JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J. 1. This is an appeal filed under Section 378 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Cr.P.C. in short from a private complaint proceeding being C.R. No. 1111/02 instituted by the appellant herein on the allegation that the respondent No. 1 committed theft by dishonestly removing the paddy from the possession of the appellant, namely, Smt. Pravati Debnath on 29.11.2002 at about 9 a.m. The cognizance accordingly was taken and thereafter inquiry started. The process was issued compelling the respondent No. 1 to appear before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sonamura, West Tripura to reply the charge. On 29.01.2004 the charge was framed against the respondent No. 1 under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, IPC for short. By a Criminal Revision Petition No. 51 of 2004 the order dated 29.01.2004 framing the charge against the respondent No. 1 under Section 379 IPC was challenged. However, the Addl. Sessions Judge, Sonamura, West Tripura terminated the challenge on reverting the case for trial. The complainant introduced as many as three witnesses including herself in the evidence. Thereafter the trial Court examined the respondent No. 1 under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. for recording his response to the testimony as laid by the complainant. The trial Court on scrutiny of the evidence as a whole held that the complainant could not prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly the respondent No. 1 was acquitted by the judgment and order dated 24.01.2005. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal on the ground that there was an order of temporary injunction passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court No. 2, Agartala on 07.08.2003 against the appellant, on consideration of all prima facie materials that the land was under possession of the complainant and the respondent No. 1 was restrained from interfering with the said possession in any manner. The operative part of the said order as read in the evidence is reproduced hereunder: OPs could not produce any written objection to discard the assertion of the petitioner. From the photo-copy of the sale deed, it is clear that predecessor-in-interest of the OPs transferred the suit land to the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. Thus, Upendra Chandra Debnath became the owner by purchase of the suit land from the predecessor of the OPs. From the photo-copy of the sale deed, it is clear that predecessor-in-interest of the OPs transferred the suit land to the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. Thus, Upendra Chandra Debnath became the owner by purchase of the suit land from the predecessor of the OPs. On his death, the suit land was succeeded by her, i.e. the petitioner being the sole legal heir. She became the rightful owner and possessor of the suit property. There is a good prima facie case in-favour of the petitioner. The balance of convenience and inconvenience also lies in her favour. There will be irreparable loss if she is dispossessed by the OPs which has no right in her possession. So, prayer for temporary injunction is allowed. 2. The defence plea is that the possession is disputed in the suit as pending; in the said Court and as such even if it is proved that the respondent No. 1 took away the ripe paddy from the said land without consent of the complainant he cannot be held guilty of an offence of theft as defined by Section 378 IPC. The appellant further projected the plea that even though the trial Court held in no uncertain terms that the Court was; convinced that the respondent No. 1, namely, Narayan Banik had taken away ripe paddy from the possession of the complainant, namely, Smt. Pravati Debnath, but without any evidence the trial Court held abruptly that the prosecution had not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent No. 1 took away the ripe paddy with dishonest intention and that the said act did not constitute an offence of theft. 3. Mr. Lodh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant referred the depositions of the PW-1 (the complainant-appellant) and PWs-2 and 3 to show that the finding as returned by the trial Court as perverse as existence of the overwhelming evidence of theft against the respondent No. 1 has been discarded unceremoniously. For purpose of appreciating the challenge against the order of the acquittal, this Court would reappreciate the evidence so recorded. The appellant appearing as the PW-1 stated that the respondent No. 1, Sri. Narayan Banik had taken away the ripe paddy from her land by breaching the said temporary injunction. She further submitted that the paddy was standing on her land, as described by boundary. The appellant appearing as the PW-1 stated that the respondent No. 1, Sri. Narayan Banik had taken away the ripe paddy from her land by breaching the said temporary injunction. She further submitted that the paddy was standing on her land, as described by boundary. The PW-1 though deposed in the Court that she inherited land from her father 30 to 35 years back and the said land was transferred by the father of the respondent No. 1, Sri Narayan Banik to her father, did not admit in the evidence any proof of the ownership of the said land except making a reference to the said order of temporary injunction. However, no cross examination of the complainant is available in the record. One Anil Chandra Das deposed in the trial Court as PW-2 and stated that he was possessing the land by cultivating and growing crops as Bargadar of Nani Debnath for about two years. He stated that the respondent No. 1 took away the ripe paddy from the said land without his consent. According to him, despite his resistance, Sri Narayan Banik, the respondent No. 1 took away the ripe paddy from the field. The PW-2, the Bargadar, further stated that he shared 50% of the paddy with the respondent No. 1 and the respondent No. 1 had taken the 50% of the paddy. There was no effective cross-examination. Even though, he revealed in the cross examination that the complainant Pravati Debnath did not know the fact that there was a meeting in question on the said incident. In the meeting, it was decided that the 50% of the paddy as was taken away would be given to him and other 50% would be retained by Sri Narayan Banik. One Babul Datta who deposed as the PW-3 stated that in that meeting it was decided that the PW-2 as the Bargadar would get 50% of the paddy. He denied the suggestion that the said land belonged to the complainant. On scrutiny of the oral testimony any prudent person would be confused over the ownership of the ripe paddy. No evidence has been laid in the Court as regards the ownership of the ripe paddy on the said disputed land. He denied the suggestion that the said land belonged to the complainant. On scrutiny of the oral testimony any prudent person would be confused over the ownership of the ripe paddy. No evidence has been laid in the Court as regards the ownership of the ripe paddy on the said disputed land. It may so happen that the seed was sown by the respondent No. 1 and there was an arrangement with the PW-2 that he would take 50% of the ripe paddy at the time of harvesting. The PW-2, Bargadar is a vital witness as adduced by the complainant-appellant, but he also did not say who was the owner of the ripe paddy rather he referred to some village baithak wherefrom one view is possible that there was a claim of the respondent No. 1 over the ripe paddy. The breach of injunction may have its own consequences but that cannot be the absolute proof of theft as defined in Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Even if it is proved that the respondent No. 1, Sri Narayan Banik had taken away the paddy from the field over which there was a temporary injunction against him, this would not establish beyond reasonable doubt that there was theft unless the ownership of the paddy is established. Since two views are possible as regards the ownership of the paddy, this Court does not feel persuaded to interfere with the order of the acquittal. 4. Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Spl. P.P. appearing for the State fairly submits that two views are possible on the ownership of the ripe paddy from the evidence as laid by the appellant. 5. Mr. P. Majumder, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the respondent as engaged by this Court referred a decision of the Apex Court as rendered in Ram Ekbal Rai & Ors. Vs. Jaldhari Pandey; reported in AIR 1972 SC 949 , where the Apex Court held as under: 12. It is true that some of these orders, as remarked by the High Court, were passed very much after the date of the incident in question and even after the order of conviction passed by the Trial Magistrate, But that fact would not seem to make difference. It is true that some of these orders, as remarked by the High Court, were passed very much after the date of the incident in question and even after the order of conviction passed by the Trial Magistrate, But that fact would not seem to make difference. The principal question before the Trial Magistrate was whether the respondent was in actual possession of the land in question on the date of the incident, and whether there was any dispute with regard to his title and possession of the said land. The documents referred to above would indicate that there was from the very inception a dispute going on between the respondent and Mst. Sita Devi, and further that he could not have been in actual possession since 1954 as alleged by him, firstly, because possession delivered to him in that year appears to have been mere symbolic possession, and secondly, because the land remained submerged under water from 1954 until 1959. Whether the said decree passed in the said rent suit and the execution proceedings following it were valid and binding against Mst. Sita Devi or not is a question in which we need not at present enter into. But the fact remains that she had disputed all along the title of the respondent and his right to be in possession of the said land. The findings given both in the mutation, proceedings as well as in proceedings under Sections 144 and 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would also indicate that Mst. Sita Devi and through her Sikmidars had remained in physical possession of the land at any rate since 1959. The rent receipts for the years 1961, 1963 and 1964, all in favour of Mst. Sita Devi, would seem to corroborate the stand taken by the appellants that the respondent had not been in actual possession of the said plot-It is, thus, impossible to say that the appellants were not at any rate under a bona fide belief that they were entitled to the possession and that that being so there was no question of their having trespassed into the said land or formed an unlawful assembly for committing theft of the standing crop therein or of their having committed theft of the said crop. In any event, the stand of the respondent that he had cultivated the land, and therefore, the crop was his was a matter of considerable doubt The dispute between the parties was such that civil Court would have more appropriately decided it, particularly in view of the decisions given by another Magistrate and the Deputy Collector in the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as also in the said mutation proceedings. The entire question of possession and even title was thus in an extremely fluid state and therefore the question of the respondent's possession on the date of the incident in question was not beyond controversy. The Trial Magistrate V. these circumstances ought not to have and could not have, on a mere partial view of the evidence, come to a conclusion that the appellants had formed an unlawful assembly and that as members of such unlawful assembly had been guilty of stealing the said crop. In these circumstances, it is difficult to uphold the order of conviction passed by the Trial Magistrate and upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellants is set aside. Mr. Majumder, learned Amicus Curiae has also referred the decisions in State of Rajasthan Vs. Naresh @ Ram Naresh reported in (2009) 9 SCC 368 and Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 for emphatically laying down the limit of interference of the order of acquittal. From conjoint reading of both this reports the following general principles emerge: (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The CrPC puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court; and (5) If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial Court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellant Court. 6. In a decision as referred in Premananda Namasudra & Anr. Vs. State of Tripura & Ors., reported in 2011 (4) GLT 1, this Court held that the trial Court judgment cannot be set aside because the appellate Court's view is more probable. The appellate Court would not be justified in setting aside the trial Court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshalling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial Court is perverse or wholly unsustainable in law. 7. Even though this Court is not very happy the way reasoning has been made in the impugned order but on re-appreciation it appears on the ownership of the ripe paddy, two possible views have surfaced and one of views favours the accused. One view having been accepted by the trial Court, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. 8. For the reasons as aforesaid, the appeal fails. 9. Mr. P. Majumder, learned Amicus Curiae be paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from the Legal Aid Fund by the State. 10. Before parting, this Court is constrained to observe that the counsel so engaged by the respondent No. 1 namely, Mr. 8. For the reasons as aforesaid, the appeal fails. 9. Mr. P. Majumder, learned Amicus Curiae be paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from the Legal Aid Fund by the State. 10. Before parting, this Court is constrained to observe that the counsel so engaged by the respondent No. 1 namely, Mr. P. Roy Barman preferred not to appear without reference. It can be gathered from the order dated 30.06.2012 that on several occasions this appeal was taken up for hearing, but for non-appearance of the said Counsel the matter could not be taken up. Even on two consecutive occasions the case was kept part-heard expecting the representation from the respondent No. 1. Ultimately, by the said order dated 30.06.2012, Mr. P. Majumder, learned counsel was appointed as Amicus Curiae for proving the legal assistance to the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 having appeared in the Court in person on 02.07.2012 expressed his helplessness. With a visible amount of spontaneity, he accepted the arrangement made by this Court for completing the hearing by engagement of the amicus curiae for representing his case. Send down the LCR forthwith. Appeal dismissed