JUDGMENT : RAKESH SAKSENA, J. Appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment dated 29th June, 2000, passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Seoni in Sessions Trial No. 119/99, convicting the appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to imprisonment for life. 2. In short, the prosecution case is that appellant developed affairs with Koushalyabai, a married woman, who was residing in village Nandora. Her husband and son had gone to Nagpur to earn livelihood. On 28-5-1999, at about 9 P.M., when appellant went to the house of Koushalyabai, she insisted him to keep her as his woman. When appellant did not agree for the same, there occurred an altercation, during which, he kicked Koushalyabai and after pouring kerosene set her on fire by burning matchstick. But, immediately thereafter he tried to save her by extinguishing the fire. On her shouting, Lakkhu (PW2), Shankerlal (PW5), Shivlal (PW7) and Rajkumar (PW1) also reached there and extinguished the fire. They carried her in a jeep to Police Station Barghat, where, in the night of 29-5-1999, at about 2.25 A.M., she lodged the report Ex. P/14. 3. Sub Inspector G. R. Singh (PW14) after recording the report sent Koushalyabai to Community Health Centre, Barghat. At Barghat, Naib Tahsildar S. L. Choudhary (PW8) recorded her dying declaration Ex.P/9. She was referred to District Hospital, Seoni for further treatment. Dr. R. K. Sharma (PW12) examined her injuries and vide her M.L.C. report Ex. P/12 found 40% burn injuries on her body. She was admitted in female surgical ward. In the course of treatment, on 8-7-1999, Koushalyabai succumbed to her injuries. Dr. Abdul Hamid Qureshi (PW11) sent intimation about her death to Police Station, Seoni. 4. Head Constable Nandlal (PW13), in presence of witnesses viz. Sewakram Sahu (PW3) and Nandkishore (PW4) conducted inquest proceeding and recorded memorandum Ex. P/4. The dead body of Koushalyabai was sent to District Hospital, Seoni for post-mortem examination. 5. Dr. A. K. Sarawgi (PW6) conducted post-mortem examination on 8-7-1999 and found burn injuries on her body. In his opinion, the death of deceased was the result of septic shock and complications due to 45% burn injuries. 6. Sub Inspector G. R. Singh (PW14) converted the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and proceeded for investigation. After completing the investigation, he filed charge-sheet in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seoni. In his opinion, the death of deceased was the result of septic shock and complications due to 45% burn injuries. 6. Sub Inspector G. R. Singh (PW14) converted the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and proceeded for investigation. After completing the investigation, he filed charge-sheet in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seoni. The case was then committed to the Court of Sessions. 7. On charge being framed, appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded false implication. He pleaded that Koushalyabai suffered accidental burn injuries. On hearing her shrieks, he reached there and tried to extinguish the fire. 8. In support of prosecution case, prosecution examined Rajkumar (PW1), Lakkhu (PW2), Shankerlal (PW5) and Shivlal (PW7), but they did not support the prosecution version. The Trial Judge, however, relying on the evidence of dying declaration Ex. P/9 recorded by Executive Magistrate S. L. Choudhary (PW8), the first information report Ex. P/14 recorded by Inspector G. R. Singh (PW14) treating as dying declaration and finding the same corroborated by the medical evidence held the appellant guilty and convicted him under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, appellant has filed this appeal. 9. Shri Siddharth Datt, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the evidence of dying declaration was not reliable since it was not supported by the evidence of independent witnesses Rajkumar (PW1), Lakkhu (PW2), Shankerlal (PW5) and Shivlal (PW7). It was evident from the aforesaid dying declarations that the appellant tried to save deceased by extinguishing fire and also took deceased to police station and hospital. In the alternative, placing reliance on the ratio of Apex Court decision rendered in case of Kalu Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2000 SC 3630 , he submitted that the conviction of appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was not justified. At the most, appellant could have been held guilty under section 304-II of the Indian Penal Code. He pointed out that appellant was in custody since the date of his arrest i.e. 30-5-1999. On the other hand, Shri Amit Pandey, learned Panel Lawyer for the State submitted that the guilt of appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was well established by the evidence of two dying declarations. Once appellant ignited deceased, it had to be presumed that he intended to cause her death. On the other hand, Shri Amit Pandey, learned Panel Lawyer for the State submitted that the guilt of appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was well established by the evidence of two dying declarations. Once appellant ignited deceased, it had to be presumed that he intended to cause her death. He justified and supported the impugned judgment of conviction. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and the evidence on record carefully. 