JUDGMENT GOPINATHAN, J. 1. These appeals arise from a common judgment dated 10.7.2009 in W.P.(C). Nos. 34361/2007 and 8144/2008. The appellant in W.A.No.439/10 are the respondents in W.P.(C) No.34361/07. The appellants in W.A.No.455/10 are the respondent 1 to 3 in W.P.(C) No.8144/08. The appellant in W.A. 1205/2010 is the petitioner in W.P. (C) No.34361/07. The appellant in W.A.No.1061/10 is the petitioner in the other writ petition. Hereinafter, unless otherwise required, the parties are referred to as the petitioners and the respondents as in the writ petition. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.34361/07 entered the State service as High School Assistant in Government Higher Secondary School, Thodupuzha on 12.1.1983. The other petitioner entered the service as Assistant in St. Mary’s Higher Secondary School, Kaliyar, Thodupupzha. While in service, the Government issued 1992 pay revision order which came into force with effect from 1.3.1992. As per the pay revision order, a Government servant who completes 10 years of service in the entry cadre is entitled to a higher scale of pay in the next higher grade. All employees are given option for choosing a date for opting the revised pay scale. Rule 8 of the pay revision order deals with exercise of option. Rule 8 reads as follows: “8. Exercise of Option (a) A government servant may elect to continue to draw pay in the existing scale until the date on which he earns his next increment or until he vacates his post or ceases to draw pay in that scale or until such date as the employee considers necessary. Provided that the option to retain the existing scale under the proviso to this rule shall be admissible only in respect of one existing scale. In cases of subsequent6 reversions only, the employees will be allowed to exercise option in r/o the lower post also. Such option will be exercised within a period of 3 months from the date order of reversion. The aforesaid option shall not be admissible to any person appointed to a post on or after the 1st day of March 1992, whether for the first time in Government service, or by transfer or promotion from another post and he shall be allowed pay in the new post, only in the revised scale” The petitioners accordingly submitted their options for revision and for time bound higher grade promotion. Accepting the option their salary was revised and granted higher grade promotion. Accepting the option their salary was revised and granted higher grade promotion. Subsequently, the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.8144/08 submitted are option for pay revision. The other petitioner filed are option for availing the first higher grade. Both the re options were accepted by the authority concerned and pay was accordingly re fixed, drawn and disbursed. During audit by the Accountant General, it was noticed that by virtue of fixation in pursuance to the re option, they have opted to the revised pay and the time bound higher grade promotion on different dates and that it is not permitted. Their higher grade promotion can only be on a date subsequent to the pay revised and their promoted post would be automatically under the revised pay and there is no question of option for the commencement of the revised pay in the promoted post. It was also noticed that owing to acceptance of re-option and re fixation, the petitioners had obtained undue pecuniary advantage which is liable to be recovered from the petitioners. Accordingly, action was initiated. Thereupon the petitioners had approached this Court with the above writ petitions assailing the recovery proceedings. 2. The leaned Single Judge after referring to Rule 8 for the exercise of the option found that the petitioners could not have opted for time bound higher grade promotion on any date subsequent to the date when they become eligible for such promotion. Therefore cancellation of their option by which they opted to a subsequent date to the date of becoming eligible for time bound promotion was found against the rules of fixation of pay. It was also found that the petitioners are not entitled to opt for different dates for pay revision and time bound higher grade. Consequently, the challenge against action of the respondents in reversing the fixation of pay was found without any merit. But, the learned Judge further found that the imbroglio arose only because of the further orders issued by the State after the pay revision. Therefore, the learned judge in view of Aleyamma Varghese v. Secretary, General Education (ILR 2007 (3) Kerala 105) and Narayanan v. State of Kerala (2008 (3) KLT 188) held that the respondents are not entitled to recover the excess amount drawn by the petitioners on account of the wrong fixation of pay. Assailing that portion of the judgment, the respondents had preferred W.A.Nos. 439/10 and 455/10. Assailing that portion of the judgment, the respondents had preferred W.A.Nos. 439/10 and 455/10. Assailing the judgment, so far as it ratified the reversing of the re fixation, the petitioners had preferred the other two appeals. They would also seek a relief that the petitioners should have been granted permission for a further re option. In filing W.A.No.1061/10 there is a delay of 472 days. The delay in filing W.A.1205/10 was already condoned. The delay in filing W.A.No.1061/10 is condoned and all the appeals were heard together. 