ORDER 1. The Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”), which is a Transmission and Distributing Licensee under the Electricity Act, 2003, has approached this Court by filing the present writ application, questioning the validity and legality of the order dated 13.02.2012 passed by the learned Chairperson, Bihar Human Rights Commission, Patna (hereinafter referred to as Commission) in File No. BHRC/COMP.2544/09, whereby the Chairman of the Board has been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 1 lakh as compensation to the Respondent No.2 within a period of one month, holding that electricity is an absolute requirement of life which the Respondent no.2 was deprived of by the Board for several years. From the facts incorporated in the order dated 13.2.2012 passed by learned Chairperson, Bihar Human Rights Commission, Patna, it appears that Respondent No.2 approached the Commission claiming compensation for loss, harassment and mental agony caused by the officials of the Board alleging that inspite of directions issued by the Fora under the Consumer Protection Act, the Board was not restoring his Electricity connection and he was without connection after its unauthorized disconnection since 30.9.1995. 2. Respondent no.2 has a house near Saguna More, Danapur which had electric connection of 0.66 KW load for domestic consumption. As per the pleadings in the writ application itself, a portion of the house was let out to the tenant in the year 1992. The lessee has been described as Yashwant Kumar in the impugned order. As per the case of the Board, on 25.10.1994 an Inspection Team of the Board found connected load of 10.067 KW against the sanctioned load of 0.66 KW. Further case of the Board is that there was another inspection on 6.1.1995 which led to the discovery of 23.81 KW load. I hasten to add here that as per the impugned order passed by the learned Chairman, Bihar Human Rights Commission, in second inspection conducted on 6.1.1995 by the Assistant Electrical Engineer, Danapur and Assistant Electrical Engineer(supply), Digha the connected load was found to be 2.381 KW and not 23.81 K.W. as pleaded in the writ petition. There is no averment in the writ application to the effect that the finding recorded by the Commission in this regard is incorrect. There is no averment in the writ application to the effect that the finding recorded by the Commission in this regard is incorrect. The case of the Board is that, as during the course of first inspection the connected load was found to be more than sanctioned load, the bill of Rs. 94,889.77 was raised and as the consumer failed to deposit the bill amount, his line was disconnected on 30.9.1995. 3. From the impugned order it appears that the bill amounting to Rs. 94,889.77 was raised on 16.11.1994 and on protest by Respondent no.2 herein, against such billing, a second inspection was conducted in which the connected load was found to be 2.381 KW instead of 10.067 KW. It appears that revised bill for Rs. 53,037.25 was raised subsequently by the Board on 18.12.1996 in place of Rs. 94,889.77. As has been recorded hereinabove, the electric line was disconnected, in the meanwhile, on 30.9.1995 itself for non-payment of bill, i.e. prior to issuance of revised bill based on second inspection. On 4.7.1997 the Board’s official raided the premises and found electricity being consumed even though the line was disconnected on papers, which resulted into institution of a First Information Report against Respondent no.2 and the tenant Yashwant Kumar vide Danapur P.S. case No. 290 of 1997. Thereafter a punitive bill amounting to Rs. 83,484 was raised against Respondent no.2. From the impugned order of the learned Chairperson of the Commission, it appears that Respondent no.2 approached this Court by filing Cr. Misc. no. 13562 of 1997 and pursuant to a direction, he deposited a sum of Rs. 13,537/-. Simultaneously Respondent no.2 approached the District Consumer Forum, Patna under the Consumer Protection Act alleging deficiency in service and praying for determination of dues on the basis of second Inspection held on 6.1.1995. The District Forum allowed the application vide an order dated 16.10.1997 read with another order dated 17.4.1998 directing the Board to restore the electric connection on payment of a sum of Rs. 13,537/-. The Forum also held that there was deficiency of service on the part of the Board. 5. The Board challenged this order of the District Forum by preferring an appeal vide Appeal No. 674 of 1997 before the State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as the State Commission). 13,537/-. The Forum also held that there was deficiency of service on the part of the Board. 5. The Board challenged this order of the District Forum by preferring an appeal vide Appeal No. 674 of 1997 before the State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as the State Commission). The State Commission vide an order dated 19.07.2004 upheld the decision of the District Forum as regards the claim of the respondent no.2 that the bill should have been issued on the basis of the second inspection. The State Commission accordingly directed that on receipt of the amount of the bill from 1.1.1995 till date, the electric connection of the applicant must be restored. 6. Inspite of the decision of the District Forum holding respondent no.2 liable for the payment of sum of Rs. 13537.23 calculated on the basis of the second inspection dated 6.1.1995, the electric connection was not restored, forcing him to file an Execution case No. 109 of 1999 under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act. It was alleged before the Human Rights Commission that out of misconception of the fact that a sum of Rs. 13537.23 was still due, the District Forum directed the respondent no.2 to deposit the amount in order to buy peace and get the connection restored after payment of the said amount. Respondent no.2 thereafter said to have again paid that amount but the electric connection was not restored. 