Judgment :- 1. These writ petitions have been filed praying that this Court may be pleased to call for and quash the records relating to the impugned notices issued by the respondent, for the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97, under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and quash the same. 2. It has been stated that the petitioner is a company manufacturing cement machinery/equipment and it is engaged in the business of turn key projects for the setting up of cement manufacturing units. The petitioner has been regularly assessed to income on the basis of the returns submitted by the petitioner. 3. The petitioner has been entering into the turn key contracts with its customers, in the normal course of its business. The contracts, invariably, contained a clause of performance guarantee. The contract casts an obligation on the petitioner, as it is also contained a warranty clause providing for warranty of performance, in respect of the equipments supplied by the petitioner, including the service performance. Under the warranty clause, the petitioner was bound to reimburse the customers to the extent of the loss caused by the reason of breach of warranty. The petitioner?s liability under the warranty clause continued to exist during the period specified in it. The claim under the warranty clause could be enforced by the customers concerned. 4. It has been further stated that, in view of the liability cast on the petitioner, due to the warranty clause, certain protective provisions had been provided to cover such liability on the basis of professional advise, by making a provision base in its accounting, based on the warranty clause contained in the contract. Under the accounting policy, notes and accounting annexed to and forming part of the balance sheet, the petitioner had made the following specific statements of policy, under the head of 'warranty and guarantee claims', which is as follows: "The company's liability for warranty and guarantee claims are accounted on accrual basis as per the contract terms and after adjusting claims no longer required." 5. It has been further stated that, in respect of the assessment for the year 1995-96, the petitioner had filed the return of income, originally, on 20.11.1995, admitting a total income of Rs.7,95,43,106/-. Subsequently, a revised return was filed, on 27.1.1997, admitting an income of Rs.11,84,08,370/-. The assessment had been completed, on 27.2.1998, determining the total income at Rs.12,16,05,960/-. It has been further stated that, in respect of the assessment for the year 1995-96, the petitioner had filed the return of income, originally, on 20.11.1995, admitting a total income of Rs.7,95,43,106/-. Subsequently, a revised return was filed, on 27.1.1997, admitting an income of Rs.11,84,08,370/-. The assessment had been completed, on 27.2.1998, determining the total income at Rs.12,16,05,960/-. Along with the return of income filed by the petitioner, a memo of statement of total income, in addition to the published accounts of the company, had also been filed. The published accounts of the company contained the profit and loss account for the year ended on 31.3.1995. Schedule XIX, appended to the profit and loss account, gave the details of the administrative and other expenses recorded for the said year. Item No.9 of the schedule related to the warranty and guarantee claims pertaining to the year that had ended on 31.3.1995, as well as for the year that had ended, on 31.3.1996. The warranty and guarantee claims had been duly explained in the statements of accounting policy and notes and in the accounts in item 9, wherein the petitioner had explained that the company?s liability for warranty and guarantee claims had been accounted, on accrual basis, as per the terms of the contract and after adjusting the claims, which were no longer required. The income declared for assessment purposes, in the return filed by the petitioner, was based on the published accounts, which forms part of the documents filed before the respondent. 6. It has been further stated that, in respect of the assessment year 1996-97, the petitioner had filed a return, on 29.11.1996, admitting a total income of Rs.6,94,96,340/-. A revised return of income had been filed, on 27.1.1997, admitting an income of Rs.10,10,85,582/. The assessment had been completed, under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after a due hearing, on 24.3.1999. Both the assessments relating to the years 1995-96 and 1996-97 showed the dates of hearing and it was clear that the hearings were held on various dates before the completion of the assessment. As such, the assessment for the years 1995-96 and 1996-97 had become final. While so, the petitioner had filed the assessments for the subsequent assessment years 199798 and 1998-99. The assessment had been completed on identical basis. As such, the assessment for the years 1995-96 and 1996-97 had become final. While so, the petitioner had filed the assessments for the subsequent assessment years 199798 and 1998-99. The assessment had been completed on identical basis. The returns for the said years had also been accompanied by similar statements, including the published accounts. The accounts and all other connected records were examined in detail, at the time of the finalisation of the assessment. The published accounts for the financial years 1996-97 and 1997-98, relating to the assessment years 1997-98 and 1998-99, had also contained the full particulars of the warranty and guarantee claims, relating to the respective years, under the schedule. It was also duly explained in the accounting policy followed by the petitioner. 