3. In the light of Rule 8 which we quoted above, we find that all those, who are appointed to a post on or after 1.3.1992, whether for the first time in Government service, or by transfer or by promotion from another post, shall be allowed pay in the new post, only in the revised scale. It would stipulate that all employees in service on the date of the commencement of the 1992 pay revision are not entitled to opt for switching over to the revised pay scale in the event they are promoted after 1.3.1992. Their right to opt is limited to the existing scale of pay on the date of the commencement of the pay revision. Once they opt for the revised scale of pay in the existing scale, those who are entitled to 10 years time bound higher grade promotion would automatically come over to the promoted grade in the revised scale of pay because their promotion can be only after the commencement of pay revision. Their pay in the promoted post shall necessarily be as per the revised scale. There would not be any question of opting for any other date for the commencement pay in the promoted post. Hence, in this case, admittedly the petitioners had opted a day for switching over to the revised scale and another date for their time bound promotion. Once they opt for switching over to the revised pay scale, automatically they would be in the revised pay scale and they cannot further opt another date for the commencement of revised pay following the time bound higher grade promotion because time bound grade promotion is benefit consequent to the implementation of the pay revision order. Such promotion shall be to post with revised pay as stipulated in the last para of Rule 8 quoted above. Such promotion shall be to post with revised pay as stipulated in the last para of Rule 8 quoted above. Therefore we find that the leaned Single Judge was correct n finding that the petitioners are not entitled to opt for different dates for pay revision and time bound grade promotion and that the action of the respondents reversing the refixation is correct and requires no interference. 4. Going by Aleyamma’s case and Narayanan’s case, we find that it is a precedent on peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and no law was laid down up the above rulings. In Aleyamm’s case, she was appointed on temporary basis for certain spells from 20.1.1980 to 19.8.1983. Later she was given permanent appointment with effect from 4.6.1984. While working on temporary basis, she had ailed 10 days leave without allowance. Later while counting the period of probation, leave availed for 10 days without allowance was also counted for fixing of her pay. So, the issue was in respect of the period of 10 days while Aleyamma was on temporary leave for the purpose of declaration of probation and for giving consequent increment. The monetary loss to the State and the benefit given to the employee was every negligent. Taking into account of that aspect and the delay of 17 years for initiating action for recovery, with a view to do complete justice to the parties, Apex Court ordered not to recover after such long time. It laid no law or precedent to be followed in all cases, but a magnanimity. In Narayanan’s case, the petitioner retired from service as Headmaster. Before entering the State service, he was working in an aided school. For counting the service, the period of 6 months and 15 days he had worked in the aided school was also counted. That was the issue involved in that case. The pecuniary benefit that the petitioners therein had got was not much. This Court while ordering not to recover, following Aleyamma’s case and another case, also observed that the appellant had not committed any fraud or misrepresentation but a misconception of law. Here, the cases on hand are entirely different. The Headmasters concerned acted on the representations of the petitioners for re option. Petitioners might have either misinterpreted the provision for option or represented as experimental case. Here, the cases on hand are entirely different. The Headmasters concerned acted on the representations of the petitioners for re option. Petitioners might have either misinterpreted the provision for option or represented as experimental case. Of course, the Headmasters should have read the provision correctly and declined the relief. However, the petitioners cannot wash their hands s they had the leading role by representing for re option which was accepted by the authorities concerned. The cases on hand have no similarity with the facts in Aleyamma’s case in Narayanan’s case. 5. The learned Government Pleader would canvass our attention to three decision reported in Santhakumari v. State of Kerala (2005 (4) KLT 649), State of Kerala v. Saiful Islam (2006(1) KLT 619) and Venugopal K.P. v. State of Kerala (2009 (2) KLJ 809). In Sathakuamr’s case, it was a issue regarding receipt of amount contrary to statutory provisions. A Division bench of this Court had at para 6 held as follows: “We may hasten to add, unless there is statutory bar in recovering the amount, any amount paid by mistake could be recovered depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To hold that only in a case where employee has contributed to the mistake amount could be recovered cannot be sustained. Facts situation my warrant a sympathetic consideration but cannot be accepted as a general principle of law”. 6. In Saiful’s case, the issue was relating to re fixation. At para 14, another Division Bench held as follows. “14. A more simple approach would have been to enquire into a circumstance as to one’s normal admissible right of getting two fixation at the time of two grade promotions, and to see whether he had been denied this benefit. The answer is in the negative. A fortuitous ratio promotion, which was thereafter practically withdrawn, could not have contributed to a more advantageous and differential treatment to him than their colleagues. The reasonable stand of the Government ought to have been appreciated, instead of going on with litigation on technical grounds. We find that re fixation of pay and recovery order were valid”. 