Judgment : (Ms. Justice K.Suguna) 1. Since the issue involved in all these writ petitions is one and the same, these writ petitions a by this common order. 2.1 W.P. No.1932 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to entire records relating to Home Department Notification dated 21/01/2012, Government of T calling for applications for the post of Civil Judge from the file of the first respondent and to same and consequently direct the respondent to issue a fresh Notification in connection with direct recruitment, in accordance with law. 2.2 W.P. No.2141 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call pertaining to the impugned notification dated 21.1.2012 and in particularly clause 3 (A) of the issued by the 1st respondent and to quash the same and consequently direct the responden the age limit to the fresh law graduates. 2.3 W.P. No.2353 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to records pertaining to the notification issued by the 1st respondent dated 21.1.2012 and to d impugned clause I (ii) (a) of educational qualification of the notification as ultra vires and uncon 2.4 W.P. No.2363 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to records in respect of notification dated 21.1.2012 calling for the application to write examination and to quash the provisions of clause prescribing minimum three years prac advocate to write the examination and consequently direct the respondents 1 and 2 to petitioner to apply for the post of Civil Judge and to write examination and also to attend viv per notification. 2.5 W.P.No.2457 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call from the 1st respondent pertaining to the impugned Notification dated 13.9.2011 and its c Notification dated 21.01.2012 in particularly Clause 3(A) of the Notification and quash the consequently direct the respondents to relax the age limit as no age limit. 2.6 W.P. No. 2537 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for the rec Notification calling for Applications for the post of Civil Judge dated 21.1.2012 issued respondent and quash the same. 2.6 W.P. No. 2537 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for the rec Notification calling for Applications for the post of Civil Judge dated 21.1.2012 issued respondent and quash the same. 2.7 W.P. No.2566 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to callfor the concern relating to G.O.Ms.No.81 Home (Courts-I) Department dated 13.01.2012 issued by the 2nd R and the consequential notification dated 21.01.2012 issued by the 2nd respondent call applications for appointment of 185 posts of Civil Judge in the Tamil Nadu State Judicial S quash both the orders. 2.8 W.P. No. 2549 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to records relating to Notification dated 21.1.2012 of the 1st respondent and quash the same in relates to imposing age restriction in 3 (A) of the said Notification and consequently respondents to permit the petitioner to apply and participate in the selection pursuant to the dated 21.1.2012 for the post of Civil Judge. 2.9 W.P. No.2652 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of declaration declaring para (3) in in serial No.9 of Rule 5 of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and Recruitment amended and the consequential notification dated 21.1.2012 issued by the 1st resp unconstitutional and void. 2.10 W.P. No.2916 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the 1st respondent in proceedings Nil dated 21.1.2012 and quash the proceedings therein incompetent, irregular and without authority of law. 2.11 W.P.No.2960 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call from the 1st respondent pertaining to the impugned notification dated 13.09.2011 and its c notification dated 21.01.2012 in particularly Clause 3(A) of the notification and quash the consequently direct the respondents to relax the age limit as no age limit. 2.12 W.P.No.2961 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to records pertaining to the impugned notification dated 21.01.2012 issued by the 1st respond quash the same as the 1st respondent was acting under the dictation of the 2nd and 3rd re and consequently direct the respondents to issue fresh and separate notification for th vacancies numbering about 9 and the current year vacancies. 2.13 W.P. No.3090 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to records of the 1st respondent in his impugned notification dated 21.1.2012 and in particularly (1) of the notification issued by the 1st respondent and to quash the same so far as the p concerned and consequently direct the respondents to relax the age limit to the Advocates/Pleaders and APPs. 2.14 W.P.No.3201 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to entire records connected with the Impugned Notification calling for the post of Civil Ju 21.1.2012 issued by the 2nd respondent and quash the same and direct the respondents t age limit of the fresh Law Graduates (for all Categories) for applying for the post of Civil Judge 2.15 W.P.No.3210 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call from the 1st respondent pertaining to the impugned amendment G.O.Ms.No.504, Home (Cou 13th September 2011 to the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and requirement) Rule in particularly Rule 5 column (3) and subsequent notification of Civil Judge recruitment dated and in particularly clause 3 (A) and to quash the same and consequently to direct the resp relax the age limit to the fresh law graduates. 2.16 W.P. No. 3302 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of declaration declaring para (3 (4) in Serial No.9 of Rule 5 of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and Recruitmen amended dated 19.01.2007 and the consequential notification dated 21.01.2012 issued respondent as unconstitutional and void. 2.17 W.P. No. 3308 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarito call for the rec Notification calling for applications for the post of Civil Judge dated 21.01.2012 issued Respondent and quash the same. 2.18 W.P. No.3324 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of declaration declaring para tabular column (4) in serial No.9 of Rule 5 of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service ( Recruitment) Rules as amended stipulating the calculation of age as on 1st July of the year in selection for appointment is made and the consequential notification dated 21.1.2012 issued respondent as unconstitutional. 2.19 W.P. No.3348 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to records pertaining to 1st respondent Notification dated 21.01.2012 and set aside the said dated 21.01.2012 in respect of Clause 3(A) (ii) pertains to maximum age limit only and co direct the 1st and 2nd respondents herein to relax the maximum age limit for 3 years i.e. from 30 years in the Civil Judge (Jr. Division) Recruitment 2012 and allow the petitioner to partici Civil Judge (Jr. Division) Examination-2012 if the petitioner meets all other qualifications. 2.20 W.P.No.3364 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of declaration to declare the dated 21.1.2012 published by the Home Department of Government Tamil Nadu as unconstit illegal insofar as it fails to include service candidates with Degree in Law as eligible for recruit post of Civil Judge. 2.21 W.P.No.3365 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to entire records in connection with the impugned notification of the 1st respondent dated 21.1 quash the said notification in so far as it relates to the qualification age as contained in clau relating to the fresh graduates and consequently direct the respondents 1 and 2 to co applications of the petitioners for the post of Civil Judge Tamil Nadu State Judicial Services without reference to the age qualification contained in Clause 3A (ii) relating to fresh graduates 2.22 W.P. No.3413 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the resp include the Clause in respect of service candidates in the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service Recruitment) Rules 2007 as amended in G.O.Ms.No.504, Home (Courts-1) Department dated and permit the service candidates of the petitioners Association to write the examination to 24.3.2012 and 25.3.2012. 2.23 W.P.No.3441 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to records relating to impugned maximum age criteria of 27 years in column No. 4 of Sl.N schedule in Rule 5 of Tamil Nadu Judicial Service (Cadre and Recruitment) Rules consequential Sl. No. 3 (A)(ii) of notification issued by the 1st respondent dated 21.1.2012 and same and consequently direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to participate in th process by accepting his application and issuing Hall Ticket, etc. No. 3 (A)(ii) of notification issued by the 1st respondent dated 21.1.2012 and same and consequently direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to participate in th process by accepting his application and issuing Hall Ticket, etc. 2.24 W.P.No.3449 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of declaration to declare explanat (3) in tabular column (4) in serial No. 9 of Rule 5 of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service ( Recruitment) Rules as amended and the consequential notification dated 21.1.2012 issued respondent as unconstitutional and void. 2.25 W.P.No.3450 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to records of the 2nd respondent in respect of the Notification dated 21.01.2012 and quash fixing age limit as 40 years for reserved categories in the said Notification dated 21.01.2012 in co maximum age limit 40 years (for reserved categories) of the same for the post of Civil Judge i Nadu State Judicial Service vide the above Notification dated 21.01.2012 and consequently 2nd respondent to permit the petitioner to apply and appear for the examination i.e. to be co 24.03.2012 and 25.03.2012 or any other date. 2.26 W.P. No.3662 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of declaration declaring that the age limit prescribed as 40 years (Reserved Category) in the impugned notification dated issued by the 1st respondent calling for application for the post of Civil Judge in the Tamil N Judicial Service is unconstitutional, arbitrary and illegal. 