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2012 DIGILAW 862 (GAU)

Partha Sharathi Baidya v. State of Tripura

2012-07-20

SUBHASIS TALAPATRA

body2012
JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J. 1. By this petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as CrPC), the order dated 16.07.2011 as passed by the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in Criminal Revision No. 21 (3) of 2010, whereby the challenge as projected against the order for framing of charge against the petitioners was shot down. The prosecution against the petitioners herein was launched at the instance of one Kshirmohan Debnath who filed an ejahar to the Officer- in-charge, East Agartala Police Station, alleging amongst other things that the petitioners and their relative, one Sajal Sarkar fell down and had stolen away two Gamai trees from his land. The land from where those two trees were allegedly taken away was, in the occupation of the informant and was duly parted by the original owner. Thereafter, the petitioners and that Sajal Sarkar kept the said trees in the house of one Swapan Ghosh of the locality. The informant also suspected involvement of that Swapan Ghosh in the alleged incident of theft. The informant assessed the value of the trees at Rs.1,000/- approximately. On the basis of the said ejahar dated 28.07.2008, East Agartala P.S. Case No. 115/08, under Sections 379 of IPC was registered. After investigation, the charge sheet was filed on having a prima facie case against the petitioners. The Investigating Officer, who filed the charge sheet, stated in the brief fact of the case that in course of investigation the previous IO also issued a letter to the Forest Range Officer, Sadar, to furnish the details regarding some wooden logs which were seized from Baldakhal, the place of occurrence of the case. The Forest Range Officer intimated that as no claimant appeared before them, the Forest Department confiscated the same. The previous IO also examined and recorded the statement of the Forest Range Officer. The charge sheet was filed vide East Agartala P.S. C/S. No. 32/ 2009, dated 07.03.2009 under Section 379 of IPC against the present petitioners by the Investigating Officer who completed the further investigation. The other accused person was not sent up for trial as no materials were available against him during the investigation. On taking cognizance, the case was taken up for framing of charge. On 30.03.2010, the said Judicial Magistrate took up the matter for hearing on framing of the charge. The other accused person was not sent up for trial as no materials were available against him during the investigation. On taking cognizance, the case was taken up for framing of charge. On 30.03.2010, the said Judicial Magistrate took up the matter for hearing on framing of the charge. In the hearing, learned defence counsel raised a question that the informant was not the owner of the land at the relevant point of time and no possession was not taken by the informant from the original land owner. He further submitted that there is no eye witness of the alleged occurrence. The Judicial Magistrate discarded the said contention holding that there is no legal requirement that only the registered owner can lodge the ejahar unless the alleged offence is covered by the provisions of Sections 195 to 199 of Cr. P.C. Relevant part of the observations of the Judicial Magistrate is excerpted hereunder: In the said statement recorded under Section 161, Cr. P.C. of the original land owner. Keshab Ghosh, I find that the said witness categorically stated that before selling his land, he has not sold out the 2(two) trees in question to anybody. The other witnesses, in their statements recorded under Section 161, Cr. P.C., though have stated that the original land owner sold out the 2 (two) trees In question for Rs.1,100/- to the accused persons, but in my opinion, at this stage there is no evidence before the court to rely on the statements given either by the said witnesses or by the original land owner. This observation also applied to the contention raised by Ld. Defence Counsel that the seized goods do not tally with the statement of the complainant given in the FIR. It would be pertinent to add here that the letter addressed to the O.C., East Agartala PS by the Forest Range Officer. Sadar Range, Agartala, as present in the case record, does not mention anything about the valuation of the seized trees. Ld. Defence Counsel also argued that the case firstly ended in FR(T) and later, on the basis of a new and afreshed investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the accused persons. But the IO submitting the charge sheet did not re-examine the earlier witnesses and no explanation is given by him for this, in the charge sheet. Ld. Defence Counsel also argued that the case firstly ended in FR(T) and later, on the basis of a new and afreshed investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the accused persons. But the IO submitting the charge sheet did not re-examine the earlier witnesses and no explanation is given by him for this, in the charge sheet. I find that the 10 submitting the charge sheet has recorded the statements of 3 Nos. of new witnesses, under Section 161, Cr. P.C. Now, those statement cannot at all be negated or thrown out altogether due to any lacuna, if at all on the part of the I.O. Regarding the decisions cited by the Ld. Defence Counsel, i.e., AIR 1997 SC 2041 , (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2006 CRJJ 3123, I find the principle enshnned regarding framing of charge do not find application in this case, I find that the contentions raised by Ld. Defence Counsel are all matters which are subject to proof during the trial of the case. It is also found that the alleged guilt of the accused persons are something about which nothing can be hold at this stage without conducting full fledged trial of this case. Hence, I reject the objection raised by Ld. Defence Counsel against framing of charge in this case. 2. Being aggrieved by that order dated 30.03.2010 as passed in GR : No. 614/2008 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, the Criminal Revision was filed in the Court of the Sessions, West Tripura, Agartala, being Criminal Revision No. 21(3)/2010 and the said Criminal Revision was disposed of by the impugned order dated 16.07.2011, whereby the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, has recorded his reasonings as under: It appears East Agartala P.S. Case No. 115/ 08 was ended in charge sheet submitted before the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala and in consideration of that charge sheet, the Ld, Chief Judicial Magistrate taken cognizance of offence punishable under Section 379 of IPC against the accused-petitioners and the case was transferred to the file of Ld. Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Court No. 4, Agartala for trial and disposal The Court below heard Ld. Counsel of both sides on 22.03.2010 and passed impugned order dated 30.03.2010 directing framing of charge against both the accused persons for commission of offence punishable under Section 379 of IPC. Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Court No. 4, Agartala for trial and disposal The Court below heard Ld. Counsel of both sides on 22.03.2010 and passed impugned order dated 30.03.2010 directing framing of charge against both the accused persons for commission of offence punishable under Section 379 of IPC. