JUDGMENT MANJULACHELLUR, A.G. C.J. 1. The petitioners herein, aggrieved by the order in O.A. No.191/2006 dated 15-10-2007, are before us, challenging the reasoning given by the Tribunal while interpreting Rule 29 of CCS(CCA) Rules, also FR 54 as well as the consequences while quashing Annexures-A7 and A11. The respondent herein, while working as a Sorting Assistant in the Railway Mail Service('RMS' for short), was residing at P & T Taluk Quarters at Thevara, adjacent to the quarters of Deputy Superintendent of Railway Mail Service. A strike was held in the Postal Department during October 1996, wherein large number of employees participated in the strike. According to the respondent, he did not participate in the strike as a duty bound employee but, however, on 28-10-1996, at about 9.15 PM, when he met the Deputy Superintendent of RMS, Ernakulam, to express his desire and intention to work during the strike, the alleged incident in question seems to have occurred. According to the respondent, the Director of Postal Service was under a wrong impression that he trespassed into her quarters at that time. Therefore, a complaint came to be lodged on 29-10-1996 followed by another complaint by K.G.Muraleedharan, Deputy Director of Marine Products Exports Development Authority, Kochi, alleging that the respondent was using filthy language, shouted at him on 06-11-1996 at the RMS, Ernakulam, when Mr.Muraleedharan was visiting his friend P.A.Thomas. It is not in dispute that after issuance of charge sheet, departmental enquiry was conducted, ultimately opining the respondent was guilty of both the charges, compulsory retirement was the punishment imposed which was upheld by the first appellate authority at the initial stage. A revision was also filed but held against the respondent. This prompted respondent to approach the Tribunal in O.A.No.43/2002 which came to be decided on 29-07-2003 opining that appellate authority, being a junior officer to the complainant, ought not to have decided the appeal of the respondent. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the stage of appeal, directing rehearing of the matter afresh on merits. Subsequently, appellate authority, after rehearing the matter, exonerated the respondent on both the charges with a direction to reinstate him with full pay and allowances for the period between the compulsory retirement and the reinstatement. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the stage of appeal, directing rehearing of the matter afresh on merits. Subsequently, appellate authority, after rehearing the matter, exonerated the respondent on both the charges with a direction to reinstate him with full pay and allowances for the period between the compulsory retirement and the reinstatement. Nothing seems to have happened immediately after this order in 2003 and as a matter of fact, he was reinstated on 08-12-2003 and all benefits as directed by the appellate authority also came to be paid to the respondent. 2. After a lapse of 14 months of the appellate order, a notice under Section 29 of the above Rules came to be issued to the respondent proposing to revise the appellate authority's order exonerating the respondent. Subsequently, on 26-06-2005, AnnexureA7 order by revisional authority came to be passed, revising the order of appellate authority and imposing a penalty of reduction of pay by three stages for a period of two years with further direction that the respondent will not earn increment during the period of reduction in pay. This was followed by another order dated 26-09-2005 alleged to be under FR 54 by the revisional authority reducing the pay and allowances which were already received by the respondent between the period from the date of compulsory retirement till reinstatement. 3. Aggrieved by these two orders, as the respondent/applicant had to pay total amount which is equal to 18 months' salary, he approached the Tribunal contending that in view of his retirement on 31-07-2007 and with the nature of punishment imposed in the two orders at Annexures A7 and A11, virtually he would not earn any increment during the subsistence of his service and he will also loose the benefit of DCRG after retirement on 31-07-2007. The grounds of challenge in the application so far as Annexures-A7 and A11 are concerned mainly on the question of time limit within which the revisional authority could have exercised its suo motu powers in revising the appellate order. According to the respondent, in the absence of any indication of period and Rule 29(1) (vi) of the above Rules, even the words used 'at any time' and Rule 29 would not assist the authorities to initiate revisional proceedings after a lapse of 14 months from the date of the appellate order. According to the respondent, in the absence of any indication of period and Rule 29(1) (vi) of the above Rules, even the words used 'at any time' and Rule 29 would not assist the authorities to initiate revisional proceedings after a lapse of 14 months from the date of the appellate order. It was also contended, only with malafide intention with the sole purpose of victimising the respondent, such course of action was adopted. Therefore, he sought for quashing of Annexures-A7 and A11. So far as Annexure-A11 is concerned, respondent contended that powers and FR 54 were also not exercised within a period of six months as contemplated under the procedure. Therefore, Annexure-A11 also was bad in law. He also brought on record certain facts indicating that his compulsory retirement was not in accordance with the procedure and the disciplinary authority was not justified in imposing such punishment. Therefore, the appellate authority, on facts, rightly found that no such incident took place as alleged in the two charges by the Department. His main grievance is that the disciplinary authority totally ignored the evidence placed on record and intentionally imposed the punishment as stated above. Of