11. As far as the death of Koushalyabai by burn injuries, it has not been disputed that she died due to burn injuries. It was apparent from the First Information Report Ex. P/14 lodged by deceased herself, the dying declaration Ex. P/9 recorded by Executive Magistrate S. L. Choudhary (PW8) and the evidence of Rajkumar (PW1), Lakkhu (PW2), Shankerlal (PW5) and Shivlal (PW7) that deceased suffered burn injuries in her house in the night of 28-5-1999. She was taken to hospital, Barghat and then to District Hospital Seoni, where her injuries were examined by Dr. R. K. Sharma (PW12). Dr. Sharma vide his report Ex. P/12 found burn injuries on the face and both the sides of neck of deceased. Both arms, forearms and chest was burnt. On front side of abdomen and on the back there were burn injuries and blisters. Her hair were singed. There were about 40% of burn injuries. Koushalyabai was admitted in female surgical ward for the treatment. 12. Koushalyabai remained under treatment at District Hospital Seoni. On 7-7-1999, she expired. After her death, on 8-7-1999, after inquest her body was sent for post-mortem examination. Dr. A. K. Sarawgi (PW8) conducted post-mortem examination and observed: "highly emaciated body with bone and skin appearance. Eye lids were partially eaten by maggots. There was ulcer in different stages of healing. Ulcers were distributed in her whole face, forehead, chest, post thorax, both upper limbs and scalp hair. The body was ulcerated over about 45% of body surface area. Ulcers were ante mortem and were consistent with the history of burns of longer duration." Dr. Sharma opined that the cause of death of deceased was septic shock as a complication and sequelae of burns. Post-mortem examination report Ex. P/7 was written and signed by him. 13. From the aforesaid evidence, there appears no doubt that deceased died as a result of burn injuries. 14. Sharma opined that the cause of death of deceased was septic shock as a complication and sequelae of burns. Post-mortem examination report Ex. P/7 was written and signed by him. 13. From the aforesaid evidence, there appears no doubt that deceased died as a result of burn injuries. 14. Rajkumar (PW1), Lakkhu (PW2), Shankerlal (PW5) and Shivlal (PW7), the neighbours of deceased, who reached immediately after the occurrence and extinguished the fire, did not support the prosecution case that appellant set fire to deceased. On the contrary, all of them stated that deceased told to them that while she was climbing up the stairs with a lamp in hand, it fell down due to which she got burnt. All these witnesses were declared hostile. 15. The only evidence on which the learned Trial Judge placed reliance was the evidence of dying declaration. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of dying declaration was not reliable. Naib Tahsildar S. L. Choudhary (PW8) stated that at the time of occurrence, he was posted at Barghat. On the requisition of police Barghat, he went to record the dying declaration of Koushalyabai, who was admitted in Govt. Hospital Barghat. The doctor, who was on duty, certified that Koushalyabai was in fit state to give her statement. On 29-5-1999, at 2.50 A.M., he recorded the dying declaration (Ex.P/9). Koushalyabai told that she was in love with Jham Singh, therefore, she asked him to keep her as his wife, but he refused. During the talks, he picked up the bottle of kerosene kept in the house and after sprinkling kerosene over her, he ignited her. He obtained the right hand thumb impression of Koushalyabai on the dying declaration Ex. P/9. On perusal of the dying declaration Ex. P/9, it is revealed that deceased stated that when she cried, appellant Jham Singh extinguished her fire and in the meanwhile, Shivlal, Shankerlal and Lakkhu reached there. It is true that none of these witnesses, who reached at the spot supported the version given by deceased in the dying declaration, but they were declared hostile. There appeared no reason for the Executive Magistrate to have recorded the aforesaid dying declaration incorrectly. In our opinion, dying declaration Ex. P/9 was a correct and genuine document. 16. The dying declaration Ex. P/9 stands further supported by the first information report Ex. There appeared no reason for the Executive Magistrate to have recorded the aforesaid dying declaration incorrectly. In our opinion, dying declaration Ex. P/9 was a correct and genuine document. 16. The dying declaration Ex. P/9 stands further supported by the first information report Ex. P/14, which was got recorded by deceased herself at police station Barghat. This report was recorded by Sub Inspector G. R. Singh (PW14), the station officer of the said police station. Report Ex. P/14 was recorded soon after the occurrence i.e. in the morning of 29-5-1999 at about 2.25 A.M. In Ex. P/14, deceased disclosed the same story that she was in love with appellant. He used to visit her house. In the night at 8-8.30 P.M., when he came to her house, she told to him that since he loved her, he should keep her as his wife, but he refused. This resulted into an altercation during which he gave two kicks to her and picked up kerosene bottle from the house and after dousing her with kerosene ignited her with matchstick. When she shouted, appellant extinguished her fire and at the same time Lakkhu, Shankerlal, Shivlal, and Rajkumar reached there and brought her to police station. Sub Inspector G. R. Singh proved the first information report Ex. P/14. Absolutely, no allegation was levelled against Inspector G. R. Singh that he recorded a false report. The fact that deceased was taken to police station immediately after the occurrence and the said report was recorded early in the morning indicated the genuineness of the said document. It is well settled that the first information report lodged by a person, who subsequently dies can be treated as a dying declaration, if it relates to the cause of his/her death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his/her death. 