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order directing framing of charge, the accused-petitioners preferred the present revisional application on different grounds. Ld. Counsel of the petitioners has submitted that the FIR was lodged by a person alleging theft who had no dominion over the property and that after investigation, police submitted final report, but on reinvestigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused persons, but it was without any cogent evidence. The evidence and materials on record does not justify framing of charge for commission of offence under Section 379 of IPC. In the circumstances, Ld. Counsel prayed for allowing the revisional application and discharging the accused persons from the liability of the case. Ld, P.P., on the other hand, has submitted that the Ld. Magistrate has passed a reasoned order touching all the points raised by the Ld. Counsel for accused persons and there is no defect in the order to interfere by this Revisional Court. Ld, P.P., therefore, prayed for dismissal of the revision application. Section 397 Cr. P.C. empowers the Sessions Court to call for and examining the records of any proceeding pending before any inferior criminal court situated within its jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior court. In the present case, as I find, cognizance was taken considering the materials on record and thereafter, Ld. Magistrate heard both sides and arrived at a conclusion that charge should be framed against the accused persons on the basis of the materials already on record. Section 239 and 240 of Cr. P.C. is relevant here for reference which runs as follows :- 239. When accused shall be discharged. Magistrate heard both sides and arrived at a conclusion that charge should be framed against the accused persons on the basis of the materials already on record. Section 239 and 240 of Cr. P.C. is relevant here for reference which runs as follows :- 239. When accused shall be discharged. If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, an record his reasons for so doing. 240. Framing of charge. (1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. Under Section 239 Cr. P.C. the Magistrate is empowered to discharge the accused only in the event that after consideration of the materials on record, the Magistrate found the allegation to be groundless. Section 240 CrPC has prescribed that if the Magistrate has found that there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under that Chapter, the Magistrate is competent to frame charge. In the present case, as I find, the points raised by the Ld. Defence Counsel are points relevant to be raised at the time of trial and not before. It is premature to say that there is no criminal offence committed by the accused persons. There is no illegality, impropriety or incorrectness in the order passed by the Ld. Magistrate. I find no reason at all to interfere with the order and hence, the revision application stands dismissed. 3. Mr. B.N. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the considerations of both tile Judicial Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are not based on the cogent reasons and the law as settled. Magistrate. I find no reason at all to interfere with the order and hence, the revision application stands dismissed. 3. Mr. B.N. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the considerations of both tile Judicial Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are not based on the cogent reasons and the law as settled. Even though the allegations are ex facie groundless and the petitioners were entitled to get discharge from the allegations, the Sessions Judge had affirmed the finding of the Judicial Magistrate by the impugned order and held that no interference was called for. 4. At the outset, Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing for the State-respondent raised objection that the present petition filed under Section 482 of CrPC is the second revision in disguise. The first revision as has been shot down by the Sessions Judge and this petition being the second revision for all purposes is not maintainable in view of Section 397(3) of CrPC, which stipulates that if an application under this Section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by either of them. In support of his contention, Mr. Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor relied a decision of the Apex Court as rendered in Rajathi Vs. C. Ganesan, as reported in (1999) 6 SCC 326 , where the Apex Court held that the powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. are not the substitute for the second revision under Section 397(3) of Cr. P.C. 5. To meet the question of maintainability as raised by Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Mr. B.N. Majumder, learned counsel for the petitioners also relied few decisions of the Apex Court and various High Courts, contending that even after the first revision is dismissed or rejected, the High Court is not prevented from exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. in appropriate cases for securing the ends of justice. 6. In Krishnan & Anr. Vs. Krishnaveni & Anr., as reported in AIR 1997 SC 987 , the Apex Court held: 6, Section 401 of the Code gives to every High Court power of revision. P.C. in appropriate cases for securing the ends of justice. 6. In Krishnan & Anr. Vs. Krishnaveni & Anr., as reported in AIR 1997 SC 987 , the Apex Court held: 6, Section 401 of the Code gives to every High Court power of revision. Sub-section (1) of the said section provides that in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Sections 386, 389 and 391 and on a Court of Sessions by Section 307. Apart from the express power under Section 397(1) the High Court has been invested with suo motu power under Section 401 to exercise revisional powers. In addition, Section 482 saves inherent powers of the High Court postulating that "Nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." Section 483 enjoins upon every High Court to so exercise its continuous superintendence over the Courts of Judicial Magistrates subordinate to it as to ensure that there is an expeditious and proper disposal of cases by such Magistrates. It is, therefore, clear that the power of the High Court of continuous supervisory jurisdiction is of paramount importance to examine correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed as also regularity of the proceedings of all inferior Criminal Courts. It has been further held in Krishnan(supra) as follows: 9. The inherent power of the High Court is not one conferred by the Code but one which the High Court already has in it and which is preserved by the Code. The object of Section 397(3) is to put a bar on simultaneous revisional applications to the High Court and the Court of Sessions so as to prevent unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. As seen, under Sub-section (3) of Section 397, revisional jurisdiction can be invoked by "any person" but the Code has not defined the word 'person'. The object of Section 397(3) is to put a bar on simultaneous revisional applications to the High Court and the Court of Sessions so as to prevent unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. As seen, under Sub-section (3) of Section 397, revisional jurisdiction can be invoked by "any person" but the Code has not defined the word 'person'. However, under Section 11 of the IPC, 'person' includes any Company or Association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. The word 'person' would, therefore, include not only the natural person but also juridical person in whatever form designated and whether incorporated or not: By implication, the State stands excluded from the purview of the word 'person' for the purpose of limiting its right to avail the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Code for the reason that the State, being the prosecutor of the offender; is enjoined to conduct prosecution on behalf of the society and to take such remedial steps as to deems proper The object behind criminal law is to maintain law, public order, stability as also peace and progress in the society. Generally, private complaints under Section 202 of the Code are laid in respect of non-cognizance offences or when it is found that police has failed to perform its duty under Chapter XII of the Code or to report as mistake of fact In view of the principle laid down in the maxim Ex debito justitiae, i.e., in accordance with the requirements of justice, the prohibition under Section 397(3) on revisional power given to the High Court would not apply when the State seeks revision under Section 401. So the State is not prohibited to avail the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. 