JUDGEMENT Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary, Judge (Oral) The petitioner-Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board for short) feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the award dated 13.10.2009, passed by the learned Presiding Judge, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla in reference No.112 of 2006 has preferred the present writ petition for quashing and setting aside the same. 2. In nut-shell, the case of the petitioner-Board is that the respondent though was engaged as Beldar on daily wage basis in the month of August 1989 and worked as such till May, 1999, however, with breaks as he used to remain absent from duties at his own and that he never completed 240 days uninterrupted service in any calendar year. Since he was engaged on a specific work, therefore, on the completion of the said work and there being no work available for him, his services were rightly dispensed with after serving notice under Section 14(2) and 23(1) (3) of the standing orders applicable to the employees of the petitioner-Board. Neither the petitioner-Board gave fictional breaks to respondent No.1 nor any junior to him was engaged, therefore, he could have not been ordered to be reinstated with seniority and continuity in service. The Tribunal below stated to have not appreciated the pleadings as well as evidence produced on record by the parties in its right perspective and as a result thereof has arrived at a wrong conclusion. It has further been submitted that since respondent No.1 had never completed 240 days in a calendar year right from his initial engagement, therefore, Section 25 (g) and (h) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not at all attracted in the present case nor the respondent-workman was entitled to the benefit thereof. 3. Pursuant to the process issued, the respondent No.1, has put in appearance and he is represented by Shri L.N. Sharma, Advocate. 4. Since the point in issue in the present writ petition stands adjudicated upon in catena of judgments delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, therefore, we proceed to dispose of this writ petition at the stage of admission itself. 5. 4. Since the point in issue in the present writ petition stands adjudicated upon in catena of judgments delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, therefore, we proceed to dispose of this writ petition at the stage of admission itself. 5. It has been argued on behalf of the petitioner-Board that it is the respondent-workman who himself absented from duties at his own and failed to complete 240 days in a calendar year right from his initial engagement till his retrenchment from service after issuance of legal notice and on completion of the work against which he was engaged. Therefore, he could have neither been held entitled to reinstatement along with seniority and continuity in service nor the benefit of Section 25 (g) and (h) of Industrial Disputes Act was available to him. 6. On behalf of the respondent-workman, it is submitted that the persons junior to him have been retained by the petitioner Board whereas his services have been dispensed with without issuing any notice to him. 7.After taking into consideration the rival submissions and also the award impugned in this writ petition, it is evident that the respondent-workman was engaged as Beldar on daily wage basis by the petitioner Board in the month of August 1989 and continued as such till May 1999. It is not established on record that the respondent-workman had absented from duty at his own as no cogent and reliable evidence to this effect has been produced by the petitioner-Board. It is well established that the petitioner-Board has retained the persons junior to respondent-workman in service. The own case of the petitioner in para 4-E of the writ petition that no person junior to respondent-workman, save and except those who were ordered to be reinstated by the Court, were retained in service itself reveals that the persons junior to the respondent-workman have been retained in service. The Tribunal-cum-Labour Court below has also concluded so in the impugned award. 8. The present also is not a case where it can be said that the respondent-workman did not complete 240 days during every calendar year right from his initial engagement as daily wage Beldar. The Man-days chart Annexure P-1 reveals that he has completed 240 days during the calendar years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1996 and also 1997. 9. 8. The present also is not a case where it can be said that the respondent-workman did not complete 240 days during every calendar year right from his initial engagement as daily wage Beldar. The Man-days chart Annexure P-1 reveals that he has completed 240 days during the calendar years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1996 and also 1997. 9. Above all, it is well settled, at this stage, that it is not necessary for a workman to complete 240 days in a calendar year to render himself entitled to the benefit of Section 25 (g) and (h) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This question has been considered by our own High Court in its Judgment dated 18.6.2010 in CWP No.308 of 2009 titled Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board and others versus Ghanshyam and Others and its connected petitions. While placing reliance to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Bank of India versus S.Satyam and others (1996) 5 Supreme Court Cases 419, Samishta Dube versus City Board, Etawah and another (1999) 3 Supreme Court Cases 14, and Regional Manager, SBI Vs. Rakesh Kumar Tewari (2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases 530, it has been held in the judgment Supra that completion of 240 days by a workman in a calendar year is not required for seeking the benefit of Section 25 (g) and (h) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 10. The plea raised by the petitioner Board that the respondent-workman used to remain absent from duty at his own is not established at all. As a matter of fact, the question of abandonment of work voluntarily by a workman is required to be established by way of cogent and reliable evidence as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G.T. Lad and others versus Chemicals and Fibers India Ltd., AIR 1979, Supreme Court 582. The law so laid down has been taken note of by this Court in its judgment in Ghanshayam’s case cited supra. 11. In the light of what has stated hereinabove, the present writ petition, being devoid of any merits, is hereby dismissed. No order so as to costs.