JUDGEMENT BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. This application under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is at the instance of the Management and is directed against order dated April 5, 2012 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad, Gujarat, in Reference (IT) No.3 of 2008 by which the Tribunal has partially allowed the application for interim relief filed by the second party-union and thereby directed the first party-organization to pay all the workmen/employees of the organization ad hoc pay rise of Rs.1500/- a month with effect from January 1, 2008. It was further ordered that the amount of difference in increase from January 1, 2008 till March 31, 2012 should be given in three equal monthly installments. It was further clarified by the order impugned that the amount of interim relief should be adjusted with the final award at the time of disposal of the Reference. The Tribunal further held that the decision with regard to pay rise for the period between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2007 would be taken up at the time of final disposal. The Tribunal refused to consider the alleged settlement placed on record by the petitioner being Exh.70 and 74/1 on the ground that the same was not a valid one in accordance with law. 2. Being dissatisfied, the Management has come up with the present application under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 3. The following facts are not in dispute:- 3.1 The Reference before the Industrial Tribunal was made under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the following effect:- Should the workers of the first party organization be provided the demands, being rise in wages, inflation allowance and other allowances like housing allowance, conveyance allowance, education allowance, medical allowance, LTA, Shift allowance, out station allowance, attendant allowance for remaining present in the accidental cases, Modi group Benevolent fund scheme, after death benefits, uniform, petrol allowance, bonus, long service award, overtime, washing allowance, festival holidays, holidays, accident and mediclaim insurance, facilities agreed upon in previous agreement and keeping the facilities running, union facilities, etc. being such other facilities summing it to a total of around 24 demands, from 01.01.2006 and should the amount of difference be paid to the workmen from that particular date? 3.2 The respondent- union has made demand regarding salary compensation, inflation allowance and other demands which are noted in Exh.7 in detail. being such other facilities summing it to a total of around 24 demands, from 01.01.2006 and should the amount of difference be paid to the workmen from that particular date? 3.2 The respondent- union has made demand regarding salary compensation, inflation allowance and other demands which are noted in Exh.7 in detail. 3.3 In connection with the said Reference, by Exh.8, the Union prayed for interim relief of Rs.2000/- a month from January 1, 2006 till the date of decision. The said application for interim relief was opposed by the petitioner No. 1 before us thereby inter alia contending that the Reference was incompetent and not maintainable since previous settlement dated July 15, 2004 had not been terminated as required under Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On merit, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner no.1 that the wages paid to the workmen were higher than those paid by the similar organizations engaged in the transport business and that those are higher than the minimum wages prescribed under the law and the wages of the workmen were periodically increased by release of increments. It was further contended that the financial position of the petitioner No.1 was not sound and that it was suffering loss and there was no justifiable reason for granting interim relief. The aforesaid allegation was, however, controverted by the respondent- union by producing documents with list vide Exh.40, 20 and 32 which included pay slips of workers, the notice dated March 31, 2005 purporting to terminate the earlier settlement and also the copy of the magazine CADIWANI in which there was reference to the petitioner No.1 in support of the contention of the workmen that the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are the one and the same. 3.4 It may not be out of place to mention here that the petitioner No.1 came up with a case that during the pendency of the Reference, the workmen held a meeting on January 16, 2011 and elected five representatives authorizing them to negotiate and arrive at a settlement with regard to their pending demand for wage-revision and that about 40 workmen remained present in the said meeting. The petitioner No.1 claimed that the workmen in the said meeting elected (1) R.C. Jadeja (2) Deepak Sinde (3) Rashid Pathan (4) Babu R. Nayak and (5) Gopal Bharwad as their representatives to negotiate and arrive at the settlement and subsequently, there was a settlement between those five elected representatives and the petitioner No.1 which was signed on February 28, 2012 and according to the settlement, the parties agreed for wage rise of Rs.800/- to Rs.1500/- for the Driver for the period commencing from the year 2012 till December 2017 and for the Helper, the wage-rise for the period at the rate of Rs.500/- to Rs.1100/-. 