ORDER This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging order dated 10.11.2004 (Annexure-5) by which the Senior Divisional Manager (Disciplinary Authority) held the petitioner guilty under Regulation 39 (1) (d) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as „the Regulations? for the sake of brevity) and proposed penalty of “reduction in basic pay by one stage” on the basis of enquiry report dated 19.07.2003. The petitioner also challenged order dated 14.06.2005 (Annexure-5/1) and order dated 15.02.2006 (Annexure-5/2) by which petitioner?s appeal and memorial were dismissed and the order of Disciplinary Authority was affirmed respectively by the Appellate Authority and the Chairman of the respondent Corporation. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner claimed that the respondents did not follow clause 19 (vii) of the LTC Rules with respect to LTC advance before passing the impugned orders and decided the matter in a most arbitrary and illegal manner. It was claimed that other employees similarly situated as the petitioner in the vigilance case had been exonerated, whereas petitioner had been punished for identical charges and hence there was a gross discrimination violating the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel for the petitioner also claimed that with respect to the issues involved in the case the law is well settled by the Apex Court as well as by the High Court holding such imposition of penalty to be illegal as it was in utter violation of the instructions with respect to LTC advance. He went on raising another claim that the respondents had violated their own guidelines/circular, namely Vig./Misc./46 dated 27.08.2003 (Annexure-10), which precluded the delay in refund of adjustment of advance from the purview of misconduct. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that he joined Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as „the LIC? for the sake of brevity) in the year 1990 and was working at Aligarh (U.P.), but he was transferred in the year 1994 to Madhubani where he has been working as Assistant. 4. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that he joined Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as „the LIC? for the sake of brevity) in the year 1990 and was working at Aligarh (U.P.), but he was transferred in the year 1994 to Madhubani where he has been working as Assistant. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he applied for LTC advance on 07.08.1998 for one block year i.e. 1996-98 for himself and his wife mentioning 05.09.1998 as the date of commencement of proposed journey and for that purpose Rs.6,000.00 was sanctioned by the competent authority, but the petitioner could not avail the said facility due to flashflood and he informed the competent authority, whereafter vide order dated 05.09.1998 the competent authority accorded sanction to deposit the amount, which the petitioner deposited on 08.09.1998 as 06.09.1998 was Sunday, whereas on 07.09.1998 refunded amount of ticket was obtained from the travel agent. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner averred that thereafter he applied for two blocks of LTC for the block year of 1996-98 and 1998-2000, and on 21.04.1999 the authority concerned sanctioned Rs.16,000.00 at a time for two block periods for which the proposed date of journey was 05.05.1999 inclusive of petitioner?s wife and small children. It was also averred that due to extreme heat the petitioner extended the date of journey and gave the required information to the competent authority, whereafter on 12.05.1999 the wife of petitioner became seriously ill as she was in the third month of pregnancy and the petitioner had to cancel his journey and got his wife treated by a lady doctor at Darbhanga who after examining her advised complete bed rest. It was further averred that the petitioner informed the authorities regarding the aforesaid cancellation in writing on 29.05.1999 although he had earlier informed office verbally from time to time and thereafter the authorities allowed the petitioner to deposit the LTC advance money of Rs.16,000.00, which the petitioner deposited on 31.05.1999 as 30.05.1999 was Sunday. 6. It was further averred that the petitioner informed the authorities regarding the aforesaid cancellation in writing on 29.05.1999 although he had earlier informed office verbally from time to time and thereafter the authorities allowed the petitioner to deposit the LTC advance money of Rs.16,000.00, which the petitioner deposited on 31.05.1999 as 30.05.1999 was Sunday. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in the aforesaid circumstances although the petitioner did not commit any illegality but a departmental proceeding was initiated against him, charges were framed and notice dated 17.11.2001 (Annexure-2) was sent to him, in response to which he filed his detailed reply/explanation dated 14.12.2001 (Annexure-3) stating all the aforesaid facts, but in spite of that the Enquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report dated 19.07.2003 (Annexure-4) against the petitioner, relying upon which the Disciplinary Authority punished the petitioner with reduction in basic pay by one stage permanently by his order dated 10.11.2004 (Annexure-5) against which the petitioner filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the appellate authority on 14.06.2005 (Annexure-5/1) and similarly the memorial of petitioner was also dismissed by the Chairman of the Corporation vide order dated 15.02.2006 (Annexure-5/2). 