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2012 DIGILAW 886 (GAU)

Jaya Saha v. State of Tripura

2012-07-26

I.A.ANSARI

body2012
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. Because of the fact that all these three writ petitions, made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, have raised identical questions of law and are based on substantially similar facts, all these writ petitions, on the request made by the learned counsel for the parties concerned, have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. Before I formulate the questions, which have been raised for determination in these three writ petitions, it would be apposite that the material facts, giving rise to these writ petitions, filed by three female litigants, are taken note of. With this end in view, let me set out the material facts of each of these three writ petitions, which are not in controversy. BACKGROUND FACTS : WP (C) 577/2010 (i) The petitioner herein initiated a proceeding, in the Family Court, Agartala, by filing an application, under Section 125 CrPC, seeking maintenance for her own self and for their minor female child. This application gave rise to Misc. Case No. 116/2009 under Section 125 CrPC. Aggrieved by the order, dated 30.11.2002, passed in the said maintenance proceeding, the petitioner impugned the said order by way of criminal revision before this Court. However, having, instituted the proceeding for maintenance, which, as indicated above, stood impugned in the revision before this Court, the petitioner has come to know that the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Family Courts Act'), has not been brought into force, in the State of Tripura, by the Central Government, till the date of hearing of the writ petition, namely, WP (C) 577/2010. (ii) In the meanwhile, however, the petitioner's husband has instituted two separate suits, at Andaman, one of the suits being for custody of the child and the other one for a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between the parties concerned. On a petition being moved by the petitioner seeking transfer of the said suits from Andaman to Agartala, Tripura, Transfer Petition (C) Nos. 56-57 of 2010 arose and, by order, dated 09.08.2010, the Transfer Petition was allowed by the Supreme Court transferring the suits, namely. Matrimonial Suit No. 75/2010 (Dr. Avijit Roy Vs. Smt. Tania Kar), and Guardian Case No. 12 of 2009 (Dr. Avijit Roy Vs. 56-57 of 2010 arose and, by order, dated 09.08.2010, the Transfer Petition was allowed by the Supreme Court transferring the suits, namely. Matrimonial Suit No. 75/2010 (Dr. Avijit Roy Vs. Smt. Tania Kar), and Guardian Case No. 12 of 2009 (Dr. Avijit Roy Vs. Smt. Tania Kar), pending in the Court of District Judge, at Port Blair, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, to District/Family Court, at Agartala, Tripura. (iii) Thus, though Family Court has been set up, in the State of Tripura, by the State Government of Tripura, in purported exercise of its powers under Section 6 of the Family Courts Act, by Notification, dated 30.11.2002, in consultation with the jurisdictional High Court, the Family Court, at Agartala, has no jurisdiction to exercise the powers, embodied in the Family Court Act, and, in consequence thereof, an order, passed by the Family Court, at Agartala, granting or refusing to grant maintenance and/or an order granting or refusing to grant restitution of conjugal rights and/or a decree of divorce dissolving marriage by or refusing to grant a decree and/or an order granting alimony, permanent or temporary, all are of beyond jurisdiction of the Family Court, Agartala, and such orders are, therefore, complete nullity in the eyes of law and cannot be enforced. The present writ petition was instituted at a time, when the proceedings in the suits aforementioned, which, on being transferred, as mentioned above, from Port Blair to the Family Court, Agartala, were in progress. By order, dated 30.11.2011, passed in this writ petition, all further proceedings of the suits, pending in the Family Court, have been stayed by a Single Judge of this Court. In the meanwhile, however, the proceedings have been concluded resulting into a decree of dissolution of marriage. (iv) With the help of this writ petition, the petitioner has sought for issuance of a writ, in the nature of mandamus, setting aside the impugned Notification, dated 30.11.2002, whereby the Family Court, at Agartala, was established and to pass such consequential directions/order(s), which are necessary for the purpose of effective disposal of the writ petition. WP (C) 368/2011 (i) The petitioner and the respondent No. 3 herein are legally wedded husband and wife, their marriage having been solemnized, on 01.08.2005, according to Hindu rites and customs and, on 22.5.2007, a male child was born to them. WP (C) 368/2011 (i) The petitioner and the respondent No. 3 herein are legally wedded husband and wife, their marriage having been solemnized, on 01.08.2005, according to Hindu rites and customs and, on 22.5.2007, a male child was born to them. Alleging torture at the hands of her husband and other members of his family, the writ petitioner's mother made a request to Tripura Women Commission to rescue the petitioner and her baby, whereupon the Tripura Women Commission, by its letter, dated 07.01.2008, requested the Officer-in-Charge, R. K. Pur Police Station, South Tripura, to rescue the petitioner and her baby. Acting upon the letter, so issued, the police rescued the petitioner and her said child and, thereafter, respondent No. 3 herein filed a suit, which gave rise to Title Suit (RCR) No. 13/2008, in the Family Court, South Tripura, Udaipur, seeking, restitution of conjugal rights against the petitioner and the proceedings were concluded ex parte, by order, dated 06.04.2009, in favour of the respondent No. 3. (ii) The petitioner, too, instituted a proceeding, under Section 125 CrPC, in the Family Court, at Udaipur, seeking maintenance for herself and her minor child. The said proceeding gave rise to Misc. Case No. 304/2008. The maintenance proceeding, so instituted, concluded in an order of maintenance, passed ex parte, on 30.11.2009, with direction to the respondent No. 3 to pay a sum of Rs. 2,000/-, per month, towards maintenance of the petitioner and their minor son. The directions, contained in the maintenance proceeding, have, however, not been carried out by the respondent No. 3. (iii) In the year 2009, respondent No. 3 instituted a suit, in the Family Court, Udaipur, South Tripura, seeking a decree of dissolution of his marriage with the present petitioner, the suit having been registered as Title Suit (Divorce) No. 28 of 2009. However, the petitioner herein filed a Transfer Petition seeking transfer of the said Title Suit (Divorce) and the Transfer Petition, so filed, gave rise to Tr.P (C) 02/2010. By order, dated 14.05.2010, passed in the said Transfer Petition, the Divorce Suit was transferred by the High Court from the Family Court, Udaipur, South Tripura, to the Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala, and was renumbered as Title Suit (Divorce) No. 172/2010. By order, dated 14.05.2010, passed in the said Transfer Petition, the Divorce Suit was transferred by the High Court from the Family Court, Udaipur, South Tripura, to the Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala, and was renumbered as Title Suit (Divorce) No. 172/2010. (iv) Thereafter, on 26.03.2010, the present petitioner instituted a suit, in the Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala, seeking enforcement of the order of maintenance, dated 30.11.2009, passed in Misc. Case No. 304/2008 aforementioned. The said Suit (Execution Proceeding) gave rise to Misc. Case (Execution) No. 114/2010. By order, dated 30.11.2011, passed in this writ petition, all further proceedings of the said Misc. Case (Execution) No. 114/2010, pending in the Family Court, stand stayed. (v) In purported exercise of its power, under Section 3 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the State Government of Tripura, vide Notification, dated 30.11.2002, established a Family Court, at Agartala, Tripura, for exercising the jurisdiction under the said Act, the Notification having been issued in consultation with the jurisdictional High Court. The establishment of the Family Court, at Agartala, by the Notification, dated 30.11.2002, which stands impugned in the present writ petition, is completely void inasmuch as the Act, in question, has not come into force as yet in the State of Tripura, inasmuch as there is no Notification by the Central Government, in terms of the provisions of Section 1(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, bringing into force the provisions of the said Act to the State of Tripura. As the Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala, is a Court, which has been established without the provisions of the said Act having come into force in the State of Tripura, any judgment/order, passed therein, is wholly without jurisdiction, because it is only a Court of competent jurisdiction, which can determine the status of a person, particularly, when the litigation will result into right in rem and not into right in personam inasmuch as divorce, if granted, will create a right in rem and not a right in personam. WP (C) 09/2012 (i) The petitioner and respondent No. 4 herein were legally wedded husband and wife, their marriage having been solemnized according to Hindu rites and customs and a female child was born to them on 24.03.2005. WP (C) 09/2012 (i) The petitioner and respondent No. 4 herein were legally wedded husband and wife, their marriage having been solemnized according to Hindu rites and customs and a female child was born to them on 24.03.2005. As the petitioner was subjected to inhuman torture and cruelty at her matrimonial home, she lodged First Information Report (in short, 'FIR') with the police and, based on the said FIR, GR Case No. 1357/2006, under Section 498A/ 34 IPC, was registered. (ii) The petitioner also instituted a maintenance proceeding, under Section 125 CrPC, in the Family Court, at West Tripura, Agartala, which gave rise to Misc. Case No. 145/2007. The said maintenance proceeding ended in a direction to the respondent No. 4 herein to pay to the petitioner and her child maintenance allowance @ Rs. 1,700/- per month. As the respondent No. 4 had failed to comply with the order directing him to pay maintenance, an execution proceeding has been started, which gave rise to Misc. (Execution) Case No. 224/2010, presently pending in the Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala. The petitioner also filed a complaint against the respondent No. 4 and his parents alleging criminal breach of trust, punishable under Section 406 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, on the ground that her Stridhan had not been returned despite requests made by her in this regard. This complaint gave rise to CR Case No. 2926/2006 and the respondent No. 4, along with his parents, came to be convicted for offence under Section 406 read with Section 34 IPC and each of the convicted persons was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. An appeal, against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence, has been filed, in the Sessions Court, West Tripura, by the respondent No. 4, the appeal, so filed, having given rise to Appeal No. 06(2)/2008. As the appeal stands dismissed, respondent No. 4 has filed a revision, which is still pending in this High Court, the revision being Criminal Revision No. 70/2010. (iii) Coupled with the above, respondent No. 4 instituted a suit, in the Family Court, at Agartala, seeking a decree for dissolution of marriage between the parties concerned and the suit, so instituted has given rise to Title suit (Divorce) No. 194/2010. (iii) Coupled with the above, respondent No. 4 instituted a suit, in the Family Court, at Agartala, seeking a decree for dissolution of marriage between the parties concerned and the suit, so instituted has given rise to Title suit (Divorce) No. 194/2010. The suit has, however, been decided, by the Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala, on 06.06.2010, in favour of respondent No. 4, whereby a decree for divorce has been granted and a direction has been given to respondent No. 4 to pay a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-, as permanent alimony, to the present petitioner as his divorced wife, the order of dissolution of marriage being contingent upon payment of permanent alimony as directed. (iv) The petitioner has, however, learnt that though the State Government has, in purported exercise of its power under Section 3 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, established, with the help of Notification, dated 30.11.2012, Family Court, at Agartala, the said Act, having not come into force, the Family Court, at Agartala, has no jurisdiction and cannot, therefore, decide any matrimonial dispute. 2. I have heard Ms. R. Guha, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners, and Mr. P. K. Biswas, learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing for the Union of India, and Mr. B. Das, learned Senior counsel, appearing for the State of Tripura. I have also heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel, appearing for the private respondent in WP (C) 09/2012. 3. Before entering into the merit of the present set of writ petitions, let me, first, reproduce hereinbelow the Notification, whereunder the Family Court, at Agartala, was established. The Notification reads as under: No. F8(3)-LAW/LEG-II/2002 GOVERNMENT OF TRIPURA LAW DEPARTMENT Dated Agartala the 30th November, 2002. NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 3 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the State Government, in consultation with the Gauhati High Court, establishes a Family Court, at Agartala, for exercising the powers conferred on it by the Act within the local limits of Sadar Sub-Division. The notification shall take effect from the date the Presiding Judge of the Family Court takes over charge. By order of the Governor Sd/- (A.B. Paul) Secretary, Law, Government of Tripura. 4. The moot question, which these writ petitions have raised for determination, is: Whether the Family Courts Act, 1984, stands legally enforced in the State of Tripura? The notification shall take effect from the date the Presiding Judge of the Family Court takes over charge. By order of the Governor Sd/- (A.B. Paul) Secretary, Law, Government of Tripura. 4. The moot question, which these writ petitions have raised for determination, is: Whether the Family Courts Act, 1984, stands legally enforced in the State of Tripura? This question, in turn, leads to yet another question, and the question is: When and how do the provisions, embodied in the Family Courts Act, 1984, come into force in a State? 5. My quest for an answer to the above question brings me to Section 1 and, more particularly, to sub-section (3) of Section 1, which reads as under: 1. Short title, extent and commencement.– (1) *** *** *** (2) *** *** *** (3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different States. 6. From a bare reading of sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, it becomes abundantly clear that the Family Courts Act, 1984, shall not come into force until the time the Central Government appoints a date bringing into force the said Act, in a State, by issuing notification, in this regard, in the official Gazette sub-section (3) of Section 1 also makes it clear that different dates may be appointed for different States as regards bringing into force the provisions of the said Act in a State. 7. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 is, thus, a clear case of conditional legislation, which has left it to the Central Government to notify the date on which the provisions, contained in the Family Courts Act, 1984, shall come into force in a State. 