3.5 The aforesaid case made out by the petitioner No.1 regarding settlement at the instance of five representatives was, however, denied by the Union contending that the same was illegal and, at the same time, such alleged settlement was at the instance of less than majority of the members of the workmen and that too, in violation of the existing law. 3.6 The learned Tribunal below, by the order impugned, has refused to accept the said settlement arrived at the instance of five representatives by holding that the same was invalid and not in accordance with law and thereafter, after taking into consideration the materials on record, passed the interim order as indicated earlier. 4. Mr. K.M. Patel, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, vehemently contended before us that the Tribunal below committed substantial error of law in ignoring the settlement arrived at between the petitioner No.1 and the majority of the workmen and, according to him, the reason assigned by the Tribunal for not taking into consideration the said settlement was on the face of it perverse. Mr. Patel contended that the Tribunal below proceeded on the erroneous assumption that during the pendency of the Reference, a settlement can be arrived at only by the sponsored union and that the five elected representatives had no authority in law to represent the workmen before the Tribunal. According to Mr. Patel, the terms industrial dispute, in accordance with Section 2(k) of the Act, refers to the dispute between the employer and the workmen and trade union is only a body representing its members and there cannot be any industrial dispute between the employer and the trade union. Mr. According to Mr. Patel, the terms industrial dispute, in accordance with Section 2(k) of the Act, refers to the dispute between the employer and the workmen and trade union is only a body representing its members and there cannot be any industrial dispute between the employer and the trade union. Mr. Patel, contends that the right of representation given to the trade union qua its members in the proceedings before the Tribunal did not make such a trade union a party to the dispute. In other words, according to Mr. Patel, the settlement between the parties to the industrial dispute being arrived at the instance of the workmen on one hand and the employer on the other, the said agreement does not cease to be a settlement merely because the sponsored union is not signatory to the settlement notwithstanding the fact that the vast majority of the workmen agreed to the terms of the settlement. Mr. Patel further contends that the view taken by the Tribunal that the five elected representatives who submitted the application Exh.17 had no right or authority to appear before the Tribunal was also erroneous. By referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Herbertsons Limited vs. Workmen reported in AIR 1977 SC 322 and that of Tata Engineering & Locomotive Company Ltd. vs. Workmen reported in AIR 1981 SC 2163 , Mr. Patel contended that it was the duty of the Tribunal to make an award in terms of the settlement because such settlement was accepted by the majority of the workmen and the Tribunal should have sent its award disposing of the Reference in terms of settlement to the Appropriate Government. 4.1 Mr. Patel further contends that the view taken by the Tribunal that the fact of arriving at settlement was a suspicious one was based on total misreading of the materials on record. Mr. Patel further contends that the absence of signatures of witnesses in the settlement cannot invalidate the settlement and filling in of the column of the signature of the witnesses in the prescribed form of settlement is directory in nature and not mandatory. At any rate, according to Mr. Mr. Patel further contends that the absence of signatures of witnesses in the settlement cannot invalidate the settlement and filling in of the column of the signature of the witnesses in the prescribed form of settlement is directory in nature and not mandatory. At any rate, according to Mr. Patel, the Tribunal committed substantial error in rejecting the applications being Exh.70 and 74 without recording evidence as the question whether there was really meeting of workmen on January 16, 2011 and whether the five persons were duly authorized as representatives can be answered only after appreciating the evidence. According to Mr. Patel, without taking evidence, such dispute could not be resolved. 4.2 As regards the merits of the order for interim relief, Mr. Patel submits that the order allowing Exh.8 by granting interim relief of Rs.1500 a month is cryptic and laconic one and has been passed on the basis of general observation that there was rise in cost of living. Mr. Patel submits that the Tribunal failed to consider that the wages of the workmen had not remained stagnant for all these years after expiry of earlier settlement. He further contends that the wages paid by the petitioner No.1 to the workmen were much higher than the minimum wages fixed by law and that having regard to the fact that the petitioner No.1 had accumulated a loss of Rs.110.58 lakh as on March 31, 2010, there was no justification of granting interim relief as it was not possible for the petitioner No.1 to bear the additional burden. 4.3 Lastly, Mr. Patel contends that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that the petitioner No.2 was not the employer and was in no way liable to the demand of the workmen and thus, the Tribunal could not pass any direction upon the petitioner No.2. 