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that admittedly money was returned and the only allegation was the delay in return of the money, which according to the Rule, had to be returned within 7 days, hence no charge of any misconduct was made out, as such minor violations cannot be termed as „misconduct? even according to the LIC Rules. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in case of A.L. Kalra vs. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., reported in A.I.R. 1984 SC 1361 as well as a decision of a Bench of this Court dated 24.06.2005 (Annexure-7) passed in CWJC No.9272 of 2004. 8. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in case of A.L. Kalra vs. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., reported in A.I.R. 1984 SC 1361 as well as a decision of a Bench of this Court dated 24.06.2005 (Annexure-7) passed in CWJC No.9272 of 2004. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents stated that LIC Rules specifically required the money to be returned by the date the adjourned journey was to commence, but in the instant case neither the money was returned by the prescribed date nor even ticket could be produced by the petitioner, which showed the intention of the petitioner and hence such act of violation was clearly misconduct and hence the claims of the petitioner on the aforesaid facts were rejected by all the three authorities because the Corporation had suffered loss of interest on the amount advanced, due to the acts of the petitioner, who had the liability to abide as per the Regulation 21 of the Regulations, for which penalties were prescribed, hence this Court will not go into those facts regarding misconduct of the petitioner. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that term „misconduct? was not defined anywhere in the service rules but when the petitioner did not want to travel and did not even purchase the ticket and avoided return of money on one pretext or the other, this definitely amounted to misconduct and in these circumstances the findings in the enquiry report were not at all controverted by the petitioner. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents averred that the principles of natural justice and procedure prescribed had been followed as had been detailed in the order of Disciplinary Authority with respect to enquiry, notice, opportunity and show-cause as well as the reasons and findings given in all the three orders of the authorities concerned, namely the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the Chairman of the Corporation. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that if an employee did not follow the direction of the higher authorities, which was clearly not illegal, he was liable to be proceeded against under misconduct, because if such misconduct was allowed, it would be difficult for the Corporation to work. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that if an employee did not follow the direction of the higher authorities, which was clearly not illegal, he was liable to be proceeded against under misconduct, because if such misconduct was allowed, it would be difficult for the Corporation to work. In this connection he relied upon Regulation 39 (1) of the Regulations, which included indolence and knowingly doing anything detrimental to the interest of the Corporation or conflicting with the instructions given, whereas Regulation 21 thereof provided that the employee must obey all the orders and directions of the authorities in course of his official duties and hence non-obedience clearly amounted to misconduct. 12. In this connection learned counsel for the respondents relied upon three decisions of the Apex Court in case of Noratanmal Chouraria vs. M.R. Murli and another, reported in (2004) 5 Supreme Court Cases 689; in case of Union of India and others vs. Harjeet Singh Sandhu, reported in A.IR. 2001 SC 1772; and in case of State of Punjab and others vs. Ram Singh Ex-constable, reported in A.I.R., 1992 SC 2188 = (1992) 4 SCC 54 . 13. Considering the arguments of learned counsel for the parties as well as the materials on record it is quite apparent that for the aforesaid reasons departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and notice was given to him on 17.11.2001 (Annexure-2) on the following charges:- (i) You took an advance of Rs.16,000.00 (Rupees Sixteen thousand only) on 21.04.1999 for the purpose of availing Leave Travel Concession for the block year 1996-98 & 1998-2000 for two members of your family vide application for advance i.e. in form „B? dated 21.04.1999 wherein you had mentioned the proposed date of onward and return journey as 05.05.1999 and 01.06.1999 respectively for visiting Delhi, Bombay, Kanyakumari etc. But you did not undertake the journey and finally refunded an amount of Rs.16,000.00 on 31.05.1999 vide MR No.137. (ii) On earlier 1 (one) occasion also as detailed below you took LTC advance but you did not avail of the LTC facility and ultimately refunded the money to the corporation after keeping the same for pretty long time. Sl No. Dt. of Adv. (ii) On earlier 1 (one) occasion also as detailed below you took LTC advance but you did not avail of the LTC facility and ultimately refunded the money to the corporation after keeping the same for pretty long