2.27 W.P.No.3673 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to concerned records relating to G.O. Ms. No.81, Home (Courts I) Department dated 13.1.2012 the 2nd respondent and the consequential notification dated 21.1.2012 issued by the 2nd calling for the applications for appointment of 185 posts of Civil Judge in the Tamil Nadu Sta Service and quash both the orders. 2.28 W.P.No.3953 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of declaration declaring Explanat (3) in tabular column (4) in Serial No.9 of Rule 5 of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service ( Recruitment) Rules as amended and the consequential notification dated 21.01.2012 issued respondent as unconstitutional and void. 2.28 W.P.No.3953 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of declaration declaring Explanat (3) in tabular column (4) in Serial No.9 of Rule 5 of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service ( Recruitment) Rules as amended and the consequential notification dated 21.01.2012 issued respondent as unconstitutional and void. 2.29 W.P.No.4150 of 2012 is filed for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to entire records in connection with the impugned notification of the first respondent dated 21.0 quash the said notification insofar as it relates to the qualification, age as contained in c relating to the practising advocates/pleaders and consequently, direct the respondents 1 consider the applications of the petitioners for the post of Civil Judge, Tamil Nadu State Judici on merits without reference to the age qualification contained in clause 3A(i) relating to the advocates/pleaders. 2.30 W.P.(MD)Nos.1482 and 1483 of 2012 were filed before the Madurai Bench of this Cou transferred to this Court for the issuance of a writ of declaration declaring that the Notifica 21.01.2012 of the 1st respondent calling for applications for the post of Civil Judge in s classified persons eligible to apply into two categories viz., practising Advocates/Pleaders an Public Prosecutors on the one side and Fresh Law Graduates on the order in class 3(A prescribes a minimum practice of 3 years for practising advocates in Clause 3(B)(i)(ii)(a) etc., 3(B)(ii) and (iv) in respect of fresh law graduates and also fixing their maximum age limit as 2 unconstitutional, arbitrary, ultra vires. 2.31 W.P.(MD)Nos.1450 to 1453 of 2012 were filed before the Madurai Bench of this Cou transferred to this Court for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the rec impugned notification dated 21.01.2012 calling for applications for the post of Civil Judge, on the 1st respondent and quash the same as to the extent of fixing the maximum age lim candidate as 27 years as illegal and consequently directing the respondents to relax the ma limit as 30 years. 2.32 W.P.(MD)No.1454of 2012 was filed before the Madurai Bench of this Court and is transfe Court for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records pertain impugned notification dated 21.01.2012 calling for applications for the post of Civil Judge, on the 1st respondent and quash the same as illegal and consequently directing the respond necessary action for re-fixing the maximum age limit as 30 years instead of 27 years Notification dated 21.01.2012 for the interest of the petitioner and some other candidates wh their law graduation in three years stream within the time stipulated by this Court. 2.33 W.P.(MD)No.1595 of 2012 was filed before the Madurai Bench of this Court and is tra this Court for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the notification issued by the 1st respondent dated 21.01.2012 regarding to the post of Civil J quash the same as illegal and consequently direct the 1st respondent to permit the petitioner Civil Judges Exam and consider his appointment as Civil Judge with consequential benefits w frame. 2.34 W.P.(MD)No.1915 of 2012 was filed before the Madurai Bench of this Court and is tra this Court for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the notification dated 21.01.2012 issued by the 1st respondent by the publication in Dinathanthi and quash the same and consequently direct the 1st respondent to earmark six vacancies for Tribe for carrying forward the unfilled backlog. 3. The main contention of the learned counsels for the petitioners is with reference to relaxati Category 9 of Rule 5 of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and Recruitment R (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) read with Annexure II, so as to enable the High Court t the exercise of recruitment of 185 Civil Judges (Junior Division) as an one-time measure assistance of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Category 9 of Rule 5 of the Rules reads as under: 4. By this impugned Government Order issued in G.O. Ms.No.81, Home (Courts-I) Departm 13.01.2012, Rule 5 of the Rules read with Annexure II of the Rules has been relaxed as a measure insofar as the selection process to the post of Civil Judges (Junior Division), i.e., the recruitment has been relaxed by the said notification. By this impugned Government Order issued in G.O. Ms.No.81, Home (Courts-I) Departm 13.01.2012, Rule 5 of the Rules read with Annexure II of the Rules has been relaxed as a measure insofar as the selection process to the post of Civil Judges (Junior Division), i.e., the recruitment has been relaxed by the said notification. As per the Rules, the TNPSC has to written examination and viva voce. But, a perusal of Rule 5 read with Annexure II of the Ru that in the vital work, viz., setting the question paper and conducting viva voce, the major rol by the High Court. Of course, there are certain other administrative works, otherwise called as work, which have to be done by the TNPSC. But, by the impugned Government Order, in the the said examination and in the selection process, the assistance of the TNPSC is dispense that is under challenge. 5. The main argument of the learned counsels for the petitioners is that as far as appointment Officers is concerned, it is governed by Articles 234 and 320 of the Constitution of India; powe conferred only on the TNPSC, especially, as per Article 234 of the Constitution of India, app persons other than District Judges to the Judicial service of a State, shall be made by the G the State, in accordance with the rules made in that behalf, after consultation with the S Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. this, according to the learned counsels, as per Rule 5 of the said Rules, which has been above, as far as direct recruitment is concerned, written examination as well as viva voce conducted by the TNPSC in accordance with the procedure specified under Annexure II, but, impugned notification, conducting the examination and selecting the candidates have to be d High Court without the assistance of the TNPSC; consequently, this impugned notification is c only to the Rules but also contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of India, referred to abo 6. Yet another stand taken by the learned counsels for the petitioners is that even as far appointment to the Judicial service is concerned, as per the Rules, the High Court can consultation with the TNPSC and that consultation should be as among the expert body of th High Court as well as the Government of Tamil Nadu; as far as the cases in hand are concer on the letter of the Registrar General of this High Court dated 02.01.2012, this impugned notif been issued; consequently, consultation is not in accordance with law. Apart from this, ac them, when an expert body is conferred with the power of conduct of examination and se same cannot be diluted by the impugned Government Order. According to the learned couns petitioners, dispensing with the assistance of the TNPSC by the impugned notification a suspension of the members and the Chairman of the TNPSC. But, according to them, as per of the Constitution of India, the power of suspension of the Chairman and the members of t can be exercised only by the President of India or by the Governor of the State. 