Judgment Dev Darshan Sud, J. This revision petition has been preferred by the plaintiff against the order of the learned Additional District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala seeking amendment in the written statement to the effect that the plaintiff-petitioner has no locus standi to file the suit as also he is not owner of the suit land/property. Secondly it sought to clarify that the land/property of the defendant was decreased in area from 0-11 marlas to 0-7½ marlas during the settlement operations when old Khasra number 441 measuring 0-11 marlas was substituted by new khasra number 505 measuring 0-11 Marlas and 505 was substituted with three new Khasra Nos. 908, 909 and 911 as per Missal Hakiyat Bandobasat Jadid and area of these numbers was decreased to 7½ Marlas from 11 Marlas and the land of the plaintiff has been increased from 6 marlas to 8 marlas. The revenue entries incorporated during settlement are illegal, wrong, null and avoid and not binding on the interest of the plaintiff. It was pleaded that the amendment was clarificatory in nature and in this event, it was necessary to amend the written statement. 2. The learned Court permitted the amendment holding that the truth of the allegations made could not be gone into at the stage of considering the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter ‘CPC’). The amendment was resisted denying the allegations with respect to the increase and decrease of the area in question. 3. The petitioner-plaintiff submits that the suit in question was pending since 2000 and the appeal was filed somewhere in the year 2008. Application under Order 26 Rule 9 of CPC was filed and was adjudicated by the trial Court. The amendment sought to be incorporated is nothing but a ploy to delay the proceedings as this is the second time when the appeal has been taken up after the first remand by the learned trial Court. It is also apprehended that if the defendant would file an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC it would also result in remanding the suit for consideration on additional evidence in accordance with law. It is also apprehended that if the defendant would file an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC it would also result in remanding the suit for consideration on additional evidence in accordance with law. The petitioner submits that the amendment is barred by limitation and it has changed the nature of the case as pleaded as mutually destructive pleas were taken i.e. title of the property on the basis of sale or by way of adverse possession. This plea cannot be allowed to be withdrawn or substituted by a subsequent amendment. It was submitted that the plea with respect to the revenue entries can be adjudicated by the revenue courts and not by the civil courts. The application itself does not give the date as to when the settlement took place and in that eventuality the defendant now seeks retrial in accordance with law. 4. I do find from the pleadings that no date has been given as to when the settlement record changed the area in question. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of this Court in Mehar Dass vs. Surjoo 1972 SLJ HP 146 holding: “7. It is manifest, that whatever amendment the defendant is seeking should be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties, Therefore, the “real controversy” test is the cardinal test for refusing or allowing the amendment. It is, therefore, necessary to find out as to what is the real controversy between the parties. In order to ascertain the questions in controversy between the parties within the meaning of Order 6 Rule 17, only such questions are to be considered which had arisen between the parties at the time when they joined issues that is, when the defendant had put in his written statement. Obviously, they do not include any question which the parties at the time when they joined issues that is when the defendant had put in his written statement. Obviously, they do not include any question which the parties neither wish nor intend to dispute till they at a much later stage in the proceedings, wish to raise because they have changed their minds or because something has happened after the filing of the written statement which makes it profitable or necessary for them to put forward……..” (at p.148) 5. Learned counsel submits that in M/s Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and another vs. M/s Ladha Ram and Co., AIR 1977 SC 680 the Supreme Court holds: “8. The High Court on revision affirmed the judgment of the trial Court and said that by means of amendment the defendants wanted to introduce an entirely different case and if such amendments were permitted it would prejudice the other side. 9. The decision of the trial Court is correct. The defendants cannot be allowed to change completely the case made in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the written statement and substitute an entirely different and new case.” (at pp. 680-681) 6. To similar effect is the judgment of this Court in Satya Parkash and others vs. State of H.P. and others 2009(3) Shim. L.C. 286 in which it is held: “12. The applicants have projected their case for amendment in view of amendment of the principal Act in the year 2001. The learned Counsel for the applicants has relied Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and others v. K.K. Modi and others, (2006)4 SCC 385 , in which it has been held that Courts should allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties, provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. In State of H.P. and others v. Pioneed Builders, A.P., (2006)12 SCC 119 , it has been held that power to a ow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings, the Court should adopt liberal approach. However, one distinct cause of action cannot be substituted for another nor the subject ma er of the suit can be changed by means of an amendment. The Supreme Court in North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das, (2008)8 SCC 511 has held that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of not working injustice to the other side and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. 