10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/ complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code, So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the Courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when expeditious trial is conducted. 11. In Madhu Limaye, Vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 , a three-Judge Bench was to consider the scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482 and Section 397(2) of the Code. This Court held that the bar on the power of revision was put in order to facilitate expedient disposal of the cases but in Section 482 it is provided that nothing in the Code, which would include Section 397(2) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. On an harmonious construction of said two provisions in this behalf, it was held that though the High Court has no power of revision in an interlocutory order; still the inherent power will come into play when there is no provision for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. On an harmonious construction of said two provisions in this behalf, it was held that though the High Court has no power of revision in an interlocutory order; still the inherent power will come into play when there is no provision for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In that case, when allegations of defamatory statements were published In the newspapers against the Law Minister, the State Government had decided to prosecute the appellant for offence under Section 500 IPC. After obtaining the sanction on a complaint made by the public prosecutor, cognizance of the commission of the offence by the appellant was taken to take trial in the Sessions Court. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The Sessions Judge rejected all the contentions and framed the charges under Section 406. The order of the Sessions Judge was challenged in revision in the High Court on a preliminary objection raised on the maintainability, this Court held that power of the High Court to entertain the revision was not taken away under Section 397 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code. 12. In V.C. Shukla Vs. State through CBI: ( (1980) 2 SCR 380 : AIR 1980 SC 962 at p.967) a four-Judge Bench per majority had held that Sub-section (3) of Section 397, however; does not limit at all the inherent powers of the High Court contained in Section 482. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Court under Section 397(1) of the Code. In Rajan Kumar Manchanda case, (1990 Supp SCC 132) (supra), the case relating to release of a truck from attachment, obviously on filing of an interlocutory application. It was contended that there was prohibition on the revision by operation of Section 397(2) of the Code. In that context it was held that it was not revisable under Section 482 in exercise of inherent powers by operation of Sub-section (3) of Section 397. On the facts in that case, it was held that by virtue of provisions contained in Section 397(3) the revision is not maintainable. In that context it was held that it was not revisable under Section 482 in exercise of inherent powers by operation of Sub-section (3) of Section 397. On the facts in that case, it was held that by virtue of provisions contained in Section 397(3) the revision is not maintainable. In Dharam Pal case (1993 AIR SCW-303) (supra) which related to the exercise of power to issue an order of attachment under Section 146 of the Code, it was held that the inherent power under Section 482 was prohibited On the facts in that case it could be said that the learned Judges would be justified in holding that it was not revisable since it was prohibitory interim order of attachment covered under Section 397(2) of the Code but the observations of the learned Judges that the High Court had no power under Section 482 of the Code were not correct in view of the ratio of this Court in Madhu Limaye's case ( AIR 1978 SC 47 ) (supra) as upheld in V.C. Shukla's case ( AIR 1980 SC 962 ) (supra) and also in view of our observations stated earlier The ratio in Deepti's case (1995) (7) JT (SC) 175) (supra) is also not apposite to the facts in the present case. To the contrary, in that case an application for discharge of the accused was filed in the Court of Magistrate for an offence under Section 498A, IPC. The learned Magistrate and the Sessions Judge dismissed the petition In the revision at the instance of the accused, on a wrong concession made by the counsel appearing for the State that the record did not contain allegations constituting the offence under Section 498A, the High Court without applying its mind had discharged the accused. On appeal, this Court after going through the record noted that the concession made by the counsel was wrong. The record did contain the allegations to prove the charge under Section 498A, IPC. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, had committed an error of law in discharging the accused leading to the miscarriage of justice, in that context this Court held that the order of the Sessions Judge operated as a bar to entertain the application under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, had committed an error of law in discharging the accused leading to the miscarriage of justice, in that context this Court held that the order of the Sessions Judge operated as a bar to entertain the application under Section 482 of the Code. In view of the fact that the order of the High Court had led to the miscarriage of justice, this Court had set aside the order of the High Court and confirmed that of the Magistrate. 7. Krishnan (supra) was also followed by various High Courts, Mr. B.N. Majumder, learned counsel for the petitioners also relied a decision rendered by the Punjab & Harayana High Court in Rakesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab &Anr., as decided on 22.01.2009 in Criminal Misc. No. M-18404 of 2008. It has been held therein that the framing of charge was challenged by the petitioner before the Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana by way of a revision petition and the said petition was eventually dismissed. Maintainability of the said petition filed under Section 482 Cr. P.C. was raised on relying some decisions as rendered in (1) Darshan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, as reported in 1996 (1) RCR (Cri) 464, (2) Rajinder Prasad Vs. Bashir, as reported in 2001 (4) RCR (Cri) 312 and (3) Deepti Vs. Akhil Raj, as reported in 1995 (3) RCR (Cri) 638. Following the ratio as laid down in Krishanan(supra), it has been held: So far as the decision in Darshan Singh's case (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the complainant, is concerned, there it was held that the second revision petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C was not maintainable as disputed questions