7. But, according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court, in W.P.Nos. 30080 of 2011, the Government as well as the TNPSC gave consent for taking up the process for filling up 185 vacancies in the Civil Judges (Junior Division) by the High Court assistance of the TNPSC; based on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble First Bench in the writ petitions, there was a correspondence between the three forums viz., the TNPSC, this and the Government. According to the learned Senior Counsel, by the letter of the TNP 10.01.2012, even the TNPSC has given its consent to take appropriate steps, as an one-time with regard to the recruitment process with reference to 185 vacancies of Civil Judges (Junio by the High Court. Further, according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High C on the consent given by the Government and the TNPSC before the Hon'ble First Bench of the said writ petitions were disposed of in the following terms:- "21.) We appreciate the fact that the Government and the TNPSC have realised the difficulties State Judiciary is facing due to dearth of Judicial Officers. Since the Government and the TN agreed for the taking up of the recruitment process for Judicial Officers (Junior Division) b Court, no further direction needs to be issued in these matters. We expect that, in this regard, by the Advocate General necessary Government Order will be issued forthwith. Conseq respondent/High Court is directed to proceed expeditiously after the receipt of Government send the draft advertisement/notification inviting applications for the said post to the Governm due publication." Relying on the above said Judgment, according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing fo Court, in view of the consent expressed by the State Government as well as the TNPSC , fu were taken and the Government has issued the impugned notification under challenge; con under the prevailing circumstances, Rule 5 of the said rules has been relaxed with regard to t of selection process. Further, according to the learned Senior Counsel, as far as the concerned, certain allegations have been levelled not only against the Chairman and mem said Commission but also against the staff of the said Commission. Based on this, accord when such cloud is there as against the TNPSC, especially, when selection and appointment i service, that work cannot be entrusted to the TNPSC, though it is an expert body; under such e circumstances, the High Court can conduct the said examination based on the impugned not support of these contentions, the learned Senior Counsel also relied on the following Judgmen AIR 1991 SC 1933 , State of Sikkim vs. Dorjee Tshering Bhutia and Others - (paragraph no and 15) "4.) Before dealing with the points involved in the appeals it is necessary to notice the provis rules in some detail. Rule 3 deals with the initial Constitution of the service. It provides that t holding the posts mentioned therein would be deemed to be members of the service on the e of the rules. Rule 4 which provides for the method of recruitment to the service is as under: 4.) Method of Recruitment to the Service: (1) Recruitment to the service after the publishme rules shall be by the following methods, namely: (a) Competitive Examinations to be held by the Commission; (b) Selection from among persons serving in connection with the affairs of the State of Sikkim. (2) The proportion of vacancies to be filled in any year in accordance with Clauses (a) and shall be 50: 50 respectively: Provided that the number of persons, recruited under Clause (b) above, shall not at any time percent of the total strength of the Service. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-rule (I), if in the opinion of the Government ex the service so require, the Government may, after consultation with the Commission, adopt su of recruitment to the Service other than those specified in the said sub-rule, as it may by No this behalf, prescribe. 8.) The Memorandum was considered by the Cabinet in its meeting held on September 1, was decided to hold a written examination and viva voce test for selection to the Service. Con the notification dated September 16, 1981 was issued, the operative part of which is hereunder: "NOTIFICATION In pursuance of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 of the Sikkim State Civil Service Rules, 1977, the G being of opinion that the exigencies of the Service as require, hereby adopts the meth examination-cum-viva voce test as a method of recruitment to the service for that purpose co Selection Committee and prescribe the conditions of eligibility and regulation of seniority selected officers as follows: 1.) Constitution of the Selection Committee. There shall be a Selection Committee comprising of the following officers, namely: 1.) Chief Secretary Chairman 2. Home Secretary Member 3. Development Commissioner Finance Secretary Member 5. Establishment Secretary Member The Deputy Secretary in the Establishment Department shall act as the Secretary to the Committee. 2.) Functions of the Selection Committee: The Selection Committee shall arrange to hold a written examination-cum-viva voce test for officers with a view to assess their suitability for appointment to Service. Provided that any officer who fails to obtain forty per cent of the total marks at the written ex cum-viva voce test shall not be considered for appointment to Service. 3.) Officers eligible to appear at the written Examination-cum-viva voce test-(1) Every person 1st day of August, 1981 is a gazetted officer under the Government of Sikkim not poss technical qualifications as specified in the Notification of the Government of Sikkim in the Est Department No. 350/GEN/EST dated 3rd Feb., 1978 shall be eligible to appear at t examination-cum-viva voce test." 12.) The High Court rejected the arguments advanced on behalf of the State of Sikkim. It was High Court that the impugned notification was violative of the Rules, the Government coul acted in its executive power when the statutory rules were holding the field, the two conditions under Rule 4(3) of the Rules were mandatory, there was no material before the State Gov form an opinion that exigencies of service required the issuance of the impugned notificati Public Service Commission was not consulted. On these findings the High Court quashed th and the consequent appointments. 13.) The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the Rules came into force in the which provided recruitment to the service through the Public Service Commission. T constituted under the Rules consisted of the top-ranking posts in the State-Service. It also s feeder-cadre for appointments to the Indian Administrative Service. After its initial Constitution appointments were made to the service under the Rules because in the absence of the Pub Commission there was no mechanism to operate the Rules. According to him when recruitm service was not made for a long period there were representations from number of office opportunity to enter the service. It was under these circumstances that the cabinet decision special selection was taken and the impugned notification was issued. The learned Counsel v contended that the Rules being inoperative the State Government was within its executive pow the notification. He also justified the Government action under Rule 4(3) of the Rules. Accord the necessary opinion regarding existence of 'Exigencies of Service' was formed by the Gove the basis of the reasons contained in the Cabinet Memorandum (quoted above) and the High C not have gone into the sufficiency of the said reasons. He further argued that the requ consultation with the Public Service Commission was directory and its non-compliance coul rendered the selection illegal. 15.) The executive power of the State cannot be exercised in the field which is already occu laws made by the legislature. It is settled law that any order, instruction, direction or notificatio exercise of the executive power of the State which is contrary to any statutory provisions jurisdiction and is a nullity. But in this case we are faced with a peculiar situation. The Ru enforced, remained unworkable for about five years. The Public Service Commission, whic authority to implement the Rules, was not in existence during the said period. But in this case we are faced with a peculiar situation. The Ru enforced, remained unworkable for about five years. The Public Service Commission, whic authority to implement the Rules, was not in existence during the said period. There is noth record to show as to why the Public Service Commission was not constituted during all those In the absence of any material to the contrary we assume that there were justifiable reasons fo in constituting the Commission. The executive power of the State being divided among functionaries under Article 166(3)of the Constitution of India there is possibility of lack of co amongst various limbs of the Government working within their respective spheres of alloc object of regulating the recruitment and conditions of service by statutory provisions is arbitrariness, provide consistency and crystilise the rights of employees concerned. Th provisions which are unworkable and inoperative cannot achieve these objectives. Such pro non-est till made operational. It is the operative statutory provisions which have the effect executive power of the State from the same field. When in a peculiar situation, as in the pre the statutory provisions could not be operated there was no bar for the State Governmen exercise of its executive power. The impugned notification to hold special selection was iss four years after the enforcement of the Rules. It was done to remove stagnation and to opportunity to the eligible persons to enter the service. In our view the State Government was issuing the impugned notification in exercise of its executive power and the High Court fell i quashing the same." Besides, according to the learned Senior Counsel, even as per the decision taken in the Con Chief Justices and Chief Ministers, the process of selection has to be entrusted to the concerned and in support of this contention, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on th portion of paragraph no. 5 of the judgment reported in (2008) 17 SCC 703, Malik Mazhar Sul another v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission and Others: “5.) Before we issue general