Judgment : The decree-holder in O.S.No.11/2006 filed this Civil Revision Petition assailing order dated 6-9-2011 in I.A.No.5/2011 in O.S.No.11/2006 on the file of the learned XI Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad (for brevity “the lower Court”). 2. The facts, in nutshell, are that the petitioner filed the above mentioned suit for specific performance of agreement of sale against the respondent. After the respondent was set exparte, an exparte decree was passed by the lower court on 28-11-2006. One of the conditions stipulated therein was that the petitioner shall deposit the balance sale consideration of Rs.16,640/- into the Court within one month from the date of decree. The petitioner did not deposit the balance sale consideration as per the said condition. He has, however, filed I.A.No.5/2011 for condoning the delay of 1417 days and extension of time for deposit of balance sale consideration. 3. In support of his application, the petitioner has averred that he has left to his native village Amaravathi in Chandapur District, Maharashtra and that his Advocate was not aware of his whereabouts, due to which he could not comply with the decretal condition regarding deposit of the balance sale consideration. The petitioner further averred that he was under the impression that the suit was pending and his Advocate was looking after the suit proceedings and that recently he came back to Hyderabad and came to know about the passing of the exparte decree through his counsel. 4. The respondent resisted the petitioner’s application by filing a counter-affidavit wherein he has questioned the bonafides of the petitioner in filing the application with the huge delay of 1417 days and prayed for dismissal of the application. 5. The lower Court has dismissed the application of the petitioner mainly on two grounds, namely, that the petitioner remained quiet for about four years after passing the exparte decree and that his averments relating to his leaving for his native place and staying there all those years, were not supported by any evidence. The lower Court further held that the petitioner failed to give satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay of 1417 days in filing the application and that having obtained the decree for specific performance, it is the duty of the petitioner to pursue the case with diligence. The lower Court further held that the petitioner failed to give satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay of 1417 days in filing the application and that having obtained the decree for specific performance, it is the duty of the petitioner to pursue the case with diligence. The second ground on which the lower Court declined the relief is that as per the amended provisions of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "the Code"), the Court cannot enlarge the time beyond 30 days. 6. At the hearing, Sri D.V. Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the lower Court has committed a serious jurisdictional error in dismissing the petitioner’s application for extension of time for depositing the balance sale consideration. He submitted that the lower Court is vested with the power to extend time for payment of the balance sale consideration under Section 28 (1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short "the Act") and that therefore the lower Court has misdirected itself in holding that it has no power to extend the time beyond 30 days as stipulated under Section 148 of the Code. In support of his submission that the petitioner is entitled to extension of time, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the Judgment of Madras High Court in B.V. Gururaj Vs. M.R. Rathindran (AIR 2010 Madras 129)and also on various Judgements of the Supreme Court, which found reference in the said Judgment. 7. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 8. As per the condition contained in the decree, the petitioner is liable to deposit the balance sale consideration within one month. Admittedly, the petitioner neither complied with the said condition nor filed an application seeking extension of time before the expiry of the time stipulated by the lower Court. The petitioner filed an application seeking condonation of delay of 1417 days, which is equivalent to almost four years. 9. Let me first deal with the conclusion drawn by the lower Court that it has no power to extend the period beyond 30 days for depositing the balance sale consideration, in view of Section 148 of the Code, as amended by Act 46/1999 w.e.f. 1-7-2002. 10. 9. Let me first deal with the conclusion drawn by the lower Court that it has no power to extend the period beyond 30 days for depositing the balance sale consideration, in view of Section 148 of the Code, as amended by Act 46/1999 w.e.f. 1-7-2002. 10. Section 148 of the Code, after its amendment, reads as under : “Enlargement of time: Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period not exceeding thirty days in total, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.” Section 28(1) of the Act, which is relevant for the present purpose, is as follows: “Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require.” While dealing with the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the case after grant of decree for specific performance, the Supreme Court, in Sardar Mohan Singh Vs. Mangilal ( (1997) 9 SCC 217 ), at para-4, held as under: “From the language of sub-section (1) of Section 28, it could be seen that the court does not lose its jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific performance nor it becomes functus officio. The very fact that Section 28 itself gives power to grant order of rescission of the decree would indicate that till the sale deed is executed in execution of the decree, the trial court retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree of specific performance. The very fact that Section 28 itself gives power to grant order of rescission of the decree would indicate that till the sale deed is executed in execution of the decree, the trial court retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree of specific performance. It would also be clear that the court has power to enlarge the time in favour of the judgment-debtor to pay the amount or to perform the conditions mentioned in the decree for specific performance, in spite of an application for rescission of the decree having been filed by the judgment-debtor and rejected. In other words, the court has the discretion to extend time for compliance of the conditional decree as mentioned in the decree for specific performance…..” 