8. While dealing with the concept of conditional legislation, it is imperative to bear in mind that there may be practical difficulties in enforcement of laws contemporaneously with their enactment and also in their uniform extension to different areas. It may, therefore, become necessary, in a given case, to leave it to the discretion of an outside agency, such as, the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, to decide as to when a legislation shall be brought into force. It may, therefore, become necessary, in a given case, to leave it to the discretion of an outside agency, such as, the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, to decide as to when a legislation shall be brought into force. This is what is meant by conditional legislation, which has, been described, in clear terms, in A. K. Roy Vs. Union of India, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 271 , which Ms. Guha, learned counsel the petitioners, relies upon. The relevant observations, made in A. K. Roy (supra), read as follows: 50.... The difficulty of discovering the ratio of the seven judgments delivered in the Delhi Laws Act case is well known. There is, however, no difference amongst the learned Judges in their perception and understanding of what was actually decided in the three Privy Council cases to which we have referred and which were discussed by them. They read the Privy Council decisions as laving down that conditional legislation is permissible whereby the legislature entrusts to an outside agency the discretionary power to select the time or place to enforce the law. As stated by Shri H.M. Seervai in his Constitutional Law of India (2nd Edn., p. 1203): The making of laws is not an end in itself, but is a means to an end, which the legislature desires to secure. That end may be secured directly by the law itself. But there are many subjects of legislation in which the end is better secured by extensive delegation of legislative power. There are practical difficulties in the enforcement of laws contemporaneously with their enactment as also in their uniform extension to different areas. Those difficulties cannot be foreseen at the time when the laws are made. It, therefore, becomes necessary to leave to the judgment of an outside agency the question as to when the law should be brought into force and to which areas it should be extended from time to time. What is permissible to the legislature by way of conditional legislation cannot be considered impermissible to the Parliament when, in the exercise of its constituent power, it takes the view that the question as regards the time of enforcement of a constitutional amendment should be left to the judgment of the executive. What is permissible to the legislature by way of conditional legislation cannot be considered impermissible to the Parliament when, in the exercise of its constituent power, it takes the view that the question as regards the time of enforcement of a constitutional amendment should be left to the judgment of the executive. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act is not ultra vires the power of amendment conferred upon the Parliament by Article 368(1) of the Constitution. (Emphasis added) 9. Thus, as mentioned above, conditional legislation may leave it to the discretion of the Government, Central or State, to decide different dates on which a legislation shall be brought into force or the manner in which a legislation shall be brought into force. Reference may be made, in this regard, to the case of State of Tamilnadu Vs. K. Sabanayagam, reported in (1998) 1 SCC 318 , wherein the Supreme Court, while dealing with the difference between delegated legislation and conditional legislation, held as under: 14. . . . The question with which we are concerned in the present proceedings was not on the anvil of scrutiny before the Constitution Bench of this Court in that case, namely, whether before exercising powers under Section 36 as a delegate of conditional legislative function the appropriate Government was estopped from considering the rival version or rebuttal evidence that may be offered by the employees whose employer seeks exemption from the Act under Section 36 thereof. The distinction between delegated legislation and conditional legislation is a clear and well-settled one. In this connection we may usefully refer to a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Vs. Union of India. Kapur, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench has made the following pertinent observations at pp. 695-96 of the Report: The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation is this that in the former the delegate's power is that of determining when a legislative declared rule of conduct shall become effective; Hampton & Co. Vs. U.S. and the latter involves delegation of rule-making power which constitutionally may be exercised by the administrative agent. This means that the legislature having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the administrative authority. Vs. U.S. and the latter involves delegation of rule-making power which constitutionally may be exercised by the administrative agent. This means that the legislature having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the administrative authority. In other words by delegated legislation the delegate completes the legislation by supplying details within the limits prescribed by the statute and in the case of conditional legislation, the power of legislation is exercised by the legislature conditionally leaving to the discretion of an external authority the time and manner of carrying its legislation into effect as also the determination of the area to which it is to extend; (R. v. Burah; Russell Vs. R., AC at p. 835; King Emperor Vs. Benoari Lal Sarma; Sardar Inder Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan). Thus when the delegate is given the power of making rules and regulations in order to fill in the details to carry out and subserve the purposes of the legislation the manner in which the requirements of the statute are to be met and the rights therein created to be enjoyed it is an exercise of delegated legislation. But when the legislation is complete in itself and the legislature has itself made the law and the only function left to the delegate is to apply the law to an area or to determine the time and manner of carrying it into effect, it is conditional legislation. It is thus obvious that in the case of conditional legislation, the legislation is complete in itself but its operation is made to depend on fulfillment of certain conditions and what is delegated to an outside authority, is the power to determine according to its own judgment whether or not those conditions are fulfilled. In case of delegated legislation proper, some portion of the legislative power of the legislature is delegated to the outside authority in that, the legislature, though competent to perform both the essential and ancillary legislative functions, performs only the former and parts with the latter, i.e., the ancillary function of laying down details in favour of another for executing the policy of the statute enacted. The distinction between the two exists in this that whereas conditional legislation contains no element of delegation of legislative power and is, therefore, not open to attack on the ground of excessive delegation, delegated legislation does confer some legislative power on some outside authority and is therefore open to attack on the ground of excessive delegation. In this connection we may also refer to a decision of this Court rendered in the case of Sardar Inder Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan wherein it is laid down that when an appropriate legislature enacts a law and authorises an outside authority to bring it into force in such area or at such time as it may decide, that is conditional and not delegated legislation. 19. Conditional legislation can, therefore, be broadly classified into three categories: In the first category when the legislature has completed its task of enacting a statute, the entire superstructure of the legislation is ready but its future applicability to a given area is left to the subjective satisfaction of the delegate who being satisfied about the conditions indicating the ripe time for applying the machinery of the said Act to a given area exercises that power as a delegate of the parent legislative body. Tulsipur Sugar Co. case is an illustration on this point. When the Act itself is complete and is enacted to be uniformly applied in future to all those who we are to be covered by the sweep of the Act, the legislature can be said to have completed its task. All that it leaves to the delegate is to apply the same uniformly to a given area indicated by the parent legislature itself but at an appropriate time. This would be an act of pure and simple conditional legislation depending upon the subjective satisfaction of the delegate as to when the said Act enacted and completed by the parent legislature is to be made effective.... (Emphasis added) 10. In conditional legislation, the legislature makes the law, which is complete in all respects, but the same is not brought into operation immediately. The enforcement of law would depend upon the fulfillment of given condition. One may also refer, in this regard, to the observations