directions and the time schedule to be adhered to for filling vac may arise in subordinate courts and District Courts, it is necessary to note that selections are be conducted by the authorities concerned as per the existing Judicial Service Rules in the States/Union Territories. We may, however, note that, progressively, the authorities concer consider, discuss and eventually may arrive at a consensus that the selection process be co the High Court itself or by the Public Service Commission under the control and supervision Court. In this regard, considerable progress has already been made. Reference can be m decision taken in a conference held between the Chief Justices and Chief Ministers, minut show that in some of the States, selection of subordinate judicial officers at all levels of Civi already being made by the High Courts. Some States, where selection is still being made by Service Commission, were agreeable to entrust the selection to the High Courts whe Ministers/Ministers of Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal, Punjab and Kerala were of the vie present system may continue but the decision taken jointly was that in the said States Pradesh, West Bengal, Punjab and Kerala) setting up of question papers and evaluation sheets be entrusted to the High Court. Further decision taken was that in other States where s subordinate judicial officers is not being done by the High Courts, such selection be entrusted Courts by amending the relevant rules...” 8. On the other hand, according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the TNPSC, TNPSC has not disputed the consent given before the Hon'ble First Bench and also by its lett conduct of the said examination by this High Court, the consequential Government Ord challenged by the TNPSC if the same is not in accordance with the rules. Apart from this, a the learned Senior Counsel, after the appointment of the new Chairman, certain reforms introduced in the Commission, consequently, as on date, the TNPSC is in a position to condu examination in accordance with the rules and regulations, hence, the statutory powers g TNPSC cannot be totally ignored and cannot be allowed to be exercised by the High Court. 9. According to the learned Advocate General appearing for the Government, the Governme consulted the TNPSC. In support of this contention, the learned Advocate General has relied o dated 10.01.2012. 9. According to the learned Advocate General appearing for the Government, the Governme consulted the TNPSC. In support of this contention, the learned Advocate General has relied o dated 10.01.2012. Further, according to him, the TNPSC has also given its consent in the l has been referred to above, consequently, as far as the Government Order issued, whic challenge is concerned, it is in conformity with the judgment earlier rendered by the Hon'ble F of this Court and in the event of any decision to be taken to the contrary, it will nullify the con and the orders passed by the Hon'ble First Bench of this Court. 10. As far as this aspect is concerned, there is no doubt that the appointment to Judicial governed by Articles 234 and 320 of the Constitution of India. From the process of rule-ma consultation of the TNPSC is mandatory. In normal circumstances, this can be accepted. But, is no dispute with regard to the consent given by the TNPSC before the Hon'ble First Bench o in the above said writ petitions and also the consent given to the Government by letter dated which has been referred to above and having given such a consent for conduct of examina High Court, we are of the opinion that they cannot shift their stand. Apart from this, the stan the TNPSC now is that by the appointment of the new Chairman, the situation has totally consequently, as on date, the TNPSC is in a position to conduct the examination. The specific learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court is that not only as against the Chairma of the TNPSC, but also, as against the staff of the TNPSC, allegations are pending. This is n by the learned counsel appearing for the TNPSC. Under such circumstances, based on this consent was given. 11. As far as the stand taken by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the TNPSC that n reforms have been introduced by the TNPSC, consequently, they are in a position to c examination is concerned, this stand of the TNPSC clearly indicates that on the date of the o 12.01.2012 passed by the Hon'ble First Bench in W.P.Nos.29956 and 30080 of 2011, the T not in a position to conduct the said examination in view of the allegations levelled against its members and staff. But, according to the learned Senior Counsel, in view of the appointm Chairman, reforms are introduced in the TNPSC; consequently, the TNPSC can co examination. However, to substantiate this stand, no material is placed before this Court. Con we are not in a position to go into that aspect and give a finding with regard to the same. B date, the allegations levelled against the Chairman, members and staff of the TNPSC still co the issue in this regard is not finalised. Under such circumstances, since the position of the unworkable, as per the judgment relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the which is reported in AIR 1991 SC 1933 , (State of Sikkim vs. Dorjee Tshering Bhutia and Othe relevant portion of which reads as follows:- "13.) The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the Rules came into force in the which provided recruitment to the service through the Public Service Commission. T constituted under the Rules consisted of the top-ranking posts in the State-Service. It also s feeder-cadre for appointments to the Indian Administrative Service. After its initial Constitution appointments were made to the service under the Rules because in the absence of the Pub Commission there was no mechanism to operate the Rules. According to him when recruitm service was not made for a long period there were representations from number of office opportunity to enter the service. It was under these circumstances that the cabinet decision special selection was taken and the impugned notification was issued. The learned Counsel v contended that the Rules being inoperative the State Government was within its executive pow the notification. He also justified the Government action under Rule 4(3) of the Rules. Accord the necessary opinion regarding existence of 'Exigencies of Service' was formed by the Gove the basis of the reasons contained in the Cabinet Memorandum (quoted above) and the High C not have gone into the sufficiency of the said reasons. He further argued that the requ consultation with the Public Service Commission was directory and its non-compliance coul rendered the selection illegal. 15.) The executive power of the State cannot be exercised in the field which is already occu laws made by the legislature. He further argued that the requ consultation with the Public Service Commission was directory and its non-compliance coul rendered the selection illegal. 15.) The executive power of the State cannot be exercised in the field which is already occu laws made by the legislature. It is settled law that any order, instruction, direction or notificatio exercise of the executive power of the State which is contrary to any statutory provisions jurisdiction and is a nullity. But in this case we are faced with a peculiar situation. The Ru enforced, remained unworkable for about five years. The Public Service Commission, whic authority to implement the Rules, was not in existence during the said period. There is noth record to show as to why the Public Service Commission was not constituted during all those In the absence of any material to the contrary we assume that there were justifiable reasons fo in constituting the Commission. The executive power of the State being divided among functionaries under Article 166(3)of the Constitution of India there is possibility of lack of co amongst various limbs of the Government working within their respective spheres of alloc object of regulating the recruitment and conditions of service by statutory provisions is arbitrariness, provide consistency and crystilise the rights of employees concerned. Th provisions which are unworkable and inoperative cannot achieve these objectives. Such pro non-est till made operational. It is the operative statutory provisions which have the effect executive power of the State from the same field. When in a peculiar situation, as in the pre the statutory provisions could not be operated there was no bar for the State Governmen exercise of its executive power. The impugned notification to hold special selection was iss four years after the enforcement of the Rules. It was done to remove stagnation and to opportunity to the eligible persons to enter the service. In our view the State Government was issuing the impugned notification in exercise of its executive power and the High Court fell i quashing the same." we are of the considered opinion that there is no illegality in the impugned Government Order to relaxation of Rule 5 with regard to conduct of examination by the High Court without the as the TNPSC. Even as per the judgment reported in (2008) 17 SCC 703, Malik Mazhar Sult another v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission and Others also, selection for judicial s be entrusted to the High Court. Further, the issue involved in these cases is appointment service. