ORDER Yadav, J. -- 1. This appeal under section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 read with section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is directed against the judgment and decree dated 21.1.2008; whereby, the Family Court Bhopal has dismissed the appellant’s suit for divorce under section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1958. 2. The appellant and respondent were married on 12.5.2001. The marriage was solemnized at Bhopal. The appellant thereafter lived with her husband, the respondent at his abode at Rewa for a month and thereafter came back to Bhopal. Thereafter living at Rewa for three years with the respondent, the appellant came to Bhopal and is living there since then. Respondent husband joined her at Bhopal some time in 2005 and stayed with her till 2006, during which period he underwent medical treatment for infertility, whereafter, it is alleged he left for Delhi wherefrom he did not return. 3. In September 2006, appellant filed an application under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking annulment of marriage on the ground of appellant’s importency and cruelty. It was alleged that because of the respondent being impotent there was no consummation of marriage and that the respondent also meted her with cruelty by physical harassment and the demand for dowry. Respondent husband denied the allegation of importency and the cruelty and stated that in respect of infertility he underwent medical treatment. 4. Appellant and respondent led evidence in support of respective pleadings. In regard to allegation of importency Dr. Pankaj Agrawal in whose hospital the respondent underwent Bilateral Orcheopexy (Lap Assistant) for infertility was examined. In his evidence he proved the document Ex.A-11 whereby it was certified that due to illness respondent is infertile but not impotent. There is no other medical evidence to establish that respondent was impotent as alleged by appellant, in absence whereof the Family Court disbelieved the appellant’s version of respondent being impotent. In his evidence he proved the document Ex.A-11 whereby it was certified that due to illness respondent is infertile but not impotent. There is no other medical evidence to establish that respondent was impotent as alleged by appellant, in absence whereof the Family Court disbelieved the appellant’s version of respondent being impotent. Regarding allegation of cruelty the Family Court analyzing the evidence of the appellant observed that having married in the year 2001 and living for a period of one month in her husband’s house with him, she came back to her parental house and her husband lived with her till 2006 and it was in the year 2006 for the first time she lodged complaint with the police that she is being troubled for dowry by her in-laws, disbelieved the appellant, holding that the same has been cooked up with the allegation of respondent’s alleged infertility. 5. In absence of direct medical evidence impotency cannot be presumed merely because the respondent was medically treated for infertility. Impotency is defined as ‘a party’ is importent if his or her mental or physical condition makes a consummation of the marriage a practical impossibility. {Please see : Halsbary’s laws of England 3rd Edition Vol.12 p.228; Digvijay Singh v. Pratap Kumari [ AIR 1970 SC 137 ]; Mst. Shewanti Bhaurao Dongre v. Bhaurao Daulatrao Dongre [ 1971 JLJ 307 = AIR 1971 M.P. 168 ]}. 6. In the case at hand besides the respondent even father of the appellant who was examined as AW2 in paragraphs 3 and 4 of his deposition admitted about the consummation of marriage which did not result in bearing of child. In view whereof the finding arrived at by the Family Court that the appellant has failed to prove that respondent is impotent cannot be interfered with. 7. Regarding cruelty, the Family Court elaborately dwelt upon the evidence led by the appellant and her father and disbelieved the allegations observing that from 2001 till 2006 there were no complaints by them regarding dowry demand and that the appellant having left the husband’s house within one month and thereafter lived with her parents where the respondent lived with her till 2006 and there were no complaints during this period of physical harassment. These findings when tested on the evidence on record does not suffer from the vice of perversity as would warrant an interference. 8. These findings when tested on the evidence on record does not suffer from the vice of perversity as would warrant an interference. 8. Question would then be whether the appellant can be non-suited when it is apparent from the proceedings of the present appeal and the statement made by the appellant that since 2006 the appellant and respondent have not met and the respondent has voluntarily kept himself away from the company of appellant since then. That, during the entire pendency of this appeal the respondent has not personally appeared in the matter except through his counsel. Effort for reconciliation was made as would be apparent from order sheet dated 9.8.2012; learned counsel for the respondent, however, could not ascertain his presence. On the contrary on earlier occasion as is apparent from order sheet dated 12.9.2011, the appellant had alleged that respondent has contracted another marriage. There is no denial of this fact. Be that as it may. The fact remains that for last six years there is no contact between the appellant and the respondent. In Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli [ (2006)4 SCC 558 ], it is held : “72. Once the parties have separated and the separation has continued for a sufficient length of time and one of them has presented a petition for divorce, it can well be presumed that the marriage has broken down. The Court, no doubt, should seriously make an endeavour to reconcile the parties; yet, if it is found that the breakdown is irreparable, then divorce should not be withheld. The consequences of preservation in law of the unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be effective are bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties. 73. A law of divorce based mainly on fault is inadequate to deal with a broken marriage. Under the fault theory, guilt has to be proved; divorce Courts are presented concrete instances of human behaviour as bring the institution of marriage into disrepute. 74. We have been principally impressed by the consideration that once the marriage has broken down beyond repair, it would be unrealistic for the law not to take notice of that fact, and it would be harmful to society and injurious to the interests of the parties. Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be surmised that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be surmised that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction, though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie the law in such cases do not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. 75. Public interest demands not only that the married status should, as far as possible, as long as possible, and whenever possible, be maintained, but where a marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest lies in the recognition of that fact. 76. Since there is no acceptable way in which a spouse can be compelled to resume life with the consort, nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied forever to a marriage that in fact has ceased to exist.” 9. In these circumstances which are subsequent developments the question is whether there can be good grounds for divorce at an appellate stage. 10. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur [(2005)1 SCC 22], it is observed: “16. The matter can be looked at from another angle. If acts subsequent to the filing of the divorce petition can be looked into to infer condonation of the aberrations, acts subsequent to the filing of the petition can be taken note of to show a pattern in the behaviour and conduct. In the instant case, after filing of the divorce petition a suit for injunction was filed, and the respondent went to the extent of seeking detention of the appellant. She filed a petition for maintenance which was also dismissed. Several caveat petitions were lodged and as noted above, with wrong address. The respondent in her evidence clearly accepted that she intended to proceed with the execution proceedings, and prayer for arrest till the divorce case was finalized. When the respondent gives priority to her profession over her husband’s freedom it points unerringly at disharmony, diffusion and disintegration of marital unity, from which the Court can deduce about irretrievable breaking of marriage.” 11. When the respondent gives priority to her profession over her husband’s freedom it points unerringly at disharmony, diffusion and disintegration of marital unity, from which the Court can deduce about irretrievable breaking of marriage.” 11. In Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal [ (2012)7 SCC 288 ], while taking note of the incident taking place subsequent to filing of the divorce petition and affirming the view taken by Courts below it is held by their Lordships “that the subsequent events can be taken into consideration”. (Paragraphs 48 and 49 of the Report). 12. Section 13(1)(ib) of 1955 Act stipulates “Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of this petition”. 13. In the case at hand since the respondent has not come forward for reconciliation and has voluntarily deserted the appellant since 2006 and there being no chance of reunion, we are of the considered opinion that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. We accordingly direct its dissolution as further continuation would tantamount to cruelty on the appellant. 14. In respect of alimony the appellant expresses her unwillingness for the same; therefore, no order is being passed for the same. 15. In the result, appeal is allowed to the extent above. Parties to bear their own costs. Let a decree be drawn accordingly.