of the Supreme Court, in Vasu Dev Singh Vs. Union of India, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 753, which read as under: 16. The enforcement of law would depend upon the fulfillment of given condition. One may also refer, in this regard, to the observations of the Supreme Court, in Vasu Dev Singh Vs. Union of India, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 753, which read as under: 16. We, at the outset, would like to express our disagreement with the contentions raised before us by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that the impugned notification is in effect and substance a conditional legislation and not a delegated legislation. The distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation is clear and unambiguous. In a conditional legislation the delegatee has to apply the law to an area or to determine the time and manner of carrying it into effect or at such time, as it decides or to understand the rule of legislation, it would be a conditional legislation. The legislature in such a case makes the law, which complete in all respects but the same is not brought into operation immediately. The enforcement of the law would depend upon the fulfilment of a condition and what is delegated to the executive is the authority to determine by exercising its own judgment as to whether such conditions have been fulfilled and/or the time has come when such legislation should be brought into force. The taking effect of a legislation, therefore, is made dependent upon the determination of such fact or condition by the executive organ of the Government. Delegated legislation, however, involves delegation of rule-making power of legislation and authorises an executive authority to bring in force such an area by reason thereof. The discretion conferred on the executive by way of delegated legislation is much wider. Such power to make rules or regulations, however, must be exercised within the four corners of the Act. Delegated legislation, thus, is a device which has been fashioned by the legislature to be exercised in the manner laid down in the legislation itself. By reason of Section 3 of the Act, the Administrator, however, has been empowered to issue a notification whereby and whereunder, an exemption is granted for application of the Act itself. (Emphasis added) 11. While dealing with the subject of conditional legislation vis-a-vis delegated legislation, reference may be made to Section 3 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, which is akin to the case at hand. (Emphasis added) 11. While dealing with the subject of conditional legislation vis-a-vis delegated legislation, reference may be made to Section 3 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, which is akin to the case at hand. Section 3 of the said Act read as under: 3. Establishment of Employees' State Insurance Corporation: (1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf, there shall be established for the administration of the scheme of employees' state insurance in accordance with the provisions of this Act a Corporation to be known as the Employees' State Insurance Corporation. (2) The Corporation shall be a body corporate by the name of Employees' State Insurance Corporation having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall by the said name sue and be sued. (Emphasis added) 12. The Supreme Court had the occasion to decide, in Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. Notified Area Committee, reported in (1980) 2 SCC 295 , as to whether Section 3 of the Employees State Insurance Act was an instance of delegated legislation or conditional legislation. Referring to Section 3(1) of the Employees State Insurance Act, the Supreme Court concluded that Section 3(1) really is not an instance of delegated legislation, but can be appropriately described as conditional legislation inasmuch as Section 3(1) of the Act authorizes the Central Government to establish a corporation for the administration of the scheme of Employees State Insurance by notification. In other words when the notification shall be issued and in respect of what factories the notification shall be issued have been left to the discretion of the Central Government. 13. In Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court had to consider the validity of Section 3(1) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. In Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. (supra), the provisions of Section 3(1) of the said Act had been challenged on the ground that the said provisions suffered from the vice of excessive delegation on the ground that the power, given to the Central Government, to apply the provisions of that Act by notification, conferred on the Central Government absolute discretion, the exercise of which was not guided by any legislative provision and the said Section 3(1) of the said Act was, therefore, invalid. The Supreme Court, referring to the case of Baxter Vs. The Supreme Court, referring to the case of Baxter Vs. Ah Way (1909) 8 CLR 626, held, in Tulsipur Sugar Co. of Ltd. (supra), that as Section 3(1) of the Act purports to authorize the Central Government to establish a Corporation for the administration of the scheme of Employees' State Insurance by a notification, and when the discretion has been left to the Central Government as to when the notification should be issued and in respect of what factories, it should be issued, Section 3(1) of the said Act was nothing but a conditional legislation and the same could not be held invalid. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court, appearing in Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. (supra), read as follows: 15. In Basant Kumar Sarkar Vs. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., this Court was required to consider the question whether Section 1(3) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 was valid. One of the contentions urged by the appellants in that case was that the said provision suffered from the vice of excessive delegation on the ground that the power given to the Central Government to apply the provisions of that Act by notification, conferred on the Central Government absolute discretion, the exercise of which was not guided by any legislative provision and was, therefore, invalid. Gajendragadkar, C.J., rejected the above contention with the following observations: We are not impressed by this argument. Section 1(3) is really not an illustration of delegated legislation at all; it is what can be properly described as conditional legislation. The Act has prescribed a self-contained code in regard to the insurance of the employees covered by it; several remedial measures which the Legislature thought it necessary to enforce in regard to such workmen have been specifically dealt with and appropriate provisions have been made to carry out the policy of the Act as laid down in its relevant sections. Section 3(1) of the Act purports to authorise the Central Government to establish a Corporation for the administration of the scheme of Employees' State Insurance by a notification. In other words, when the notification should be issued and in respect of what factories it should be issued, has been left to the discretion of the Central Government and that is precisely what is usually done by conditional legislation. In other words, when the notification should be issued and in respect of what factories it should be issued, has been left to the discretion of the Central Government and that is precisely what is usually done by conditional legislation. What Lord Selborne said about the powers conferred on the Lieutenant Governor by virtue of the relevant provisions of Act 22 of 1869 in Queen Vs. Burah, can be said with equal jurisdiction about the powers conferred on the Central Government by Section 1(3). (Emphasis added) 14. The Supreme Court has made it clear, in no uncertain words, in State of Orissa Vs. Chandrasekhar Singh Bhoi, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 334 , that a law cannot be said to be in force unless it is brought into operation by legislative enactment or by the exercise of authority by a delegate empowered to bring it into operation. 