ORDER 1. This revision petition under section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 is preferred by the petitioner against an order dated 6th September 2011 passed in Criminal Revision No.272/2011 by the Third Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Dabra District Gwalior (M.P.) setting aside thereby the order dated 23rd April 2011 in Criminal Case No.1x1x145 CrPC passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Dabra, restraining the respondent No.1 from interfering into peaceful possession of the petitioner Raghunath Singh over the disputed agricultural land situated in village Litapur Tehsil Dabra and also permitting him to reap the wheat crops standing on the disputed agricultural field. 2. Briefly stated, the relevant facts of the case are that the petitioner Raghunath Singh filed a complaint under section 145 CrPC to the effect that the respondent No.1 Smt. Pragobai intended to create obstructions in cutting the wheat crops standing on his land bearing Survey Nos.826, 831, 844, 845, 852, 853, 854 and 855 total area 23 bighas and 8 biswa, situated in village Rajiyawar and therefore with a view to restrain her from raising interference, he prayed for appropriate directions against the respondent No.1. The learned Magistrate after taking cognizance on the complaint, issued preliminary notices to both parties for their presence and submit the reply along with evidence on 21st April 2011. The spot inspection report by the Revenue Inspector of the area Chimak and replies from parties along with documentary evidence were filed before the Magistrate. It was also mentioned in the replies by the parties that two civil suits in relation to dispute over the said agricultural land were pending before the civil Courts. The trial Magistrate on 23rd April 2011 after perusing the replies and the documentary evidence, passed the order as mentioned above. 3. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 23rd April 2011, the respondent No.1 Pragobai submitted a revision petition under section 397/401 of CrPC before the Revisional Court contending that she had purchased the disputed land from Sirnam Singh and others through registered sale-deeds and the petitioner Raghunath Singh had no title over the land in dispute. It was pleaded by her that when the order was passed said civil suit was pending and under such a circumstance the learned Magistrate ought to have followed the procedure contemplated in sub-section (4) of section 145 of CrPC. It was pleaded by her that when the order was passed said civil suit was pending and under such a circumstance the learned Magistrate ought to have followed the procedure contemplated in sub-section (4) of section 145 of CrPC. Considering the grounds raised by the petitioner before the learned revisional Court and after hearing the parties, the order was set aside by the revisional Court. Hence, the present revision has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order passed by the revisional Court. 4. By filing the present revision, it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for him that the revisional Court has erred in setting aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate. It is contended that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate was empowered by law to pass an order in an appropriate situation and the revisional Court was wholly unjustified in setting aside the same. Under the circumstances mentioned above, it is prayed that the order impugned passed be set aside restoring the order of the learned Magistrate and consequently the revision be allowed. 5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 contended that the order by the learned Magistrate was passed without applying his mind and the law, therefore, the revisional Court did not commit any error. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that before passing any order, the Magistrate was supposed to follow the procedure as mentioned in sub-section (4) of section 145 of CrPC. He was also obliged to consider the fact that the respondent No.1 had filed a civil suit with respect to same disputed land which was pending on the date when the order in question was passed by him. Under such circumstances, the revisional Court rightly, by setting aside the said order, directed to decide the case as per provisions of law, in which an enquiry is reported to be in progress. Therefore, it is requested that by confirming the order of the revisional Court, the revision petition be dismissed. 6. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also perused the impugned orders and the documents filed by the respective parties along with relevant provisions of law applicable to the case in hand. 7. Before adverting to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be profitable to reproduce relevant provisions of the Code, which are extracted herein below : “145. 7. Before adverting to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be profitable to reproduce relevant provisions of the Code, which are extracted herein below : “145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace. -- (1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) and (3) xxx xxx (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, persue the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute : Provided that, if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final. (6)(a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or should under the proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being, in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all distrurbance of such possession until such eviction; and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. (b) The order made under this sub-section shall be served and published in the manner laid in sub-section (3).” 