5. Mr. T.R. Mishra, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No.3/1, 3/3 and 3/5 has, however, supported the contentions of Mr. Patel. 6. Mr. Vasavada, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1-union, on the other hand, has opposed the aforesaid contentions of Mr. 5. Mr. T.R. Mishra, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No.3/1, 3/3 and 3/5 has, however, supported the contentions of Mr. Patel. 6. Mr. Vasavada, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1-union, on the other hand, has opposed the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Patel and has contended that the Tribunal below, on consideration of the materials on record, rightly ignored the alleged settlement signed by a very limited number of workmen and, at the same time, the meagre amount of interim relief granted by the Tribunal below does not justify interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6.1 Mr. Vasavada points out that it would appear from the order of Reference that at the behest of the sponsored union, the respondent No.1, the dispute with regard to wage-revision of 128 workers of petitioners were referred to the Industrial Tribunal and such Reference was never challenged by the petitioners. Mr. Vasavada further points out that on April 5, 2010, the settlement for OT allowance arrived at between the petitioners and respondent itself answers that the petitioners are the employer and not the petitioner No.1 alone. He further submits that on February 3, 2011, the petitioners produced a list of 128 workmen employed by them by way of affidavit before the Industrial Tribunal and the union also accepted the said list. Mr. Vasavada contends that in order to create impediment in adjudication and to frustrate the Reference of the respondent-union, the petitioner no. 1 tried to enter into settlement with a poultry number of 37 workers and such agreement was also not in accordance with law and, therefore, the purported settlement was rightly discarded by the Tribunal. Thus, according to Mr. Vasavada, the list of workmen produced by the petitioners before the Industrial Tribunal being 128 and only 37 workmen allegedly having accepted the settlement, the purported settlement was factually opposed by majority of the workmen. Apart from the aforesaid fact, Mr.. Vasavada contends that the purported settlement is not in accordance with the statutory provisions and rules framed there under and in support of his contention, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Workmen of M/s. Delhi Cloth General Mills. Ltd. v. The Management of M/s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Ltd. reported in AIR 1970 SC 1851 . Ltd. v. The Management of M/s. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Ltd. reported in AIR 1970 SC 1851 . In other words, according to him, the sponsored union as well as the majority of the workmen cannot be ignored while arriving at a so-called settlement and only five workers cannot decide the fate of 128 workers. 6.2 Mr. Vasavada, therefore, prays for dismissal of the present Special Civil Application. 7. Therefore, the question that falls for determination in this Special Civil Application is, whether on the basis of materials on record, the learned Tribunal below was justified in passing the order impugned and whether such order can be interfered with within the limited scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. First of all, we propose to consider whether in the case before us, while considering the question of grant of interim relief, the Tribunal below was justified in not taking into consideration the alleged settlement entered into between the five representatives of some of the employees with the appellant No. 1 before us. 9. We are quite conscious that the finding arrived at by the Tribunal in the order impugned is a tentative one for consideration of the grant of interim relief and thus, we will also restrict our scrutiny on prima facie basis. 10. In our opinion, the respondent no. 1 is quite justified in contending that the settlement having been entered into between a limited number of employees, whose number is much less than even half of the total strength of the employees, the learned Tribunal was quite justified in discarding the said settlement. We further find that there is no signature of witnesses, and, at the same time, the settlement is arrived at not between the two petitioners on one hand and the respondent-Union on the other. Therefore, we do not find any reason to disturb the detailed findings recorded by the Tribunal below on question of legality of the said settlement and the question of binding nature of the same upon the Union. 11. So far as the question of the actual amount of interim relief is concerned, we find that the Tribunal below took into consideration the fact that the amount of Rs.2000/- a month was claimed as interim relief from 1st January 2006 and also took into consideration the accounts from the year 2006 to 2010 pertaining to the petitioner No.1. 11. So far as the question of the actual amount of interim relief is concerned, we find that the Tribunal below took into consideration the fact that the amount of Rs.2000/- a month was claimed as interim relief from 1st January 2006 and also took into consideration the accounts from the year 2006 to 2010 pertaining to the petitioner No.1. The Tribunal has also taken note of the fact that even in the alleged settlement, the petitioner No.1 has agreed to enhance the wages and thus, the economic condition of the organization, as tried to be projected, was not believable. The learned Tribunal below further came to the conclusion that the workers working in similar organizations were getting more amount. Thus, the learned Tribunal below, after taking into consideration the Balance Sheet of the petitioners came to the conclusion that both the petitioners are really the employer. Such finding is based on an overall consideration of the materials on record, and cannot be said to be unreasonable. 