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph no.13 of the Judgment reported SCC 339, High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar vs. Shirishkumar Rangra another which reads as under: "13.). . .The Judges do not do an easy job. They repeatedly do what the rest of us seek to make decisions. Judges, though are mortals, they are called upon to perform a function tha divine in character. The trial Judge is the kingpin in the hierarchical system of administration He directly comes in contact with the litigant during the day-to-day proceedings in the Court. O the responsibility to build a solemn atmosphere in the dispensation of justice. . .." when the impugned Government Order and notification is issued for selection of candidates to Civil Judges (Junior Division) who are required to decide the issues of the public, their selec be in a proper manner, without giving rise to any doubt in the minds of the public. 12. Apart from this, a perusal of Annexure II read with Rule 5 of the Rules also reveals tha functions of the TNPSC with regard to appointment of Civil Judges (Junior Division) are m character. The relevant portion of the Rule reads as follows:- Annexure II (under Rule 5) CIVIL JUDGE BY DIRECT RECRUITMENT (1) The Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission applications for direct recruitment to the post of Civil Judge, with reference to the vacancies r the Government through one English daily and one Tamil daily. (5) The Commission shall conduct the written examination and viva-voce as specified below:- (a) On receipt of applicationsfrom the candidates, scrutiny of applications will be do Commission strictly in accordance with the instructions and guidelines prescribed by it for the p (b) Hall Tickets will be dispatched to the candidates whose applications have been admit Commission, sufficiently in advance to the date of examination. (c) Sets of question papers for drawal for all the four papers of the written examination tog answer keys will be set by the Hon'ble Judges of the High Court nominated by the Hon'ble C for the purpose. (c) Sets of question papers for drawal for all the four papers of the written examination tog answer keys will be set by the Hon'ble Judges of the High Court nominated by the Hon'ble C for the purpose. (d) Five sets of question papers in the prescribed syllabi will be set by moderators appoin Hon'ble Chief Justice from time to time and these sets would be handed over to the Commiss custody. (e) The Hon'ble Chief Justice would pick up, in the presence of other Hon'ble Judges, a set papers containing key answers from a minimum of three such sets. The picked up set would by the Hon'ble Chief Justice and by other Hon'ble Judges present and handed over to the C Examinations, Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission for printing. The other not picked ques would be collected back by the Controller of Examinations for safe custody. (f) The printed question papers will be received at the Commission's office and will be transpo designated Centres escorted by the officials from the Commission and the High Court. Each contain 20 question papers and they will be bundled into larger parcels of cloth lined covers. (g) At the point of arrival, the representatives of the High Court and the Commission will re sealed bundles containing the question papers and the papers will be kept inside the Trea under armed security. (h) Chief Invigilators will be appointed by the Commission as per the usual procedure. On th day of examination, the Chief Invigilator appointed, shall verify the adequacy of question pa Treasury ini the presence of the officials of the Commission and the High Court and keep th Treasury vault till the morning of the examination day. .(i) On the day of examination, the question papers will be taken from the vault of the Tre transported to the examination centre as per the procedure evolved by the Commission, so reach the examination centre at least half-an-hour before the examination. The question pape shall be opened by the Invigilators five minutes before the commencement of the examination. (j)... (k) The Commission's staff as well as the High Court or Judicial Officers may be deputed for in the examination halls. Flying squads are also appointed by the District Revenue Officer, who ordinator for the examinations conducted by the Commission. The question pape shall be opened by the Invigilators five minutes before the commencement of the examination. (j)... (k) The Commission's staff as well as the High Court or Judicial Officers may be deputed for in the examination halls. Flying squads are also appointed by the District Revenue Officer, who ordinator for the examinations conducted by the Commission. (l) Hon'ble High Court Judges or District Judges, to be nominated by the Hon'ble Chief Justic make surprise inspection. Members of the Commission will also make surprise inspection. (m) Immediately on the completion of the examination, all the answer papers of the candida collected by the invigilators and the same will be counted, packed and sealed by the Chief The same will be signed by him, handed over to the persons nominated by the Comm deposited in the Treasury for onward transmission to the Commission in chartered vehicles bandobust accompanied by the staff of the Commission. (n) Dummy numbers will be assigned to the answer papers by the persons deputed by the C Examinations in the Commission's office, after all the answer paper are received in the Co office, from the respective Centres. (o) After the dummy numbers are assigned to the answer papers, the same will be s Commission to the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Academy situated at Greenways R Annamalaipuram, Chennai – 600 028 or any other place designated by the Hon'ble Chief Madras High Court for evaluation, which will be the centralized evaluation centre. (p)... (q)... (r) The staff and officers of the Commission will be present at the time of evaluation of the ans and assist the Examiners in the evaluation process. (s)... (t)... (u)... (v) The viva-voce will be conducted in the Commission's office with a minimum of five interv per day, comprising of one Hon'ble Judge of the High Court and such number of Memb Commission, as are available at the time of conduct of interview. (s)... (t)... (u)... (v) The viva-voce will be conducted in the Commission's office with a minimum of five interv per day, comprising of one Hon'ble Judge of the High Court and such number of Memb Commission, as are available at the time of conduct of interview. (w) An Hon'ble Judge of the High Court, to be nominated by the Hon'ble Chief Justice, for e interview Boards constituted will be the chairperson of the Board and his views in the matter o marks or grades, which is by consensus will normally be accepted, unless there are cogent r not accepting such advice, to be recorded in writing by the Chairman and Members of the Com (x) The marks or grade sheets will be sealed and handed over to the Secretary to the Com safe custody. After the viva-voce is completed, the marks obtained by the candidates in written viva-voce would be collated and published. The names of the successful candidates will, the prepared by the Commission and sent to the Government of Tamil Nadu for appointmen publication of the results as per Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and Recruitment) Ru (y)... (z) A tentative time schedule for the recruitment would be prepared by the Commission in c with Hon'ble High Court and the same would be adhered to, to the maximum possible extent fo the selection process." The above extracted portion reveals that the question papers have to be set by this High Cou voce is also to be done by the High Court along with the TNPSC. Thus, the major and vital fu to be done by the High Court. When there are some allegations as against the Chairman, me staff of the TNPSC and when that has not been put to an end, the stand of the learned Seni for the High Court, has to be accepted. Besides, even as per paragraph 8 of the counter affi TNPSC, which reads as follows:- "8.) In such circumstances, writ petitions were filed in public interest to expedite the selection of Civil Judges in the State. In the meantime, based on the letter from Registrar General, M Court, vide D.O.Lr.No.14/2010/Con/B1, dated 02.01.2012, with a recommendation to iss enabling the High Court to carry out the exercise of recruitment of 185 Civil Judges as a measure, the Principal Secretary to Government, Home Department consulted this Respo Letter No.533/Courts-I/2012-4 dated 10.01.2012. In the meantime, based on the letter from Registrar General, M Court, vide D.O.Lr.No.14/2010/Con/B1, dated 02.01.2012, with a recommendation to iss enabling the High Court to carry out the exercise of recruitment of 185 Civil Judges as a measure, the Principal Secretary to Government, Home Department consulted this Respo Letter No.533/Courts-I/2012-4 dated 10.01.2012. It is respectfully submitted that this respo Letter No.676/RND-A3/2010 dated 10.10.2012 conveyed to the Government to take appropria as a one time measure (i.e., for the instant recruitment of 185 Civil Judges). It is respectfully that pursuant to the decision taken and conveyed to this Hon'ble Court by the Government, t Division Bench was pleased to dispose of the writ petitions by observing as follows:- "We appreciate the fact that the Government and the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commi realized the difficulties which the State Judiciary is facing due to dearth of Judicial Officers Government and the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission have agreed for the taking recruitment process for judicial officers (Junior Division) by the High Court, no further directio be issued in these matters. We expect that, in this regard, as assured by the Advoca necessary Government Order will be issued forthwith. Consequently, the respondent/Hig directed to proceed expeditiously after the receipt of the Government order and sen advertisement/Notification inviting applications for the said post to the Government f publication". with regard to filling up of 185 vacancies for the post of Civil Judges (Junior Division) by the H the Home Department had addressed a letter dated 10.01.2012 to the TNPSC and the TNPSC on the same day, by its letter dated 10.01.2012, conveyed its decision to take appropriate dec one-time measure, for the instant recruitment of 185 Civil Judges and this decision was conve Hon'ble First Bench of this Court and the same was also extracted in the above said judgm Hon'ble First Bench in the above said writ petitions. Under such circumstances, the stand of t counsel for the petitioners that there was no proper consultation is not sustainable. Under such circumstances, the stand of t counsel for the petitioners that there was no proper consultation is not sustainable. 