course, there was serious resistance of these allegations against the Department by the petitioners herein, denying all the facts submitted by the respondent especially with regard to the participation in strike. According to the petitioners, the respondent participated in the strike. So far as the participation in strike, according to the petitioners, respondent stayed away from duty during the relevant period of strike by availing leave with false medical certificates. They also contended that if there was genuineness of the intention of the respondent to participate in the strike, he ought to have informed the superior officer much earlier and not by knocking at the doors of the complainant at an odd hour. 4. Ultimately, after considering entire material, Tribunal opined that there was no exercise of revisional power within a reasonable time and, therefore, there was no justification in issuing Annexure-A7 followed by Annexure-A11. A detailed discussion from paragraph 13 onwards is made by the Tribunal to conclude that application deserves to be allowed. Aggrieved by this, the present petition is filed. 5. Ultimately, after considering entire material, Tribunal opined that there was no exercise of revisional power within a reasonable time and, therefore, there was no justification in issuing Annexure-A7 followed by Annexure-A11. A detailed discussion from paragraph 13 onwards is made by the Tribunal to conclude that application deserves to be allowed. Aggrieved by this, the present petition is filed. 5. The learned counsel Mr.S.Krishnamoorthy, arguing for the petitioner, took us through Rule 29 to contend that the words used at the end of sub-rule (vi) 'may at any time' would mean that there is no time limit as such prescribed for exercising revisional powers. Therefore, irrespective of reinstatement of the respondent on 08-12-2003, if the revisional authority independently, during an inspection in the normal course of duties, comes across a case where revisional powers have to be exercised, question of filing a revision within a particular period would not arise and he relies upon a decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh reported in Mahadco Prasad Gautam Vs. Regional Manager Food Corporation of India and others [1986 (1) SLR 306]. Rule 29 is as under:- "29. Regional Manager Food Corporation of India and others [1986 (1) SLR 306]. Rule 29 is as under:- "29. Revision (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules- (i) the President; or (ii) the Comptroller and Auditor-General, in the case of a Government servant serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department; or (iii) the Member (Personnel) Postal Services Board in the case of a Government servant serving in or under the Postal Services Board and [Adviser (Human Resources Development), Department of Telecommunications] in the case of a Government servant serving in or under the Telecommunications Board]; or (iv) the Head of a Department directly under the Central Government, in the case of a Government servant serving in a department or office (not being the Secretariat or the Posts and Telegraphs Board), under the control of such Head of a Department; or (v) the Appellate Authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be revised]; or (vi) any other authority specified in this behalf by the President by a general or special order, and within such time as may be prescribed in such general or special order; may at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and revise any order made under these rules or under the rules repealed by Rule 34 from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred or from which no appeal is allowed, after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary, and may- (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or (b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed; or (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order to or any other authority directing such authority to make such further enquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or (d) pass such other orders as it may deed fit. Provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any revising authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed and where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be revised to any of the penalties specified in those clauses, and if an inquiry under Rule 14 has not already been held in the case, no such penalty shall be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in Rule 14 subject to the provisions of Rule 19, and except after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary. Provided further that no power of revision shall be exercised by the Comptroller and Audit-General, Member (Personnel), Postal Services Board, Adviser (Human Resources Department), Department of Telecommunications or the Head of Department, as the case may be, unless- (i) the authority which made the order in appeal, or (ii) the authority to which an appeal would lie, where no appeal has been preferred, is subordinate to him. (2) No proceedings for revision shall be commenced until after- (i) the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal, or (ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has been preferred. (3) An application for revision shall be dealt with in the same manner as if it were an appeal under these rules." 