Raghuveer Prasad v. Mandir Marghatia Mahavir and Gurudwar
2012-09-14
ALOK ARADHE
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is by the defendant-tenant who has suffered decree for eviction from both the Courts. The appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law : “Whether both the Courts below have erred in not fixing a reasonable time for completing the repair works and restoring the possession thereof to the defendant?” 2. Facts giving rise to filing of the appeal, briefly stated, are that the plaintiff filed the suit for eviction on the ground that suit accommodation which comprises one room admeasuring 10’x12’ was let out to the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.20/-. The defendant was in arrears of rent for a period from February, 1981 to June, 1981. It was further pleaded that the suit accommodation was in dilapidated condition and repairs works could not have been carried out without getting the same vacated. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought decree for eviction. 3. The defendant-tenant filed written statement in which, inter alia, it was pleaded that defendant is not in arrears of rent and the suit accommodation is not in a dilapidated condition. It was further pleaded that plaintiff wanted to let out the suit accommodation on the enhanced rent and, therefore, the suit has been filed. 4. The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 20.11.1992, inter alia, held that the defendant was not in arrears of rent. The trial Court by taking into account the statements of plaintiff’s witnesses, namely, Baba Shanker Das (PW1), R.K.Jain (PW2), Premchand Agrawal (PW3) and Shiv Prasad (PW4) as well as the application dated 30.12.1981 (Ex.D-5) which was admittedly filed by defendant before the Rent Controlling Authority which contained the admission that the suit accommodation is in dilapidated condition, recorded a finding that the suit accommodation is in dilapidated condition and the repairs cannot be got done without getting the same vacated. Accordingly, the trial Court directed the defendant to handover possession of the suit accommodation to the plaintiff within a period of two months and the plaintiff was directed to carry out the repairs and thereafter handover possession to the defendant. 5. The defendant filed an appeal. The lower appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 23.7.1994, inter alia, held that the counsel for the defendant was unable to point out any infirmity in the decree of the trial Court. Accordingly, the decree of the trial Court was affirmed in appeal. 6.
5. The defendant filed an appeal. The lower appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 23.7.1994, inter alia, held that the counsel for the defendant was unable to point out any infirmity in the decree of the trial Court. Accordingly, the decree of the trial Court was affirmed in appeal. 6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the Courts below grossly erred in decreeing the claim for eviction without fixing the reasonable time for completing the repairs works and restoration of possession thereof to the defendant. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the decision in the case of Gunnalal v. Babulal [1967 JLJ SN 45], wherein this Court has held that to obviate the difficulty of the tenant, it would be better if the Court taking into consideration the facts in each case tentatively prescribes as to what shall be the reasonable period for completion of works of repairs or reconstruction. 7. I have considered the submissions made by learned senior counsel for the appellant and have perused the record. Section 18 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 reads as under : “18. Recovery of possession for repairs and re-building and re-entry. -- (1) In making any order on the grounds specified in clause (g) or clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12, the Court shall ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof from which he is to be evicted and, if the tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the election in the order and specify therein the date on or before which he shall deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building, as the case may be. (2) If the tenant delivers possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord shall, on the completion of the work of repairs or building or re-building place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof, as the case may be,within one month of the completion of such work.
(2) If the tenant delivers possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord shall, on the completion of the work of repairs or building or re-building place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof, as the case may be,within one month of the completion of such work. (3) If, after the tenant has delivered possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building within one month of the specified date or fails to complete the work, fails to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation in accordance with sub-section (2), the Court may, on an application made to it in this behalf by the tenant within such time as may be prescribed, order the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof or to pay to the tenant such compensation as the Court thinks fit.” 8. From perusal of section 18 of the Accommondation Control Act, 1961 it is apparent that the section does not cast an obligation on the Court to fix the time limit for completion of work of repairs or reconstruction. Thus, no statutory obligation has been cast on the Court to fix the time limit for carrying out repairs/reconstructions works. On the other hand, sub-section (3) of section 18 of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961 provides after the tenant has delivered possession on or before the date specified in the order, if the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building within one month of the specified date or fails to complete the work and fails to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation in accordance with sub-section (2), the Court may, on an application made to it in this behalf by the tenant within such time as may be prescribed, order the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof or to pay to the tenant such compensation as the Court thinks fit. This Court in the case of Gunnalal (supra), has expressed the desirability of fixing the time limit for completion of repairs/construction works of the accommodation. In the absence of prescription of any time limit, the same in no way affects the legality of the decree.
This Court in the case of Gunnalal (supra), has expressed the desirability of fixing the time limit for completion of repairs/construction works of the accommodation. In the absence of prescription of any time limit, the same in no way affects the legality of the decree. For the aforementioned reasons, the substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in the negative and in favour of the plaintiff. 9. At this stage, learned senior counsel submits that the defendant be granted suitable time to vacate the premises. Taking into account the submissions made by learned senior counsel for the appellant, it is directed that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within a period of one month from today that he shall vacate the accommodation in question on or before 28.2.2013 and that he shall not create any interest in respect of the accommodation in question and shall handover possession to the respondent in peaceful manner. The appellant shall also deposit the entire arrears of rent within a period of two months from today and shall continue to comply with the provisions of section 13(1) of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961 for the period for which he remains in possession of the accommodation. In case of violation of any of the conditions mentioned supra the decree for execution shall become executable forthwith. 10. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of.