7. It had been further stated that the petitioner has been following uniform and consistent method of accounting, in respect of the maintenance of accounts, as well as with regard to the submissions of the return, for the purpose of assessment. The petitioner is a public limited company and its accounts had been duly passed at the Annual General Body Meeting relating to the respective years. The petitioner's accounts had also been accepted by the income tax authorities, over a number of years. The petitioner had disclosed all the necessary particulars relating to the accounts, which had been considered during the past years, while finalising the assessments. The entries relating to the warranty and guarantee claims had been duly reflected in all the accounts and has been on record, before the Assessing Authority, at the time of the filing of the returns and in the course of the assessment proceedings. The assessing authorities had completed the assessment proceedings only after conducting a detailed enquiry. While so, in respect of the assessment year 1999-2000, the petitioner had filed its return, on 22.12.1999. The return had been processed, under section 143(1)(a) of the Act, on 3.1.2000. Subsequently, a notice, under section 143(2) of the Act, had been issued, on 31.7.2000, and the assessment had been completed by an order, dated 28.3.2002. 8. It has been further stated that, during the course of the assessment proceedings, the respondent had examined the accounts and sought certain clarifications, with regard to the warranty and guarantee claims in the accounts relating to the said years. 8. It has been further stated that, during the course of the assessment proceedings, the respondent had examined the accounts and sought certain clarifications, with regard to the warranty and guarantee claims in the accounts relating to the said years. The petitioner had explained the position relating to the warranty and guarantee claims stating that provisions had been made for the warranty and guarantee, with regard to the consistent method of accounting followed by the petitioner. As and when the warranty and guarantee period expired, the excess provisions, if any, is reversed back to the profit and loss account. The net provisions or excess, if any, is carried to the profit and loss account. The provision, which is reversed back, as not required, is adjusted against the provision made for a year and the net amount is declared its accounts. Even though it had been stated by the petitioner that the said accounting method has been followed for many years and that it had been accepted by the assessing authorities concerned, the respondent took a decision stating that the provision for warranty and guarantee claims is not allowable, under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessing authority had also proposed to reopen the assessment for the earlier year, where such provisions had been considered and allowed by the assessing authorities concerned. The disallowance or the provision is resorted to by the respondent, in respect of the assessment year 1999-2000, on a mere change of opinion, without any addition or material being available, other than those which are already on record and considered by the assessing authorities concerned, for the assessment made during the respective years. Accordingly, the respondent had issued notices, under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in respect of the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97, stating that there were reasons to believe that the petitioner?s income, chargeable to income tax, as estimated assessment for the aforesaid assessment years, within the meaning of Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and therefore, the respondent had proposed to re-assess the income for the above said assessment years. The petitioner was required to submit its return, pursuant to the said notices, in the prescribed form, for the aforesaid assessment years. 9. The petitioner was required to submit its return, pursuant to the said notices, in the prescribed form, for the aforesaid assessment years. 9. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it is not open to the respondent to reopen the assessment, in respect of the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97, by way of notices issued under section 148 of the Act, as the said notices had been issued, on 22.3.2002, beyond the period of four years, as prescribed under the relevant provisions of Section 147 of the Act. 10. The learned counsel had further stated that a notice can be issued beyond the period of four years, in respect of the assessment years, wherein assessment had been completed under section 143(3) of the Act, subject to the proviso therein. However, the respondent had not shown the existence of the necessary ingredients for the reopening of the assessment made earlier. 