time. Sl No. Dt. of Adv. Amt-Adv Dt-Ref Period of Retention 1 07.08.98 6000/- 08.09.98 1 month 1 day (iii) By aforesaid acts you had thus temporarily misappropriated the Corporation?s money to the tune of Rs.22,000.00 (Rupees Twenty two thousand only) for your personal gain causing thereby a financial loss to the corporation to the said extent. (iv) By your aforesaid acts you have failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, have displayed gross negligence in discharge of your duty and have acted in a manner prejudicial to good conduct and detrimental to the interest of the office, thereby violating the provisions of Regulations 21, 24, 39 (1) of the LIC India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, for which any one or more of the penalties specified under Regulation 39(1) (a) to (g) of the aforesaid Staff Regulations can be imposed on you. 14. In response to the said notice the petitioner submitted his reply/extension on 14.12.2001 (Annexure-3), whereafter an enquiry was held by the Manager (CRM), LICI, Divisional Office, Muzaffarpur (Enquiry Officer), who submitted his report dated 19.07.2003 (Annexure-4) in which it was found that charge of temporary misappropriation in case of LTC advance for Rs.6000.00 applied for on 05.08.1998 was not established as the same was refunded on 08.09.1998 well within 7 days from the date it became due on 05.09.1998 as per Rule 19 (vii) of LTC Rules in case of failure to commence journey. However, he also found that the charge of temporary misappropriation in case of LTC advance of Rs.16,000.00 drawn on 21.04.1999 for proposed journey on 05.05.1999 was established as the said amount after failure to perform the journey was refunded by the CS employee on 31.05.1999 vide MR No.137 after 26 days without showing the evidence of purchase of tickets for the proposed journey and without showing the evidence of appropriation of that amount for the assigned purpose. 15. 15. It was also found by the Enquiry Officer that the charge of violating Regulation 21 and 24 of the Staff Regulation attracting penalty under Regulation 39 (1) was established as:- (1) Cs Employee has not shown good behaviour and conduct in utilizing the LTC advance for purchasing Rail Tickets and for commencement of journey. The tickets were not purchased either by the CS employee or the TINEX Travel Agency. (2) The CS Employee has shown negligence and insincerity in refunding the outstanding advance of Rs.16,000.00 which was lying unutilized with unregistered TINEX travel agency, Madhubani for the period from 21.04.1999 to 28.05.1999. The amount was sanctioned for the benefit of the employee for availing LTC journey and not for third party like TINEX Travel Agency where it was kept for 38 days. (3) These acts of CS Employee are prejudicial to his good conduct in dealing with utilization of LTC advance for Rs.16,000.00. So violation of Regulation 21 and Reg 24 is established. 16. However, the Enquiry Officer concluded his enquiry report mentioning that the charge sheeted employee has violated the provisions of LTC Rules 19 (vii) due to system failure prevailing in the branch in dealing with the sanction of LTC advance and its follow up as evident from the enclosed inspection with the Special Report dated 20.02.2001 and CS employee has become victim of the same but at least in this case the CS employee has not crossed the time limit given to the management for its recovery as per LTC Rules. The system failure and inactivity of Branch is also proved from the fact that the loss to the Corporation would have been minimized had the outstanding advance been recovered prior to refund on 31.05.1999 by CS employee himself. It was also held that in the above Special Report there were six cases where 18 % interest were charged form the employee for violating the LTC Rules 19 (vii) in refunding the outstanding advances even beyond the time limit given to the management for recovery from the next pay bill of the employee. 17. It was also held that in the above Special Report there were six cases where 18 % interest were charged form the employee for violating the LTC Rules 19 (vii) in refunding the outstanding advances even beyond the time limit given to the management for recovery from the next pay bill of the employee. 17. However when the matter came up before the Disciplinary Authority on 10.11.2004 (Annexure-5) it found that all the contentions raised by the petitioner were not tenable and imposed penalty on “reduction in basic pay by one stage permanently” in terms of Regulation 39 (1)(d) of the Regulations with immediate effect, on the following findings:- (1) The provision 19 (VII) of LTC rules cause an obligation on the employee to refund the advance within seven days and the non-adherence to the instructions tantamount to misconduct as per regulations 21, 24 and 39(1) of the (Staff) regulations, 1960. A provision for recovery from the salary of the employee would not be a ground to escape a charge of misconduct within the meaning of the regulation. (2) It is only a guideline for the central Government employee, the employees of LIC of India are not civil servant and their terms and conditions of service are governed by the rules framed by the Corporation. (3) The instruction of the Assistant Secretary (OS), EZO, Kolkata, though not binding on the Disciplinary Authority is not a policy decision of the Corporation. In any case, the rate of the interest to be charged is simply a compensatory measure in regard of the realization of the amount but the violation of the LIC instruction or non-refund of the LIC advance within the specified 7 days is a misconduct. (4) A.L. Kalra case is not applicable in facts and circumstances of this case, in the present case a proper enquiry has been held and in terms of the provision of the Staff Regulations, 1960 he has been found guilty of the charges. 