15. The above position of law has been further clarified by the Supreme Court, in Common Cause Vs. Union of India, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 250 , in the follows words : 13. According to the appellant, the Act was enacted as Act 33 of 1995. It was placed on the statute-book by a public notification in terms of Article 366(19) of the Constitution on 23.8.1995. By this, the Act is now out of the legislative arena. As neither has a particular date been stipulated by Parliament in its enforcement nor has Parliament expressed any contrary intention by the prescription of permitting different dates being stipulated for enforcement of different provisions of the Act, the Act would be deemed to have come into force in terms of the provisions of Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 14. Point in issue is not res integra. This point was considered in depth by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.K. Roy Vs. Union of India. It was held that an Act cannot be said to commence or put in force unless it is brought into operation by a legislative enactment or by exercise of authority by the delegatee empowered to bring the Act into operation by issuing the necessary notification. Union of India. It was held that an Act cannot be said to commence or put in force unless it is brought into operation by a legislative enactment or by exercise of authority by the delegatee empowered to bring the Act into operation by issuing the necessary notification. When enforcement of a statute or a provision therein is left to the discretion of the Government without laying down any objective standards, no writ of mandamus can be issued to the Government to enforce the statute or any of the provisions of the statute. 15. In A.K. Roy case this Court was examining the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 which was passed by both the Houses of Parliament and assented to by the President of India. Section 1(2) of the amending Act read as under : 1 (2) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act. 16. This Court examined the point regarding the interpretation to be put on Section 1 (2) of the Forty-fourth Amendment Act; the consequences of the failure of the Central Government to issue a notification under Section 1 (2) for bringing into force the provisions of the Forty-fourth Amendment Act within a reasonable time, and, the question, as to whether despite the provisions contained in Section 1 (2), the Forty-fourth Amendment must be deemed to have come into force on the date on which the President gave his assent to it. Another question examined was as to whether Section 1 (2) of the Forty-fourth Amendment Act was severable from the rest of the provisions or if that section was bad for any other reason. *** *** *** 28. The submission that by virtue of Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, the Act has come into force is misconceived. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act has no application. Section 5 is applicable only when the Act does not express any date with effect from which the Act would come into force. It will apply to such cases where there is no provision like Section 1(3) of the Act or Section 1(2) of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act has no application. Section 5 is applicable only when the Act does not express any date with effect from which the Act would come into force. It will apply to such cases where there is no provision like Section 1(3) of the Act or Section 1(2) of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act. When the legislature itself provides that the date of coming into force of the Act would be a date to be notified by the Central Government. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act will have no application. It is plain and evident from the language of the provision. Section 5(1) provides that "where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent". Sub-section (3) provides that "unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or regulation shall be construed as corning into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement". In simple words it would mean that unless otherwise provided a Central Act would come into operation on the date it receives the Presidential assent and is construed as coming into operation immediately on the date preceding its commencement. Thus, if a Central Act is assented by the President on 23.8.1995 then it would be construed to have come into operation on the midnight between 22.8.1995 and 23.8.1995. Sub-section (3) has to be read as a corollary to sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides that the Act would come into operation on the date it receives the assent of the President where a particular day w.e.f. which the Act would come into force is not prescribed whereas sub-section (3) provides the exact time of the day/night when the Act would come into force. It would not apply to cases where the legislature has delegated the power to the executive to bring into force the Act from a date to be notified by publication in the Official Gazette. (Emphasis added) 16. On the subject of conditional legislation, one may also recall the decision, in Om Prakash Vs. It would not apply to cases where the legislature has delegated the power to the executive to bring into force the Act from a date to be notified by publication in the Official Gazette. (Emphasis added) 16. On the subject of conditional legislation, one may also recall the decision, in Om Prakash Vs. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, reported in (2010) SCC 183, wherein the Supreme Court held that a law cannot be said to be in force unless it is brought into operation by legislative enactment or by the exercise of authority by a delegate empowered to bring it into operation. The theory of a statute being "in operation in a constitutional sense", though it is not in fact in operation, has, in its judgment, no validity, 17. In Ramchandra Keshav Adke Vs. Govind Joti Chavare, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 559 , the Supreme Court referred to the decision in Taylor Vs. Taylor Jassel, reported in (1876) 1 Ch D 426, wherein the Privy Council referred to the rule : where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. The Supreme Court held that the said rule squarely applies where : the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing, in a particular manner, did not imply a prohibition to do it in any other. The relevant observations, made by the Supreme Court, in Ramchandra Keshav Adke (supra), read as under : 25. A century ago, in Taylor Vs. Taylor Jassel, M.R. adopted the rule that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. This rule has stood the test of time. It has applied by the Privy Council, in Nazir Ahmed Vs. Emperor and later by this Court in several cases, to a Magistrate record under Sections 164 and 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. This rule has stood the test of time. It has applied by the Privy Council, in Nazir Ahmed Vs. Emperor and later by this Court in several cases, to a Magistrate record under Sections 164 and 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. This rule squarely applies "where, indeed the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner did not imply a prohibition to do it in any other." The rule will be attracted with full force in the present case, because non-verification of the surrender in the requisite manner would frustrate the very purpose of this provision. Intention of the legislature to prohibit the verification of the surrender in a manner other than the one prescribed, is implied in these provisions. Failure to comply with these mandatory provisions, therefore, had vitiated the surrender and rendered it non-est for the purpose of Section 5(3)(b). (Emphasis added) 18. In State of Gujarat Vs. Shantilal Mangaldas, reported in (1969) 1 SCC 509 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to refer to the decision of Privy Council, in Taylor Vs. Taylor Jassel (supra), and held that it is a settled rule of interpretation of statutes that when power is given under a statute to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. 19. The above principle of law has been followed, in Kiran Singh Vs. Chaman Paswan, reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 , wherein a four Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held as under : 6. The answer to these contentions must depend on what the position in law is when a Court entertains a suit or an appeal over which it has no jurisdiction, and what the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is on that position. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position. (Emphasis added ) 20. The principle of law, laid down, in Kiran Singh (supra), has been followed by the Supreme Court in a number of its decisions, such as Hira Lal Patni Vs. Kali Nath, reported in (1962) 2 SCR 747, Sunder Dass Vs. Ram Prakash, reported in (1977) 2 SCC 662 , and Balvant N. Viswamitra Vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 706 . 21. What can be gathered from the authorities, cited above, is that it is not necessary that a legislation is brought into force immediately following the legislation. The enforcement of law may be left by the legislator to the discretion of the Government, Central or State, as the case may be, indicating therein the manner in which the legislation shall be brought into force. Such a legislation is called conditional legislation. 22. In the light of the above concept of conditional legislation, when one closely examines Sub-Section (3) of Section 1 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, there remains no room for doubt, as already pointed out above, that the said Act is a clear case of conditional legislation inasmuch as the Parliament has left it to the Central Government to notify the date on which the provisions, embodied in the said Act, shall be brought into force in a State. 23. Let me, now, turn to Section 3 of the said Act, which embodies the provisions with regard the establishment of Family Courts in a State. 23. Let me, now, turn to Section 3 of the said Act, which embodies the provisions with regard the establishment of Family Courts in a State. Section 3 of the said Act is reproduced below: 3. Establishment of Family Courts.– (1) For the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on a family Court by this Act, the State Government, after consultation with the High Court, and by notification,- (a) shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, establish for every area in the State comprising a city or town whose population exceeds one million, a Family Court; (b) may establish Family Courts for such other areas in the State as it may deem necessary. 24. Coming to Section 3, which relates to establishment of Family Court, in a State, it becomes clear that a Family Court can be established by the State Government after consultation with the jurisdictional High Court and, for this purpose, a notification is required to be issued, which shall also specify the local limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court, so established, shall extend. Liberty has also been given to the State Government to increase, reduce or alter the limits of the local area of the territorial jurisdiction of the Family Court so established. 25. Though the Family Courts have been established, at Agartala and Udaipur, by issuing notification under Section 3 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, there is no dispute before this Court that these Family Courts have been established without the provisions of the said Act having been brought into force, in the State of Tripura, in terms of the provisions of the said Act inasmuch as no notification was issued by the Central Government, in this regard, in terms of the provisions of Sub-Section (3) of Section 1 of the said Act, bringing into force the provisions of the said Act, in the State of Tripura, before the notification, establishing Family Courts, in the State of Tripura, was issued by the State Government. In such a situation, what relief shall be granted, in the present set of writ petitions, is the vital question to be answered by this Court. 26. In such a situation, what relief shall be granted, in the present set of writ petitions, is the vital question to be answered by this Court. 26. I may pause here to point out that it has been contended, on behalf of the respondents, that the Family Courts Act, 1984, is a mere procedural law and a decree, which such a Court grants, cannot be a nullity in the eyes of law merely because the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984, have not been brought into force in a given State. In order to appreciate the submissions, so made, it is appropriate that the Court takes, once again, note of the provisions of Sub-Section (1) of Section 3. To test the correctness of the submissions, so made, when one closely analyses the provisions, embodied. In Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, it becomes crystal clear that a Family Court is actually established under the Family Courts Act, 1984, for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and power, which stands conferred on a Family Court by the Family Courts Act, 1984, meaning thereby that the Family Court Act, 1984, is not merely a procedural law; rather, the Family Courts Act, 1984, confers jurisdiction and powers on the Family Court, established under line said Act, to pass such orders/judgments/decrees as may have been permitted by the said Act. 27. Conversely, therefore, when a Family Court exercises jurisdiction and passes orders/judgments/decrees without the said Act having been brought into force in a given State, then such orders/judgments/decrees shall be nothing, but nullity in the eyes of law. 28. Further-more, the jurisdiction of a Family Court, as perceived by Section 7 the Family Court Act, 1984, reads as under: 7. Jurisdiction.– (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall– (a) have and exercise all the jurisdictions exercisable by any District Court of any subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district or, as the case may be, such subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation- The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely– (a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage; (b) a suit or proceeding for declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property to the parties or of either or them; (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship; (e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person. (f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance; (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise– (a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and (b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment. 29. When the Family Courts Act, 1984, comes into force in terms of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the said Act and a Family Court is established in tune with the provisions of Section 3 of the said Act, then, such a Family Court can exercise jurisdiction and powers, which stand enumerated in Section 7. The moment such a Family Court is established, the exercise of jurisdiction by the District Court or any subordinate Civil Court, in respect of the matters referred to in Section 7(1), shall, within the territorial jurisdiction of such a family Court, be wholly impermissible inasmuch as such a Court which may have been exercising immediately before the establishment of the Family Court, shall be debarred from exercising the jurisdiction and power, which a Family Court has. 30. 30. Thus, the enforcement of the Family Courts Act, 1984, not merely leads to the establishment of the Family Court but that the exercise of jurisdiction by such Family Court becomes legally feasible. Conversely, when the Family Courts Act, 1984, is not brought into force by publication of notification, in a State, by the Central Government, as provided by sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the said Act, it is not legally permissible for the State Government to establish, under Section 3, a Family Court in such a State and, when the Family Court itself is not permissible to be established, it logically follows that the Family Court, if established in a given State without the said Act having been brought into force, no jurisdiction and powers, in terms of Section 1 of the said Act, can be exercised by the Family Court so established. 