11. The learned counsel had further stated that the petitioner had fully and truly disclosed the material facts necessary, in respect of the aforesaid assessment years. No averments had been made on behalf of the respondent stating that certain material facts, necessary for the assessment, had not been disclosed by the petitioner. The respondent does not have the jurisdiction to reopen the assessment for the assessment year 1996-97, in respect of which the warranty claim had already been allowed. Therefore, the impugned notices issued by the respondent, for reopening the assessment already made, is without jurisdiction. The reopening of the assessment is only based on a change of opinion on the materials already on record. Thus, it is clear that the respondent is not vested with the jurisdiction, under section 148 of the Act, to issue a notice or to make a reassessment, under section 147 of the said Act. Further, the respondent does not have the power to reopen the assessment, as it is not the case of the respondent that there has been a change in the method of accounting followed by the petitioner, for the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97 or for the subsequent years. 12. The learned counsel had further stated that the petitioner had been following the consisting method of accounting over a number of years and it had been accepted by the revenue. The claim on account of warranties and guarantees is a part of the method of accounting. 12. The learned counsel had further stated that the petitioner had been following the consisting method of accounting over a number of years and it had been accepted by the revenue. The claim on account of warranties and guarantees is a part of the method of accounting. Since, the respondent had already taken a decision, with regard to a similar issue, for the assessment year 1999-2000, contrary to the decision taken by the various assessing authorities, over a number of years, the petitioner apprehends that the respondent could complete the assessment disallowing the warranty and guarantee. In such an event, the petitioner would be put to irreparable loss and hardship. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner had further submitted that the present assessment proceedings are based only on a change of opinion by the assessing authority and therefore, it cannot be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the case. As such, the impugned notices issued by the respondent, in respect of the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had relied on the following decisions: 14.1. In T.S.SANTHANAM Vs. EXPENDITURE TAX OFFICER, COMPANY CIRCLE II (1), MADRAS (1973 VOL.87 I.T.R.582), this Court had held that the essential principle as to the rule of finality of an assessment is that the assessing officer cannot change the mood and to try to reopen a closed state of affairs. 14.2. In PARASHURAM POTTERY WORKS CO.LTD Vs. INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CIRCLE I, WARD A, RAJKOT (1977 VOL.106 I.T.R.1), the Supreme Court had held that, when an income tax officer relies upon his own records, for determining the amount of depreciation allowable to the assessee, and makes a mistake in doing so, the responsibility for such a mistake cannot be ascribed to an omission or failure on the part of the assessee. 14.3. In INDIAN OIL CORPORATION Vs. INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CENTRAL CIRCLE V. CALCUTTA, AND OTHERS (1986 Vol.159 I.T.R.956), the Supreme Court had held that, to confer jurisdiction, under clause (a) of Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to reopen an assessment, beyond the period of four years, but within a period of eight years from the end of the relevant year, two conditions are required to be fulfilled. The first condition is that the income tax officer must have reason to believe that the income, profits or gains, chargeable to tax, had been underassessed or escaped assessment. The second condition is that he must have reason to believe that such escapement or underassessment was occasioned by the reason of the assessee's failure to disclose, fully and truly, all material facts necessary for the assessment of that year. Both the said conditions are conditions precedent to be satisfied. There must be materials to come to the conclusion that there was omission or failure to disclose, fully and truly, all material facts necessary for the assessment of the year. 14.4. In PALA MARKETING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD., Vs. STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER (1999 VOL.236 ITR 604), the Kerala High Court had held that the material facts having been placed before the assessing officer, it was the duty of the officer concerned to draw the inference from the material facts disclosed. Section 147 is of special or extraordinary nature, as it empowers reopening of the assessment, after the period of limitation of four years and therefore, it must satisfy the test, strictly. 14.5. In GARDEN SILK MILLS PVT LTD., Vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (1999 VOL.237 I.T.R.668), the Gujarat High Court had held that the assessing authority should have reason to believe that certain income had escaped assessment. The reason must be based on materials available. A mere change of opinion would not justify the reassessment. 14.6. In FORAMER Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX AND ANOTHER (2001 VOL.247 I.T.R.436), the Allahabad High Court had held that the notice issued by the assessing authority, under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for reassessment, after a lapse of more than 7 years, especially, when there was no failure on the part of the assessee to make a return or disclose, fully and truly, all material facts, is clearly without jurisdiction. In such a case, the assessee should not be relegated to avail the alternative remedy. 14.7. In ANUP ENGINEERING LTD., Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (2001 VOL.247 I.T.R.458), the Gujarat High Court had held that the income accrues only when the assessee gets a right to receive the same. If the right to receive is not established, no income would accrue or arise in favour of the assessee. 