17. Indisputably, the conviction can be recorded on the basis of dying declaration alone, but therefor the same must be wholly reliable. In a case, where suspicion can be raised as regard the correctness of the dying declaration, the Court before convicting an accused on the basis thereof would look for some corroborative evidence. In the instant case, there appears no circumstance to give rise any suspicion about the genuineness, correctness or the truthfulness of the dying declaration. In a case, where suspicion can be raised as regard the correctness of the dying declaration, the Court before convicting an accused on the basis thereof would look for some corroborative evidence. In the instant case, there appears no circumstance to give rise any suspicion about the genuineness, correctness or the truthfulness of the dying declaration. The presence of appellant at the time of occurrence is also established by the evidence of Lakkhu (PW2), Shankerlal (PW5) and Shivlal (PW7). It is thus amply established that appellant, who was in love with deceased, set fire to her as a result of which she died. 18. The evidence of defence witnesses Chain Singh (DW1) and Murlidhar (DW2) does not appear truthful that they along with appellant and other persons had gone to pacify a quarrel in the neighbourhood of the deceased and on hearing cries of deceased they went there. According to Chain Singh, the uncle and brother of deceased went to police station and got a false report lodged against Jham Singh because of enmity. This fact is belied by the evidence of first information report Ex. P/14. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant next submitted that the conviction of appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was not justified as the appellant was in love with deceased and that upon a sudden quarrel he set fire to deceased because deceased, who was a married woman insisted him to keep her as his wife. 20. On perusal of the dying declarations Ex. P/9 and Ex. P/14, it is revealed that appellant used to visit the house of deceased because of love relations between him and the deceased. On the insistence of deceased that he should keep her as his wife, appellant kicked her and picked up kerosene from the house of deceased itself, sprinkled it and threw a burning matchstick at her. When she caught fire and shouted, he extinguished the fire to save her and did not try to run away from the spot. From these facts, it can be appreciated that the incident occurred in a sudden impulse without any premeditation on the part of appellant. In case of Kalu Ram (supra), accused without any premeditation ablazed deceased, his wife, when deceased refused to part with her ornaments on the insistence of accused/husband. From these facts, it can be appreciated that the incident occurred in a sudden impulse without any premeditation on the part of appellant. In case of Kalu Ram (supra), accused without any premeditation ablazed deceased, his wife, when deceased refused to part with her ornaments on the insistence of accused/husband. Under infuriation accused doused her with kerosene and wanted her to die and supplied a box of match-stick to her. When she failed to ignite the matchstick, accused collected the match box and lit one matchstick and set her ablaze. When the flames were up, he brought water in a frantic effort to save her from death. Statement of deceased was recorded by the police which became the basis for the FIR and subsequently the Magistrate also recorded her dying declaration. Later deceased succumbed to her burn injuries. The Apex Court in the above circumstances held that the conduct of accused could not be seen divorced from the totality of the circumstances. Very probably he would not have anticipated that the act done by him would have escalated to such a proportion that she might die. If he had ever intended her to die, he would not have altered his senses to bring water in an effort to rescue her. It could be that unfortunately the situation slipped out of his control and it went to the fatal extent. Accused would not have intended to inflict the injuries which she sustained on account of his act. Therefore, the Apex Court brought down the offence from the first degree murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder and altered the conviction of accused/appellant from section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code. Finding the circumstances of the instant case similar to the circumstances of the case of Kalu Ram (supra), we deem it appropriate to hold that appellant did not intend to inflict the injuries on deceased which she ultimately sustained on account of his act and ultimately died after about 38-39 days. 21. We, therefore, alter the conviction of appellant from section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to section 304-Part II of the Indian Penal Code and impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. 21. We, therefore, alter the conviction of appellant from section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to section 304-Part II of the Indian Penal Code and impose a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. If appellant, who is reported to be in custody since 30-5-1999, has served out his aforesaid sentence, he be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 22. Appeal partly allowed.