JUDGMENT Pratap Kumar Ray, J. 1. Heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties. Assailing the judgment and order dated 4th April, 2012 passed in writ petition No. 4027(W) of 2012, this appeal has been preferred. 2. Learned Trial Judge did not quash the impugned order dated 18th January, 2012 passed by the Vice-Chairman, Ranaghat Municipality asking the writ petitioner to close Cold Storage for ice cream and not to run the powerful machine installed for Cold Storage but simply directed that opportunity of hearing should be given on that issue by the Municipal Authority and till a reasoned decision is taken the writ petitioner would not be entitled to run the Cold Storage Plant in the concerned premises. The appellant being the writ petitioner assailed the order of Vice-Chairman, Ranaghat Municipality dated 18th January, 2012, which reads such: As per direction of the Chairman, Ranaghat Municipality, you are hereby ordered to close your cold storage for ICE Cream and not to run the powerful machines installed for cold storage by you. You are directed to act as per order within 3(three) days from the date of receipt of this letter failing which any legal action may be taken against you. 3. Private respondent who was the complainant on issue of running of the Cold Storage for ice cream also participated in the hearing before the learned Trial Judge and filed respective affidavits. A very short question is involved before us as to whether the Vice-Chairman, Ranaghat Municipality had the power to pass impugned order in writ petition or whether the Chairman without adjudicating the issue, if any, may direct the Vice-Chairman to take action regarding stoppage of business. We have asked the learned Advocate for the Municipality about the power of the Vice-Chairman by which he issued the impugned order aforesaid. Learned Advocate has referred to section 200 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 and particularly sub-section (4) of the said section as an answer to that point by contending, inter alia, that Vice-Chairman was duly authorized by the Chairman to take action. Learned Advocate has referred to section 200 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 and particularly sub-section (4) of the said section as an answer to that point by contending, inter alia, that Vice-Chairman was duly authorized by the Chairman to take action. Section 200 reads such: Power to prohibit change of authorized use of building.--(1) No person shall, without the written permission of the Chairman or otherwise than in conformity with the conditions of such permission,-- (a) use or permit to be used for the purpose of human habitation any building or part thereof not originally erected or authorized to be used for such purpose; (b) change or allow the change of the use of a building for any purpose other than that specified in the sanctioned plan; (c) change or allow the change of the use of any building erected before the commencement of this Act contrary to the use for which such erection was originally sanctioned; (d) convert or allow the conversion of a tenement within a building to an occupational use, other than the use intended in the original sanctioned plan, nor materially alter, enlarge or extend the permitted use. (2) If, in any case, such permission is given, no change of occupancy or use shall be allowed before necessary alternations or provisions have been made to the satisfaction of the Chairman and in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force. (3) Any change of use made before the commencement of this Act, except in so far as such use is permissible under the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 (Ben. Act XV of 1932), shall be deemed to be an unauthorized change and shall be dealt with under the provisions of this Act. (4) Without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against any person, whether owner or occupier, contravening any provision of this section, the Board of Councilors may levy on such person, in accordance with such scale as may be prescribed, a fine not exceeding in each case rupees one hundred per square meter per month for the area under unauthorized use throughout the period during which such contravention continues. (5) The Chairman may, if he deems fit, order that the unauthorized use be stopped forthwith: Provided that before making any such order, the Chairman shall give a reasonable opportunity to the person affected to show cause why such order shall not be made. (6) Any person aggrieved by an order of the by an order of the Chairman under sub-section (5) may, within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal against the order to the Board of Councilors whose decision in the matter shall be final and conclusive. (7) Where an appeal is preferred under sub-section (6), the Board of Councilors may stay the enforcement of the order made by the Chairman under sub-section (5) on such terms and for such period as it may think fit. (8) Save as otherwise provided in this section, no Court shall entertain any suit, application or other proceeding for injunction or other relief against the Chairman or the Board of Councilors to restrain from taking any action or making any order in pursuance of the provisions of this section. Explanation.-- For the purposes of this Chapter, "Unauthorized use" shall mean change or conversion of a building without sanction from one occupancy or use to another, such "occupancy" or "use" being from purposes, namely, residential, commercial, business, mercantile, industrial, storage, institutional assembly and hazardous (dangerous and offensive): Provided that any change or conversion, which is considered not to be of material significance under the rules made under this Act, shall not be deemed to be an "unauthorized use" for the purposes of this Chapter. Regarding delegation of the power to the Vice-Chairman learned Advocate for the Municipality has referred to sections 19 and 20A. Sections 19 and 20A reads such: Section 19. Vice Chairman.