of fact were involved in the case. In Deepti's case (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court could not interfere simply on the basis of the statement of the State Govt. as there was sufficient material on record to frame charge against the accused under Section 498A IPC. In Rajinder Prasad's case (supra) the order, whereby the cognizance taken by the Magistrate was set aside by the High Court was challenged in the Apex Court and it was held that since the revision petition filed under Section 397 CrPC had been rejected by Criminal Misc. In Rajinder Prasad's case (supra) the order, whereby the cognizance taken by the Magistrate was set aside by the High Court was challenged in the Apex Court and it was held that since the revision petition filed under Section 397 CrPC had been rejected by Criminal Misc. No. M-18404 of 2008 10 the High Court then the aggrieved party had no right to file a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. with a prayer for quashing the same order. In Rishi Anand vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2002 SC 1531 , the Apex Court quashed the FIR under Section 482 CrPC because there were no allegations of specific nature to connect the accused with the alleged offence under Section 406 IPC. There was nothing in the FIR to show that the articles were entrusted to the accused at the time of marriage. The accused had gone to USA after his brief stay in India. In Prasanta Kumar vs. The State of West Bengal, AIR 2003 SC 4412 , the High Court had declined to entertain a petition under Section 482/ 401 CrPC on the ground that the second revision petition was not maintainable. The judgment of the High Court was set aside that petition could not be dismissed on this technical ground and the High Court should have gone out into the merit of the case to find out if it was a fit case to interfere in revision. Reliance was placed on the decision in Krishanan's case (supra). 8. The legal position as summed up by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rajesh Kumar (supra) that the Court is not expected to throw out a case on technicalities but is expected to interfere whenever there surfaced probable failure of justice or abuse of judicial mechanism or procedure. This Court is not expected to be a mere silent spectator when it is made out that that criminal prosecution is an abuse of process of the Court. This Court, in its discretion, is expected to prevent the abuse of process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. Another case in the similar line was relied on by Mr. B.N. Majumder, learned counsel for the petitioners as rendered by the Madras High Court in Tmt. A. Vimala Vs. Thiru. N. Alaguvel Nadar, as decided on 01.07.2009 in Criminal Crl. P.C. Another case in the similar line was relied on by Mr. B.N. Majumder, learned counsel for the petitioners as rendered by the Madras High Court in Tmt. A. Vimala Vs. Thiru. N. Alaguvel Nadar, as decided on 01.07.2009 in Criminal Crl. R.C. SR No. 14455 of 2009, wherein it was held: To prevent abuse of the process, the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified under appropriate circumstances to exercise the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. The Delhi High Court also in K.K. Mohta Vs. The Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax, as decided on 23-03-2009 in Crl M.C. 6325/2006, held that the scope of interference by this Court in such cases under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would depend on the facts of the particular case. In other words, the merits of the case would necessarily have to be examined in order to determine if interference under Section 482 is called for. On the scope and ambit of Section 482 of Cr. P.C.., this Court would like to have a journey into the precedence. 10. In Jagir Singh Vs. Ranhir Singh & Anr., as reported in AIR 1979 SC 381 , the Apex Court held: 5. In order to cross the hurdle imposed by Section 397(3) it was suggested that the revision application before the High Court could be treated as an application directed against the order of the Sessions Judge instead of an one directed against the order of the Magistrate. We do not think that it is permissible to do so. What may not be done directly cannot be allowed to be done indirectly; that would be an evasion of the statute. It is a "well-known principle of law that the provisions of an Act of Parliament shall not be evaded by shift or contrivance" (per Abbott CJ. in Fox Vs. Bishop of Chester: (1824) 2 B & C 635 "To carry out effectually the object of a Statute, it must be construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined" (Maxwell, 11th edition, page 109), When the Sessions Judge refused to interfere with the order of the Magistrate, the High Court's jurisdiction was invoked to avoid the order of the Magistrate and not that of the Sessions Judge. The bar of Section 397(3) was, therefore, effectively attracted and the bar could not be circumvented by the subterfuge of treating the revision application as directed against the Session Judge's order. 6. If the revision application to the High Court could not be maintained under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, could the order of the High Court be sustained under Article 227 of the Constitution, as now suggested by the respondent? In the first place the High Court did not purport to exercise its power of superintendence under Article 227. The power under Article, 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to the order of the High Court such source of power when the High Court itself did not, in terms, purport to exercise any such discretionary power. In the second place the power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 could only be exercised, sparingly, to keep subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Where the statute banned the exercise of revisional powers by the High Court, it would indeed require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, since the power of Superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. In the third place it was doubtful if the High Court could exercise any power of judicial superintendence on the date of its order as the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act had by then been passed. By the 42nd Amendment Act Clause (5) was added in Article 227 of the Constitution and it says "Nothing in this article shall be construed as giving to a High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior Court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision." Clause (5) of Article 227 introduced by the 42nd Amendment Act is a verbatim reproduction of Sub-Section (2) of Section 224 of the Government of India Act 1935 which it was held conferred powers of administrative superintendence only and not the power of Judicial Superintendence. In the present case the revision application was, however, filed before the passing of the 42nd Amendment Act and it was therefore, argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the High Court could exercise the power of superintendence possessed by it before the 42nd Amendment. In the present case the revision application was, however, filed before the passing of the 42nd Amendment Act and it was therefore, argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the High Court could exercise the power of superintendence possessed by it before the 42nd Amendment. We have serious doubts Article 227 before the 42nd Amendment gave no right to any party. An application invoking the High Court's power of Superintendence did not create any vested right in the suitor. There could therefore, be no question of any vested right being taken