No. 286 of 2011 and three other connected special appeals. The ratio of the said judgment squarely applies to the present case also, inasmuch as, assuming that the petitioner declined second time in 2008, at that time according to the policy of 2007, the petitioner was entitled to forego or decline promotion for two times without being debarred for being promoted in future. For the reasons, as above, we do not interfere with the judgment and order under appeal. _