6. Sub-rule (vi) is relevant apart from the main Rule so far as the controversy before us. So far as the revisional powers of the authority, who exercise the power i.e., competency of the authority, initially the respondent challenged the same before the Tribunal, however, Tribunal held the revisional authority has competency to issue notice to revise the order of appellate authority and this is not challenged before us. This is not the subject matter challenged before us. Therefore, we need not ponder over the said issue further. Then, coming to the limitation of period within which revision could have been initiated, sub-rule (vi) indicates that any authority specified by the President, in order to exercise powers under Rule 29, either by special or general order, may also prescribe within what time such action has to be taken. Therefore, we need not ponder over the said issue further. Then, coming to the limitation of period within which revision could have been initiated, sub-rule (vi) indicates that any authority specified by the President, in order to exercise powers under Rule 29, either by special or general order, may also prescribe within what time such action has to be taken. Apparently, though there is an order directing launching revisional proceedings, no time limit is prescribed. In the absence of prescribing any time limit, with the assistance of words 'may at any time', whether the Department could choose to prefer suo motu revision at any point of time subsequent to the appellate order before the retirement of the respondent, is the question before us. 7. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners [1986 (1) SLR 306] is with reference to Food Corporation of India Staff Regulations where a similar provision like sub-rule (vi) of Rule 29 was available. Paragraph 10 of the said judgment indicates, when no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of the power, the same must be exercised within a reasonable time, which is a question of fact in each case depending on the facts of that case. Otherwise, it may lead to arbitrary exercise of power in favour of the authority. 8. The learned counsel representing the respondent relies upon (1997) 6 SCC 71, the case of Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin Vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim, where their Lordships pertaining to a tenancy and land laws of Bombayheld when no time limit prescribed for exercise of power under a statute, it should be exercised within a reasonable time. At paragraph 2 of the judgment, the facts would reveal that the transfer of land took place as early as in the year 1972 but, suo motu enquiry commenced by the Mamlatdar was in September 1973. 9. According to the Apex court, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the said case, the exercise of power by Mamlatdar was not within a reasonable time. Therefore, they interfered with the action of the Mamlatdar. he second citation relied upon by the learned counsel for he respondent is 1969 (2) SCC 187 in the case of State of ujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and others. Therefore, they interfered with the action of the Mamlatdar. he second citation relied upon by the learned counsel for he respondent is 1969 (2) SCC 187 in the case of State of ujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and others. This was a case where the Lordships held power exercised by the uthority under Section 65 of the Act concerned beyond a period of one year as not reasonable. Paragraph 12 is the relevant paragraph which indicates under what circumstances such opinion was expressed, which reads as under:- "12. It seems to us that Section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under Section 211. Under Section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the Legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on October 12, 1961, i.e., more than a year after the order and it seems to us that this order was passed too late." 10. The last decision relied upon is S.S.Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1989) 4 SCC 582. Paragraph 17 is the relevant paragraph which deals with an issue similar to the controversy on hand, wherein the Lordships said that ordinarily a period of three to six months should be the outer limit. This is required to discipline the system and keep the public servant away from a protracted period of litigation. It is relevant to reproduce paragraph 17, which reads as under:- "17. This is required to discipline the system and keep the public servant away from a protracted period of litigation. It is relevant to reproduce paragraph 17, which reads as under:- "17. In this background if the original order of punishment is taken as the date when cause of action first accrues for purposes of Article 58 of the Limitation Act, great hardship is bound to result. On one side, the claim would not be maintainable if laid before exhaustion of the remedies; on the other, if the departmental remedy though availed is not finalised within the period of limitation, the cause of action would no more be justiciable having become barred by limitation. Redressal of grievances in the hands of the departmental authorities take an unduly long time. That is so on account of the fact that no attention is ordinarily bestowed over these matters and they are not considered to be governmental business of substance. This approach has to be deprecated and authorities on whom power is vested to dispose of appeals and revisions under the Service Rules must dispose of such matters as expeditiously as possible. Ordinarily, a period of three to six months should be the outer limit. That would discipline the system and keep the public servant away from a protracted period of litigation." 