away or not being taken away by the amendment. It was just a question whether the High Court possessed the power of Superintendence on the date of the High Court's order there is no dispute that it did not. We do not wish to pursue the matter further as in our view there was no case to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. In Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi Vs. State of Maharashtra, as reported in 2008 AIR SCW 5043, the Apex Court held: 15. It is trite that the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" appearing in the Section postulate exercise of judicial mind on the part of the Judge to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. However, in assessing this fact the Judge has the power to sift and weigh the material for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine a prima facie case depends upon the facts of each case and in this regard it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large, however, if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. At this stage, he is not to see as to whether the trial will end in conviction or not. The broad test to be applied is whether the materials on record, if unrebutted, makes a conviction reasonably possible. At this stage, he is not to see as to whether the trial will end in conviction or not. The broad test to be applied is whether the materials on record, if unrebutted, makes a conviction reasonably possible. [See: State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh: (1977) 4 SCC 39 and Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 4 ] 12. In P. Vijayan Vs. State of Kerala & Anr., as reported in 2010 AIR SCW 886, the Apex Court held: 10. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further: the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the Court, after the trial starts. At the stage of Section, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 13. In Rajinder Prasad Vs. Bashir & Ors., as reported in 2002 CRI. L.J. 90, the Apex Court held: 7. We are of the opinion that when the earlier revision petition filed under Section 397 of the Code had been dismissed as not pressed, the accused-respondents could not be allowed to invoke the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code for the grant of the same relief. L.J. 90, the Apex Court held: 7. We are of the opinion that when the earlier revision petition filed under Section 397 of the Code had been dismissed as not pressed, the accused-respondents could not be allowed to invoke the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code for the grant of the same relief. We do not agree with the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents that as the earlier application had been dismissed as not pressed, the accused had acquired a right to challenge the order adding the offence under Section 395 of the Code and arraying four persons as accused-persons by way of subsequent petition under Section 482 of the Code - The object of criminal trial is to render public justice and to assure punishment to the criminals keeping in view that the trial is concluded expeditiously. Delaying tactics or protracting the commencement or conclusion of the criminal trial are required to be curbed effectively, least the interest of public justice may suffer. For exercising power under Section 482 of the Code the learned Judge of the High Court relied upon a judgment of this Court in Krishnan v. Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SC 241. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment, however, shows that the reliance by the learned Judge was misplaced. This Court in Krishnan's case (supra) had held that though the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is very wide, yet the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. Only in cause where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, It was further held, "ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person -accused/complaint -cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code." 8. We are of the opinion that no special circumstances were spelt out in the subsequent application for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and the impugned order is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. 14. In Kirpalsingh Pratapsingh Ori Vs. Balvinder Kaur Hardipsingh Lobana & Anr. as reported in 2004 CRI L.J. 3786, the Apex Court held: 16. I have considered the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respective party and some other decisions of the Apex Court and I do not think it necessary to enlist those decisions which are taken into consideration for the purpose of the present proceedings. But ultimately one balanced principle has emerged that the petitions invoking inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. after dismissal/ disposal or revision application under Section 397 Cr. P.C. read with Section 401 Cr. P.C. are not maintainable by the same party, more so when no special circumstances are made out. The gist of this ratio is reflected in the decision reported in AIR 2001 SC 3524 : 2002 Cri. LJ 90 in the case of Rajinder Prasad vs. Bashir. It was contended before the Apex Court that as the earlier revision petition filed by the accused persons under Section 397 of the Code has been rejected by the High Court vide order dated 13.7.1990, they had no right to file the petition under Section 482 of the Code with prayer for qushing the same order While dealing with the above contention the Apex Court observed that (Para 7): ....... We do not agree with the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents that as the earlier application had been dismissed as not pressed, the accused had acquired a right to challenge the order adding the offence under Section 395 of the Code.,, (i.e. IPC) It is farther observed that (Para 8): We are of the opinion that no special circumstances were spelt out in the subsequent application for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and the impugned order is liable to be set side on this ground alone.... 17. 17. So can be legitimately argued and inferred and held that in all cases where the petitioners are able to satisfy this court that there are special circumstances which can be clearly spelt out, subsequent application invoking INHERENT powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. can be moved and cannot be thrown away on the technical argument as to its sustainability. The Apex Court in case of Rajendra Prasad (supra) was dealing with a case related to first part of Section 482 CrPC but when it comes to third part, the approach should remain more pragmatic and indirect relegation to Supreme Court, if legally possible, can be prevented. 18. In the case of Krishnan vs. Krtshnsvenl, reported in (1997) 4 SCC 241 : 1997 Cri LJ 1519 the Apex Court has held that though the inherent power of the High Court is very wide, yet the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may in its discretion prevent the abuse of process or miscarriage of justice by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. 