8. The contentions put forth by the learned counsel appearing for the parties present before this Court necessitate an examination of the following two questions of law : (1) Whether starting a proceeding under section 145 of CrPC, during the pendency of a suit or proceeding relating to the title in the disputed land is without jurisdiction? (2) Whether the trial Magistrate can pass the final order without affording opportunity of hearing to the parties as mentioned in section 145(4) of CrPC? 9. It would be worthwhile examining the scope, ambit and character of a 145 proceeding. It is well settled that a Magistrate gets jurisdiction only where there is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning any land. He passes a preliminary order indicating his satisfaction regarding the apprehension of the breach of the peace and require the parties to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute and put in such documents and to adduce, by putting in affidavits, the evidence of such persons as they rely upon in support of such claims. 10. Under sub-section (4), the Magistrate, without reference to the merits or the claims of any such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, decides the question whether any or which of the parties is in possession of the subject of dispute on the date of the preliminary order. Under sub-section (4), second proviso, the Magistrate may treat the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date of the preliminary order as being in possession at the date of such order. Under sub-section (4), second proviso, the Magistrate may treat the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date of the preliminary order as being in possession at the date of such order. Sub-section (6) lays down that the party in whose favour the final order is passed, is to retain possession until evicted from the subject of dispute in due course of law. 11. Thus, it is now authoritatively settled that the Magistrate does not purport to decide a party’s title or right to possession of the land but leaves the question to be decided in due course of law. As has already been stated, the foundation of a Magistrate’s jurisdiction is apprehension of breach of the peace. With that object in view, a temporary order is passed under section 145 of CrPC with regard to the possession of the property until the matter is settled by a Court of competent jurisdiction.The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the life of the said order is conterminous with the passing of a decree by a civil Court and the moment a civil Court makes an order of eviction, it displaces the order of the Criminal Court. It is further held that these orders are merely police orders to prevent breaches of the peace and they decide no question of title. See Bhinka v. Charan Singh [ AIR 1959 SC 960 ]. 12. Doubtless the Courts have powers to grant interim relief to preserve the status quo but it cannot be denied that a 145 proceeding, initiated during the pendency of the proceeding in the suit, is not without jurisdiction. Generally such proceedings are inexpedient, but certainly they are not without jurisdiction. The final order passed under section 145 CrPC is not without jurisdiction. 13. The final order under section 145 CrPC is, however, subject to the result of the litigation in the proceeding in the civil Court. It is an order of interim nature and comes to an end the moment the right, title and interest of the parties are declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction. 14. 13. The final order under section 145 CrPC is, however, subject to the result of the litigation in the proceeding in the civil Court. It is an order of interim nature and comes to an end the moment the right, title and interest of the parties are declared by a Court of competent jurisdiction. 14. It cannot be ignored that the section in the Code of Criminal Procedure is enacted with the object of ascertaining who is in possession of the property either on the date on which the breach is likely to occur or within two months of that date; and when a finding is given. 15. As has already been stated, 145 proceeding was started during the pendency of the proceeding in the civil suit. As observed by Privy Council in (1897)29 Ind. App. 24, the order under section 145 CrPC is one of interim nature and would vanish with an ultimate decree to be passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The final order in the 145 proceeding is one of interim nature and stands on analogous footing with the interim injunction issued in a suit. The position would have been different if no suit or proceeding is at all filed to get over the effect of the final order passed in a 145 proceeding. 16. Now coming back to the case at hand, it may be noted that the order under section 145(1) was passed by the learned Magistrate on 18th April 2011 and thereby directed to the parties to file the claims themselves over the land in dispute by filing replies. Without reference to the merits or the claims of any such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, the learned Magistrate, at first instance was obliged to decide the question whether any or which of the parties is in possession of the subject of dispute on the date of the preliminary order, after following the procedure laid down in sub-section (4) of section 145 of CrPC, but, instead of making an enquiry as contemplated thereunder, the learned Magistrate straightway passed the final order merely on the basis of the spot report prepared by the revenue authorities and the statements recorded during enquiry conducted by the police, without receiving and taking further evidence as may be produced by the parties. It appears that the trial Magistrate passed the order dated 23rd April 2011 in a cryptic manner, without considering the legal provisions of law as indicated above. 17. The conclusions on the questions enumerated in preceding paragraphs of this order may now be summed up : (i) A proceeding under section 145 CrPC during the pendency of a suit is not without jurisdiction, though it may be inexpedient. Normally the parties approach the Court of competent jurisdiction for granting interim reliefs by way of appointment of receiver or passing of injunction order for avoidance of breach of the peace. (ii) A final order in such proceeding initiated during the pendency of that suit can be passed by the Magistrate but after following due procedure contemplated in section 145(4) of CrPC, as described above. 18. In view of what has been stated above, the revision petition stands hereby dismissed. The learned Magistrate is directed to continue with the proceedings under section 145 of CrPC and pass an appropriate order, after holding due enquiry, in terms of the procedure established in the section itself.