18. (4) A.L. Kalra case is not applicable in facts and circumstances of this case, in the present case a proper enquiry has been held and in terms of the provision of the Staff Regulations, 1960 he has been found guilty of the charges. 18. Against the aforesaid order, petitioner filed an appeal under Regulation 46 (2) of the Regulations before the appellate authority, namely the Zonal Manager, who dismissed the appeal vide order dated 14.06.2005 (Annexure-5/1) after arriving at the following conclusion:- “Upon carefully examining the records of the case, I find that all reasonable opportunities were given to Shri Jha and the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with the prescribed norms and principle of natural justice was followed throughout the enquiry proceedings. From the enquiry report it is evident that Shri Jha took LTC advance on two occasions but did not undertake the journey. In one case he did not undertake the journey and also did not refund the advance in time. It has further been found that he did not purchase any ticket and therefore did not utilize the advance for the purpose for which it was given. The reference of the Court case cited by the appellant is not applicable in the case of the LIC. Further he has brought out no new facts or evidence to merit any reconsideration of the case. The penalty imposed is commensurate with the gravity of misconduct and thus the appeal does not deserve sympathetic consideration. I am, therefore, left with no option but to reject his aforesaid Appeal.” 19. Against the aforesaid order, petitioner filed a memorial under Regulation 49 of the Regulations before the Chairman of the LIC, who dismissed the memorial on 15.02.2006 (Annexure-5/2) after arriving at the following findings:- “After carefully examining the records of the case and evidence on record I find that all the contentions raised by the Memorialist are not tenable. The procedures prescribed under the aforesaid Staff Regulations have been followed and the Memorialist was afforded reasonable opportunity to defend his case. With regard to his contentions No.(1), (2) and (3) suffice it to state that family problems have no nexus to the charge sheet issued to him. The procedures prescribed under the aforesaid Staff Regulations have been followed and the Memorialist was afforded reasonable opportunity to defend his case. With regard to his contentions No.(1), (2) and (3) suffice it to state that family problems have no nexus to the charge sheet issued to him. I find that the Memorialist did not utilize the LTC advances for the purpose for which it was taken and the same was refunded well after the stipulated period on two occasions as more particularly detailed in the charge sheet issued to him. His said actions amount to temporary misappropriation of the funds of the corporation which is a grave misconduct warranting deterrent penalty. The judgment of the Hon?ble Supreme Court cited by him has no relevance to the case against him. With regard to his contention No.(4), I find that the charges levelled against the Memorialist stand established on the basis of evidence adduced in the course of the Enquiry proceedings. As regards his reference to the „guidelines? issued by the Vigilance Department, suffice it to state that disciplinary action which is a quasi judicial proceeding is taken by the Disciplinary Authority with due application of mind as has been done in his case and hence his aforesaid contention is nothing but an after thought. With regard to his contention Nos.(5) & (6) past good conduct does not absolve him of the misconduct committed by him. Further, promotion is an administrative action based on other criteria. As regards his reference to other cases suffice it to state that each disciplinary action case is decided on its own merits.” “After carefully examining the records of the case and evidence on record, I find that all the contentions raised by the Memorialist are not tenable. I also observe that the procedure prescribed under the aforesaid Staff Regulations has been followed and the Memorialist was afforded reasonable opportunity to defend his case in respect of the charges contained in the Charge Sheet dated 17.11.2001 issued to him.” 20. Against the aforesaid orders, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition in which the main question involved is as to whether the petitioner has committed any misconduct by alleged violation of the provisions of LTC instructions and the Staff Regulations, 1960. 