13. The dominant factor in allowing and disallowing the amendment is that the amendment is necessary in order to adjudicate the real controversy between the parties, the amendment should not change the nature of the case and it should not cause prejudice to the other side. 13. The dominant factor in allowing and disallowing the amendment is that the amendment is necessary in order to adjudicate the real controversy between the parties, the amendment should not change the nature of the case and it should not cause prejudice to the other side. The proposed amendment of the applicants on factual side is not in consonance with 2001 Act and therefore, the amendment sought to be carried out by the applicants will not assist this Court for deciding the suit effectively. The proposed amendment is otherwise not available to the applicants in as much as the applicants now intend to take plea of ownership by afflux of time and they have been pleaded declaration to this effect in the proposed amendment. In other words the applicants now altogether intend to change the nature of the suit. The suit was filed on 18.5.1984 and the amendment application was filed on 22.7.2008 after about 24 years of the filing of the suit. The application is hopelessly barred by delay and laches. It appears the applicants want to delay the ultimate decision in the suit. The principal Act was amended in the eh year 2001 and the application for amendment was filed after about seven years when the amendment was carried out in principal Act.” (at p 291) 7. Lastly he places reliance on the judgment in State of Maharashtra vs. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. AIR 2010 SC 1299 holding: “25. …… The words in Clause (b) “the Court finds that” do enable the Court, where the application under Section 34 has been made within prescribed time, to grant leave to amend such application if the very peculiar circumstances of the case so warrant and it is so required in the interest of justice. L.J. Leach and Company Ltd. (1957 SC 357) and Pirgonda Hongonda Patil, ( AIR 1957 SC 363 ),seem to enshrine clearly that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh claim on the proposed amendments would be barred by limitation on the date of application but that would be a factor for consideration in exercise of the discretion as to whether leave to amend should be granted but that does not affect the power of the court to order it, if that is required in the interest of justice. There is no reason why the same rule should not be applied when the Court is called upon to consider the application for amendment of grounds in the application for setting aside the arbitral award or the amendment in the grounds of appeal under Section 37 of 1996 Act.” (at p.1306) This was a case under the Arbitration Act. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sushil Kumar Jain vs. Manoj Kumar and another (2009)14 SCC 38 holding: “13. At this stage, we may remind ourselves that law is now well settled that an amendment of a plaint and amendment of a written statement are not necessarily govered by exactly the same principle. “15….Adding a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence does not raise the same problem as adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action.” (See Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh, (2006)6 SCC 498 , SCC p. 504, para 15.) Similar view has also been expressed in Usha Balashahed Swami v. Kiran Appaso Swami (2007)5 SCC 602 . 14. It is equally well settled that (SCC p. 609, para 22) in the case of an amendment of a written statement, “the courts would be more liberal in allowing than that of a plaint as the question of prejudice would be far less in the former than in the latter and addition of a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence or taking inconsistent pleas in the written statement can also be allowed.” 15. Keeping these principles in mind, let us now take up the question raised before us by the learned counsel for the parties. As stated herein earlier, the admission made by a defendant in his written statement can be explained by filing the application for amendment of the same. The principle has been settled by this Court in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Jyoti Sahay AIR 1983 SC 462 while considering this issue, held that the admission made by a party may be withdrawn or may be explained. It was observed in para 3 of the said decision as follows: (SCC p. 595) “3…..An admission made by a party may be withdrawn or may be explained away. Therefore, it cannot be said that by amendment an admission of fact cannot be withdrawn.” 16. It was observed in para 3 of the said decision as follows: (SCC p. 595) “3…..An admission made by a party may be withdrawn or may be explained away. Therefore, it cannot be said that by amendment an admission of fact cannot be withdrawn.” 