11. In K. Kalpana Saraswathi Vs. P.S.S. Somasundaram Chettiar ( AIR 1980 S.C. 512 ), the Supreme Court held that under Section 28 of the Act, it is perfectly open for the trial Court to extend time for deposit and that in appropriate cases, such extension can be made even at the appellate stage by the Supreme Court. This view was reiterated in Ramankutty Gutan Vs. Avara ( (1994) 2 SCC 642 ). 12. The ratio that could be culled out from the above noted Judgments of the Apex Court is that the power to extend the time for payment of balance sale consideration is vested in the Court under Section 28 of the Act. A fortiori, an application filed for extension of time is traceable to the said provision. The language of Section 148 of the Code would reveal that it enables the Court to enlarge the period prescribed or allowed by the Code for doing any act. In my opinion, in the present case, the obligation of the petitioner to pay the balance sale consideration arose under the decree. The petitioner is not required to do any act within the time stipulated by the Code. Therefore, ex facie, Section 148 of the Code is not attracted to an application filed by a decree-holder for extension of time for deposit of balance consideration stipulated in a decree for specific performance of agreement of sale. As Section 28 of the Act being the substantive provision, any such application for extension of time for deposit of balance sale consideration is traceable to the said provision. As Section 28 of the Act being the substantive provision, any such application for extension of time for deposit of balance sale consideration is traceable to the said provision. It, therefore, necessarily follows that the maximum time limit of 30 days stipulated under Section 148 of the Act does not bar the Court from extending time beyond the period of 30 days. If the Court is satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for enlargement of time, it can enlarge the time in exercise of its power under Section 28 of the Act, regardless of the provisions of Section 148 of the Code. As such the finding of the lower Court that it has no power to extend the time beyond 30 days for deposit of balance sale consideration, in view of Section 148 of the Code, cannot be sustained. 13. The crucial question which remains to be considered in the present case is whether the petitioner is entitled for extension of time for depositing the balance sale consideration? 14. It is trite that the relief of specific performance is purely a discretionary relief and the Court is not bound to grant the same merely because there was a valid agreement of sale. It is an equitable remedy which lies purely in the discretion of the Court, which of course, has to be exercised according to the settled principles of law (See: K.S. Vidyanadam Vs. Vairavan ( (1997) 3 SCC 1 ), Lourdu Mari David Vs. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy ( (1996) 5 SCC 589 )and Manjunath Anandappa Vs. Tammanasa ( (2003) 10 SCC 390 )). 15. In N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao ( (1995) 5 SCC 115 )the Supreme Court held that the Court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. 16. In V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm Vs. C. Alagappan ( AIR 1999 S.C. 918 ), the Supreme Court has dealt with a case where execution petitions filed by the decree-holder were dismissed by the trial court. In the revision petitions filed by the decree-holders before the Madras High Court, the decree-holders filed separate applications seeking extension of time granted under the decrees by the trial court for deposit of balance sale consideration. In the revision petitions filed by the decree-holders before the Madras High Court, the decree-holders filed separate applications seeking extension of time granted under the decrees by the trial court for deposit of balance sale consideration. The High Court has remitted the cases to the executing Court with a direction to treat the said applications as Interlocutory Applications in the execution proceedings and to dispose them off in accordance with law. Questioning the said remand order, the judgment-debtor approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, after a thorough discussion of the case law on Section 28 of the Act, allowed the appeals filed by the judgment-debtor by holding that the decree-holders failed to assign any reason whatsoever in not depositing the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time under the decrees. The Supreme Court has referred to Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribed three years period for filing the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale from the date of agreement or when the cause of action arose and observed that merely because the suit is filed within the prescribed period of limitation, it does not absolve the vendee from showing that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement of sale and if there was non-performance, the same was on account of any obstacle created by the vendor. It was further observed that the provisions to grant specific performance of an agreement are quite stringent and that equitable considerations come into play. The Supreme Court further held that the Court has to see all the attendant circumstances including, if the vendee has conducted himself in a reasonable manner under the contract of sale. Drawing the same analogy, the Supreme Court has posed a question