11. With the settled position as stated above, let us examine the present case. After exonerating the respondent from the two grave charges alleged against him in the departmental enquiry by the appellate authority, no challenge as such came to be made by the department. If no statutory provision is available subsequent to the appeal, nothing prevented the department from challenging the appellate order if the alleged charges are grave indicating indiscipline by an employee against a superior officer. Apparently, respondent need not challenge the same in revision as he was benefited by the order of appellate authority. Then, the question is why the department or the revisional authority did not move for a period of 14 months. If the charges are of grave nature, immediately, the steps that would have taken by the authority would not have shown this laxity. An inspection though said to be in the normal course of business seems to have been made an excuse to initiate action against the respondent. If the charges are of grave nature, immediately, the steps that would have taken by the authority would not have shown this laxity. An inspection though said to be in the normal course of business seems to have been made an excuse to initiate action against the respondent. As a matter of fact going through the reasoning of the appellate order, it indicates the incident which led to the two serious charges against the respondent, in fact was not supported by much evidence. 12. In that view of the matter, when it is total exoneration of charges where the principle of preponderance of probability could be invoked by the authorities against the respondent, it was virtually a case where there was no semblance of evidence to accuse the respondent on the charges alleged against him. Therefore, in such a situation, it has to be considered as a honourable exoneration rather than the benefit of doubt like a criminal case. 13. The Tribunal, after considering all these aspects, having regard to the seriousness of the alleged charges and the inaction on behalf of the petitioners, ultimately opined that there was no justification to initiate or exercise revisional powers after 14 months during a visit for an inspection in the branch concerned. 14. Even otherwise, the consequences of the appellate order had endured to the benefit of the respondent subsequent to his reinstatement on 08-12-2003. The alleged incident took place way back in 1996. He was compulsorily retired by an order dated 07-01-2000. He was reinstated on 08-12-2003. Right from 1996, till 08-12-2003, he had a Democlic sword hanging over his head and was uncertain what would happen to him so far as the departmental enquiry. He was allowed to work peacefully for a period of 14 months. Again after 14 months, he was served with notice why the appellate order should not be revised. The benefit of appellate order was not only for reinstatement but also full pay and allowances. He was actually paid all these amounts before he was served with a notice under Rule 29. He retired on 31-07-2007 and we are in 2012. The saga of fighting the litigation so far as the respondent is concerned, even after his retirement has not come to an end. This would only indicate the attitude of the petitioners to follow the respondent till his grave. 15. He retired on 31-07-2007 and we are in 2012. The saga of fighting the litigation so far as the respondent is concerned, even after his retirement has not come to an end. This would only indicate the attitude of the petitioners to follow the respondent till his grave. 15. The revisional order further indicates the actual intensity of the animosity towards the respondent. The imposition of penalty by order dated 22-06-2005 results in reduction of pay by three stages and this would be effective from the date of order for a period of two years. He would superannuate on 31-07-2007 and virtually, if he would not earn any increment in these two years apart from the indignation. That apart, from what he had earned between 8-12-2003 to 22-06-2005 a major chunk of earnings have to be refunded i.e., equal to 18 months salary. 16. All these facts weighed with the Tribunal to opine that period of 14 months under Rule 29 can be termed as unreasonable. Therefore, they proceeded to hold that the initiation of revisional proceedings under Rule 29 though suo motu was not within a reasonable period from the date of appellate order in the facts and circumstances of the case. 17. We do not find any in justification being caused to the petitioners leave alone prejudice in the observation of the Tribunal. Then coming to Annexure-A11, the learned counsel for the petitioners persistently and insistently contends that it is a justifiable order independent of Annexure-A7 as such power is vested with the authority in view of FR 54. The very reading of Annexure-A11 order indicates that the order commences with the statement that it is in continuation of order at Annexure-A7. Therefore, though Annexure-A7 order is dated separately from Annexure-A11 order, the words used in Annexure-A11 would indicate it is in continuation of Annexure-A7 order. Therefore, the Tribunal was justified in saying Annexure-A7 punishment was followed by AnnexureA11 and both deserve to be quashed. In short, Annexure-A7 and Annexure-A11 would only indicate the approach of the petitioners towards the respondent and its intention not to leave the respondent to serve peacefully during his tenure with the department till he superannuated in 2007 and even after the retirement unpleasant attitude followed him. 18. In short, Annexure-A7 and Annexure-A11 would only indicate the approach of the petitioners towards the respondent and its intention not to leave the respondent to serve peacefully during his tenure with the department till he superannuated in 2007 and even after the retirement unpleasant attitude followed him. 18. Even otherwise, once revisional order is set aside by virtue of Annexure-A7, what follows is that all the benefits payable on account of appellate order would become valid including reinstatement and the consequences of quashing Annexure-A7 and Annexure-A11 would mean that the respondent is entitled for all the retiral benefits like any other government servant, who retires from service. Therefore, if any amounts are due to the respondent by the department, the same shall be disbursed to him within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. In view of the above observations, we are of the opinion that none of the grounds raised by the petitioners would warrant interference with the observations and the order of the Tribunal. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed.