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2012 DIGILAW 850 (KER)

Mogera Nema Daivasthana Parankila v. Seethamma

2012-09-12

K.VINOD CHANDRAN

body2012
ORDER : K. Vinod Chandran, J. Essentially, the dispute in the Civil Revision Petition is between A party No. 9, K. Babu and A party No. 11, Mogera Nema Daivasthana Parankila; as arrayed before the Land Tribunal, Kasaragode. The proceedings under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as K.L.R. Act) was with respect to 3.29 acres in R.S. No. 260/ 4 of Mangalpady Village, Kasaragod Taluk. Suo motu proceedings S.M. No. 35/71 was initiated by the Land Tribunal, Kasaragod and title and interest over the above referred 3.29 acres was assigned in favour of Venkappadas (A party No. 1). B Party No. 3, Narayana Shenoy filed an appeal numbered as AA/Kozhikode/811/1972 and Appellate Authority (LR) Kozhikode by its judgment dated 21.7.1973 set aside the order in appeal and remanded it for fresh consideration. On remand the proceedings were renumbered as S.M. No. 1253/1976. During the pendency of the same, Venkappadas having died, his legal heirs assigned the property in favour of five different persons. A party No. 9, K. Babu, was assigned 1.78 acres. The dispute in the above revision is only with respect to the said assignment to A party No. 9; more specifically with respect to 50 cents out of 1.78 acres so assigned. A party No. 11 claiming under B party No. 3 contended that the said 50 cents was set apart for a foundation by Ext. B16. Whether Ext. B16 is a gift deed compulsorily registerable or an instrument of dedication not liable to be registered is the issue highlighted by the counsel for the petitioner in the revision, (A party No. 11). The counsel for the 5th respondents party No. 9) would, however, contend that Narayana Shenoy (B Party No. 3), who is said to have executed Ext. B16 was not competent to deal with the 50 cents described therein as a gift or as a dedication. 2. Coming back to the chronology of proceedings before the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority, S.M. No. 1253/1976, after assignment by Venkappadas's legal heirs, inter alia included A party No. 9, claiming under Venkappadas (A party No. 1) and A party No. 11, claiming under Narayana Shenoy (B party No. 3). The Land Tribunal having found the possession of 50 cents in favour of A Party No. 11 assigned the same to A party No. 11 as per order dated 31.8.1975. The Land Tribunal having found the possession of 50 cents in favour of A Party No. 11 assigned the same to A party No. 11 as per order dated 31.8.1975. Five other purchase certificates were also issued in the very same proceedings. 3. A party No. 9 filed an appeal as AA No. 41/1987 before the appellate authority. The appellate authority categorically found that the assignment of 50 cents of land in favour of the 9th respondent (A party No. 11) was without any basis and without any evidence and set aside the same on the strength of such findings. However, finding procedural irregularities in six certificates of purchase having been issued in a solitary S.M. proceeding, the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh disposal, in accordance with law. Admittedly, the said proceedings with respect to 50 cents of land had become final and the order of remand was only on the count of the procedural irregularities noticed by the appellate authority. 4. Be that as it may, before the Land Tribunal on remand, A Party No. 11 produced Ext. B16. On the strength of Ext. B16, it was claimed that the possession of 50 cents of property was dedicated as a "Bhandaram" and the Adalthedars (Managers) of Magarthi Nema Temple of Parankila in Mangalpady Village at Kasaragode Taluk was put in possession of the said property. On a consideration of Ext. B16, the Land Tribunal upheld the contention of A party No. 9 that it is only a gift deed and the same having not been registered; no right over the 50 cents of property, flows from the said document. The Land Tribunal also considered the evidence adduced by both sides with respect to the conflicting claims made on the 50 cents of property. The Commission report filed by the Advocate Commissioner, taken out at the instance of A party No. 11, as also the report of the Special Revenue Inspector were elaborately considered by the Land Tribunal. Having found that Ext. B16 would not come to the help of A party No. 11, the Land Tribunal followed the findings of the appellate authority in its judgment in AA No. 41/1987 dated 29.4.1989 and rejected the claim of A party No. 11. The entire 1.78 Acres of property was consequently assigned in favour of A party No. 9, by order dated 25.2.1995. B16 would not come to the help of A party No. 11, the Land Tribunal followed the findings of the appellate authority in its judgment in AA No. 41/1987 dated 29.4.1989 and rejected the claim of A party No. 11. The entire 1.78 Acres of property was consequently assigned in favour of A party No. 9, by order dated 25.2.1995. The Appeal No. AA 51/1995 filed by A party No. 11 was dismissed by order dated 18.12.2004. The order of the Land Tribunal as confirmed by the Appellate Authority is impugned in the instant revision. 