31. It further follows that upon bringing into force the Family Court Act, 1984, in terms of the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act, in a given State, a Family Court can be legally established by the State Government by invoking its powers under Section 3 of the said Act and then only the exercise of jurisdiction and powers, which have been conferred on a Family Court by Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, would by permissible. No sooner a Family Court is established, in terms of the provisions of Section 3 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the jurisdiction and powers, which a Family Court has, would not be legally exercisable by the District Court or by any subordinate Civil Court in the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court would extend inasmuch as it is for the State to fix the local limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of a Family Court shall extend and the territorial limit of such a Family Court is fixed by the State Government by issuing notification, under Section 3 of the said Act, after consultation with the jurisdictional High Court. 32. In the light of the discussions held above, when we turn to the facts of the cases at hand, it becomes clear that so far as WP (C) 577/2010 is concerned, though the petitioner has impugned the proceedings of Misc. 32. In the light of the discussions held above, when we turn to the facts of the cases at hand, it becomes clear that so far as WP (C) 577/2010 is concerned, though the petitioner has impugned the proceedings of Misc. Case No. 116/2009, pending in the Family Court, at Agartala, which has been established by the impugned notification, dated 30.11.2011, aforementioned, what deserves to be noted is that there has been no interim direction staying further proceedings of the said Misc. Case and the said Misc. Case has accordingly proceeded. This apart, even the petitioner, in WP (C) 577/2010, has filed a criminal revision in the High Court, against the order passed by the Family Court, Agartala, in the maintenance proceeding, which none other than the petitioner had instituted. 33. So far as the writ petition, namely, WP (C) 368/2011 is concerned, the Title Suit (RCR)No. 13/2008, filed by the respondent No. 3 therein, seeking restitution of conjugal rights against the petitioner, was concluded ex parte by order, dated 06.04.2009, favour of the plaintiff. The writ petitioner, too, instituted a proceeding, under Section 125 CrPC, in the Family Court, at Udaipur, seeking maintenance for herself and her minor child. As already mentioned above, the said proceeding, which gave rise to Misc. Case No. 304/2008, concluded in an order of maintenance, passed ex parte on 30.11.2009, with direction to the respondent No. 3 to pay a sum of Rs. 2,000/-, per month, towards maintenance of the petitioner and their minor son. In the year 2009, respondent No. 3 of WP (C) 368/2011 instituted a suit, in the Family Court, at Udaipur, South Tripura, seeking a decree of dissolution of this marriage with the present petitioner, the suit having been registered as Title Suit, (Divorce) No. 28 of 2009. However, on the petitioner's filing a petition seeking transfer of the said Title Suit (Divorce), the Divorce Suit was transferred by the High Court from the Family Court, Udaipur, South Tripura, to the Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala, and was renumbered as Title Suit (Divorce) No. 172/2010. On 26.03.2010, the present petitioner instituted a proceeding, in the Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala, seeking enforcement of the order of maintenance, dated 30.11.2009, passed in Misc. Case No. 304/2008 aforementioned. The said proceeding gave rise to Misc. Case (Execution) No. 114/2010. On 26.03.2010, the present petitioner instituted a proceeding, in the Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala, seeking enforcement of the order of maintenance, dated 30.11.2009, passed in Misc. Case No. 304/2008 aforementioned. The said proceeding gave rise to Misc. Case (Execution) No. 114/2010. By order, dated 30.11.2011, passed, in the writ petition, namely, WP (C) 368/2011, all further proceedings of the said Misc. Case (Execution) No. 114/2010, pending in the Family Court, stand stayed. 34. Thus, interim directions have been passed, in WP (C) 368/2010, staying further proceedings of the relevant suits pending in the Family Court, which was established by notification, dated 30.11.2011, aforementioned and, in consequence thereof, the suits, covered by the two writ petition, namely, WP (C) 368/2011, cannot be adjudicated upon and/or decreed by the Family Court established at Udaipur or Agartala, as the case maybe. 35. The petitioner, in WP (C) 09/2011, instituted a maintenance proceeding, under Section 125 CrPC, in the Family Court, at West Tripura, Agartala, which gave rise to Misc. Case No. 145/2007. The said maintenance proceeding ended in a direction to the respondent No. 4 herein to pay to the petitioner and her child maintenance allowance @ Rs. 1,700/- per month. The respondent No. 4, too, instituted a suit, in the Family Court, at Agartala, seeking a decree for dissolution of marriage between the parties concerned, which gave rise to Title suit (Divorce) No. 194/2010. By order, dated 06.06.2010, the suit has been decided by the Family Court, West Tripura, Agartala, in favour of respondent No. 4, whereby a decree for divorce has been granted with the direction to respondent No. 4 to pay a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-, as permanent alimony, to the present petitioner as his divorced wife. 36. Thus, the Family Court at West Tripura, Agartala, and the Family Court, at Udaipur, South Tripura, have disposed of, as indicated above, a number of suits, maintenance proceedings, etc. ... by granting requisite decrees and/or by making order(s). These decrees orders or directions, as can be clearly seen, have been passed by Family Courts, which were established without the Family Courts Act, 1984, having come into force in the State of Tripura. ... by granting requisite decrees and/or by making order(s). These decrees orders or directions, as can be clearly seen, have been passed by Family Courts, which were established without the Family Courts Act, 1984, having come into force in the State of Tripura. Thus, the Family Courts, which were established by the impugned notification, dated 30.11.2002, were inherently incapable of exercising jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act, 1984, and these orders/decree, if any granted by such a Court, would be nothing, but nullity in the eyes of law. 37. What also needs to be carefully noted is that the establishment of the two Family Courts, one at Udaipur, South Tripura, and in the other at West Tripura, Agartala, by virtue of the Notifications, which had been purportedly issued under Section 3(1) of the said Act, being without jurisdiction, cannot be sustained and, hence, the Notification, dated 30.11.2002, should be, ordinarily, set aside and quashed and the series of proceedings, pending in these two Courts, shall ordinarily, be made over to Civil Court(s) of competent jurisdiction. 38. However, so far as those cases, where the judgments/orders/decrees, as the case may be, have already been passed by the Family Court, and the same have become final, it is of immense importance to note that any interference with such judgments/orders/decrees will have far-reaching consequences and may even render the marriages invalid, which would have been, otherwise, valid. This would even make children, who were till now, legitimate, as illegitimate ones. 39. In the above view of the matter, I am not inclined to render the judgments/orders/decrees, which might have already been passed by the Family Court at Udaipur, South Tripura, and/or the Family Court at West Tripura, Agartala, ineffective by cancelling or setting aside the same. I derive strength for this decision of mine from the maxim 'communis error facit jus'. The principle) underlying the maxim, is that "the law so favours the public good, that it will in some cases permit a common error to pass for right". This maxim was applied by the Supreme Court, in Raman Nadar Viswanathan Nadar & Ors. Vs. Snehappoo Rasalamma & Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1759 . The principle) underlying the maxim, is that "the law so favours the public good, that it will in some cases permit a common error to pass for right". This maxim was applied by the Supreme Court, in Raman Nadar Viswanathan Nadar & Ors. Vs. Snehappoo Rasalamma & Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1759 . In Raman Nadar Viswanathan Nadar (supra), a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, having noticed that, under the Hindu Law, a bequest to an unborn person or a person, not in existence, had been held to be void, although there was no authority, in Hindu Law, to justify the doctrine that a Hindu cannot make a gift or bequest for the benefit of an unborn person, yet this doctrine was engrafted, on Hindu Law, by the decision of the Judicial Committee in the famous Tagore's case (1872) Ind App Supp 47 (PC). The Supreme Court, in Raman Nadar Viswanathan Nadar (supra), clearly held that the decision, in Tagore's case (supra), was based on wrong reading of the relevant verse in Dayabhaga, but since the decision stood a great length of time, and, on the basis of that decision, rights had been regulated, arrangements with regard to property had been made, entitlement to properties have been passed, the Supreme Court, relying upon the maxim 'communis error facit jus', did not disturb the actions, which had already been taken on the basis of the wrong decision in Tagore's case (supra). The application of this maxim is also traceable in the speech of Lord Blackburn in his speech in Charlee Dalton Vs. Henry p. 812, as follows: I quite agree with what is said by the late Chief Justice Cockburn, (1877) 3 QBD 85 at p. 105), that where the evidence proved an adverse enjoyment as of right for twenty years or little more, and nothing else, 'no one had the faintest belief that any grant had ever existed, and the presumption was known to be a mere fiction'. He thinks that thus to shorten the period of prescription without the authority of the Legislature was a great judicial usurpation. Perhaps it was. The same thing may be said of all legal fictions, and was often said (sith, I think, more reason) of recoveries. He thinks that thus to shorten the period of prescription without the authority of the Legislature was a great judicial usurpation. Perhaps it was. The same thing may be said of all legal fictions, and was often said (sith, I think, more reason) of recoveries. But I take it that when a long series of cases have settled the law, it would produce intolerable confusion if it were to be reversed because the mode in which it was introduced was not approved of even where it was originally a blunder and inconvenient, communis error facit jus. 40. Apart from the doctrine of 'communis error facit jus', which I have referred to above, one may also refer, in this regard, to the doctrine of de facto authority, which makes an order, including conviction on sentence, passed by a Court, valid even if the appointment of Judge is found to be illegal or invalid. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1994) 3 SCC 569 , wherein the Supreme Court, referring to the decision, in Gokaraju Rangaraju Vs. State of A.P., observed thus: In Gokaraju Rangaraju Vs. State of A.P. this Court applied the doctrine of de facto authority and validated the conviction or sentence awarded by the Sessions Judges whose appointments were declared illegal. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court, in Kartar Singh (supra), read as under : 422. In Gokaraju Rangaraju Vs. State of AP., this Court held that: A judge, de facto, therefore, is one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him, when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a Judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. This Court also further held that the validity of the appointment cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. This Court also further held that the validity of the appointment cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings. It is true that in the light of the finding that Section 9(7) is invalid, violative of the basic structure and judicial independence envisaged in the Constitution, public policy requires that the doctrine of de facto be engrafted on necessity to protect the interest of the public and the individuals involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an office without actually being one in strict point of law. Therefore, though, de jure they are not by title validly appointed, but by colour of title the exercise and functions as Judge of the Designated Court, trials conducted, judgments rendered, orders passed, punishments imposed and convictions made are legal and valid. The de facto doctrine is not a stranger to the Constitution or to the Parliament and the legislature of the States. Article 233-A recognizes this doctrine brought by Constitution Twentieth Amendment Act, 1966. Therefore, the trials conducted, judgments pronounced and the orders or punishment imposed under the Act remained valid. (Emphasis added) 41. Thus, taking a cue from the decisions, in Raman Nadar Viswanathan Nadar (supra) and Kartar Singh (supra), I may hasten to point out that, the orders/judgments/decrees, which might have, in the meanwhile, been passed by the Family Courts, at Udaipur, South Tripura, and/or at West Tripura, Agartala, and have attained finality shall remain undisturbed and the actions, taken on the basis of such orders/judgments/decrees, shall also remain intact. 42. In short, thus, the judgments/decrees/orders/directions, passed by the two Family Courts, in Tripura, which have attained finality, cannot and shall not, now, be disturbed. But what about those cases, which were instituted at the Family Courts, in the State of Tripura, and some progress have been made therein? For instance, what would happen to those suits, which have already been instituted, written statements have been filed and/or evidence have been adduced? Similarly, what would happen to those proceedings, such as, maintenance proceedings, which have been instituted, interim directions for payment of maintenance have been passed, written statements have been filed and/or evidence from either side already stands adduced? For instance, what would happen to those suits, which have already been instituted, written statements have been filed and/or evidence have been adduced? Similarly, what would happen to those proceedings, such as, maintenance proceedings, which have been instituted, interim directions for payment of maintenance have been passed, written statements have been filed and/or evidence from either side already stands adduced? Should such proceedings be, now, disturbed, because of the fact that the establishment of the Family Courts by the State Government in the manner in which it has been done, was illegal and has no support of law contained in that behalf? 43. While considering the above aspect of the matter at hand, it needs to be noted that after this set of writ petitions was heard and, before delivery of the judgment and order, a notification has been issued, in the Official Gazette, by the Central Government in exercise of its powers contained in sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, bringing into force the provisions of the said Act in the State of Tripura. In other words, the provisions, embodied in the Family Courts Act, 1984, stand enforced in the State of Tripura, w.e.f. 27th June, 2012 by issuance of the said Notification, dated 26.06.2012, by the Central Government. The notification reads as under: MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE (Department of Justice) NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 26th June, 2012. S. O. 1428 (E).--In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (66 of 1984), the Central Government hereby appoints the 27th day of June, 2012, the date on which the said Act shall come into force in the State of Tripura. 44. In view of the fact that the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984, have already come into force in the State of Tripura, the establishment of the Family Courts, in the State of Tripura, by the State Government shall be taken to be valid w.e.f. the 27th day of June, 2012. However, notwithstanding the fact that the Family Courts in the State of Tripura, shall be deemed to have come into existence w.e.f. 27.06.2012, it would be in the larger interest of the people and society not to disturb the proceedings, which have already commenced in the said Family Courts, but have not yet concluded. 45. However, notwithstanding the fact that the Family Courts in the State of Tripura, shall be deemed to have come into existence w.e.f. 27.06.2012, it would be in the larger interest of the people and society not to disturb the proceedings, which have already commenced in the said Family Courts, but have not yet concluded. 45. Situated thus, these three writ petitions are hereby disposed of without disturbing the proceedings, which have already been instituted in the Family Courts, in the State of Tripura. 46. With the above observations and directions, all these three writ petitions stand disposed of. No order as to costs.