21. Rule 19 (vi) of the LTC Rules provides the circumstances when advance drawn under the LTC Rules shall be deemed to become due. 21. Rule 19 (vi) of the LTC Rules provides the circumstances when advance drawn under the LTC Rules shall be deemed to become due. It contains the following circumstances:- (a) Where the advance is drawn for both the outward journey and return journey one half of the advance shall be refunded on the date on which the employee comes to know that the period of leave or anticipated absence would exceed 90 days or when such period of 90 days expires (a period of 90 days being reckoned from the date of commencement of leave or the date of commencement of outward journey, as the case may be) whichever is earlier. (b) The entire amount of advance drawn shall become due for refund if outward journey is not commenced on the date on which it was to commence. (c) Where an employee who is eligible to travel by higher class of Railway accommodation travels by lower class or Railway accommodation or where cheaper mode of travel is adopted or where he does not visit all the places indicated by him in Form „B? at the time of draw all of the advance (or otherwise), excess amount of advance drawn shall become due for refund on the date on which the authority competent to sanction the reimbursement under the instruction ascertains the amount required to be refunded and intimates about it to the employee concerned. 22. There is another important clause for consideration in the instant matter, namely clause 19 (vii) of the LTC Rules (Annexure-6), which provides as follows:- (vii) The employees concerned should refund LTC advance sanctioned to them within 7 days after the advance drawn by them becomes due for refund as per clause (vi) above under the instructions. If the employee fails to refund it within the prescribed period of 7 days, then the amount of advance due for return of refund shall be recovered from the next pay bill of the employee. 23. So far the Staff Regulations, 1960 is concerned, the authorities have relied upon Regulation 21, 24 and 39 (1) thereof which provide as follows:- 21. 23. So far the Staff Regulations, 1960 is concerned, the authorities have relied upon Regulation 21, 24 and 39 (1) thereof which provide as follows:- 21. Every employee of the Corporation shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, shall conform to and abide by these Regulations and shall observe, comply with and obey all orders and directions which may, from time to time, be given to him in the course of his official duties by any person or persons under whose jurisdiction, superintendence or control he may, for the time being, be placed. 24. Every employee shall serve the Corporation honestly and faithfully and use his utmost endeavours to promote the interest of the Corporation and shall pay courtesy and attention in all transactions. 39. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations, (any one or more of) the following penalties for good and sufficient reasons, and as hereinafter provided, be imposed (by the disciplinary authority specified in Schedule I) on an employee who commits a breach of regulations of the Corporation, or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interest of the Corporation, or conflicting with the instructions or who commits a breach of discipline, or is guilty for any other act prejudicial to good conduct:- (a) Censure; (b) withholding of one or more increments either permanently or for a specified period; (c) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or breach of orders; (d) reduction to a lower service, or post, or to a lower time scale, or to a lower stage in a time scale; (e) compulsory retirement; (f) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; (g) dismissal. 24. So far the question of misconduct is concerned, learned counsel for the respondents had admitted that the term „misconduct? is not defined anywhere in the service rules, but claimed that violation of the prescribed procedures for personal aggrandizement amounted to misconduct and such act of the petitioner had been fully proved by the respondents, which had been upheld by all the three authorities. is not defined anywhere in the service rules, but claimed that violation of the prescribed procedures for personal aggrandizement amounted to misconduct and such act of the petitioner had been fully proved by the respondents, which had been upheld by all the three authorities. In this connection he had relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in case of State of Punjab vs. Ram Singh (supra), which was followed by the Apex Court in case of Noratanmal Chouraria (supra), and in paragraphs-5 and 6 thereof it had been held as follows: 5. Misconduct has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 999 thus "A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, willful in character, improper or wrong behaviour, its synonyms are misdemeanour, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offence, but not negligence or carelessness." Misconduct in office has been defined as: "Any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. The term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's the Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at p. 821 misconduct' defines thus:- "The term misconduct, implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion if left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskilfulness are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected." 6. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected." 6. Thus it could be seen that the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receive its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, willful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order. 25. The other decision relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents in case of Union of India & others (supra) in paragraphs-20 and 21 the Apex Court had held as follows:- 20. 