5. The judgment of the appellate authority dated 29.4.1989 if considered to be an open remand, the entire issue would revolve around Ext. B16. The findings of the appellate authority in AA41/1987, without Ext. B16 on record has become final. 6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner (A party No. 11) would rely upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Thayarammal (Dead) by Lr. Vs. Kanakammal and Others. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the ratio decidendi of the said decision would squarely apply to the facts of the instant case. That would enable the revision petitioner to claim that Ext. B16 would be taken out of the mischief sought to be rectified by S. 84 of the KLR Act. A dedication, it is argued, on the strength of the Supreme Court decision, is neither a gift nor a trust and there is no transfer as is understood in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as 'T.P. Act') and hence there is no question of deemed invalidation under S. 84 of the K.L.R. Act. Ext. B16 stands by itself as a dedication and cannot be deemed to be a transfer invalidated by the provisions of S. 84, is the argument. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent however, would contend that the question of invalidation under S. 84 or whether Ext. B16 is a gift or dedication, does not arise at all because Narayana Shenoy, B party No. 3, styles himself as a lessee in Ext. B16 document and there is no proceeding initiated under the K.L.R. Act in his favour as a cultivating tenant either suo motu or on his application. In such circumstances, it is contended that Narayana Shenoy does not have any right over the 50 cents of property and Ext. B16 document and there is no proceeding initiated under the K.L.R. Act in his favour as a cultivating tenant either suo motu or on his application. In such circumstances, it is contended that Narayana Shenoy does not have any right over the 50 cents of property and Ext. B16 whether it be assignment, gift, dedication or any transfer permitted by law could not have been made by the executant of Ext. B16. 8. The thrust of the case built up by the revision petitioner is on the ratio decidendi, of the Supreme Court judgment cited above. The facts of the above cited case would show that schedule A property in the suit therein, was dedicated for being used by the public as Dharma-chathram. The dedication was evidenced by a stone inscription on the front wall of the property. The property was being used as a 'choultry' where travellers and pilgrims could take shelter and could be provided with refreshment. The inscription as translated and extracted in the said decision would show that the dedicator described himself as the owner of the property which he dedicated to the general public as a resting place. There is no trustee mentioned therein and the witness to the dedication is Lord Thyagaraja. The suit was filed by the plaintiffs asserting possession and occupation of Schedule A and seeking eviction of the defendants from schedule B being a portion of Schedule A and consequential injunction from entry into any portion of the dedicated property. The defendants, inter alia, pleaded that they have acquired title of B schedule portion of the property on the basis of purchase made by them in court sale in execution of a compromise decree. The concurrent finding of the Trial Court and the first appellate court was that the compromise decree was a collusive one. On second appeal before the High Court the finding that the property was dedicated for public use was confirmed and the defendant's claim of title by reason of court sale was rejected. However, on the finding that no trustees were appointed and the plaintiff cannot assume such status, the High Court directed the Administrator General to take over the management of the property. 9. Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court it was contended on behalf of the defendants that the endowment was not registered. However, on the finding that no trustees were appointed and the plaintiff cannot assume such status, the High Court directed the Administrator General to take over the management of the property. 9. Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court it was contended on behalf of the defendants that the endowment was not registered. The Supreme Court held that the dedication is neither a gift as understood under the T.P. Act which requires an acceptance by the donee of the property, nor is it a 'trust'. Religious endowment itself does not create title in respect of the property dedicated; in anybody's favour. In the instance of the donor having not indicated any administrator or manager or trustees, then, quoting from B.K. Mukherjea on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, (5th Edition by A.C. Sen) it was held that, then, the said property belongs to nobody. Being dedicated for general public use such property itself is raised to the category of a juristic person. Bombay High Court decision reported in (ILR 12 Bom. 247) was quoted with approval. In Manohar Ganesh v. Lakhmiram, it is held that 'the Hindu Law like the Roman law and those derived from it recognizes not only corporate bodies with rights or property vested in the corporation apart from its individual members, but also juridical persons and subjects called foundations.' The religious institutions like mutts and other establishments obviously answer to the description of foundations in Roman law. The idea is the same, namely, when property is dedicated for a particular purpose, the property itself upon which the purpose is impressed, is raised to the category of a juristic person so that the property which is dedicated would vest in the person so created. This necessarily does not indicate that there is no transfer of the property though it is indicated that it is not a gift as understood in the T.P. Act. Noticing the failure of the High Court to have made a distinction between "Trust" and "Religious and Charitable Endowments", it was opined that the High Court committed an error in directing the Administrator General to take possession of the property in accordance with the provisions of the Administrators General Act No. 45 of 1963 and under the Official Trustee Act No. 2 of 1913. It was noticed that when the Tamilnadu Charitable and Religious Endowments Act 1955 expressly governs the subject, there was no warrant for recourse to Act 45 of 1963 or Act 2 of 1913. 10. Distinction between a 'Trust' and an 'endowment' came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Shanmughan Vs. Vishnu Bharatheeyan. This Court held therein that they are not unanimous concepts. In the present case such a controversy is not there. The Division Bench held that the trust created in the said case was a private religious trust and was outside the purview of the Indian Trust Act as also S. 92 of the C.P.C. It was however held that the expression private religious endowment used in the saving clause of the Indian Trust Act has got the imprint of a trust. I have referred to the above case only to put in proper perspective, the argument of the leaned counsel for the petitioner that the foundation or endowment would stand on different footing from even a trust, whether public or private. This Court while holding that trust is not required for creating the endowment and all that is necessary is the existence of a religious and charitable purpose and the setting apart of the properties for endowment; it also held that an endowment necessarily has the imprint of trust. 11. In Kuldip Chand and Another Vs. Advocate General to Government of Himachal Pradesh and Others, Supreme Court was concerned with the question as to whether the user of a premises as a 'dharmasala' for about 125 years, could lead to an inference that the same belongs to a public trust. The Hon'ble Supreme Court relying on Menakuru Dasaratharami Reddi Vs. Duddukuru Subba Rao, it was held: It is beyond any dispute that a Hindu is entitled to dedicate his property for religious and charitable purposes wherefor even no instrument in writing is necessary. A Hindu, however, in the event, wishes to establish a charitable institution must express his purpose and endow it. Such purpose must clearly be specified. For the purpose of creating an endowment, what is necessary is a clear and unequivocal manifestation of intention to create a trust and vesting thereof in the donor and another as trustees. Subject of endowment, however, must be certain. Dedication of property either may be complete or partial. Such purpose must clearly be specified. For the purpose of creating an endowment, what is necessary is a clear and unequivocal manifestation of intention to create a trust and vesting thereof in the donor and another as trustees. Subject of endowment, however, must be certain. Dedication of property either may be complete or partial. When such dedication is complete, a public trust is created in contradistinction to a partial dedication which would only create a charity. Although the dedication to charity need not necessarily be by instrument or grant, there must exist cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and user of the property, which show the extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity. 12. Considering the evidence in the said case it was found that there was no dispute that the ownership of the property stood in the name of the person who is said to have created the endowment and his legal heirs during the entire period of its alleged user by the public. There was no mention of any right of the general public to use the same. The maintenance and upkeep of the dharmasala was not out of contribution from the public. The use of the dharmasala could