7. In Venugopal’s case, the issue was relating to the recovery of service benefits illegitimately retained. Referring to Aleyamma’s case, Santhakumar’s case and certain other decisions at para 7, it is held as follows by yet another Division Bench: “7. We find that re fixation of pay and recovery order were valid”. 7. In Venugopal’s case, the issue was relating to the recovery of service benefits illegitimately retained. Referring to Aleyamma’s case, Santhakumar’s case and certain other decisions at para 7, it is held as follows by yet another Division Bench: “7. If the petitioner were to be permitted to retain the service benefits legitimately not due to him undeservingly received by him, it would not only by contrary to the legal provisions already adverted to, but also would means that he can take up ignorance of law as an excuse. Moreover, such a permission would amount to putting a premium on dishonesty. All that apart, such a gesture either on the part of the Government or on the part of the Court would end a wrong message to law abiding Government servants who are to remain content with what is legitimately due to them. It is pertinent to remember that the State is recovering only the actual pecuniary gain wrongly enjoyed by the petitioner”. The ratio of the above rulings is squarely applicable to the case on hand. We find no reason to have a divergent view. 8. Going by Rule 3C, Part III of Kerala Service Rules (KSR), we notice that rule making authorities had anticipated issues like the one on hand and provisions are mad for recovery without causing hardship to the employees, even after retirement. A reading of Rule 3 C would b relevant. “3C. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, recovery of excess payments made to an officer by mistake within a period of four years before his retirement [ and which are detected within a period of our years after retirement] may be made from his pension and other amounts due to him after retirement subject to the condition that such deduction if made from his pension shall be effected only in monthly instalments in whole rupees and that of each instalment shall not exceed 10 per cent of the monthly pension admissible to him”. The above Rule would shows that the legislative intention is to effect recovery of excess payments to an officer by mistake, even after retirement subject to conditions laid thereon. Recovery of excess payment is the rule and not to recover is an exception. The above Rule would shows that the legislative intention is to effect recovery of excess payments to an officer by mistake, even after retirement subject to conditions laid thereon. Recovery of excess payment is the rule and not to recover is an exception. The above rule is neither challenged before us nor the petitioners have nay whisper in the pleadings that the recovery under challenge is not in Compliance to Rule 3 C. There is also no case that the recovery under challenge is contrary to the terms and conditions under Rule 3 C. Therefore, we find that the recovery proceedings under challenge are in tune with the rules and is not liable to be interfered by exercising writ jurisdiction. It is also in tune with the precedents referred above. 9. We also notice that the salary and allowances of Government servants at lower level are drawn and disbursed by certain category of officers called drawing and disbursing officers to whom powers are delegated. Whenever pay revision or pay re fixation is required, it is for such officers to do it. While doing so, there are chances for error because error is human. The main purpose of audit is to find out such errors and for curing the same and also recover excess payments, if any, made. Sometimes, there any may occur delay in auditing, finding out errors and initiating action for recovery. In the ordinary course, it may not be appropriate for this Court to interfere in such cases. The only reason stated by the petitioners is the delay in auditing. Having due regard to the facts and circumstances, in the cases on hand there is no inordinate delay so as to accrue a right on the petitioners which could be established by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, find that the learned Single Judge had gone wrong in directing not to recover the excess amount drawn by the petitioners. Since the petitioners had obtained undue pecuniary advantage on the basis of the wrong fixation of their pay following the 1992 pay revision, the respondents are entitled to recover the same and the petitioners are liable to refund as per rules. Therefore, W.A.Nos.439/10, 455/10 are liable to be allowed and the other wit appeals are liable to be dismissed. In the result, W.A.No.439/10 and 455/10 would stand allowed. Therefore, W.A.Nos.439/10, 455/10 are liable to be allowed and the other wit appeals are liable to be dismissed. In the result, W.A.No.439/10 and 455/10 would stand allowed. While vacating the judgment of the leaned Single Judge so far as it directs not to recover the excess amount dawn by the writ petitioners, the wit petitions would stand dismissed. The respondents in the writ petitions are entitled to recover the excess amount in strict compliance to Rule 3 C, Part III KSR and repot compliance. In the event bulk payments like gratuity, pension commutation etc are due to be paid to the petitioners, the respondents are at liberty to deduct the excess amount dawn by the petitioners from such amount also. W.A.Nos.1061/10 and 1205/10 would stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.