15. In Dharampal & Ors. Vs. Ramshri & Ors., as reported in (1993) 1 SCC 435 , the Apex Court held: 6. There is no doubt that the learned Magistrate had committed an error in passing the subsequent orders of attachment when the first attachment was never finally vacated and had revived the moment the revision application filed against it was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge. It appears that none of the parties including the Sessions Judge realised this error on the part of the Magistrate. The learned Sessions Judge had also committed a patent mistake in entertaining revision application against the fresh orders of attachment and granting interim stays when he had dismissed revision application against the order of attachment earlier. Let that be as it is. The question that falls for our consideration now is whether the High Court could have utilised the powers under Section 482 of the Code and entertained a second revision application at the instance of the respondent 1. Let that be as it is. The question that falls for our consideration now is whether the High Court could have utilised the powers under Section 482 of the Code and entertained a second revision application at the instance of the respondent 1. Admittedly the respondent 1 had preferred a Criminal Application being Cr. R. No. 180 of 1978 to the Sessions Court against the order passed by the Magistrate on October 17, 1978 withdrawing the attachment. The Sessions Judge had dismissed the said application on May 14, 1979, Section 397(3) bars a second revision application by the same party. It is now well-settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Hence the High Court had clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of respondent 1. On this short ground itself, the impugned order of the High Court can be set aside. 16. In Ganesh Narayan Hegde Vs. S. Bangarappa & Ors., as reported in (1995) 4 SCC 41 , the Apex Court held: 12. While it is true that availing of the remedy of the revision to the Sessions Judge under Section 399 does not bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court under Section 482, it is equally true that the High Court should not act as a second Revisional Court under the garb of exercising inherent powers. While exercising its inherent power in such a matter it must be conscious of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory power in the matter The High Court should interfere only where it is satisfied that if the complaint is allowed to be proceeded with, it would amount to abuse of process of Court or that the interests of justice otherwise call for quashing of the charges. A few decision of this Court may usefully be referred at this stage. In Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, this Court stated in a case of similar nature: (SCC pp. 687-88, paras 3 and 4) Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of Court. A few decision of this Court may usefully be referred at this stage. In Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, this Court stated in a case of similar nature: (SCC pp. 687-88, paras 3 and 4) Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to be High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant the ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. The High Court without proper application of the principles that have been laid down by this Court in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, S. Trilok Singh v. Satya Deo Tripathi and Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Purshotam Das Jhunjhunwala, proceeded to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all the probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrived at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed against all the respondents. The High Court was clearly in error in assessing the material before it and concluding that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. We find there are specific allegations in the complaint disclosing the ingredients of the offence taken cognizance of It is for the complainant to substantiate the allegations by evidence at a later stage. The High Court was clearly in error in assessing the material before it and concluding that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. We find there are specific allegations in the complaint disclosing the ingredients of the offence taken cognizance of It is for the complainant to substantiate the allegations by evidence at a later stage. In the absence of circumstances to hold prima facie that the complaint is frivolous when the complaint does disclose the commission of an offence there is no justification for the High Court to interfere. 13. To the same effect is the holding in another decision in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, This Court said : (SCC pp. 662-63, para 15) It is trite that jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P.C., which saves the inherent power of the High Court, to make such order as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. In exercising that jurisdiction the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate when the evidence comes before him. Though it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any inflexible rules to regulate that jurisdiction, one thing, however, appears clear and it is that when the High Court is called upon to exercise this jurisdiction to quash a proceeding at the stage of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence the High Court is guided by the allegations, whether those allegations, set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet, do not in law constitute or spell out any offence and that resort to criminal proceedings would, in the circumstances, amount to an abuse of the process of the court or not. 14. Examined from the above stand point it would be evident that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has really gone beyond the purview of Section 482 in quashing the charge. 14. Examined from the above stand point it would be evident that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has really gone beyond the purview of Section 482 in quashing the charge. He has not held that the evidence adduced by the complainant, oral and documentary, if unrebutted, would not have warranted the conviction of the accused within meaning of Section 245(1) nor has he held that on the evidence adduced, the learned Magistrate could not have reasonably formed an opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, as contemplated by Section 246(1). The learned counsel for the respondent has laid great stress upon the observations of the learned Magistrate in Para 26 of his order, which reads: A-1 has challenged the evidence, of all these witnesses generally and more particularly of the evidence of PW 1- the complainant. In my opinion at his stage, the evidentiary value of the documents and creditability of witnesses cannot be considered in view of the settled principle by Supreme Court of India in the decisions cited supra. All the contentions advanced on behalf of accused persons, could be weighed at the time of final disposal of the matter. Therefore I am rather constrained to refrain from examining any of the contentions canvassed for the accused or considering the repercussions made of cross examination of witnesses, lest any observations made by me may prejudice either of the parties at the time of trial. Further the evidence referred to in Section 245, relates to evidence before charge. Therefore I do not propose to examine any of the contentions urged for accused No. 1 during the course of arguments and about the decisions cited at the Bar on behalf of accused persons. 