Satyendra Singh Chauhan, J.— This second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Munsif First, Raebareli dated 22.3.1978 and the judgment and decree dated 13.3.1981 passed by the Civil Judge, Raebareli, dismissing the appeal. 2. The facts giving rise to the present dispute are that a suit was filed for possession Claiming therein that the disputed land belongs to the plaintiff and the defendant has no right or title over the land in dispute. In the suit, the case of the respondent-plaintiff was that his father Sri Beni Madhav purchased a house alongwith its sahan darwaza and easementary rights from one Raj Bahadur and Tuinya Lal for a sum of Rs.700/- by means of registered sale deed dated 3.6.1958. It was alleged in the suit I that the disputed land was part and parcel of the house and sahan purchased by the said Beni Madhav on the basis of boundaries mentioned in the sale deed.The plaintiff further alleged that about 7-8 years prior to institution of suit, the appellant-defendant forcibly raised certain constructions against the consent of Beni Madhav prede-cessor-in-interest of the respondent-plaintiff, shown by letters PGFO and when the respondent-plaintiff in the year 1975 constructed a wall, the appellant-defendant dugout a foundation GAMF over the land belonging to respondent-plaintiff and despite the repeated request and persuasions of the respondent-plaintiff, the appellant did not remove the same. Hence, the necessity arose for filing suit for removal of constructions and also for permanent injunction.The' suit was contested by the appellant by filing his written statement and denying the allegations made in the plaintiff. The defendant also pleaded that he had obtained the disputed land from one Gaya Prasad, Ex-Zamindar and constructed a kothri over the suit land about 28-30 years back. He also pleaded that, plaintiff was stopped from removing the disputed constructions on the basis of estoppel and acquiescence. 3. The parties were permitted to lead their evidence and the trial Court after appreciating the evidence came to the conclusion that the disputed constructions were liable to be removed and directed the defendant to remove the constructions and handover the possession to the plaintiff and he was permanently restrained from interfering in the said disputed land. 4. 3. The parties were permitted to lead their evidence and the trial Court after appreciating the evidence came to the conclusion that the disputed constructions were liable to be removed and directed the defendant to remove the constructions and handover the possession to the plaintiff and he was permanently restrained from interfering in the said disputed land. 4. The appellant feeling aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree, filed an appeal before the learned Civil Judge, Raebareli, who after hearing the parties, found that the defendant has not been able to prove his case on the basis of title set up by him in pursuance of receipt executed by the Ex-Zamindar. The appellate Court also found that there was no illegality in the judgment passed by the trial Court and after appreciating the evidence of the parties, it came to the conclusion that the defendant has not been able to prove his case, which was setup by him on the basis of patta given to him by the Ex-Zamindar. The plea of estoppel was also decided by the appellate Court in the negative on the ground that defendant was required to prove some act or omission or intention of the respondent-plaintiff in causing or permitting the appellant-defendant to raise the disputed constructions. The respondent-plaintiff though admitted in the plaintiff that constructions have been raised over the disputed land 7-8 years prior to institution of suit forcibly as against the consent of his father, but the appellate Court travelled to the area from where in cross-examination it was stated that no notice was given by the respondent-plaintiff or his father and the appellant-defendant could have matured his title on the basis of adverse possession, and on finding that the adverse possession was not of 12 years the title could be proved, dismissed the appeal. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the question of limitation would not be attracted to perfect the title by adverse possession. The constructions were raised without the consent of the owner and the owner failed to stop the appellant, who was carrying out constructions, which were completed as against his wishes and existed for certain period. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the question of limitation would not be attracted to perfect the title by adverse possession. The constructions were raised without the consent of the owner and the owner failed to stop the appellant, who was carrying out constructions, which were completed as against his wishes and existed for certain period. He further submits that in these circumstances, the question of adverse possession would not be attracted, but the plea of estoppel by acquiescence has to be considered in the light of the law Laid down by the apex Court as well as by different High Courts. 