only be with the permission of the owners. No member of the public, participated in the management of the dharmasala nor was there any evidence to show that the owners acted as trustees. In the circumstance, though it was found that the dharmasala in question was used by general public for a very long time; it was held that the mere continuance of a benevolent act of charity would not lead to creation of a trust. What is relevant for the purpose of this case is the finding of the Supreme Court in Paragraph 38 of the judgment. A dedication for public purposes and for the benefit of the general public would involve complete cessation of ownership on the part of the founder and vesting of the property for the religious object...... A dedication, it may bear repetition to state, would mean complete relinquishment of his right of ownership and proprietary. 13. Hence it goes without saying that dedication results in complete relinquishment of right of the donor as owner of property. A dedication, it may bear repetition to state, would mean complete relinquishment of his right of ownership and proprietary. 13. Hence it goes without saying that dedication results in complete relinquishment of right of the donor as owner of property. The owner would be divested of his title and going by the decision in Thayarammal's case, it cannot be gainsaid that there is no transfer in the case of there being no ascertainable person; since in such event the property itself would assume the nature of juristic person. 14. It is pertinent that the Land Tribunal has rejected the claim of A Party No. 11 on the premise that Ext. B16 document, being a gift deed, is to be compulsorily registered. The gift deed not having been registered, the party cannot claim any right under it. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would assail the said finding on the ground that Ext. B16 being in the nature of a dedication that too for a religious foundation, it does not require registration since there is no transfer as contemplated in the T.P. Act. 15. What then is 'transfer' indicated under S. 84 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act? 16. The subtle distinction between a dedication for religious purpose or charitable purpose and a Trust as also the effect of such dedication has often engaged the attention of the courts of this land. Strong under current of religiousness permeating every aspect of Indian society and culture as also the spiritual aspirations of the people, collectively and individually; has persuaded many a citizen to make dedication for religious and charitable purposes. The piety and religiousness often had not percolated down to the legal lineage of such pious souls. This has led to disputes challenging such dedications in the courts of law; when material considerations overrode spiritual pursuits. 17. Pallayya and Others and Mallayya Vs. Ramavadhanulu, was a case in which the plaintiff by a document made a declaration of Trust in relation to immovable property for a public religious purpose, i.e., dedication of the land to an idol for the purpose of building a temple on it. The plaintiff having declared himself as a Trustee without transferring the ownership to another, the transaction was held to be a 'gift' not coming within the meaning of T.P. Act. The plaintiff having declared himself as a Trustee without transferring the ownership to another, the transaction was held to be a 'gift' not coming within the meaning of T.P. Act. It was also held to be not governed by the Indian Trust Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Trusts Act') since the same was inapplicable to religious endowment vide Section 1. 18. The said decision of the Madras High Court was later considered by a Full Bench, which affirmed it. The Full Bench in Tangella Narasimhaswami, Dharmakartha of Sri Kodanda Ramachandra Moorthy Vs. Iamidi Venkatalingam and Others, dealt with a case wherein the plaintiff attached the properties in execution of a decree he obtained against the second defendant. The first defendant alleged that the land was dedicated by the second defendant to Sri Kodanda Ramachandra Moorthy Varu (manifestation of God) and the possession was given to "Him". The District Munsiff dismissed the suit and in appeal, the Subordinate Judge reversed the same since the document relied on by the first defendant was not registered. The subject document was one executed by the second defendant constituting the first defendant as Dharmakartha, conferring on him the trusteeship in respect of land dedicated to God and promising conveyance whenever it was required. This was a document which confirmed and asserted the prior dedication and trusteeship. It was contended before their Lordships that a document which does not by itself convey property but merely gives a right to call for another document does not require registration. 