7. In the meanwhile, the Danapur Court exonerated respondent no.2 of the charge of theft in a Trial being Trial No. 934/237 arising out of Danapur P.S. case No. 290 of 1997 and held the tenant, Yashwant Kumar, liable for the same. After the verdict of Danapur Trial Court, which came sometime in the year 2007, the electricity bill was bifurcated and accordingly it was served on Yashwant Kumar, the tenant. 8. This fact compelled the respondent no.2 to approach Human Rights Commission alleging that the electric connection was not being restored inspite of adjudication by statutory fora under the Consumer Protection Act. It seems that during the pendency of the complaint before the State Human Rights Commission the electric line was restored finally on 3.5.2010. Apparently, respondent no.2 had no electric connection for all these 15 years from 1995 after dis-connection that too because of some latches/misdeeds of the tenant, Yashwant Kumar. It seems that during the pendency of the complaint before the State Human Rights Commission the electric line was restored finally on 3.5.2010. Apparently, respondent no.2 had no electric connection for all these 15 years from 1995 after dis-connection that too because of some latches/misdeeds of the tenant, Yashwant Kumar. It appears from the order of the learned Chairman, Human Rights Commission that even after restoration of the electric supply to his premises in question, inflated bills to the tune of Rs. 4,24,048 and Rs. 4,54,511 were served on him which were revised on protest. The applicant was finally forced to pay the said amount for some of the months and it was only after he approached the Human Rights Commission that an inquiry was conducted by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, PESU who after getting the ledger scrutinized, directed for refund of excess amount of Rs. 71,424.63. 9. With these facts in the background Respondent no.2 alleged before the Human Rights Commission that he was deprived of the Electricity and harassed in various ways for fifteen years solely because he did not agree to the illegal demand of the officials of the Board. He contended that there was glaring violation of human rights relating to life, liberty and dignity at the hands of the officials and deserved to be duly compensated. 10. Based on submission made by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer PESU, the stand of the Board before the Commission has been recorded at page 7 of the impugned order which reads thus:- “In course of hearing, Sri SKP Singh, General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, PESU fairly submitted that the dispute should have come to an end in the normal course after the decision of the State Commission but the decision-particularly Para 9 thereof-gave rise to some confusion and therefore the decision could not be implemented. The issue being purely legal, it was referred to the Board for obtaining legal opinion and, finally, in the light of the legal advise received from the Additional Standing Counsel, the bills were revised and as of date no dispute exists. The Board having resolved the dispute “In letter and spirit” and redressed the “genuine grievances” of the applicant, the issue may be closed.” 11. The Board having resolved the dispute “In letter and spirit” and redressed the “genuine grievances” of the applicant, the issue may be closed.” 11. On the basis of these facts learned Chairperson, Human Rights Commission, Bihar, Patna came to the following conclusion:- “From the narration of events it is clear that the applicant’s liability had to be determined on the basis of the second inspection of 06.01.1995- as held by the District Forum and the State Commission. Thus there may be some justification for continuance of dispute and the disconnection, but there was absolutely no justification to delay restoration of electric connection and raise inflated bills after decision of the State Commission. The dilly-dallyings on the part of the Board’s officials and raising of excess/inflated bills were clearly acts intending to harass the applicant. Indeed, the first inspection of 25.10.1994 itself was wrong and illegal. As conceded in para 16 of the reply of the Board, “ the whole dispute that lingered over a period of time relates to surprise inspection carried in 1994.” Be that as it may, as observed above, while the dispute arising from said surprise inspection can be justified resulting in the disconnection of line etc, there was absolutely no justification to keep the dispute alive after the decision of the State Commission on 19.07.2004.”(emphasis added) 12. With these findings the learned Chairperson of the Commission held that the electricity was an absolute requirement of life and therefore right relating to life which is the asset of the human rights and accordingly held Respondent no.2 to be entitled for compensation and directed the Board to pay a sum of Rs. One lakh to the applicant within a period of one month. It is against this order of the State Human Rights Commission that the present writ application has been filed by the Bihar State Electricity Board. 13. I have taken the facts exhaustively from the impugned order dated 13.2.2012 passed by the State Human Rights Commission as none of the findings of fact recorded in the order has been disputed in the pleadings by the Board. 14. Elaborating his submission Mr. 13. I have taken the facts exhaustively from the impugned order dated 13.2.2012 passed by the State Human Rights Commission as none of the findings of fact recorded in the order has been disputed in the pleadings by the Board. 