13.Apart from this, as per paragraph no.51of the Judgment reported in (2000) 4 SCC 640 , (Sta and another vs. Bal Mukund Sah and Others) which reads as follows:- “51.) As seen earlier, consultation with the High Court as envisaged by Article 234 is for fru constitutional mandate of preserving the independence of the Judiciary, which is its basic stru Public Service Commission has no such constitutional imperative to be fulfilled. The sc examining body's consultation can never be equated with that of consultation with the appo whose agent is the former. It is also pertinent to note that the essence of consultat communication of a genuine invitation to give advice and a genuine consideration of that advi turn depends on sufficient information and time being given to the party concerned to enable useful advice. It is difficult to appreciate how the Governor while consulting the Pub Commission before promulgating the rules of recruitment under Article 234 has to solicit sim advice as he would solicit from the High Court on due consultation. The advice which in the consultation can be tendered by the Public Service Commission will confine itself to the co requirements of Article 320. They are entirely different from the nature of consultation and a solicited from the High Court which is having full control over the Subordinate Judiciary under of the Constitution and is directly concerned with the drafting of efficient judicial appointme appropriate material will be available to it through the process of selection both at the gras and at the apex level of the District Judiciary. Consultation, keeping in view the role of the under Article 234 read with Article 235, stands on an entirely different footing as compa consultation with the Public Service Commission which has to discharge its functions of different type as envisaged by Article 320 of the Constitution.” consultation with the Public Service Commission as envisaged in Article 234 read with Article Constitution of India is entirely on a different footing as compared to the consultation with Service Commission as envisaged in Article 320 of the Constitution of India. 14. 14. The other stand of the learned counsel for the petitioners is with regard to recruitment of fr As far as induction of fresh law graduates as one of the eligible hands for recruitment is according to Mr.M. Radhakrishan, learned counsel, that has been introduced based on parag the Judgment reported in (2002) 4 SCC 247 , All India Judges Association and Others vs. Un and Others. According to him, even as per the said Judgment also, the words used therein are graduates", but, under the Advocates Act, 1961, unless one is an Advocate, he is not eli appointed as a Judge. Further, according to him, even as per paragraph no.32 of the said also, there is no whisper to the effect that any fresh law graduate who had not enrolled as an can be allowed to participate in the selection process. Consequently, according to him, as far "fresh law graduates" used both in the notification as well as under category 9 of Rule 5 of the is concerned, it is in violation of the Advocates Act, 1961, as well as the Bar Council of India also the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court. However, relying on the Judgment of the Divisio this Court reported in 2008 (3) LW 157 (M. Radhakrishnan V. State of Tamil Nadu & Others), t counsel also fairly conceded that as per the wordings of the said Division Bench Judgmen "eligible to be enrolled as an Advocate" has to be construed as "must be a fresh law gradu eligible to be enrolled as an Advocate and enrolled as an Advocate"; as per this, the word " between the two terms namely "must be eligible to be enrolled as an Advocate" and "enro Advocate" should be read as "and"; hence, as per the Division Bench Judgment referred to word "or" used in between the above said two terms, has to be read conjunctively and not d consequently, the candidate who had enrolled as an Advocate alone is eligible to apply. 15. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court also fairly submitted that in v above said Division Bench Judgment, this position has been clarified and as such, the applica candidates who have enrolled themselves as Advocates, as on the date of notification alo considered and the applications of the candidates who have not enrolled as an Advocate considered. 16. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court also fairly submitted that in v above said Division Bench Judgment, this position has been clarified and as such, the applica candidates who have enrolled themselves as Advocates, as on the date of notification alo considered and the applications of the candidates who have not enrolled as an Advocate considered. 16. In view of the above submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the High Court the opinion that by recording the same, this issue can be put to an end. 17. The other stand of the learned counsels for the petitioners is that as far as fresh law gra concerned, as per the Rules as well as the notification issued, even if they have less than experience, they are eligible to apply to the said post, but, as far as other advocates are conc experience of 3 years is mandatory and as such, this creates discrimination as among the i.e., according to them, once a candidate of law course finishes the said course and enrolls him advocate, he becomes an advocate; after becoming an advocate, he cannot be differentiate general pool of advocates and consequently, the preferential treatment given to the fresh law with regard to their dispensation of 3 years experience is discriminatory. 18. As far as this aspect is concerned, as referred to above, as far as these fresh law gra concerned, based on paragraph 32 of the Judgment reported in 2002 4 SCC 247 , this term included in the said Rules of 2007. As per the said Judgment, to avail the service of the brig and capable young law graduates, they were permitted to appear for the selection and appo the Judicial service also, though they do not possess 3 years experience. As far as these graduates are concerned, as per the notification also and also as per the Rules, they are eligib based on the marks secured by them, i.e., cut off mark has been prescribed for them to be contest the said selection. As far as the other candidates are concerned, no maximum o marks or cut off marks have been prescribed at all and as such, the object of introducing thes graduates is to avail their service to get the benefit of young talented advocates to the judicia render justice in a better manner. As far as the other candidates are concerned, no maximum o marks or cut off marks have been prescribed at all and as such, the object of introducing thes graduates is to avail their service to get the benefit of young talented advocates to the judicia render justice in a better manner. Under such circumstances, when they have been allowed under a distinct category, the question of considering their case along with the hands of ge does not arise at all. Consequently, this argument of the learned counsels for the petitioners allowed to stand. 19. According to the learned counsel Mr.T.P. Prabhakaran, as far as fresh Law graduates are under Section 28(b) of the Bar Council of India Rules, maximum age is 30 years, but, impugned notification, the maximum age limit is 35 years for the general category and 40 ye reserved category. According to the learned counsel, 3 years experience is mandatory for t category. Further, according to him, when one is allowed to join the course upto the age of 3 will complete the course only in the age of 33 years and after 3 years experience, certainly, h 36 years; under such circumstances, fixing the maximum age as 35 years is arbitrary and unre 20. The learned counsels for the petitioners also submitted that for the last 4 years, no ex were conducted and relying on paragraph nos.3, 7(d) and 11 of the judgment reported in (200 703, Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) and another v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission a which read as follows:- "3.) In this matter, by judgment and order dated 3-4-2006, it was observed that it is absolutely to evolve a mechanism to speedily determine and fill vacancies of Judges at all levels. For th timely steps are required to be taken for determination of vacancies, issue of advertisement, of examinations, interviews, declaration of final results and issue of orders of appointment. It directed that for all these above and other steps, it is necessary to provide to fix the time sched the system works automatically and there is no delay in filling up of the vacancies. The date up these steps can be provided for on the pattern similar to filling up of vacancies in some othe Adherence to strict time schedule can help in ensuring timely filling up of vacancies. The date up these steps can be provided for on the pattern similar to filling up of vacancies in some othe Adherence to strict time schedule can help in ensuring timely filling up of vacancies. In this v State Governments, Union Territories and/or High Courts were directed to give suggestions the time schedule to be fixed so that every year vacancies that may occur are filled. This requested Mr Vijay Hansaria, Senior Advocate, to assist the Court. 