as to whether a Court can as a matter of course allow extension of time for making payment of balance amount of consideration in terms of a decree after five years of its passing by the trial court and three years of its confirmation by the appellate Court? While answering this issue in the negative, it was observed : “….It is not the case of the respondent-decree-holder that on account of any fault on the part of the vendor-judgment-debtor, the amount could not be deposited as per the decree. While answering this issue in the negative, it was observed : “….It is not the case of the respondent-decree-holder that on account of any fault on the part of the vendor-judgment-debtor, the amount could not be deposited as per the decree. That being the position, if now time is granted, that would be going beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing of the suit for specific performance of the agreement though this provision may not be strictly applicable. It is nevertheless an important circumstance to be considered by the Court. That apart, no explanation whatsoever is coming from the decree-holder-respondents as to why they did not pay the balance amount of consideration as per the decree except what the High Court itself thought fit to comment which is certainly not borne out from the record. Equity demands that discretion be not exercised in favour of the decree-holder-respondents and no extension of time be granted to them to comply with the decree.” 17. In the present case, the pleadings of the petitioner, as noted hereinbefore, would disclose that except making an averment in the affidavit that he has left for his native village in Maharashtra and that he was not even aware of the passing of the decree, no effort is made by him to show that he was diligent in pursuing the case. While the petitioner’s plea in this regard remained wholly unsubstantiated (the petitioner has not even examined himself as a witness), even accepting the same as it is, it discloses utter lack of diligence on his part in pursuing his case further in pursuance of the exparte decree. Even going by his version, having entrusted his case to his counsel in the year 2006, the petitioner did not bother to verify the stage of the case for nearly four years. As observed by the Supreme Court in V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm (9-supra), while the limitation for filing a suit for specific performance itself is three years, even in cases where a suit is filed within the limitation period, still the Court will not grant the decree for specific performance unless the plaintiff satisfies the Court that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The same considerations were held to be applicable even while considering an application for extension of time for deposit of the balance sale consideration. The same considerations were held to be applicable even while considering an application for extension of time for deposit of the balance sale consideration. Not even an attempt is made by the petitioner to state that he was ready and willing to comply with the condition imposed by the Court below in the exparte decree. No person, who is interested in seeking specific performance of a contract, is expected to display such a lethargic and laidback approach as the petitioner has displayed by delightfully forgetting his case for nearly four years. 18. In K.S. Vidyanadam Vs. Vairavan ( (1997) 3 SCC 1 ), the Supreme Court held that in cases of urban properties in India, it is well known that the prices are going up sharply over the last few decades particularly after 1973. The Supreme Court while disagreeing with the view of the Madras High Court in S.V. Sankaralinga Nadar Vs. P.T.S. Ramaswami Nadar (AIR 1952 Madras 389), that mere rise in price is no ground for denying relief of specific performance, held that the Court cannot be oblivious of the reality of the constant and continuous rise in the value of urban properties. This view is reiterated in Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals Vs. Ramaniyam Real Estates Pvt.Ltd. ( (2011) 9 SCC 147 ). 19. The subject matter of the suit is situated in Lalaguda, which is a part of the city of Hyderabad. The agreement of sale is of the year 1985. The petitioner filed the suit 21 years after entering into the agreement of sale. The whole face of the city has undergone a radical change during the last decade leading to huge increase in land prices. It will be nothing short of windfall for the petitioner if his exparte decree is allowed to be executed at this length of time. Conversely, serious prejudice will be caused to the interests of the respondent as he will be compelled to lose his valuable property for a pittance. If any relief is granted to the petitioner, that would amount to placing a premium on his indolence and total lack of diligence and lethargy. The lower Court is therefore completely justified in dismissing the petitioner’s application for extension of time for deposit of balance sale consideration, on the ground of inordinate delay. 20. If any relief is granted to the petitioner, that would amount to placing a premium on his indolence and total lack of diligence and lethargy. The lower Court is therefore completely justified in dismissing the petitioner’s application for extension of time for deposit of balance sale consideration, on the ground of inordinate delay. 20. The Judgment in B.V. Gururaj (1-supra), on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, does not in any manner advance the petitioner’s case. That was a case where the decree-holder was all through diligent in filing applications for extension of time. Moreover, the application filed by the judgment-debtor under Section 28(1) of the Act for rescission of the contract was dismissed and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties, the Madras High Court has extended the time. Hence, the said Judgment is of no help to the petitioner. 21. On the premises as above, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.