14. Elaborating his submission Mr. Anand Kumar Ojha, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Board contended that there is statutory remedy available under the Electricity Act, 2003 itself for the redressal of the grievance of respondent no.2 and the Human Rights Commission ought not to have entertained the complaint of Respondent no.2. He contended that the action of the Commission amounted to usurping the power of the other authorities in the guise of violation of rights relating to life. Mr. Ojha, referring to Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 has further contended that this provision imposes an embargo against the Commission on inquiring into any matter after expiry of one year from the date of alleged violation of Human Rights. He asserted that the bar under Section 36(2) could not be got over even by invoking theory of “continuing wrong and the recurring cause of action.” 15. Mr. Ojha has placed reliance in support of his contention on an Apex Court Judgment in case of N.C. Dhoundial Vs. Union of India & ors. Reported in (2004) 2 SCC 579 . It has been pleaded by the Board in the writ petition that the rights which are already under protection in Statute cannot be termed as Human Rights and the learned State Human Rights Commission should not have entertained the application of harassment and humiliation. The Board, in its pleading has charged respondent no.2 of conduct of litigious person litigating with the Board and also accused in criminal case. 16. In order to deal the contentions raised on behalf of the Board, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 2 (d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 which defines human rights as follows:- “2(d)“human rights” means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by Courts in India.” 17. Chapter III of the Act which contains Section 12 to 16, deals with the functions and power of the Commission. Chapter III of the Act which contains Section 12 to 16, deals with the functions and power of the Commission. The Commission has been defined under Section 2(c ) as the National Human Rights Commission constituted under Section 3. However by operation of Section 29 of the Act, provisions as contained in Chapter III have been made applicable to the State Commission constituted under Section 21 of the Act. The State Human Rights Commission has, thus, the same functions and power within the jurisdiction of the State as the National Commission has and as per the provisions contained in the Act the Commission has to be read as State Human Rights Commission in Chapter III of the Act. One of the functions of the State Human Rights Commission is to inquire into complaint of violation of Human Rights or abatement thereof for negligence in prevention of such violation by a public servant. As has been noted hereinabove, Human Rights means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by Courts in India. 18. There is absolutely no justification put-fourth by the Board in the pleadings of the writ application in hand as to why electric connection could not be restored after the decision of the State Commission on 19.7.2004. It is not the ground of the Board to the writ application that its conduct in not restoring the electric connection inspite of the decision of the State Commission under the Consumer Protection Act does not amount to violation of human rights. The plea of the Board in paragraph 19 of the writ application is that a right which could be enforced through the particular Statute cannot be a subject matter of human right’s violation. The Board goes on to allege that the conduct of Respondent no.2 has been litigating with the Board authority and also being an accused in criminal case though subsequently acquitted. The further plea of the Board, as has been noted hereinabove is that even if there was violation of human rights of Respondent no.2 he could have raised his grievance before the State Human Rights Commission within one year from the date of the order of the State Commission in view of the provisions under Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. 19. 19. In my opinion, the plea of the Board is as frivolous as its conduct. It ventured to defy the order passed by the State Commission constituted under the Consumer Protection Act. The conduct and attitude of the Board hits at the very rule of law which is the foundation of a democratic society. Respondent no.2 did not only suffer harassment and mental agony at the hands of the Board; Board’s conduct also caused loss of dignity to the Respondent no.2. It is loss of dignity for a human being, a member of civilized society, to have in his hand orders in his favour and authorities, which are instrumentality of State and under statutory obligation to carry out such orders thumbing their nose at such order/orders. Denial of electric supply to respondent no.2 in the present case is violative of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, not only because electricity in the present time and context is an essential requirement but also because he has a right to live with human dignity. 20. The Apex Court in case of Chameli Singh Vs. State of UP in (1996) 2 Supreme Court Cases 549 has held, inter alia, that right to live guaranteed in any civilized society implies the right to food, water, decent environment, education, medical care and shelter which are basic human rights. Elaborating further the Apex Court has held in paragraph 8 as follows:- “Shelter for a human being, therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limb. It is home where he has opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as to have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter, therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one’s head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as a human being. Right to shelter when used as an essential requisite to the right to live should be deemed to have been guaranteed as a fundamental right.” 21. It has been pleaded by the Board in the writ application that there is an alternative statutory remedy available under Electricity Act, 2003 and Supply Code framed thereunder. Right to shelter when used as an essential requisite to the right to live should be deemed to have been guaranteed as a fundamental right.” 