7.) For filling up of vacancies in the cadre of District Judge, accepting the proposal to which objected, except in the manner hereinafter noticed, we direct as under: D. For appointment to the posts of Civil Judge (Junior Division) by direct recruitment Sl. No. DescriptionDate 1.) Number of vacancies to be notified by the High Court. 15th January Vacancies to be including (a) Existing vacancies. (b) Future vacancies that may arise within one year due to retirement. (c) Future vacancies that may arise due to promotion, death or otherwise, say ten per cent of t of posts. 2.) Advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates 1st February 3.) Last date for receipt of application. 1st March 4.) Publication of list of eligible applicants. 2nd April The list may be put on the website. 5.) Dispatch/Issue of admit cards to the eligible applicants.2nd-30th April 6.) Preliminary written examination 15th May Objective questions with multiple choice wh scrutinised by computer. 7.) Declaration of result of preliminary written examination 15th June (a) Result may be put on the website and also published in the newspaper. (b) The ratio of 1:10 of the available vacancies to the successful candidates be maintained. 8.) Final written examination Subjective/Narrative. 15th July 9.) Declaration of result of final written examination 30th August (a) Result may be put on the website and also published in the newspaper. (b) The ratio of 1:3 of the available vacancies to the successful candidates be maintained. (c) Dates of interview of the successful candidates may be put on the internet which can be the candidates and no separate intimation of the date of interview need be sent. 10.) Viva voce. 1st-15th Oct. 11.) Declaration of final select list and communication to the appointing authority 1st Nov. (a) Result may be put on the website and also published in the newspaper. 10.) Viva voce. 1st-15th Oct. 11.) Declaration of final select list and communication to the appointing authority 1st Nov. (a) Result may be put on the website and also published in the newspaper. (b) Select list be published in order of merit and should be double the number of vacancies not 12.) Issue of appointment letter by the competent authority for all existing vacant posts as o Dec. 13.) Last date for joining. 2nd January of the following year 11.) Insofar as the State of Bihar is concerned, the Patna High Court has suggested that due t (sic) of floods, the time schedule between June and November is not feasible and that the tim of one year may be modified so as to complete the selection process from December to June State. Learned counsel for the State Government and the Public Service Commission has sup viewpoint of the High Court. Accordingly, the High Court can suitable, after consulting with Service Commission and the State Government, amend the aforesaid time schedule. The am schedule be filed in this Court." according to the learned counsels, every year, vacancies have to be filled up as per the direc Honourable Apex Court; for any reason, if the examination could not be conducted and sele not be made for the post in question, permission should be sought from the Honourable Apex no fault of the petitioners, examination was not conducted for the past four years and if the e had been conducted every year, then, a number of candidates would have got the eligibility to the same; for the lapse committed by the 1st respondent, the petitioners should not be force Consequently, according to the learned counsels, the maximum age limit fixed should be relax 21. As far as this stand of the learned counsels for the petitioners is concerned, as per paragra 5, 7, 10, 11 and 12 of the judgment reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614 , (Dr. Ami Lal Bhat v Rajasthan and Others) which read as follows:- “4.) Is such a cut-off date fixed by the Rules applicable to the relevant service, arbitrary? I urged before us by the petitioners and/or appellants that the cut-off date of 1st of January fo last date fixed for receipt of applications is arbitrary. The cut-off date should only be fixed with to the last date of making the application in question. I urged before us by the petitioners and/or appellants that the cut-off date of 1st of January fo last date fixed for receipt of applications is arbitrary. The cut-off date should only be fixed with to the last date of making the application in question. It is submitted before us that the dat January has no nexus with the application in question and, therefore, must be struck down. 5.) This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cut-o determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Ba fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a pos discretion of the rule-making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as w hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some perso on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the c That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Para Match Works and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P. Pub Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate shou completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is ma cut-off date was challenged. In the case of A.P. Pub Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate shou completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is ma cut-off date was challenged. This Court considered the various steps required in the process o and said, “when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age o of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidat eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fau The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determina particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the application This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximu candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which m uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cut-off date should be with reference to a fixed date. fixing an independent cut-off date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in deter maximum age. 7.) Inthe present case, the cut-off date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Ru to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the appli invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on whic departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for rec uniform cut-off date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January o following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for a the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly un or arbitrary. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. I account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of application scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and appointment. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. I account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of application scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and appointment. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. B no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to given circumstances. In the first place, making a cut-off date dependent on the last date fo applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it depen date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of su date may well contend that the cut-off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have b earlier; or in the alternative that the cut-off date could have been fixed later at the point of s appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cut-off date fixed and the which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Work cases that the cut-off date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unr To say that the only cut-off date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be w basis. In our view the cut-off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the begin calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreas the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. 10.) It is next contended on behalf of the appellants/petitioners that under all the service rules there is a provision for age relaxation. In Rule 11(A) of the Rajasthan Medical Services Branch) Rules, there is a provision for age relaxation by 5 years by the Government in consu the Commission. 