14.8. In IPCA LABORATORIES LTD., Vs. G.MEENA, DY. In ANUP ENGINEERING LTD., Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (2001 VOL.247 I.T.R.458), the Gujarat High Court had held that the income accrues only when the assessee gets a right to receive the same. If the right to receive is not established, no income would accrue or arise in favour of the assessee. 14.8. In IPCA LABORATORIES LTD., Vs. G.MEENA, DY. C.I.T. (NO.2) (BOM.) (2001 VOL.251 I.T.R.416), the Bombay High Court had held that a reassessment cannot be based on change of opinion, when no materials were available to indicate that there was a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. 14.9. In SHREE THARAD JAIN YUVAK MANDAL Vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER (1999) 107 TAXMAN 498 (GUJ), the Gujarat High Court had held that reopening and reassessment of the assessment after a period of four years on the basis of audit objections cannot be held to be valid. 14.10. In COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND ANOTHER Vs. FORAMER FRANCE (2003 VOL.264 ITR 566), the Supreme Court had held that, when there was no failure on the part of the assessee to file the return or disclose, fully and truly, all materials facts, the notice for reassessment, issued beyond the period of seven years, is barred by limitation. The reassessment cannot be on the basis of a mere change of opinion by the assessing authority. 14.11. In JSRS UDYOG LIMITED AND ANOTHER Vs. INCOME-TAX OFFICER (2009) 313 ITR 321 (DELHI), the Delhi High Court had held that, when the assessing authority had issued a notice for reassessment, after a period of four years, without any indication of any specific information, with regard to any accommodation entry being provided by the assessee, cannot be held to be a failure to disclose material facts necessary for the assessment. 14.12. In WEL INTERTRADE P. LTD. AND ANOTHER Vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER (2009) 308 ITR 22 (DELHI), the Delhi High Court had held that a reassessment notice issued by the assessing officer, requiring the assessee to furnish the details, with regard to the loss occasioned by foreign exchange fluctuation, after a period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, cannot be held to be valid, as the precondition for invoking proviso to Section 147 had not been satisfied, when the assessee had disclosed fully and truly, all material facts necessary for assessment. 14.13. 14.13. In DULI CHAND SINGHANIA Vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (2004 VOL.269 ITR 192), the Punjab and Haryana High Court had held that a bare perusal of Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, shows that the power to assess or reassess the escaped income, for any assessment year, has been conferred upon the Assessing Officer, subject to the provisions of Sections 148 to 153 of the Act, only if he has reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. However, the proviso places a further restriction on this power, in cases where assessments, under sub-section (3) of section 143 or section 147 of the Act, have been made for the relevant assessment years. It provides that, in such cases, no action shall be taken, under Section 147, after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the escapement of income is on account of failure on the part of the assessee to make a return or to disclose, fully and truly, all materials facts necessary for his assessment. 14.14. The learned counsel for the petitioner had also relied on the unreported decision of this Court, dated 9.6.2009, Tax Case (Appeal) No.341 of 2004, wherein the Division Bench of this Court had followed the decision of the Supreme Court, dated 12.5.2009, in C.A.Nos.3506 to 3510 of 2009 etc., batch, wherein the Supreme Court had held that the provision made for warranty, in respect of the good in question would be entitled to deduction on the gross deductions, under Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and that it would depend on the data systematically maintained by the assessee. 15. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent, denying the averments and allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. 16. It has been submitted that the in return of income filed by the assesee, for the assessment year 1999-2000, the assessee had not furnished the details for the reversal of warranty provision. It is only after the assessing officer had called for the objections of the assessee against its proposal to add the provisions of warranty, as it is not an ascertained liability, the assessee had furnished the details, vide letter, dated 15.3.2002. It is only after the assessing officer had called for the objections of the assessee against its proposal to add the provisions of warranty, as it is not an ascertained liability, the assessee had furnished the details, vide letter, dated 15.3.2002. Therefore, there was a failure on the part of the petitioner in disclosing fully all the relevant facts needed for the assessment. The averments made by the assessee that the disallowance of the provisions was on the basis of a change of opinion is not correct. 