-- (1) The Vice Chairman shall, in the absence of the Chairman, preside over the meetings of the Chairman-in-Council as well as the Board of Councilors. Regarding delegation of the power to the Vice-Chairman learned Advocate for the Municipality has referred to sections 19 and 20A. Sections 19 and 20A reads such: Section 19. Vice Chairman.-- (1) The Vice Chairman shall, in the absence of the Chairman, preside over the meetings of the Chairman-in-Council as well as the Board of Councilors. (2) When-- (a) the office of the Chairman falls vacant by reason of death, resignation, removal or otherwise, or (b) the Chairman is, by reason of leave, illness or other cause, temporarily unable to exercise the powers, perform the functions and discharge the duties of his office, the Vice-Chairman shall exercise the powers, perform the functions and discharge the duties of the Chairman until a Chairman is elected under sub-section (3) of section 17 and assumes office or until the Chairman resumes his duties, as the case may be. (3) The Vice-Chairman shall, at any time, perform such other duty or exercise such other powers as may be delegated to him under the provisions of this Act. Section 20A. Delegation of powers and functions.--(1) The Board of Councilors may, by resolution, delegate, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the resolution, any of its powers or functions to the Chairman-in-Council or the Chairman. (2) The Chairman-in-Council may, by resolution, delegate, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the resolution, any of its powers or functions to the Chairman of the Chairman-in-Council. (3) Subject to such resolution as may be made by the Chairman-in-Council in this behalf, the Chairman may, by order, delegate, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, any of his powers or functions to the Vice-Chairman or to a member of the Chairman-in-Council or to the holder of any of the posts of officers referred to in sub-section (1) of section 53. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the Chairman-in-Council, the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, a member of the Chairman-in-Council or a holder of any of the posts of officers referred to in sub-section (1) of section 53 shall not delegate-- (a) any of its or his powers or functions delegated to it or him under this section, or (b) such of its or his powers as may be prescribed. 4. 4. Learned Advocate for the Municipality, however failed to produce any document which is in the nature of the direction of the Chairman of Ranaghat Municipality to the Vice-Chairman of the said Municipality to take action which is mentioned in the impugned order of 18th January, 2012. On a bare reading of sub-section (5) of section 200 as quoted above, it appears that for unauthorised use of a building, Chairman may pass order to stop such use subject to giving an opportunity of hearing prior to passing such a decision. In the instant case, admittedly, Chairman has not exercised that power and in the order impugned there is no whisper about unauthorised use of the building. In the order impugned dated 18th January, 2012 in fact no reason assigned as to why the writ petitioner/appellant was directed to close the Cold Storage for ice cream and was restrained from running the machine. Section 20A as has been referred to by the learned Advocate for the Municipality to contend that Vice-Chairman was delegated with power to act all functioning of the Chairman and in support of such the resolution of the Board of Councilors as has been referred to being the resolution dated 29th January, 2010 and 28th May, 2011, have been relied upon. We are of the view that said resolutions to exercise all powers of the Chairman by the Chairman-in-Council under any stretch of imagination could be considered as delegation of the adjudicating power under sub-section 5 of section 200 of the said Act. Section 20A is a specific provision by which the Board of councilors may delegate its power or function to the Chairman but those functions cannot be sub-delegated further by the Chairman. Section 19 of the Act as referred to by the learned Advocate for the Municipality also does not speak about delegation of power to the Vice-Chairman with reference to the adjudicatory power of a lis under section 200. Further more, Vice-Chairman practically has issued the letter without assigning any reason simply mentioning "as per direction of the Chairman". Under the four-corners of section 200, there is no scope to pass any direction which may be telephonic direction or may be verbal direction. Further more, Vice-Chairman practically has issued the letter without assigning any reason simply mentioning "as per direction of the Chairman". Under the four-corners of section 200, there is no scope to pass any direction which may be telephonic direction or may be verbal direction. Statute is very clear on that point that the Chairman himself will adjudicate the matter upon giving proper opportunity of hearing prior to passing any order restraining some body to use the building any other way which would be considered by the Chairman as unauthorised use. It is a settled legal principle of law that a statutory body must exercise its power within the parameter and periphery of the statute and the contour of the power limited by the statute. An individual may exercise all powers save and except as are prohibited under law but a statutory body cannot exercise any power as per whims and can exercise only those powers prescribed under a statute. This principle is a settled legal principle regarding functioning of a statutory body. Reliance is placed to the judgment passed in the case Maniruddin Bepari vs. The Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners, Dacca, reported in 40 CWN 17, K. Ramadas Shenoy vs. Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi, reported in (1974) 2 SCC 506 , J.N. Ganatra vs. Morvi Municipality, Morvi, reported in (1996) 9 SCC 495 , Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill Private Limited, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111 , Union of India vs. International Trading Company, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 437 , Meera Sahni vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 177 , Ramdeen Mayurya vs. State of U.P., reported in (2009) 6 SCC 735 . Said legal concept was considered a century ago in Taylor vs. Taylor, reported in (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426. This settled Rule also was applied by the Privy Council in the case Nazir Ahmed vs. King Emperor, reported in 1936 PC 253. This principle of law has been discussed by Crawford in his book, Statutory Interpretation wherein at page 334, this principle has been discussed under the heading "Express Mention and Implied Exclusion (Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius)", which reads such: Express Mention and Implied Exclusion (Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius.-...................... If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily, and by implication, be excluded from its operation and effect. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily, and by implication, be excluded from its operation and effect. .................. if the statute directs that certain acts shall be done in a specified manner, or by certain person, their performance in any other manner than that specified, or by any other person than one of those named, is impliedly prohibited. 5. Having regard to the aforesaid settled legal position of law which mandates that statutory body must exercise its power within the contour and periphery and parameters of the powers prescribed under this statute, the impugned decision of Vice-Chairman, Ranaghat Municipality, accordingly, is not legally sustainable. We hold that Vice-Chairman had no power and jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. Impugned order is also not legally sustainable by applying the other legal principle which is called as "speaking order doctrine", which mandates that every order/decision of administrative body, quasi-judicial body and also of judicial body, must be with proper reasoning, so that litigant may understand the reasoning and may approach the remedy to the higher forum assailing the said decision. Reason is the heart and soul of the order. Without any reason, the order has no meaning and value. 6. Section 200 sub-section (5) of the said Act as has been referred to by the learned Advocate for the Municipality is within the domain of adjudicatory field and as such the authority being the administrative body practically is exercising power as a quasi-judicial authority. Running of business by any body is a Constitutional protected right under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. As such when a decision is passed directing some body to stop any business, it requires a special adjudication within the framework of the statutory provision. The principle of reasoned order now has gained a firm root in the judicial system wherein under the principle of judicial review, the decision of administrative body and quasi-judicial body is tested. Right to be informed with reason is within the domain of Article 19(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed to the judgment passed in the case Ravi S. Naik Sanjay Bandekar vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1558 . Right to be informed with reason is within the domain of Article 19(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed to the judgment passed in the case Ravi S. Naik Sanjay Bandekar vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1558 . Administration is under a general duty to act fairly and fairness founded on reason is an essence of right of equality is the principle discussed in the case Manager Government Branch Press vs. D.B. Belliappa, reported in AIR 1979 SC 429 . Reason is one of the fundamentals of good administration is the observation of Lord Denning MR in the case Breen vs. Amalgamated Engineering Union Limited, reported in (1971) 2 QB 175. Even in the judicial field, it is settled legal position that justice not only should be done but it should be felt to have been done, where reason is a must and mandatory. Reliance is placed to the judgment passed in the case M.P. Industries Limited vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1966 SC 671 . Reason is the essential of justice, which view was expressed in the case State of West Bengal vs. Atul Krishna Shaw, reported in AIR 1990 SC 2205 , R V Civil Service Appeal Board, Ex-parte cunninghum, reported in 1991 (4) All E.R. 310, Doody V Secretary of State for the Home Department and Other appeals, reported in 1993 (3) All ER 92. 7. Absence of reason is nothing but non-application of mind is the view expressed in the case Shanti Prasad Agarwalla vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1991 SC 814 . "Reason is the heart bit of every conclusion. It introduces clarity and without the same it becomes lifeless" is the view expressed in the case Steel Authority of India Limited vs. S.T.O., reported in (2008) 9 SCC 407 . 