'Misconduct' as a ground for terminating the service by way of dismissal or removal, is not to be found mentioned in Section 19 of the Act, it is to be read therein by virtue of Rule 14. Misconduct is not defined either in the Act or in the Rules. It is not necessary to make a search for the meaning for it would suffice to refer to State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, Ex-constable, (1992) 4 SCC 54 : (1992 AIR SCW 2596 : AIR 1992 SC 2188 : 1992 Lab IC 2391) wherein the term 'misconduct' as used in Punjab Police Manual came up for the consideration of this Court. Having referred to the meaning of 'misconduct' and 'misconduct in office' as defined in Black's Law Dictionary and Iyer's Law Lexicon, this Court held (Para 5 of AIR, Lab IC):- ". . . . . Having referred to the meaning of 'misconduct' and 'misconduct in office' as defined in Black's Law Dictionary and Iyer's Law Lexicon, this Court held (Para 5 of AIR, Lab IC):- ". . . . . . . . .the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, willful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order." 21. In the context in which the term 'misconduct' has been used in Rule 14, it is to be given a wider meaning and any wrongful act or any act of delinquency which may or may not involve moral turpitude, would be 'misconduct', and certainly so, if it is subversive of army discipline or high traditions of army and/or if it renders the person unworthy of being retained in service. The language of sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 employing the expression 'the reports on an officer's misconduct' uses 'reports' in plural and misconduct in singular. Here plural would include singular and singular would include plural. A single report on an officer's misconduct may invite an action under Section 19 read with Rule 14 and there may be cases where there may by more reports than one on a singular misconduct or more misconducts than one in which case it will be the cumulative effect of such reports on misconduct or misconducts, which may lead to the formation of requisite satisfaction and opinion within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 14. 26. From the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is quite apparent that if various law lexicons/dictionaries are relied upon, the word „misconduct? 26. From the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is quite apparent that if various law lexicons/dictionaries are relied upon, the word „misconduct? embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty cast upon him or he willfully performs an act which is synonymous to delinquency, mismanagement, misdemeanour, misdeed or an offence, but this cannot be in case of any negligence or carelessness. 27. Furthermore, in the abovementioned decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents, the Apex Court had held that the word „misconduct? though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty involving moral turpitude and willful unlawful behaviour and forbidden act. It was also held that the ambit of the word „misconduct? has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. In those decisions emphasis has also been given upon plurality of such misconduct even if there is singularity of the report in contrast to plurality of reports with regard to singular misconduct. 28. In the instant case although the allegations were with respect to two LTC advances; one sanctioned in August 1998 and the other sanctioned in April 1999, but in the enquiry report, affirmed by the authority concerned, it was found by the Enquiry Officer that no illegality or misappropriation was committed by the petitioner with respect to LTC advance of August 1998 as the date of journey was 05.09.1998 and on the failure of the petitioner to commence the said journey, the advance amount became due on 05.09.1998, whereafter it had to be refunded within 7 days thereafter as per Rule 19 (vii) of the LTC Rules, but the petitioner deposited it well within the time on 08.09.1998. In the said circumstances there remained only a singular charge against the petitioner with respect to the second LTC advance of April 1999 and there remained no plurality of charges. 29. In the said circumstances there remained only a singular charge against the petitioner with respect to the second LTC advance of April 1999 and there remained no plurality of charges. 29. So far the advance of Rs.16,000.00 sanctioned by the authorities in April 1999 is concerned, the journey proposed was on 05.05.1999, but the petitioner did not commence the said journey and refunded the amount on 31.05.1999 i.e. on the 26th day, although it should have been done within 27 days from the date of the proposed journey i.e. 05.05.1999. The respondents have failed to show that the petitioner had committed a forbidden act or unlawful behaviour or neglect by which the right of any party had been affected or it was in any manner a delinquency in performance of his duties affecting the discipline of the institution, whereas on the other hand petitioner had been able to explain the reason of delay i.e. the ailment of his pregnant wife and the extreme heat due to which the doctor advised her complete bed rest, which facts have not been categorically denied or contradicted by the respondents in their counter affidavit. 