6. In support of his submission regarding plea of estoppel by acquiescence, learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant has placed reliance upon the following cases: "Rafiq Hussain and another Vs. Bhaya Bishnath Prasad and others, AIR 1925 Oudh258; Jhanda Singh and another Vs. Harnam Singh and others, AIR 1926 Lahore 415; Mool Raj and others Vs. Janeshwar Lal, AIR 1939 Lahore 502; Jagan Nath Vs. KachhuLal, AIR 1971 Rajasthan 112; Secretary of State Vs. Itwari, AIR 1937 Allahabad 512; R.S. Muthuswami Gounder Vs. A. AnnatnaLal, AIR 1981 Madras 220; and S. Palanivelu Vs. K. Veradammal, AIR 1977 Madras 342" In the case of Rafiq Hussain (supra), the Court held as under: "if a stranger builds upon the land of A, supposing it to be his own, and A remains willfully passive, equity will not allow him to profit by the mistake. A. AnnatnaLal, AIR 1981 Madras 220; and S. Palanivelu Vs. K. Veradammal, AIR 1977 Madras 342" In the case of Rafiq Hussain (supra), the Court held as under: "if a stranger builds upon the land of A, supposing it to be his own, and A remains willfully passive, equity will not allow him to profit by the mistake. If a person having a right and seeing another person about to commit, or in the course of committing an act infringing upon that right, stands by in such a manner as really to induce the person who commits the act and who might otherwise have abstained from it, to believe that he assents to its being committed, he cannot afterwards be heard to complain of the act." In the case of Jhanda Singh (supra), the Court has made the following observation: "Where the owner of a property sold in execution as the property of the judgment-debtor, stands by and allows the purchaser to buy it, he cannot question the sale and Claim the property as his own." In the case of Mool Raj (supra), the Court observed as under: "In view of the plaintiffs' allegation that a notice had been given to the defendants in connexion with the encroachment, it seems clear that they were aware of the encroachment. An agreement had been executed between the parties as regards the manner in which the building of the defendants was to be re-constructed. The agents of the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs were admittedly in Simla during the period the building was re-erected. The plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest (Madho Pershad) also seems to have given permission for putting down pipes after the erection of the building without raising any objection. The failure of the plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to raise any objection to the encroachment in the circumstances was, in my opinion, rightly held to result in estoppel in the circumstances of this case." In the case of Jagan Nath (supra), in Para-8, the Court observed as under: "8. The failure of the plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to raise any objection to the encroachment in the circumstances was, in my opinion, rightly held to result in estoppel in the circumstances of this case." In the case of Jagan Nath (supra), in Para-8, the Court observed as under: "8. The learned District Judge has also non-suited the plaintiff on the ground that the impugned construction by the defendant was made as far back as in the year 1954 A.D., whereas the present suit for demolition of the same was brought in the year 1960 A.D.Thus, the petitioner, according to the learned District Judge, was guilty of laches and by his acquiescence he disentitled himself to get the relief for mandatory injunction. I concur in this finding of the learned District Judge also and do not see any reason to take a different view." In the case of Secretary of State (supra), it has been held as under: "......Where such houses are of a permanent nature and not mere temporary huts, the natural presumption would be that the Secretary of State allowed the erection of those houses on the understanding that the reason who erected the houses would remain in possession as long as the houses stood." In the case of R.S. Muthuswami Gounder (supra), the Court observed as under: "20............the plaintiff who resides about a mile away from the suit property, would have come to know about the defendant putting up construction on a major portion of the suit property if he had cared to find out and since he has not done so and kept quiet until the first defendant had completed his construction which have been valued by the Commissioner at Rs.15000 and had sent the notice only about 7 or 8 months later after January, 1972, asserting his right to the suit property, I am of the opinion that the principles of acquiescence has to be made applicable to the facts of the present case and that the plaintiff has to be given only a decree for compensation in respect of the property." In the case of S. Palanivelu (supra), in Para-14, the Court held as under: "In the present case also, as already stated, the respondent has not done anything when the appellant was putting up a portion of his main building on a portion of the trespassed property and sinking a major portion of the well and doing other acts on the trespassed property. The appellant could not have done these things in a hurry. They must have taken several months for the appellant to complete the things which he had done on the property. The respondent had not disclosed these things in the plaintiff and has not prayed for a mandatory injunction for the removal of the structures put up by the appellant on the trespassed portion of the suit property. The Court would therefore be justified in infering acquiescence on the part of the respondent; I consider that this is not a case for directing delivery of possession of the trespassed portion to the respondent. The Court would therefore be justified in infering acquiescence on the part of the respondent; I consider that this is not a case for directing delivery of possession of the trespassed portion to the respondent. But this is a case where the respondent has to be compensated in money for the value of the trespassed portion." 7. Counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that burden of proof to prove the title is on the plaintiff, relies upon the following cases: "Jagdish Narain Vs. Nawab Said Ahmed Khan, AIR (33) 1946 Privy Council 59; Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another Vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulosc Athanasius and others, AIR 1954 SC 526 ; Brahma Hand Pun Vs. Nelci Puri, since deceased represented by Mathra Puriandanother, AIR 1965 SC 1506 ; Tatoba Ganu Vs. Tarabai and others, AIR 1957 Bombay 280; (Smt.) Savitri and others Vs. Surendra Mohan Mohana, 1987 LCD 137; Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar and others Vs. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund and others, 2008 (26) LCD 225:2008 (1) ARC 289; Mt. Gulab Devi Vs. Monji Ram and another, AIR 1919 Lahore 156; Jogesh Chandra Roy Vs. Emdad Meah, AIR 1932 Privy Council 28; and Yamuna Nagar Improvement Trust Vs. Darshan Lal, AIR 2005 SC 2245 " In the case of Jagdish Narain (supra), the Court observed as under: "The plaintiffs were suing in ejectment, and they could only succeed on the strength of their own title. There was no obligation upon the defendants to plead possible defects in the plaintiffs' title which might manifest themselves when the title was disclosed. It was sufficient that in the written statements the defendants denied the plaintiffs' title, and under this plea they could avail themselves of any defect which such title disclosed." In the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos (supra), following observation has been made by the Court: "The plaintiff in ejectment suit must succeed on the strength of his own title. This can be done by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus that is on him irrespective of whether the defendant has proved his case or not. This can be done by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus that is on him irrespective of whether the defendant has proved his case or not. A mere destruction of the defendant's title, in the absence of establishment of his own title carries the plaintiff nowhere." In the case of Brahma Hand Puri (supra), the Court observed as under: "8........The plaintiff's suit being one for ejectment he has to succeed or fail or the title he established and if he cannot succeed on the strength of his title ] his suit must fail notwithstanding that the defendant in possession has not title to the property........" In the case of Tatoba Ganu (supra), following observation has been made: "(11) In view of these authorities, one of which is the authority of the highest Court, we have no doubt that the deed of gift in this case is invalid and does not confer any title upon the plaintiff. The suit is one in ejectment. It is for the plaintiff to prove his title and the Court is not concerned with the weakness of the title of the defendant. The defendant may be a trespasser, but as a defendant in possession, he is entitled to ask the plaintiff to prove strictly his title. As the plaintiff has no title, the plaintiff's suit must fail." 'In the case of (Smt.) Savitri (supra), the Court held as under: "4.........It will thus be seen that in the instant case the plaintiff has failed to establish his title and the defendant having denied the title of the plaintiff it was incumbent on the plaintiff to establish his title and for that it was necessary for the plaintiff to disclose the right and title of the Society from which the plaintiff Claimed to have derived his title." In the case of Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar (supra), the Court held as under: "12. It was for the plaintiffs to prove that the land in suit formed part of CIS Nos. 4823/A-17 and 48237A-18. It was not for the defendants to do so. It was therefore, not necessary for them to file an application for appointment of a Commissioner nor was it necessary for them to adduce any independent evidence to establish that the report of the Advocate-Commissioner was not correct. The suit could not have been, therefore, decreed, inter alia on the basis of Ex.P-35 alone. It was therefore, not necessary for them to file an application for appointment of a Commissioner nor was it necessary for them to adduce any independent evidence to establish that the report of the Advocate-Commissioner was not correct. The suit could not have been, therefore, decreed, inter alia on the basis of Ex.P-35 alone. In a case of this nature, even Section 83 of the Indian Evidence Act would not have any application." In the case of ML Gulab Dew'(supra), the following observation has been made by the Court: "A person who sets up a title to property by purchase must prove that his vendor had a title in the property sold." In the case of Jogesh Chandra Roy (supra), the Court held as under: " It