16. In view of our discussions made hereinabove and applying the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, we are, therefore, of the view that the High Court as well as the learned Rent Controller had acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in not allowing the application for amendment of the written statement of the appellant.” (at pp.41-42) 9. In Peethani Suryanarayana and another vs. Repaka Venkata Ramana Kishore and others (2009)11 SCC 308 on the factual matrix as summed up, the Supreme Court held: “4. Respondent 1 thereafter filed an application for amendment of a mistake, said to be a clerical one, in the decree, seeking deletion of Town Survey No. 462 and substituting the same by Town Survey No. 463. The said application was allowed by an order dated 25-8-2003. 5. Defendant 4 in the suit filed a revision application there against, which was dismissed by the High Court by an order dated 19-12-2003 opining that the mistake was a clerical one. 6. The appellants herein filed an application purported to be under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the said order dated 25-8-2003 which was dismissed by an order dated 14-3-2005. The High Court, by reason of the impugned judgment dated 10-8-2005 dismissed the revision application filed by the appellants there against. The appellants are, thus, before us. 15. In Sajjan Kumar v. Ram Kishan [ (2005) 13 SCC 89 ], this Court held: "5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the appeal deserves to be allowed as the trial court, while rejecting the prayer for amendment has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law and by the failure to so exercise it, has occasioned a possible failure of justice. Such an error committed by the trial court was liable to be corrected by the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, even if Section 115 CPC would not have been strictly applicable. Such an error committed by the trial court was liable to be corrected by the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, even if Section 115 CPC would not have been strictly applicable. It is true that the plaintiff-appellant ought to have been diligent in promptly seeking the amendment in the plaint at an early stage of the suit, more so when the error on the part of the plaintiff was pointed out by the defendant in the written statement itself. Still, we are of the opinion that the proposed amendment was necessary for the purpose of bringing to the fore the real question in controversy between the parties and the refusal to permit the amendment would create needless complications at the stage of execution in the event of the plaintiff-appellant succeeding in the suit." 16. In Niyamat Ali Molla v. Sonargon Housing Cooperative Society Ltd. and Others [ (2007) 13 SCC 421 : AIR 2008 SC 225 ] this Court held: "25. It is not a case where the defendants could be said to have been misled. It is now we settled that the pleadings of the parties are to be read in their entirety. They are to be construed liberally and not in a pedantic manner. It is also not a case where by reason of an amendment, one property is being substituted by the other. If the Court has the requisite power to make an amendment of the decree, the same would not mean that it had gone beyond the decree or passing any decree. The statements contained in the body of the plaint have sufficiently described the suit lands. Only because some blanks in the schedule of the property have been left, the same, by itself, may not be a ground to deprive the respondents from the fruit of the decree. If the appellant herein did not file any written statement, he did so at its own peril. Admittedly, he examined himself as a witness in the case. He, therefore, was aware of the issues raised in the suit. It is stated that an Advocate-Commissioner has also been appointed. We, therefore, are of the opinion that only because the JL numbers in the schedule was missing, the same by itself would not be a ground to interfere with the impugned order." 17. In North Eastern Railway Admn. Vs. Bhagwan Das By LRs. It is stated that an Advocate-Commissioner has also been appointed. We, therefore, are of the opinion that only because the JL numbers in the schedule was missing, the same by itself would not be a ground to interfere with the impugned order." 17. In North Eastern Railway Admn. Vs. Bhagwan Das By LRs. [ (2008) 8 SCC 511 ], this Court held: "16. Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under Order 6 Rule17 C.P.C. (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and Ors. which still holds the field, it was held that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. (Also see: Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar)" (at pp. 310,312-313) 10. Lastly learned counsel urged that in Sumesh Singh vs. Phoolan Devi and others (2009)12 SCC 689 the Supreme Court holds: “14. By reason of Section 16(2)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, the amendments carried out therein shall only apply to in respect of the suits which were filed thereafter. (See State Bank of Hyderabad v. Town Municipal Council 92007)1 SCC 765.) As the suit had been filed in the year 1999, the proviso appended to Order 6 Rule 17 shall not apply.” (atp.694) 11. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone through the record. 