19. Their Lordships found that there was absolutely no necessity for the clause regarding the promise of conveyance and it was a deed which confirmed the appointment of the first defendant as Dharmakartha and the transfer of the property. The transaction came within the savings clause of Section 1 of the Trusts Act, and Section 5. Being not covered u/s 5 of the Trusts Act, it was held to be not compulsorily registerable. Their Lordships also considered the issue of whether such a document would require registration as contemplated under S. 123 of the T.P. Act. Noticing S. 5 of the T.P. Act it was held that it applies only to transfers by one living person to another and a gift to God cannot be said to be a gift to a living person, under the T.P. Act. Noticing S. 5 of the T.P. Act it was held that it applies only to transfers by one living person to another and a gift to God cannot be said to be a gift to a living person, under the T.P. Act. An idol though held to be a juristic person, their Lordships declined to consider the question whether a juristic person could assume the status of a living person since in the said case the dedication was not to an idol but to God Himself. 20. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court was followed in Chamba Bibi v. Panchiram Nahara Siva Bigraha & Ors. (AIR 1963 Cal. 55). There a dedication of land was made to a Hindu deity and the question was whether this would be transfer of land within the meaning of S. 5A of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as WBEA Act). The petitioner therein had dedicated agricultural land to a deity and the Authorised Officer under the WBEA Act held the transfer to be bona fide; but, with a view to preventing acquisition of surplus land under the Act. The same was confirmed by the appellate authority, which was impugned before the High Court. S. 5A of the WBEA Act defined transfer as meaning "a transfer by sale, mortgage, lease, exchange or gift". It is pertinent that these are the five forms of transfer recognized by the T.P. Act. However, the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court held that the definition of transfer of property in S. 5 of the T.P. Act does not apply to the WBEA Act. It was also held that the expression "gift" in S. 5A should not be confined or restricted to the 'gift' in T.P. Act, which is a transfer to a living person. It was held: We see no reason why a narrow construction should be given to the definition of "transfer" in S. 5A(7)(iii) and why a transfer by gift should be limited to gift within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act or to a gift for secular purposes. The general expression "gift" covers a dedication to a Hindu deity and a gift for religious purposes. The general expression "gift" covers a dedication to a Hindu deity and a gift for religious purposes. For purposes of S. 5A a gift to a deity and a gift for religious purposes stand on the same footing as a gift to a living person and a gift for secular purposes. Transfers of surplus lands by all such gifts affect the right of the State to acquire those lands as the surplus lands of the transferor. We have therefore come to the conclusion that a transfer by dedication to a Hindu deity is a transfer by gift within the meaning of S. 5A(7)(iii). 21. Sainath Mandir Trust Vs. Vijaya and Others, was a case in which the person who made the endowment on behalf of the trust, subsequently, after a notice issued in a daily news paper, sold the property; earlier dedicated to a trust. The suit was filed by the purchaser against the Sainath Mandir Trust who was in occupation of the suit land with also the vendor/donor in the array of defendants. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court with a decree for damages against the vendor. The First Appellate Court allowed an appeal filed by the plaintiff and rejected the cross objection of the Trust. Before the High Court, in second appeal, inter alia, a substantial question of law was raised as to whether the gift deed; being an act of dedication of the suit property to the deity, which is not a living person would be gift in terms of S. 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and whether the provisions of the same are applicable to the deed of gift; more specifically whether registration is mandatory. The appeals were dismissed with the learned Single Judge answering the question of law against the Trust and holding that the gift has to necessarily conform to the procedure laid down under S. 123 of the T.P. Act. The Supreme Court noticed that the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff was not in possession and that the defendant Trust was in possession of the property remained untouched by both the appellate courts. Though no title could pass on the basis of an unregistered instrument of gift under S. 123 of the T.P. Act, the subject document being in the nature of dedication of immovable property, it was held; there was no requirement of registration. Though no title could pass on the basis of an unregistered instrument of gift under S. 123 of the T.P. Act, the subject document being in the nature of dedication of immovable property, it was held; there was no requirement of registration. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court cited above was referred with approval by the Supreme Court in Sainath Mandir Trust and held to be tilting the scale of justice in favour of the appellants therein. 22. In the context of the law declared by the Courts as noticed above, the finding of the Land Tribunal as confirmed by the appellate authority that Ext. B16 is bad for want of registration cannot be upheld. A dedication for religious purpose or to an idol, as is the projected case in Ext. B16, cannot fall under S. 123 of the T.P. Act. The courts have oftener than ever held that the dedication for a religious or charitable purpose as also a gift to an idol may be even oral and there cannot be any mandate that it should be by a registered instrument itself. 23. Now, we come to the question of what is 'transfer' contemplated under S. 84 of the K.L.R. Act and which transfers are deemed to be invalid. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that in the instant case there is no transfer as contemplated under the T.P. Act and hence there cannot be any deemed invalidity under S. 84 of the K.L.R. Act. The decisions cited above would suggest otherwise. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Champa Bibi's case also deals with an enactment intended to provide ceiling limits for land holdings. WBEA Act also deems any transfers to defeat the provisions of the enactment as invalid. The 'transfer' as defined by the said enactment contain five modes of transfer as contemplated under the T.P. Act. The Calcutta High Court refused to restrict the definition under the WBEA Act to that contained in the T.P. Act. It was also categorically held that there can be a gift which does not come under the T.P. Act since the general expression 'gift' covers the dedication or gift to a deity or for a religious purpose. 24. Looking at S. 84, it is obvious that the legislature so intended in the Kerala Land Reforms Act too. It was also categorically held that there can be a gift which does not come under the T.P. Act since the general expression 'gift' covers the dedication or gift to a deity or for a religious purpose. 24. Looking at S. 84, it is obvious that the legislature so intended in the Kerala Land Reforms Act too. I say this also due to the fact that 'partition' not generally understood to be a transfer under the T.P. Act has been specifically exempted under S. 84. If partition does not constitute a transfer within the meaning of the T.P. Act (see: Sk. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhari Vs. Gundappa AMabadas Bukate, then, what was the purpose of exempting it from the voluntarily transfers deemed to be invalid under S. 84 of the K.L.R. Act? This can only indicate that 'transfers' contemplated by the legislature, that were deemed to be invalid under S. 84 were not the transfers contemplated by the T.P. Act alone; but took within its fold any transfers as generally understood. 25. Coming to the facts of the case, I have examined Ext. B16 document the translated copy of which was handed over across the Bar, by the Counsel for the revision petitioner. The said document is styled as a 'gift deed'. The same is executed by Narayana Shenoy on 20.4.1964 in favour of Magarthi Nema Temple of Parankila represented by the Adalthedars. The executant declares having obtained the said property on a lease for a period of one year at an yearly rent of Rs. 30/-. The scheduled property subjected to Rs. 5/- as rent was 'gifted, conveyed and the entire right transferred in favour of the aforesaid Bhandaram'. The Adalthedars of the temple was stated to be put in possession. The document also says that the gift has been made for performing viniyogas (probably religious rituals) and if such viniyogas are not performed; the executant is entitled to repossess the land. It cannot for a moment be held that there was no transfer. This is not a case in which the owner constituted himself as a trust along with others or by himself. The specific words employed indicate that the executant intended that his title over the property is divested and the possession is handed over to the Managers of the Temple. This is not a case in which the owner constituted himself as a trust along with others or by himself. The specific words employed indicate that the executant intended that his title over the property is divested and the possession is handed over to the Managers of the Temple. The learned counsel would say that the clause for re-possession could at best be ignored, since it does not at all arise in the case of a dedication. However, the intention of the executant if appropriately construed from the terms of the deed; it would clearly and unambiguously suggest that it was only an arrangement that too only during the period in which he continued as a lessee, if at all