CAV ORDER The Bihar State Co-operative Bank Limited, a society registered under the Bihar Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 has challenged the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal on 21st August, 2007 in Reference Case No. 8 (C) of 2007. 2. The only question that has been raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the reference made under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is without jurisdiction as the Central Government is not the competent authority to make such a reference. The petitioner did not seek to challenge the award on merits. 3. Counsel for the petitioner argues that Co-operative Bank is a Banking company as defined under Section 2 (bb) of the Act, which reads as follows:- 2 (bb) “banking company” means a banking company as defined in section 5 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) having branches or other establishments in more than one State, and includes the Export-Import Bank of India, the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India, the Small Industries Development Bank of India established under Section 3 of the Small Industries Development Bank of India Act, 1989 (39 of 1989), the Reserve Bank of India, the State Bank of India, a corresponding new bank constituted under Section 3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition & Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970), [a corresponding new bank constituted under Section 3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980 (40 of 1980), and any subsidiary bank], as defined in the State Bank of India (subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959); 4. It is argued that as the name indicates the bank has been established in Bihar and is registered in Bihar, notwithstanding it has branches in other places as well. It is, therefore, submitted that the State Government was the competent authority to make reference to the Tribunal for a decision in the matter. 5. Counsel for the respondent no. 3 submits that the award was made on 21st August, 2007, the petitioner cannot challenge the award on the ground of jurisdiction as the writ application has been filed after a gap of three years and also because it is admitted that at least 60-70 per cent of the award has been acted upon and the respondents have benefited under the said order. It is also argued that the petitioner cannot raise issue of jurisdiction at this belated stage, as it was not raised before the Industrial Tribunal. The question of jurisdiction is a mixed question of facts and law and, therefore, it would be raised before the first Court. It is also contended by the petitioner that the Reserve Bank of India wields its power in a regulatory capacity and exercises a supervisory role and, therefore, it is covered by the Reserve Bank of India Rules and Regulations and thus, the Central Government was competent to make the reference. 6. Therefore, the only question for determination before this Court is whether the reference made by the Central Government is in accordance with law? 7. This Court will come directly to the question raised in this writ application, especially in view of the two facts, firstly, that the issue of jurisdiction was not raised before the Industrial Tribunal and secondly, the parties admit that 60-70 per cent of the award has already been given effect to. 8. Counsel for the parties has referred to various decisions. However, on perusal of those decisions, this Court finds that they are not relevant to the issues in this case. The relevant cases for consideration with respect to the question of jurisdiction are, therefore, being discussed below. 9. Counsel for the petitioner relies on the judgment in the case of Union of India vs. Labour Court, Jullundur and another [1970 Vol.-I LLJ 184. Gopi Chand Rana raised a labour dispute whether the termination of his service was justified and, if not, what relief would he be entitled to? The point raised in the writ application was that after the re-enforcement of the Punjab Re-organization Act, 1966, the appropriate Government under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act is the Government of India in the case of management of Beas Dam Project. Reference having been made by the Punjab Government, the reference was without jurisdiction and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on this issue. The award was dated 24th June, 1967 and it would appear from the judgment that the issue was raised for the first time before the High Court. Reference having been made by the Punjab Government, the reference was without jurisdiction and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on this issue. The award was dated 24th June, 1967 and it would appear from the judgment that the issue was raised for the first time before the High Court. After considering Sections 78 and 80 of the Punjab Re-Organization Act, the Court came to the conclusion that the Central Government had the authority to raise this issue and not the Punjab Government, and as such, the reference made by the Punjab Government was wholly without jurisdiction and could not confer jurisdiction on the Labour Court, Jullundur to adjudicate upon the disputes referred to it. It may be noted that the writ application was filed almost immediately raising the aforesaid objection to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to adjudicate upon the reference so made. The present case is distinguishable on the ground that the writ application has been filed almost three and a half years and that too after the award has been implemented to the extent of at least 60-70 per cent by the management. 