8. Non-assigning of reason is tantamount to the breach of natural justice is the view expressed in the case Assistant Commissioner Commercial Tax Department vs. Shukla and brothers, reported in 2010 (4) SCC 785 . 9. There are many other judgments in that field passed by the Apex Court from time to time. 8. Non-assigning of reason is tantamount to the breach of natural justice is the view expressed in the case Assistant Commissioner Commercial Tax Department vs. Shukla and brothers, reported in 2010 (4) SCC 785 . 9. There are many other judgments in that field passed by the Apex Court from time to time. Reference could be made to the case State of West Bengal vs. Alpana Roy, reported in 2005 (8) SCC 296 , Jagatamba Devi vs. Hem Ram & Ors., reported in 2008 (3) SCC 509 , State of Punjab vs. Bhag Singh, reported in 2004 (1) SCC 547 . 10. Relying upon different judgments of the Apex Court the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, where one of us Pratap Kumar Ray, J. considered the issue applying the settled legal principle in the case Sudhir Kumar Saha vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2010 (1) CLJ (Cal.) 170 (D.B.), and in the case Madhusudan Mondal vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2010 (1) CLJ (Cal) 222 (D.B.). Recently a judgment has been delivered by one of us Pratap Kumar Ray, J. in the case Chairman Municipal vs. South Eastern Railway vs. Shamlal Roy dealing with that question which is reported in 2012 (2) SLR 293. 11. Considering the aforesaid settled legal position of law, the impugned decision dated 18th January, 2012 even if for argument sake it is assumed that Vice-Chairman had the jurisdiction, still then is not legally sustainable in absence of any reason. As such we are of the view that impugned order of 18th January, 2012 assailed in the writ application, is not legally sustainable and learned Trial Judge ought not to have passed the impugned judgment under appeal assailed before us. 12. Learned Advocate for the private respondents, however, has argued the case in a different angle by contending, inter alia, that writ application was not maintainable as no writ of mandamus could be passed when admittedly the writ petitioner/appellant had no legal right to run the Cold Storage for ice cream as no licence was taken under the West Bengal Cold Storage (Licensing and Regulation) Act, 1966. 13. 13. Even assuming that there was no licence taken under the said Act and on assuming further that appellant is running a Cold Storage for ice cream, but still then, question of this present writ application is on the point whether the Vice-Chairman, Ranaghat Municipality had the power to pass the impugned order directing to stop running of Cold Storage without assigning any reason as to why the appellant would be restrained from running the Cold Storage. As already discussed that in the impugned order there is no reason assigned, namely, on the point as canvassed by the learned advocate for the Municipality regarding use of building unauthorizedly or on the point as canvassed by the private respondents that there was no licence to run the Cold Storage. 14. The petitioner has not prayed for any mandamus but writ of certiorari and necessary direction. It has been contended by the learned advocate for the writ petitioner/appellant that it is not a Cold Storage but a refrigerator machine to keep the ice cream for the purpose of sale from other counter situated in other building and authorities and Pollution Law on enquiry held that there was noise pollution. 15. Be that as it may, in the instant case, we are not concerned at all as to whether there is a licence under the said Cold Storage Act. We are only concerned on the issue as to whether Vice-Chairman, Ranaghat Municipality had the power, jurisdiction under the Municipality Act to pass the impugned order. We are satisfied that said authority had no jurisdiction, as such, we pass appropriate writ of certiorari quashing the same by keeping the points as urged by the respondents open for adjudication by the authority, if approach is made on that issue. The impugned decision, accordingly, is set aside and quashed by applying said two principles of law, namely, speaking order principle and secondly, limitation of exercise of the power by the statutory body. Hence the impugned judgment and order stands set aside and quashed and writ application is allowed to that extent. 16. It is made clear that Municipality and the private respondents would be at liberty to take appropriate steps for initiating appropriate proceeding in accordance with law and we have not adjudicated anything with reference to other points as urged, save and except, aforesaid points about jurisdiction of Vice-Chairman to issue the impugned decision. 16. It is made clear that Municipality and the private respondents would be at liberty to take appropriate steps for initiating appropriate proceeding in accordance with law and we have not adjudicated anything with reference to other points as urged, save and except, aforesaid points about jurisdiction of Vice-Chairman to issue the impugned decision. It is also made clear that we have not adjudicated any other points as would be available to the respective parties in accordance with law. 17. Appeal and application for stay both stand allowed to that extent. Application for necessary order being C.A.N. 3782 of 2012 stands rejected. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis. Subal Baidya, J. I agree.