there was a lease. The executant himself styled his rights over the property as being that of a lease. The rights gifted or conveyed by the said document could be only the rights the executant had on the property. The executant could not have dedicated any property which did not belong to him. 26. Looking into the evidence; A party No. 9 examined himself as PW 1 and deposed consistent with his claim. His sale deed was produced as Exhibit A1 and the basic tax receipts were marked as Exhibits A24 to A29. The installation of a pump set was evidenced by Exhibit A30, which is a meter card relating to the pump set. Exhibit A31 also evidenced the agricultural loan availed of by A party No. 9 from the Mangalpady Service Co-operative Bank. PW 2 was one of the attestors of Exhibit A1 who denied the existence of the Daivasthanam. PW 3 was a coolie worker who had worked for Venkappa Das, the predecessor in interest of A party No. 9; as also A party No. 9 after the latter acquired the said property. He too denied the existence of a Daivasthnam in this property. The scribe of Exhibit A1 also was examined as PW 4. On the side of A party No. 11, RW 1, who claimed himself to be a committee member of the Daivasthnam was examined. Though he claimed that the 50 cents of land was obtained by the Daivasthnam as a gift from Narayana Shenoy, he would also state that the Daivasthnam is holding the property on lease hold right under Narayana Shenoy on a contract rent of Rs. 5. Though he claimed that the 50 cents of land was obtained by the Daivasthnam as a gift from Narayana Shenoy, he would also state that the Daivasthnam is holding the property on lease hold right under Narayana Shenoy on a contract rent of Rs. 5. His claim, strangely, is that the Daivasthnam had been paying lease rent. RW 2 a resident of the locality was also examined to establish the existence of a Daivasthnam and the performance of "Daivakolas" every year and "Thambilas" every month. The evidence led by A party No. 11 is starkingly incongruous. The claim was set up as a gift/dedication and the deposition of the committee member was to the effect that rentals were paid. The performance of rituals in the Daivasthnam and the property being bounded by four compound walls does not emanate from the overall evidence adduced in the case. It is also to be noticed that the landlord/B party No. 1 filed a statement dated 15.7.91 stating that B party No. 3, the intermediary, who is said to have dedicated the property to the Daivasthnam, arranged the cultivation on his behalf. Ownership of the property is asserted by Exhibit B1. There is not even a lease to B party No. 3, is the contention of the owner. In the totality of circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the claim set up by A party No. 11 is patently frivolous and clearly unsubstantiated. On the strength of the discussions above it can safely be concluded that B party No. 3, the alleged donor/dedicator did not have any ownership or interest in the property which could have been gifted/dedicated to the Daivasthnam. As held above following the various decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court cited above if Exhibit B16 is found to be gift or dedication in favour of the deity or for a religious purpose; it does not require a registration. However, Exhibit B16 cannot at all be said to have conveyed any right or interest over the property to the Daivasthnam; A party No. 11. The executant, B party No. 3 had absolutely no right over the property. No extent of the property could have been gifted/dedicated by B party No. 3. However, Exhibit B16 cannot at all be said to have conveyed any right or interest over the property to the Daivasthnam; A party No. 11. The executant, B party No. 3 had absolutely no right over the property. No extent of the property could have been gifted/dedicated by B party No. 3. In the said circumstances, this court need not look into whether any transfer has occurred in pursuance to Exhibit B16 deed and if so whether such transfer would come within the "voluntary transfers" spoken of in S. 84 of the K.L.R. Act; for the purposes of determining whether, then, it would be deemed invalid. The finding of the Land Tribunal as confirmed by the appellate authority that no right flow from Exhibit B16 cannot at all be interfered with, though not for the reason of non registration but for the reason of the executant of Exhibit B16 having no rights over the property which could be conveyed, gifted, dedicated or in any manner transferred. The decision of the Land Tribunal regarding the mandate or obligation to register Exhibit B16 as a gift deed, though found to be erroneous; in the facts and circumstances of the case the rejection of the claim set up by A party No. 11 cannot at all be interfered with. To that extent the order of the Land Tribunal is liable to be confirmed which would result in the Civil Revision Petition, being devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly, no costs.