12. It is now settled law that even in a statutory appeal against an order of discretionary relief, the appellate authority interferes not because a different conclusion can be arrived at by the appellate authority on the selfsame materials but it interferes only when the order impugned is clearly a wrong order and in arriving at the conclusion, the authority below did not follow the well-settled principles which are required to be followed. (See Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd., etc. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and others reported in AIR 1980 SC 1896 ). In a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court adopts almost the same approach. 13. In the case before us, it appears that the Tribunal below took into consideration the detailed arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties from various angles and came to the conclusion that the employees were entitled to interim relief to the extent of Rs.1500/- a month having regard to the rate of inflation and the increment enjoyed by similar employees in other organization doing similar type of job. Such conclusion, in our opinion, is quite justified and in exercise of our powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, we do not propose to interfere. 14. Such conclusion, in our opinion, is quite justified and in exercise of our powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, we do not propose to interfere. 14. It is needless to mention that the interim relief will abide by the final decision that will be passed at the time of passing of final award. Thus, the appellants will not be prejudiced in any way, even if the interim relief is confirmed by this Court. 15. We, now propose to deal with the decisions cited by the petitioners. 15.1 In the case of Herbertsons Ltd., V. The Workmen of Herbertsons Ltd. and others (supra), the Supreme Court made the following observations: When a recognised union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement since a recognised union, which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of labour. This would be the normal rule. We cannot altogether rule out exceptional cases where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Nothing of that kind has been suggested against the President of the 3rd respondent in this case. That being the position, prima facie, this is a settlement in the course of collective bargaining and, therefore, is entitled to due weight and consideration. 15.1.1 It appears that the above observations were made in the context when the recognized Union entered into agreement with the management. In the case before us, admittedly, the Union has not entered into any settlement but it has been entered into by five alleged representatives of minority number of workmen. Thus, the said decision cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. 15.2 Similarly, in the case of M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. In the case before us, admittedly, the Union has not entered into any settlement but it has been entered into by five alleged representatives of minority number of workmen. Thus, the said decision cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. 15.2 Similarly, in the case of M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd., Appellant v Their Workmen (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court that if the settlement had been arrived at between the company and the union of the workers by a vast majority of the concerned workers with their eyes open and was also accepted by them in its totality, it must be presumed to be just and fair and not liable to be ignored merely because a small number of workers were not parties to it or refused to accept it, or because the tribunal was of the opinion that the workers deserved marginally higher emolument than they thought they did. According to the Supreme Court, a settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scales and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles different from those which come into play when an industrial dispute is under adjudication. In the case before us, the settlement having been arrived not at the instance of the Union but at the instance of the five representatives allegedly selected by undisputedly minority number of workmen, the principles laid down in the above decision has no application to the facts of the present case. We, thus, find that those two decisions are of no avail to the petitioners. 16. The application is, thus, devoid of any substance and is dismissed. Interim relief stands vacated. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be, however, no order as to costs. FURTHER ORDER: After pronouncement of this judgment, Mr. Patel, the learned senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, prays for stay of operation of our order for the purpose of getting extension of the benefit of the interim order. In view of what has been stated above, we do not see any reason to stay our order. The prayer is refused. Order as to costs.