21. It has been pleaded by the Board in the writ application that there is an alternative statutory remedy available under Electricity Act, 2003 and Supply Code framed thereunder. However, there is no Forum mentioned in the writ application before which the respondent no.2 could have raised his grievance after final adjudication of the dispute between him and the Board by the order of State Commission under the Consumer Protection Act. I have examined the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003. Section 42(5) of the Act confers upon the licensee an obligation to establish the forum for redressal of his grievances as may be specified by “State Electricity Regulatory Commission” constituted under the Act. Sub-section (6) provides that any consumer aggrieved by non-redressal of his grievance under sub-section (5) may make representation for the redressal of his grievance to an authority to be known as Ombudsman to be appointed or designated by the State Commission. It appears that the Bihar Electricity Regulatory Commission has framed Bihar State Electricity Supply Code, 2007 published in Bihar Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 10.1.2008. It would be apt to reiterate here the fact, which has been admitted by the Board also, that the dispute between the respondent no.2 and the Board came to be finally settled on 19.7.2004 itself when the State Commission constituted under the Consumer Protection Act disposed of the appeal preferred on behalf of the Board against the order of the District Forum. There is no provision under the Bihar State Electricity Supply Code, 2007 which provides any mechanism for redressal of consumer grievance of the nature occurring in the present case. Clause 10.14 of the Bihar Electricity Supply Code, 2007 deals with settlement of erroneous bills. In the present case the grievance of the petitioner is related to defiance of the order passed by the fora under the Consumer Protection Act by which the dispute between the Board and the Respondent no.2 came to be finally settled. In such circumstance the plea that the proceeding before the State Human Rights Commission is not maintainable at the instance of respondent no.2 as statutory remedy was available under the Electricity Act itself, cannot be sustained and it is accordingly rejected. 22. In such circumstance the plea that the proceeding before the State Human Rights Commission is not maintainable at the instance of respondent no.2 as statutory remedy was available under the Electricity Act itself, cannot be sustained and it is accordingly rejected. 22. In any view of the matter, if a person has been guaranteed certain rights either under the Constitution or under an International Covenant or under a law, and he is denied access to such a right, then it amounts to a clear violation of his human rights and the State Human Rights Commission/ National Human Rights Commission has the jurisdiction to intervene for protecting it. Reference may be made to a judgment of the Apex Court in case of Ram Deo Chauhan Vs. Bani Kanta Das in (2010) 14 SCC 2009, relevant portion of which is being quoted hereinbelow for quick reference:- 45. Keeping those broad principles in our mind if we look at Section 12(j) of the 1993 Act, we find that it confers on NHRC “ such other functions as it may consider necessary for the promotion of human rights”. It is not necessary that each and every case relating to the violation of human rights will fit squarely within the four corners of Section 12 of the 1993 Act for invoking the jurisdiction of NHRC. One must accept that human rights are not like edicts inscribed on a rock. They are made and unmade on the crucible of experience and through irreversible process of human struggle for freedom. They admit of a certain degree of fluidity. Categories of human rights, being of infinite variety, are never really closed. That is why the residuary clause in Clause (j) has been so widely worded to take care of situations not covered by clauses (a) to (i) of Sec tion 12 of the 1993 Act. 46. The jurisdiction of NHRC thus stands enlarged by Section 12 (j) of the 1993 Act to take necessary action for the protection of human rights. Such action would include inquiring into cases where a party has been denied the protection of any law to which he is entitled, whether by a private party, a public institution, the Government or even the Courts of law. Such action would include inquiring into cases where a party has been denied the protection of any law to which he is entitled, whether by a private party, a public institution, the Government or even the Courts of law. We are of the opinion that if a person is entitled to benefit under a particular law, and benefits under that law have been denied to him, it will amount to a violation of his human rights. 47. Human rights are the basic, inherent, immutable and inalienable rights to which a person is entitled simply by virtue of his being born a human. They are such rights which are to be made available as a matter of right. The Constitution and legislations of a civilized country recognize them since they are so quintessentially part of every human bring. That is why every democratic country committed to the rule of law put into force mechanisms for their enforcement and protection. 48. Human rights are universal in nature. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( hereinafter referred to as UDHR) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10.12.1948 recognises and requires the observance of certain universal rights, articulated therein, to he human rights, and these are acknowledged and accepted as equal and inalienable and necessary for the inherent dignity and development of an individual. Consequently, though the term “human rights” itself has not been defined in UDHR the nature and content of human rights can be understood from the rights enunciated therein. 