U. B. Saha, J.:— Money Suit being M.S. No. 11 of 2006 was instituted in the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Div. Court No.1, Agartala, West Tripura by the respondent-plaintiff-decree holder against the petitioner-defendant-judgment debtor, for realization of an amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- only with interest. The said suit was contested by the petitioner by way of filing written statement. After careful consideration of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Div. framed issues and ultimately decreed the suit stating, inter alia, that the entitlement of the plaintiff for realization of the sum of Rs. 2,20,000/- is hereby declared and he shall realize the sum of Rs. 2,20,000/- from the defendant accordingly, i.e. the defendant shall pay Rs. 2,20,000/- to the plaintiff and the defendant shall also pay the interest on the aforesaid amount @ 6% p.a from the date of filing of the suit till the date of his making payment and also awarded a cost of Rs. 8,691.25 paise. 2. After passing of decree by the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Div. in the aforesaid suit the respondent has filed an Execution Case by way of filing a petition under Order XXI Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as "the Code" for short) and the same was registered as EX(M)2010 of 2009. Upon receipt of notice from the Execution Court the petitioner filed an application raising his objection under Section 47 of the Code, which was registered as Misc. Case 43 of 2010, wherein he raised the question of maintainability of the execution proceedings, i.e. the petition under Order XXI Rule 11 on the ground that the petition is incomplete and the same is not filed as per Appendix-E of the Code. In his application under Section 47, the judgment debtor also stated that the petition under Order XXI Rule 11 is not in consistence with the decree and most wrongly the amount of cost has been shown as Rs. 2,20,000/- with interest @ 6% per annum and for which the judgment debtor has failed to understand the difference between the decreetal amount and the cost of the suit. 2,20,000/- with interest @ 6% per annum and for which the judgment debtor has failed to understand the difference between the decreetal amount and the cost of the suit. In the said objection under Section 47, he has also taken another ground that column No. 10 of the petition under Order XXI Rule 11, the respondent- decree holder failed to mention the particulars of the movable properties or the mode of attachment of the movable properties while arguing for civil imprisonment of the judgment debtor. 3. The aforesaid application under Section 47 i.e. Misc. Case No. 43/2010 was taken up by the Execution Court for hearing on 27.02.2012 and on completion of hearing, the said application of the petitioner-judgment debtor was rejected and consequent thereto, proceeded with the execution case. 4. Being aggrieved by the order dated 27.02.2012 in Misc. Case No. 43 of 2010 the petitioner-defendant-judgment debtor preferred the instant petition under Article 227 of the constitution of India for setting aside the order impugned. 5. Heard Mr. B. Banerjee, learned counsel along with Ms. R. Majumdar, learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant-judgment debtor and Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned counsel along with Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff-decree holder. 6. This Court after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant-judgment debtor issued notice upon the respondent-plaintiff-decree holder and while issuing notice also stayed the further proceedings of the aforesaid Execution Case and called for the Lower Court Records. 7. Mr. Banerjee while urging for the relief sought for in the instant revision petition would contend that the Execution Court committed wrong while passing the impugned order rejecting the application of the petitioner-defendant-judgment debtor under Section 47 as he did not consider Order XXI Rule 11 and Order XXI Rule 11A of the Code in its proper perspective. More so, the Execution Court also did not consider that the application for execution of the decree, as filed by the respondent-plaintiff-decree holder under Order XXI Rule 11, was a defective one as no particulars required under Rule 11 to Rule 14 of Order XXI were mentioned. 8. He also urges that when the procedure prescribed is not followed by the defendant-decree holder and a defective application is filed then the Execution Court has no right to proceed with the said application for execution of the decree. 8. He also urges that when the procedure prescribed is not followed by the defendant-decree holder and a defective application is filed then the Execution Court has no right to proceed with the said application for execution of the decree. He further urges that in the instant case the respondent-decree holder was also provided an opportunity by the Execution Court under Order XXI Rule 17 for amending his application under Order XXI Rule 11 and the respondent-decree holder, though amended the petition again committed wrong, particularly in column 8 and column 10 of the said application under Order XXI Rule 11. Thus, the impugned order of the learned Executing Court is liable to be set aside. He finally contended that the Executing Court itself stated in its order that there is some minor error in the original application filed by the decree holder on 01.08.2009 even after detection of error the Court stated that those errors are not fatal and for which the petition under Section 47 of the Code was rejected is totally non-application of mind of the Court's below. In support of his contention that on the basis of defective Execution Application, an execution proceeding cannot be proceeded as the same is non-est, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex court in Smt. Jiwani Vs. Rajmata Basantika Devi & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1286 . He also placed reliance on a decision of the High Court of Raj asthan in Mukh Ram & Anr. Vs. Hardeepsingh, AIR 1987 Rajasthan 1, particularly paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said judgment. 9. Mr. Roy Barman while countering the contention of Mr. Banerjee submits that the instant petition is not maintainable as the petitioner did not raise any question of jurisdiction of the Execution Court which passed the impugned order and also failed to mention that the Executing Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and/or jurisdiction though available is being exercised in such a manner which tentamounts to over stepping the limits of jurisdiction. More so, the power of the High Court under Article 227 is though very wide but the same cannot be applied in a case where a statutory appeal is prescribed and in the instant case against an order passed by the Executing Court on an application under Order XXI Rule 11 an appeal lies under Order 43 of the Code. More so, the power of the High Court under Article 227 is though very wide but the same cannot be applied in a case where a statutory appeal is prescribed and in the instant case against an order passed by the Executing Court on an application under Order XXI Rule 11 an appeal lies under Order 43 of the Code. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai & Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 675 , particularly paragraphs 24 and 38 of the said report wherein the Apex Court discussed regarding the difference between a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. For better appreciation the paragraphs 24 and 38 are reproduced hereinunder:- "24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. Vs. Smt. Radhikabai and Anr, (1986) Supp. SCC 401. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary Court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the Court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. 38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder:- (1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01.07.2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisoryjurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self- evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. (6) A patent error is an error which is self- evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate Court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act,, order or proceedings of the subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act,, order or proceedings of the subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate Court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 10. He again submits that the procedural law is enacted not to defeat justice but to render substantial justice and more so, Order XXI Rule 11 to Rule 17 are not mandatory, rather directory and in support ofhis aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Vs. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353 wherein the Apex Court discussed regarding the use of the word, "shall" in Order XVIII Rule 1 and held that, mere using the word "shall" itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. To ascertain whether the word "shall" is mandatory or directory the object of the particular Order of the Code is to be seen. He further contended that the procedural law is not a penal enactment for punishing either of the parties in a lis, rather the same is for avoiding injustice and in the instant case, in Rule 17 of Order XXI, the word "shall" has given a discretionary power to the Court for ascertaining whether the requirements of Rule 11 to 14 can be applicable in every case and whether the same can also be complied with. He also contended that in each and every case Appendix E of the Code is not applicable. The same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case and the subject matter of the dispute involved in a suit. In support of his contention that the procedural law is not a penal enactment for punishment, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in Sangram Singh Vs. The same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case and the subject matter of the dispute involved in a suit. In support of his contention that the procedural law is not a penal enactment for punishment, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal Kotah & Anr., AIR 1955 SC 425 wherein the Apex Court noted, "Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is 'procedure' something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties: not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to 'both' sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it." ______________