Judgment 1) Heard counsel for the parties. These Petitions take exception to the decision of the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Raigad, dated 15th February, 2012, whereby, decision to terminate the services of the Petitioners came to be confirmed after considering the explanation of the Petitioners, as was ordered to be done by this court in previous Writ Petition filed by the Petitioners vide Writ Petition No. 8645/2011 and connected matters, decided on 15th November, 2011. In the previous set of Petitions, the principal grievance was that the decision was taken by the concerned authority without issuing show cause notice to the Petitioners, although the Petitioners were working in the respective posts for more than one year, as permanent employees. In other words, it was argued that even if the authority intended to proceed against the Petitioners on the ground that their appointments were illegal, they should have been given at least a showcause notice. This grievance was accepted by the Court and the authority was directed to issue show cause notice and give opportunity to the Petitioners. The said decision therefore, did not decide any other issue. 2) As aforesaid, the impugned decision has been passed by the Chief Executive Officer, after following the said procedure. The background in which the said decision has been taken by the authority of terminating the services of the Petitioners, is that, the Petitioners were appointed as Extension Officers (Edu.), class III, Grade II on vacant posts without advertising the same. That an advertisement was issued on 3rd May, 2008, notifying only 5 vacancies to be filled in by the department. It is noticed that although at the relevant time, there were 8 vacancies, the department decided to notify and invite applications to fill in only 5 posts, vide advertisement dated 3rd May, 2008. After the selection process for that advertisement was completed, the list of 5 selected and meritorious candidates and 4 wait list candidates was notified. The names of the Petitioners herein appeared in the wait list candidates. As regards the first 5 candidates, who were selected, each of them joined service and came to be appointed. That is not in dispute. As a result, there was no vacant post pertaining to the said selection process commenced on the basis of advertisement dated 3rd May, 2008. The names of the Petitioners herein appeared in the wait list candidates. As regards the first 5 candidates, who were selected, each of them joined service and came to be appointed. That is not in dispute. As a result, there was no vacant post pertaining to the said selection process commenced on the basis of advertisement dated 3rd May, 2008. The waitlist prepared in connection with the said selection process, thus, deemed to have exhausted itself. However, the Petitioners, who were included in the said exhausted waitlist, came to be appointed without any advertisement against the further 4 vacancies, 3 pertaining to year 2008 and 1 pertaining to year 2009, which had occurred later on, after February, 2009. 3) According to the Petitioners, this was permissible as per the Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008, which stipulates that the waitlist shall remain valid for a period of one year and future vacancies should be filled in by the waitlist candidates, without following the requisite procedure, issuing advertisement & conducting selection process pursuant to such advertisement. 4) The question is, whether the Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008 will have any application to the present case. It is not in dispute that the advertisement was issued on 3rd May, 2008 only in respect of 5 posts, although 8 posts were vacant. This was a conscious decision of the Department. The selection process commenced on the basis of the said advertisement and culminated with preparation of list of 5 selected candidates and 4 waitlist candidates. After all the 5 selected candidates joined the advertised vacant posts, the waitlist in respect of those posts, obviously, was exhausted. 5) In any case, as is noticed from the Annexture ‘A’ to Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008, the policy of waitlist to remain alive for a period of one year and the candidates there from appointed against future vacancies applies to future vacancies arising from January, 2009 to December, 2009, as is clear from Clause 5 of the procedure (karyawahi). 6) As regards the vacancies pertaining to anterior period as in this case three vacancies (unadvertised) of year 2008, against which the Petitioners came to be appointed, the same were governed by the norms specified in Government Resolution dated 19th October, 2007. 6) As regards the vacancies pertaining to anterior period as in this case three vacancies (unadvertised) of year 2008, against which the Petitioners came to be appointed, the same were governed by the norms specified in Government Resolution dated 19th October, 2007. Clause 9 of the said Government Resolution in unambiguous terms provides that once all the posts, which have been advertised, are filled up and the candidates are appointed against the said posts, the waitlist prepared in the concerned selection process will get exhausted & cannot be taken forward for filling future vacancies or vacancies which have not been advertised, instead, the vacancies will have to be readvertised. The Principle stated in the Government Resolution dated 19th October, 2007 is well accepted. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Arup Das & Ors. vs. State of Assam & Ors, decided on 27th January, 2012 in SLP (Civil) No. ....... of 12 (CC27/2012), the Apex court, after considering all the earlier decisions on the subject, observed thus: “It is well-established that an authority cannot make any selection/appointment beyond the number of posts advertised, even if there were a larger number of posts available than those advertised. The principle behind the said decision is that if that was allowed to be done, such action would be entirely arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, since other candidates who had chosen not to apply for the vacant posts which were being sought to be filled, could have also applied if they had known that the other vacancies would also be under consideration for being filled up.” (emphasis supplied) 7) Counsel for the Petitioners, however, submitted that the matter on hand will have to be decided on the basis of principle stated in the case of PremSingh and Ors. vs. Haryana State Electricity Board & Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 319 . We do not find any merit in this submission. The Apex Court in the subsequent judgment in the case of Arup Das (supra) has considered the said decision and has explained that it has to be read in such a context as stated in paragraph 12 of the Judgment and cannot be said to be the Rule, but rather the exception. The Apex Court in the subsequent judgment in the case of Arup Das (supra) has considered the said decision and has explained that it has to be read in such a context as stated in paragraph 12 of the Judgment and cannot be said to be the Rule, but rather the exception. 8) Be that as it may, for the view that we have already taken that the Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008 will have no application to the three unadvertised vacant posts pertaining to year 2008, against which the Petitioners have been appointed, no further investigation is essential. Even on this finding, the conclusion drawn by the Chief Executive Officer will have to be upheld. 9) To get over this position, Counsel for the Petitioners submit that this is not the basis on which the Chief Executive Officer has examined the grievance of the Petitioners. The Chief Executive Officer has recorded only two distinct reasons to conclude that the order of termination passed against the Petitioners was appropriate. The first reason stated is that consent of the District Selection Committee was not taken and the second is that Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008 was not referred to when the official appointments of the Petitioners was made. As regards the non mention of Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008 in the appointment orders issued in favour of the concerned Petitioners, it presupposes that the authority did not issue the same keeping in mind Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008. Thus, such appointment orders cannot be justified & legitimised with reference to that Government Resolution. Thus, it was obviously a case of clear illegality. 10) The first reason stated by the Chief Executive Officer, in the impugned decision, that the consent of the District Selection Committee was not obtained, is also an indisputable position. The argument of the Counsel for the Petitioners is that no such consent was required and the requirement so stipulated in Government Resolution dated 19th October, 2007 was relaxed in the Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008. For the reasons already recorded by us hitherto, the Petitioners cannot be permitted to rely on the Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008. Further, even going by relevant Clause 5 of Schedule ‘A’, there is nothing to indicate that the requirement of obtaining consent of District Selection Committee has been dispensed with as such. For the reasons already recorded by us hitherto, the Petitioners cannot be permitted to rely on the Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008. Further, even going by relevant Clause 5 of Schedule ‘A’, there is nothing to indicate that the requirement of obtaining consent of District Selection Committee has been dispensed with as such. 11) In view of reasons recorded, it is not necessary for us to examine the larger question, as to whether the arrangement stated in Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2008, which is applicable to future vacancies, occurring on and from 2009, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as noted by the Apex Court in case of Arup Das (supra). 12) Taking over all view of the matter, therefore, these petitions are devoid of merits and dismissed. 13) At this stage, Counsel for the Petitioners prays that the operation of this order be stayed, since the Petitioners intend to take up the matter in appeal before the Apex Court. The order of termination, passed against them by the concerned authority, be kept in abeyance and the parties be ordered to maintain status quo as on today. Although this prayer is opposed by the Counsel for the Zilla Parishad, in the interest of justice, we continue the interim protection given to the Petitioners for a period of 4 weeks from today.