17. It had also been submitted that the notices issued under section 148 of the Act, in respect of the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97, had been issued, by the assessing officer, only because there was a reason to believe that the income chargeable as tax has escaped assessment, for the said assessment years, within the meaning of Section 147 of the said Act. By virtue of the provisions of sub section 1 of Section 149 of the Act, if the income chargeable to tax, which had escaped assessment, amounts to or is likely to amount to Rs.1,00,000/-or more, a notice under section 148 can be issued before the expiry of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year. In the case of the assessee the income chargeable to tax that had escaped assessment exceeded Rs.1,00,000/-, in respect of the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97. The assessment for the assessment year 1995-96 had been made, on 27.2.1998. The assessment for the assessment year 1996-97 had been made, on 24.3.1999. For the assessment year 1995-96, a notice under section 148 had been issued, on 22.3.2002, and it had been served on the assessee, on 27.3.2002. For the assessment year 1996-97, a notice under section 148 had been issued on 22.3.2002 and it had been served on the assessee, on 27.3.2002. As such, the notices issued under section 148 of the Act, for the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97, had been issued within the time, as specified by the relevant provisions of the Act and therefore, the said notices are valid in the eye of law. 18. It had been further submitted that the existence and satisfaction of the conditions, set out under Sections 147 and 148 of the Act, are fully satisfied. 18. It had been further submitted that the existence and satisfaction of the conditions, set out under Sections 147 and 148 of the Act, are fully satisfied. The notices issued are well within the jurisdiction of the authority concerned and therefore, they are not liable to be quashed. The reopening of the assessment is not based on a change of opinion, as alleged by the petitioner, but on the basis of the satisfaction of the assessing officer that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, for the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97. The assessee has not sought the reasons for re-opening of the assessment, for the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97, from the assessing officer. Therefore, without knowing the reasons for the reopening of the assessments, the assessee has made the averment that the reopening of the assessment is only based on a change of opinion. 19. It had been further submitted that the presumption of the assessee that the reopening of the assessments, by the respondent, is sought to be made only in respect of the provisions for the warranties and guarantees is not correct. In fact, the assessee did not seek the reasons for the reopening of the assessment, by the assessing officer. Therefore, the assessee could not have known the reasons for the reopening of the assessment. The reasons recorded by the assessing officer for the reopening of the assessment, for the assessment year 1995-96, vide order sheet note, reads as follows: "(i) in the P&L A/c, Rs.1,73,21,04,956 has been credited by way of sale of goods. Projectwise details of such sales are not available on record to verify the claim of commission payments from the details of sales furnished for the FY 95-96 in the course of asst proceedings for AY 96-97 it is seen that only a sum of Rs.26,14,692 has been credited by way of sales to ACC, Kymore project. Similarly, a sum of Rs.2,51,79,161 has been credited towards sales and services in respect of M/s.Penden Cement authority, Bhutan whereas Rs.440 lakhs sales commission is debited. Therefore, there is a prima-facie case for disallowance. (ii) under Section 80 HHC, there is a excess claim of Rs.1,57,013/-. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Hence, CIT's approval is solicited under Section 151 read with section 149 for issue of notice under Section 148 for AY 95-96. Therefore, there is a prima-facie case for disallowance. (ii) under Section 80 HHC, there is a excess claim of Rs.1,57,013/-. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Hence, CIT's approval is solicited under Section 151 read with section 149 for issue of notice under Section 148 for AY 95-96. In such circumstances, the assessee is not correct in alleging that the re-opening was sought only for disallowance of the provision of warranties and guarantees." 20. The learned counsel for the respondent had submitted that the petitioner is not correct in stating that the assessing authority concerned did not have any reason for the re-opening of the assessment, in respect of the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996 97. He had relied on the decision of the supreme court, in SHIVRAM PODDAR Vs. I.T.O. (1964) 51 ITR 823, wherein it had been held as follows: "The income-tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment of tax, and for relief in respect of improper or erroneous orders made by the revenue authorities. It is for the revenue authorities to ascertain the facts applicable to a particular situation, and to grant appropriate relief in the matter of assessment of tax. Resort to the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred or recognised by the Constitution in matters relating to the assessment, levy and collection of income-tax may be permitted only when questions of infringement of fundamental rights arise or where on undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess." 21. He also relied on the decision made in GKN DRIVE SHAFTS (INDIA) LTD Vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER AND OTHERS (2003 259 ITR 19), wherein it had been held that, when a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is issued, the proper course of action for the noticee is to file a return and if he so desires, to seek reasons for the issuing of such notice. The assessing officer is bound to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order. In the instant case, as the reasons have been disclosed in these proceedings, the assessing officer has to dispose of the objections, if filed, by passing a speaking order, before proceeding with the assessment in respect of the above said five assessment years. 