49. Possibly considering the wide sweep of such basic rights, the definition of “human rights” in the 1993 Act has been designedly kept very broad to encompass within it all the rights relating to life, liberty equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by Courts in India. Thus, if a person has been guaranteed certain rights either under the Constitution or under an International Covenant or under a law, and he is denied access to such a right, then it amounts to a clear violation of his human rights and NHRC has the jurisdiction to intervene for protecting it.” 23. Learned Counsel for the Board had placed strong reliance on Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and a judgment of the Apex Court in case of N.C. Dhoundial Vs. Learned Counsel for the Board had placed strong reliance on Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and a judgment of the Apex Court in case of N.C. Dhoundial Vs. Union of India and others reported in ( 2004) 2 Supreme Court Cases 579 to contend that the jurisdiction of the State Commission was barred after expiry of one year from the date of the order of the State Human Rights Commission under the Consumer Protection Act, i.e. 19.7.2004 and according to him and the pleadings in the writ application the cause of action arose within one year when the Board authority did not comply with the direction dated 19.7.2004. It has further been contended that bar under Section 36(2) could not be got over by invoking the theory of continuing wrong as held by the Apex Court in case of N.C. Dhoundial ( Supra). The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in case of N.C. Dhoundial Vs. Union of India and others cannot be applied in the present case. In case of N.C. Dhoundial one Ashok Kumar Sinha alleged illegal detention from 25.3.1994 to 3.4.1994 and in that background the Apex Court held that the complainant was produced before the Special Judge on 3.4.1994 and remand was obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The Apex Court held that the alleged act of unauthorized detention which gave rise to violation of human rights seized on 3.4.1994 and it did not perpetuate thereafter. In that case as the complaint was filed on 19.8.1998 the Apex Court held that the time limit prescribed under Section 36(2) is referable to allege act constituting the violation of the human rights. The Apex Court specifically held that in a case like illegal detention, the offensive act must be deemed to have been committed when a person is placed under detention and it continues so long as the affected person remains under illegal detention. Relevant portion of paragraph 17 of the judgment for the benefit of quick reference is being quoted hereinbelow:- “17…………….. The time limit prescribed is referable to the alleged “act” constituting the violation of human rights. In a case like illegal detention, the offensive act must be deemed to have been committed when a person remains under illegal detention”. 24. The facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. The time limit prescribed is referable to the alleged “act” constituting the violation of human rights. In a case like illegal detention, the offensive act must be deemed to have been committed when a person remains under illegal detention”. 24. The facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. The violation of human rights in the present case was not on the date when the State Commission under the Consumer Protection Act passed the order. The cause of action arose in the present case after the Board authorities refused to restore the electric connection in the house of respondent no.2 inspite of their being adjudication over the dispute by the State Commission under the Consumer Protection Act and it continued till the electricity connection was finally restored on 3.5.2010. As a matter of fact the respondent no.2 approached the Human Rights Commission with the grievance that he was without electricity for several years and inspite of the orders of the fora constituted under the Consumer Protection Act. This fact may be emphasized that State Commission had passed the order on an appeal preferred by the Board itself. The bar under Section 36(2) of the Act will not apply in the present case as the violation of human rights continued even on the date of institution of complaint before the State Human Rights Commission. 25. The inaction on the part of the Board and its authorities in not restoring electric connection before Respondent no.2 approached the State Human Rights Commission is without lawful excuse. Such inaction on the face of it appears to be deliberate and in disregard to rights of respondent no.2. The inaction is unreasonable and without any probable cause. The conduct of the Board and its authorities amounts to conscious violation of law and depraved inclination on the part of the authority to disregard the rights of Respondent no.2. I am constrained to hold that such conduct/inaction on the part of the Board and its authorities constitute malice in law. The impugned order dated 13.2.2012 passed by the learned Chairperson, State Human Rights Commission is just and proper and I do not find any error, jurisdictional or otherwise in the same. 26. The writ application is accordingly dismissed. 27. I am constrained to hold that such conduct/inaction on the part of the Board and its authorities constitute malice in law. The impugned order dated 13.2.2012 passed by the learned Chairperson, State Human Rights Commission is just and proper and I do not find any error, jurisdictional or otherwise in the same. 26. The writ application is accordingly dismissed. 27. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, keeping in view the conduct of the Board and its authorities right from the very beginning when the dispute arose till institution of the present writ application, I impose exemplary cost of Rs. 20,000/- (Twenty Thousand) to be deposited by the Board in the account of Bihar State Legal Authority, Patna within a period of three months from the date of this order.