15. The learned counsel contended that the above observations indicate that the learned Magistrate has not applied his mind to the evidence before him at all and that he has mechanically framed the charge. We do not think that the learned counsel is right. The said observations were made by the learned Magistrate with reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Akbar Dar v. State of J & K referred to in preceding Para 21 and should not be read in isolation. We do not think that the learned counsel is right. The said observations were made by the learned Magistrate with reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Akbar Dar v. State of J & K referred to in preceding Para 21 and should not be read in isolation. A reading of the order does show that the learned Magistrate has considered the oral and documentary evidence at length and finally expressed his opinion in paragraph 30 thus: On going through the evidence adduced before court by the complainant at this stage. I am of the considered opinion that there exist grounds to frame charge against A-1 to A-3 for the offence punishable Under Section 500 IPC. In coming to conclusion that charge should be framed against A-1 to A-3, I should not be understood that I have expressed any opinion if made by me during the course of discussions will not come in the way of either parties at the Final disposal of the case on merits. Therefore, for these reasons, I answer the point in the 'AFFIRMATIVE'. 16. The learned Sessions Judge who examined the order of the learned Magistrate has also expressed the opinion that since the magistrate has framed the charge on a proper consideration of oral and documentary evidence and on forming the requisite opinion, no interference is called for. As against this, the judgment of the High Court shows that it has entered into the merits of the case and pronounced upon the truth and correctness of the complaint and the defence, as would be evident from the following observations: 17. In Para 23 the learned Judge states that the oral evidence should have been considered alongwith the documentary evidence and that if that had been done, the learned magistrate, would have came to the conclusion that the imputation made by the accused is "neither intentional nor it amounted in lowering the reputation of the complainant in the estimation of general public and the context in which such a statement was made". In Para 24 the learned Judge states that the courts below has not considered the evidence of the witnesses properly and that it has merely picked out those portions from evidence which are against the accused and relied upon them for framing the charge. In Para 24 the learned Judge states that the courts below has not considered the evidence of the witnesses properly and that it has merely picked out those portions from evidence which are against the accused and relied upon them for framing the charge. In Para 25 the learned Judge observed that the documents and statements of the witnesses were not properly taken into consideration by the courts below and that the reasons assigned by the learned Magistrate for framing the charge are not convincing in nature. Then in Para 26, the learned Judge says that for the reasons given by him, the courts below must be held to have acted without applying their mind to the relevant material. In Para 27, learned Judge records a finding that the complaint was more a matter of mere prestige for both the parties who belong to different political parties and that it is not a genuine proceeding. In our opinion, while acting under Section 482 and that too after the learned Sessions Judge had declined to interfere in the matter, the High Court ought not to have entered the arena of appreciation of evidence nor should it have recorded a finding that the complaint was the result of political differences or that it was more a matter of prestige than a genuine proceeding. The last-mentioned conclusion is drawn from the averments in the complaint, from the fact that the complainant is pursuing the complaint and from the ipse dixit of the accused; we are unable to appreciate this reasoning. 18. With respect to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that after a period of twelve years, the matter should not be allowed to be proceeded with we must say that the complainant is certainly not responsible for this delay. The learned counsel did not even made such a suggestion. Moreover, this contention does not appear to have been raised before the High Court. (The judgment of the High Court is dated 16.6.92.) We do not know who is responsible for this delay. As observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Special Courts Bill 1978 SC, 442:(para 15) It is common knowledge that currently in our country criminal courts excel in slow motion. (The judgment of the High Court is dated 16.6.92.) We do not know who is responsible for this delay. As observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Special Courts Bill 1978 SC, 442:(para 15) It is common knowledge that currently in our country criminal courts excel in slow motion. The procedure is dilatory; the dockets are heavy, even the service of process is delayed and still more exasperating there are appeals upon appeals and revisions and supervisory jurisdictions, baffling and baulking speedy termination of prosecutions. (emphasis supplied) The slow-motion becomes much slower motion when politically powerful or rich and influential persons figure as accused FIRs are quashed. Charges are quashed. Interlocutory orders are interfered with. At every step, there will be revisions and applications for quashing and writ petitions. In short, no progress is ever allowed to be made. And if ever the case reaches the stage or trial after all these interruptions, the time would have taken its own toll: the witnesses are won over; evidence disappears; the prosecution loses interest - the result is an all too familiar one, We are sad to say that repeated admonitions of this Court have not deterred superior courts from interfering at initial or interlocutory stages or criminal cases. Such interference should be only in exceptional cases where the interests of justice demand it; it cannot be a matter of course. In the circumstances, we cannot acceded to the said contention. 17. In Dilawar Balu Kurane Vs. State of Maharashtra, as reported in (2002) 2 SCC 135 , the Apex Court held: 12. Now the next question is whether a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant. In the circumstances, we cannot acceded to the said contention. 17. In Dilawar Balu Kurane Vs. State of Maharashtra, as reported in (2002) 2 SCC 135 , the Apex Court held: 12. Now the next question is whether a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant. In exercising powers under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the settled position of law is that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under the said section has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge the accused, and in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trail (See Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal). 18. In State of Punjab Vs. Kasturi Lal & Ors., as reported in (2004) 12 SCC 195 , the Apex Court held: 10. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible not desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts, All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice. While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, courts exist Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complainant, the court may examine the question of fact. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complainant, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 19. The law as it appears is no more res integra as to whether the bar as provided under Section 397(3) Cr. P.C. would create an absolute bar for the High Court to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. In appropriate cases, to secure the ends of justice even a decision as rendered under Section 397(1) Cr. P.C. by the sub-ordinate court can be interfered by the Court but this can only be done where there is glaring abuse of the justice mechanism or where a possibility of sheer miscarriage of justice is apparent. On the other hand, the challenge from the order of the revision under Section 482 CrPC shall not be discarded on the face of it but on the merit of each case. 20. Situated thus, it is required that the materials as placed before the said Judicial Magistrate be examined by this court whether there were materials for framing the charge or not. 21. Since this is a case from a police report, the materials as appended thereto will be of relevance. The Investigating Officer has examined as many as eight witnesses namely, Khir Mohan Debnath (complainant), Keshab Ghosh, Rajib Ghosh, Bimal Das, Atul Debbarma, Lal Mohan Sen, Tapan Majumder and Tarak Dey. Without prejudice it appears from the ejahar as filed on 28.07.2008 that on 15.05.2008 the petitioners have been alleged of taking away two gamai trees from the land under the contract of sale. It has been categorically alleged against the petitioners that the owner of the land, Sri Keshab Ghosh also did not permit for taking away the said gamai trees and those were kept in the house of one Swapan Ghosh of the locality. It is also alleged that the petitioners were aided by their relative namely, Sri Sajal Sarkar. It has been categorically alleged against the petitioners that the owner of the land, Sri Keshab Ghosh also did not permit for taking away the said gamai trees and those were kept in the house of one Swapan Ghosh of the locality. It is also alleged that the petitioners were aided by their relative namely, Sri Sajal Sarkar. The said ejahar was registered as East Agartala P.S. Case No. 115/2008 under Section 379 of IPC and the investigation was undertaken. The hand-sketch map that has been prepared by the Investigating Officer namely, Sri Satya Brata Gupta shows the position of the trees i.e. the place of occurrence, the land of Sri Partha Baidya, the house and lunga of Sri Swapan Ghosh. The informant was initially not happy. Thereafter, further investigation was directed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and a supplementary report was filed on 31.08.2008 by Sri Satya Brata Gupta, Investigating Officer. Earlier the investigation was conducted by Md. Jahangir Hossain and he submitted the police report on 07.03.2009. The charge sheet was filed against the two petitioners as no evidence would be collected against the FIR named accused Sajal Sarkar. Therefore, the materials were collected by the investigation as conducted by Md. Jahangir Hussain and by the further investigation as conducted by Sri Satya Brata Gupta, Investigating Officer. The materials so submitted before the Court below revealed that the owner of the land categorically stated that the land under contract of agreement was having two gamai trees and he could learn from the complainant that petitioners have taken away those gamai trees from the said land. He stated that tile petitioners have stolen away those trees. 22. One Rajib Ghosh stated to the IO that in no uncertain time, the petitioner No. 1 caused the felling of two gamai trees and thereafter removed their trunk to their house and from their house the officials of the Forest Department seized those gamai timbers. But he made a statement that the petitioner No. 1 had purchased those gamai trees from said Keshab Ghosh before the registration of the sale deed in favour of Sri Khir Mohan Debnath. Another witness namely, Bimal Das categorically stated that the petitioners had stolen away two gamai trees from the land under contract He learnt it from Khir Mohan Debnath. He advised Khir Mohan Debnath to inform the matter to the Pradhan of the village. Another witness namely, Bimal Das categorically stated that the petitioners had stolen away two gamai trees from the land under contract He learnt it from Khir Mohan Debnath. He advised Khir Mohan Debnath to inform the matter to the Pradhan of the village. Similarly Atul Debbarma, whose statement has been recorded by the 10 has stated that he also learnt from Sri Khir Mohan Debnath that two garnai trees from the land under contract of sale was dishonestly taken away by the petitioners. He also stated that he could learn from the petitioner No. 1 that Keshab Ghosh sold those gamai trees on consideration of Rs.1100/- and thereafter he caused felling and took away the gamai trees from the land of Keshab Ghosh. Similarly, Lal Mohan Sen, the Forest Range Officer stated that 11 gamai timbers were seized from the Baldakhal area, but none has claimed ownership of those seized timbers. Those were seized for felling without the required permit 23. In the first part of the investigation, the statement of one Tarak Dey was recorded, who stated that the gamai trees which were fell down and taken by the petitioners were seized by the Forest Officers. One Tapan Majumder, whose statement was also recorded in the first part of the investigation, stated that the land was under contract of sale and there two gamai trees were standing and according to the agreement, Khir Mohan Debnath was supposed to get those trees but on 15.05.2008 the petitioner No. 1 caused felling of two gamai trees from the said land under contract and took away the said trees. The felling of gamai trees were caused without permission of Khir Mohan Debnath and Keshab Ghosh. He categorically stated that at the time of felling the trees, the petitioner No. 2 was also present. 24. From a prima facie consideration, it appears that though Keshab Ghosh was owner of the land but it was under contract of sale and thus right in favour of the complainant was definitely created. In the statement, Keshab Ghosh nowhere stated that either he permitted the petitioners to take away the gamai trees on taking any consideration or that he sold those gamai trees to the petitioners. In the statement, Keshab Ghosh nowhere stated that either he permitted the petitioners to take away the gamai trees on taking any consideration or that he sold those gamai trees to the petitioners. One Rajib Ghosh though stated that he heard that the petitioner No. 1 had purchased those trees from Sri Keshab Ghosh on consideration of Rs.1100/-, but he is not the person to say so to exonerate the petitioners. Similar statement was also made by Sri Atul Debbarma. 25. There are sufficient materials to hold that on 15.05.2008 the petitioners caused felling of two gamai trees standing on the land of Keshab Ghosh, which was under contract of sale in favour of the complainant and those gamai trees were taken to the house of Sri Swapan Ghosh, father of Rajib Ghosh who confirmed such story. The other witnesses though heard from the complainant but they have given some materials which may definitely be used for establishing the charge and those trees were seized by the Forest Range Officer namely, Lal Mohan Sen, who corroborated the seizure of the gamai trees from the Baldakhal area. The statement of Anup Karmakar, Tarak Dey and Tapan Majumder are revealing involvement of the petitioners. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that there are materials for framing the charge against the petitioners under Section 379 of IPC. 26. As corollary to this observation, this Court cannot hold that unless the order framing the charge under Section 379 of IPC is quashed there would be glaring abuse of justice mechanism or there would be possibility of sheer miscarriage of justice inasmuch as it is apparent that from the nature of evidence as recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court which ex facie disclosed that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused petitioners so as to frame the charge against them. In view of this, no case has been made warranting interference from this Court and accordingly the petition as filed under Section 482 Cr. P.C. stands dismissed. Send down the LCRs forthwith. Petition dismissed.