10. In contrast to the cases cited on behalf of the petitioner, this Court may refer to several cases on the same issue. 11. In the case of Bharat Containers Pvt. Ltd. And another vs. Engineering Workers Union and another [2002-IV-LLJ (Supp) 312 (Bombay], it was argued for the first time before the High Court that the Industrial Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to consider the complaints raised on behalf of the workmen. The Bombay High Court holds that the objection as to jurisdiction in the Industrial Tribunal admittedly was never raised when the complaint was pending before the Tribunal. It was held that it would not be proper to allow such a question to be raised for the first time before the High Court. 12. The next decision on the issue is in the case of Madhya Pradesh Administration vs. Tribhuwan [ (2007) 9 SCC 748 ]. An argument was raised on behalf of the appellant (Establishment) that the Delhi Establishment does not come within the definition of industry as contained in Section 2-J of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial Tribunal had found that it was an industry. An argument was raised on behalf of the appellant (Establishment) that the Delhi Establishment does not come within the definition of industry as contained in Section 2-J of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial Tribunal had found that it was an industry. The illegality of the award of the Industrial Tribunal was not questioned, and therefore, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that the appellant could not turn around and contend that its Delhi establishment does not come within the purview of definition of “Industry”. 13. The issue may be examined from another point of view, which is that if the parties have acted upon the award, would they now be entitled to challenge the award on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction. In the opinion of this Court, they cannot raise this plea as they have acquiesced to the terms of the award, and therefore, they would now be bound by the principles of estoppel from challenging the award on the ground that the entire award is without jurisdiction as the reference has been made by the Central Government and not by the State Government. 14. For this purpose, I may refer to certain judgment. In the case of Indian Sailors Home Society, Mumbai vs. S. D. Pathare [2004 LIC 953 (Bombay)], the judgment of the Labour Court was challenged on several grounds. It was argued that the respondent was not entitled to claim benefits under the settlement dated 25.07.1996 as his name was not figuring in the Schedule. The Court held that since the settlement dated 25.07.1996 in favour of respondents was never sought to be disputed or denied by the petitioner (workmen), even before the respondents had approached the Labour Court under Section 33-C-2 of the Act, it would be too late on the day for the petitioner to dispute the right of the respondents (workmen) to claim benefits under the settlement. This case is relevant for the purpose of holding that since the merits of the award are not being challenged i.e. the claims are not being disputed, the petitioner could not challenge the award on the ground of jurisdiction. 15. Yet another question that arises before this Court is that whether this writ application should be entertained in view of the fact that it has been filed after three and a half years challenging the award of the Industrial Tribunal. 16. 15. Yet another question that arises before this Court is that whether this writ application should be entertained in view of the fact that it has been filed after three and a half years challenging the award of the Industrial Tribunal. 16. In the present facts, this Court finds that the delay is not explained, so the writ application is not maintainable due to delay and latches. 17. I am supporting the view by citing a judgment in the case of R. S. Raperia vs. Central Warehousing Corporation and others [2004 (4) LIC 3899 (Punjab & Haryana)]. The facts were that the petitioner prayed for quashing of the action of the respondents in downgrading the ACRs of the petitioner for the period from 1992 to 1997. The writ application was filed in the year 2003. The Court dismissed the writ application amongst other grounds that they had approached the Court after five years without explaining the delay and latches. 18. In conclusion, this Court holds that the pleas raised on behalf of the petitioner is with respect to a challenge that the award should be quashed on the ground that the reference was wrongly made by the Central Government, cannot be raised for the first time before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially in view of the fact that the petitioner has not raised at the time of argument any issue with regards to the merits of the award passed by the Tribunal and more so on the admitted fact that the award has partly been acted upon. The writ application is also fit to be dismissed as stated earlier on the ground of delay and latches. 19. This writ application is accordingly dismissed.