22. The assessing officer is bound to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order. In the instant case, as the reasons have been disclosed in these proceedings, the assessing officer has to dispose of the objections, if filed, by passing a speaking order, before proceeding with the assessment in respect of the above said five assessment years. 22. The learned counsel for the respondent had also relied on the decision of this Court made in its order, dated 17.9.2010, made in W.P.No.28457 of 2008 and W.P.No.19260 of 2009, wherein it has been held as follows: "The proceedings initiated for re-assessment cannot be quashed at the threshold. It is open to the petitioner to produce records and satisfy the authority that there is no necessity for re-assessment and there was no suppression or non-disclosure of true and full accounts while submitting the returns for the original assessment and it is for the authority to consider all aspects and pass final orders. If any final order is passed after placing all the records and if that order is adverse to the petitioner, it is always open to the petitioner to file appeal before the appellate authority as well as before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and thereafter, approach this Court. Thus, there are remedies available to the petitioner and the writ petition filed challenging the notice and overruling of objection for reassessment cannot be entertained in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court RAJ KUMAR SHIVHARE Vs. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT ( 2010 4 SCC 772 : 2010 (4) LW 1)." 23. It had also been submitted that the said decision has also been confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court, in a writ appeal filed against the said order. 24. In view of the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent, and in view of the submissions made on behalf of the parties concerned, and on considering the decisions cited supra, this court is of the considered view that the impugned notices issued by the respondent, under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cannot be quashed, at this stage, based on the grounds raised by the petitioner in the above writ petitions. From the available records, it is noted that the assessing authority, the respondent herein, had issued the impugned notices on the ground that there were reasons to believe that certain income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment, for the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97, within the meaning of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It is for the petitioner to raise its objections, if any, in respect of the impugned notices issued by the respondent. Even though the petitioner has claimed that it has been following certain established methods of accounting, for many years, and that the assessing authorities concerned had accepted the same, it is for the assessee to substantiate its claim by furnishing the relevant records before the respondent, pursuant to the impugned notices issued, under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 25. It is a well settled position in law that, when an efficacious alternative remedy is available under a statute, this Court would not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction, under article 226 of the constitution of India, to interfere with the proceedings initiated by the authorities concerned. 26. It is also clear from the decisions of the Apex Court, relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent, that this Court would exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction, conferred by Article 226 of the constitution of India, in matters relating to assessment, levy and collection of income tax only when the question of infringement of fundamental rights arise or where undisputed facts exist, showing that the taxing authorities had assumed jurisdiction, which they clearly do not possess. However, such a situation has not arisen for the consideration of this Court, in the present writ petition. Hence, the writ petitions stand dismissed. No costs. However, it is made clear that it would be open to the petitioner in the above writ petitions to raise its objections, in respect of the impugned notices issued by the respondent, raising all the relevant grounds available to it, including the grounds raised in the present writ petitions, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On receipt of such objections, the respondent shall consider the same and pass appropriate orders thereon, on merits and in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, within a period of eight weeks thereafter. On receipt of such objections, the respondent shall consider the same and pass appropriate orders thereon, on merits and in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, within a period of eight weeks thereafter. Accordingly, the writ petitions are disposed of with the above directions.