is clear that the finding in the concluding sentence is based on the failure of the present respondent to discharge the onus of proof which the District Judge held to be incumbent on him, and is not a finding on positive evidence. Their Lordships are unable to agree that the onus was on the tenant ii the present case. In their opinion, where there is no dispute as to the identity of the subjects let, but the tenant denies that he has ever got possession of the subjects, it is for the landlord to prove that he has discharged his obligation to put the tenant in possession before he can enforce the tenant's obligation to pay rent." In the case of Yamuna Nagar Improvement Trust (supra), Their Lordships of the apex Court in Para-26, observed as under: "26.........In our opinion, when the plaintiff had approached the Court for permanent injunction Claiming to be owner of the property, it was his duty to prove that he was the owner of the property, the said property remained in his possession and that the defendant had no right, title or interest therein. Since the plaintiff failed to prove his case the suit was liable to be dismissed. We are also satisfied that from the award, it is clear that the plaintiff had knowledge of all the proceedings......." 8. Learned Counsel for the opposite party has also placed reliance upon a judgment of the apex Court reported in AIR 2007 SC 2191 : 2007 (2) ARC 568, M/s. Kamakshi Builders Vs. We are also satisfied that from the award, it is clear that the plaintiff had knowledge of all the proceedings......." 8. Learned Counsel for the opposite party has also placed reliance upon a judgment of the apex Court reported in AIR 2007 SC 2191 : 2007 (2) ARC 568, M/s. Kamakshi Builders Vs. M/s. Ambedkar Educational Society and others, which does not fit in the facts of the present case. In fact the Claim in the said case was based on oral gift, and the oral gift was not proved, and delivery of possession was also not proved. Therefore, in those very special facts, it was held that constructions of large number of structure without objection by the owner could not confer any title, and in the said case, certain constructions were raised being a tenant of that property. The status of tenant would be altogether different where the right of ownership cannot be Claimed through estoppel by acquiescence, but in the present case, there is no relationship between the appellant-defendant and the respondent-plaintiff and the constructions were made in the full knowledge of the plaintiff and were allowed to stand even after completion of constructions. 9. Reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent upon the case of Mohan Lal (deceased) through his Lrs Kachru and others Vs. Mirza Abdul Gaffar and another, (1996) 1 SCC 639 , is not applicable in the present case on account of the fact that it was a case of specific performance and adverse possession was pleaded but the same was denied on account of the aforesaid fact that alternative delivery for retention of possession by operation of Section 53-A was also made and since the plea raised was inconsistent, the same was not allowed. Similarly in the case of L.N. Aswathama and another Vs. P. Prakash (2009) 13 SCC 229 :2010(1) ARC 371, it was held that if the right is being Claimed by prescription i.e. by adverse possession, then the burden is heavy upon the person Claiming title to be long and continuous and possession by itself would not amount to adverse possession, if it was either permissive possession or possession without animus possidendi. In the said case, it was held that in order to establish the Claim of title by prescription, possession of the Claimant must be physical/actual, exclusive, open, uninterrupted, notorious and hostile to the true owner for a period exceeding twelve years. But in the present case, the defendant has not Claimed title on the basis of adverse possession, but in fact his Claim is based on the plea of acquiescence, which has already been discussed herein above. Therefore, the argument of learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff that the possession must be of 12 years cannot be accepted. 10. The evidence on record goes to indicate that plaintiff himself has admitted in his suit that the disputed constructions were raised 7-8 years prior to institution of suit. The suit was instituted after the death of father of the plaintiff, who remained mute spectator for the entire period when constructions were raised and existed and no objection was raised at any point of time. The plaintiff at a later point of time after expiry of 7-8 years, after the death of his father, instituted the suit. The evidence in the present case goes to indicate that on the own admission of the plaintiff, the disputed constructions existed and were allowed to be completed. 11. If the present dispute is taken in the light of the law propounded by various courts in regard to estoppel by acquiescence, then it is clear that the plaintiff did not stop the constructions raised by the defendant and as such, he was not entitled to remove the same, as the defendant has perfected his right to the aforesaid extent. 12. Considering the reasoning given herein above, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by both the courts below are set aside and the suit is dismissed. Appeal allowed. _