30. However, learned counsel for the respondents had claimed that admittedly the petitioner had refunded the advance amount of Rs.16,000.00 on 31.05.1999 i.e. after 26 days delay without producing any proof of purchase of tickets and without showing any evidence of appropriation of that amount for the assigned purpose, although he was required to do so as he was depositing the amount beyond the period of 7 days prescribed in Rule 19 (vii) of the LTC Rules. 31. From a bare perusal of Rule 19 (vii) of the LTC Rules it becomes apparent that although 7 days time was prescribed for refund of amount from the date it became due i.e. the date of proposed journey which failed, but it also provides that if the employee fails to refund it within the prescribed period of 7 days then the amount of advance due for return of refund shall be recovered from the next pay bill of the employee. Thus it is quite apparent that neither any penal provision has been attached in the said Rule for any such short delay in the refund nor it is deemed to be a misconduct as per the aforesaid Rules, as the authorities have been provided an opportunity to get it deducted from the next pay bill of the employee. Furthermore, in the instant case when the amount was refunded within 26 days there was no occasion for recovery of the amount from the next pay bill. 32. In such circumstances reliance may be placed upon a decision of the Apex Court in case of A.L. Kalra vs. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., reported in A.I.R. 1984 SC 1361 in which it was held that even if the facts alleged in the heads of charges are accepted as wholly proved, yet that would not constitute misconduct as prescribed in the Rules and no penalty can be imposed for such act or delay. Furthermore, the matter was merely with respect to the payment and the recovery for which specific provisions have been made in the concerned LTC Rule itself. The same view had been taken by a Bench of this Court vide order dated 24.06.2005 (Annexure-7) passed in CWJC No.9272 of 2004 (Rai Vijay Kumar Sinha vs. The Life Insurance Corporation of India and others). 33. So far non-production of any evidence of appropriation of the said advance amount for the assigned purpose as claimed by the respondents is concerned, the petitioner has made definite statements in the writ petition with respect thereto, which remained undenied by the respondents in their counter affidavit. Furthermore in case of serious ailment of petitioner?s wife, he might not be able to use the advance amount for the assigned purpose, but that cannot in any manner whatsoever be legally deemed to be a misconduct nor the above mentioned decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents help the respondents, who have failed to prove any misconduct even in accordance with the aforesaid decisions or as per the definition of the term provided in various law lexicons/dictionaries as discussed above. 34. 34. The Enquiry Officer had also concluded his report dated 19.07.2003 by referring to a Special Inspection Report of the Corporation dated 20.02.2001 in which there were six cases and the authorities had charged 18 % interest from the employees for violating LTC Rule 19 (vii) for not refunding the outstanding advances even beyond the time limit given to the management for recovery, from the next pay bill of the employee. However, in the instant case the Disciplinary Authority went beyond the aforesaid suggestions and also went beyond the memo of charges on the basis of which the disciplinary proceeding had been initiated and such an order of the Disciplinary Authority was affirmed by the Appellate Authority and the Chairman of the Corporation. 35. The respondents authorities also completely failed to appreciate the Circular of Central Office of the Vigilance Department, namely Vig./Misc./46 dated 27.08.2003 (Annexure-10) circulated to all the Heads of Zonal Office and all the Senior/Divisional Managers giving guidelines in vigilance matter for necessary action. Clause 1 (a) of the Circular specifically provided that vigilance intervention is not required where the misconduct involved is only delay in refund/adjustment of the advances sanctioned. In the said circumstances the reliance of the respondents upon any vigilance case cannot be held to be tenable in law, as the instant matter is beyond the purview of any such vigilance case as per the aforesaid circular. 36. Considering the specific provisions detailed in the Staff Regulation of the Corporation, the LTC Rules and the guidelines of Vigilance Department, it is quite apparent that the impugned action of the authorities concerned and the orders passed by them, which are under challenge in the instant case, are illegal, arbitrary and perverse and are also against the principles laid down by the Courts of Law in their respective decisions mentioned above. 37. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and orders dated 10.11.2004, 14.06.2005 and 15.02.2006 (Annexure-5 series) passed by the Senior Divisional Manager, LIC, Muzaffarpur, the Zonal Manager LIC Eastern Zone Kolkata (the Appellate Authority) and the Chairman of LIC, Mumbai are hereby quashed and the authorities of the respondent-Corporation are directed to refund the entire amount, which they had deducted from the pay of the petitioner in accordance with the aforesaid impugned orders, within three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.