12. The suit, as originally filed, pleaded that the plaintiff drives title to the suit land in Khata No. 93, Khatauni No. 175, Khasra No. 912 area measuring 0-01-52 hectares situated in Mahal and Mauza Garh, Tehsil Dharamshala, District Kangra as per jamabandi for the year 1996-97. It was recorded in the ownership of Shri Balwant Ram, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff and in possession of Sh. Tani Ram, predecessor-in-interest of the defendant without any status. It was recorded in the ownership of Shri Balwant Ram, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff and in possession of Sh. Tani Ram, predecessor-in-interest of the defendant without any status. Balwant Ram who was father of the plaintiff died and he was succeeded by the plaintiff, Smt. Pushpa Devi sister of the plaintiff and Smt. Kaushlya Devi, mother of the plaintiff. Both Pushpa and Kaushlaya had relinquished their rights in the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. Tani Ram had died and his estate was succeeded to by the defendant. Tani Ram was allowed to use a small kacha house having two rooms on ground floor and two rooms in the first floor along with one single storeyed verandah covered with slate, by the father of the plaintiff when Tani Ram used to visit this area during winter months. He was also allowed to use the cowshed for tying his cattle but only in the capacity of licensee. The status of the defendants was that of licensee and no more. He challenged the entry in the revenue record for possession of this land including the fact that the entry in possessory column as ‘Dawedar Bei’ was wrong. The only defence set up by the respondent-defendant was that the suit land including the house has been purchased by Tani Ram father of the defendant by registered sale deed dated 26.3.1940, i.e. the date on which Tani Ram the father of the defendant had purchased the land. It was specifically pleaded that the land situated in Khata No. 44 min, Khatauni No. 106 min. Khasra No. 441, measuring 11 Marlas according to the jamabandi for the year 1936-37 was subject matter of the registered sale deed. The alternate plea was of adverse possession since he was recorded in possession of the suit land. 13. The suit was disposed of by the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, II, Dharamshala on 21.6.2001 granting decree for possession in favour of the petitioner. Thereafter, the appeal was preferred by the defendant and the suit was remanded for decision on two more issues i.e. whether the plaintiff was owner of the suit property and whether the defendant was licensee since the time of his father. By its judgment dated 14.3.2008 the suit of the plaintiff was decreed and it is against this that the appeal has been filed where the petitioner seeks an amendment. 14. By its judgment dated 14.3.2008 the suit of the plaintiff was decreed and it is against this that the appeal has been filed where the petitioner seeks an amendment. 14. There can be no dispute with respect to the proposition of law as laid down and principles considered by the Supreme Court supra. On the question of amendment, I may also note that the Supreme Court in Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and others vs. K.K. Modi and others, (2006)4 SCC 385 , holds: “16. Order 6 Rule 17 consist of two parts whereas the first part is discretionary (may) and leaves it to the Court to order amendment of pleading. The second part is imperative (shall) and enjoins the Court to allow all amendments which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. 17. In our view, since the cause of action arose during the pendency of the suit, proposed amendment ought to have been granted because the basic structure of the suit has not changed and that there was merely change in the nature of relief claimed. We fail to understand if it is permissible for the appellants to file an independent suit, why the same relief which could be prayed for in the new suit cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the pending suit.” (pp.392-393) 15. Adverting to the principle laid down her e in above, the Court holds:- “20. ... … … … … The Court always gives leave to amend the pleadings of a party unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting malafide. There is a plethora of precedents pertaining to the grant or refusal of permission for amendment of pleadings. The various decisions rendered by this Court and the proposition laid down therein are widely known. This Court has consistently held that the amendment to pleading should be liberally allowed since procedural obstacles ought not to impede the dispensation of justice. … … … …” (pp.393-394) 16. It is settled law that all the amendments which are necessary for the true and just adjudication of the dispute between the parties should and ought to be allowed. In the case of written statement, the amendments are to be granted more liberally but this principle cannot be stretched to the ex tent to make litigation interminable. It is settled law that all the amendments which are necessary for the true and just adjudication of the dispute between the parties should and ought to be allowed. In the case of written statement, the amendments are to be granted more liberally but this principle cannot be stretched to the ex tent to make litigation interminable. In other words, the parties cannot be put to trial and re-trial over and over again. I find that what has been pleaded before the Court in the application does not disclose the time when the entries etc. were altered. Be that as it may, the defendant seeks to agitate and re-agitate the same point over and over again. This cannot be permitted under any circumstance as urged because Sushil Kumar’s case supra lays down the correct principles for amendment. Even adopting a very liberal approach, I cannot help but observing that the defendant seeks to prolong the litigation. This itself in the context of the present scenario which indicates lack of bonafides on part of the defendant for the reason that even the date on which the entries in the revenue record have been changed has not been pleaded. Having failed twice in the Court below, the defendant cannot be permitted a third round of litigation. Revision petition is accordingly allowed. The order challenged is quashed and set aside. Parties to appear before the learned District Judge on 3rd January, 2013. Record, if received, be sent back. No costs.