10.) It is next contended on behalf of the appellants/petitioners that under all the service rules there is a provision for age relaxation. In Rule 11(A) of the Rajasthan Medical Services Branch) Rules, there is a provision for age relaxation by 5 years by the Government in consu the Commission. There is also Rule 35 in the said Rules which gives a general power to re exceptional cases where the Government is satisfied that it is necessary, inter alia, to relax an of these Rules with respect to age or experience of any person and this can be don concurrence of the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms and in consultatio Rajasthan Public Service Commission. It is urged that in the case of all those persons who are affected because the advertisement for recruitment is issued later than the occurrence of th corresponding age relaxation should be given to all candidates. In other words, what is conten if on the date when the vacancy occurred, the candidates were within the maximum age pre reference to the cut-off date, then if the advertisement is delayed, their age should be cons reference to the cut-off date of 1st January following the date of occurrence of vacancy. For the vacancy has occurred on 1st of April of a given year, and the applicant would be within the age on the 1st of January of the following year, then such a candidate will be considered as e if the advertisement is issued not in April of that year but say February of the following ye candidates will get age relaxation of one year. 11.) In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. Th relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if oth candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has c maximum age-limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circum a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajast Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any ma connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. Such a relaxation in special circum a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajast Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any ma connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxa make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfai number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that the barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner contended. 12.) In the premises we do not see any reason to set aside the cut-off date fixed by the rele The judgments of the Division Benches of the Rajasthan High Court insofar as they strike d January of the following year as the cut-off date for determining the maximum age of a ca selection, require to be set aside.” relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court, as far as fixing of m minimum age limit is concerned, it is within the domain of the authority concerned and this arg been advanced based on the Bar Council of India Rules. Admittedly, these Rules rela admission to Law Degree Courses and there is no reference at all in the said Rules with regard recruitment to judicial service. If this argument of the learned counsels for the petitioners accepted, then all the candidates, who have been permitted to join the Law Degree Cours allowed to write the examination. As far as admissions to Law Degree Course is concerned, i stage and as far as recruitment is concerned, one will get the eligibility subsequent to the co the said course alone and complying with the other conditions. Some may complete the course prescribed period, while some others may take a number of years to finish the same fo reasons. But, that does not mean that whenever they complete the course, they should be ma to appear for the examination concerned. Further, not only in Judicial Service, but also in othe for appointment to any post, minimum and maximum age limit is prescribed. When that is th Judiciary alone cannot be an exception to this. But, that does not mean that whenever they complete the course, they should be ma to appear for the examination concerned. Further, not only in Judicial Service, but also in othe for appointment to any post, minimum and maximum age limit is prescribed. When that is th Judiciary alone cannot be an exception to this. As far as Judiciary is concerned, a Judge is a decide the issues involved in so many cases coming before him. Under such circumstances, of this, when this is the normal procedure adopted and also in view of the judgment relied learned Senior Counsel for the High Court, which has been referred to above, fixing the ma limit or minimum age limit cannot be said to be an illegal or arbitrary one. Consequently, the a the learned counsels for the petitioners, in this regard, cannot be allowed to stand. 22. The other argument of the learned counsels for the petitioners is that the syllabus prescr the Rules is different from the syllabus prescribed under the present notification for sel appointment to the post of Civil Judges (Junior Division). In support of this, the learned coun petitioners relied on the following portion of Annexure II to Rule 5 of the said Rules: "(4) The syllabi for the examinations shall be as follows: (a) Written Examination:- (i) Translation Paper (Maximum marks 100) (ii) Law Paper I ( Maximum Marks 100) Translation of passages in English into Tamil and Tamil into English. The passages will b Depositions, (2) Judgements, and (3) Documents The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Indian Evi 1872, Principles of pleading and the Constitution of India. (iii) Law Paper II (Maximum Marks 100) Framing of Issues and Writing of Judgements in Civil Cases. (iv) Law Paper III (Maximum Marks 100) Framing of charges and Writing of Judgements in Criminal Cases." But, according to the learned counsels, as per the notification, in addition to the papers prescr the Rules, under the caption "Law Paper III", the following subjects have been included: “d) Law Paper - III Alternate Dispute Resolution Mechanism & Techniques; Legal Services Authority Act; Plea Bargaining.” and according to the learned counsels for the petitioners, this is contrary to the Rules. As righ out by the learned Senior Counsel for the High Court, as far as the above said subjects are they are governed by Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:- "89.) Settlement of disputes outside the Court:-(1) Where it appears to the court that there exis of a settlement which may be acceptable to the parties, the court shall formulate the terms of and give them to the parties for their observations and after receiving the observations of the court may reformulate the terms of a possible settlement and refer the same for - (a) arbitration (b) conciliation (c) judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat; or (d) mediation. (2) Where a dispute has been referred - (a) for arbitration or conciliation, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (2 shall apply as if the proceedings for arbitration or conciliation were referred for settlement provisions of that Act; (b) to Lok Adalat, the court shall refer the same to the Lok Adalat in accordance with the pr sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 (39 of 1987) an provisions of that Act shall apply in respect of the dispute so referred to the Lok Adalat; (c) for judicial settlement, the court shall refer the same to a suitable institution or person institution or person shall be deemed to be a Lok Adalat and all the provisions of Lega Authority Act, 1987 ( 39 of 1987) shall apply as if the dispute were referred to a Lok Adala provisions of that Act; (d) for mediation, the court shall effect a compromise between the parties and shall f procedure as may be prescribed]" and Sections 265-A to 265-L of Code of Criminal Procedure, which deal with Plea Bargaini follows:- “265A. Application of the Chapter.- (1) This Chapter shall apply in respect of an accused against whom- (a) the report has been forwarded by the officer in charge of the police station under section 1 therein that an offence appears to have been committed by him other than an offence for punishment of death or of imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven been provided under the law for the time being in force; or (b) a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on complaint, other than an offence fo punishment of death or of imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven been provided under the law for the time being in force, and after examining complainant and under section 200, issued the process under section 204, but does not apply where such offe the socio-economic condition of the country or has been committed against a woman, or a c the age of fourteen years. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the Central Government shall, by notification, det offences under the law for the time being in force which shall be the offences affecting economic condition of the country. 265B. Application for plea bargaining.-(1) A person accused of an offence may file an applicat bargaining in the Court in which such offence is pending for trial. (2) The application under sub-section (1) shall contain a brief description of the case relating to application is filed including the offence to which the case relates and shall be accompa affidavit sworn by the accused stating therein that he has voluntarily preferred, after underst nature and extent of punishment provided under the law for the offence, the plea bargaining and that he has not previously been convicted by a Court in a case in which he had been ch the same offence. (3) After receiving the application under sub-section (1), the Court shall issue notice to Prosecutor or the complainant of the case, as the case may be, and to the accused to app date fixed for the case. (3) After receiving the application under sub-section (1), the Court shall issue notice to Prosecutor or the complainant of the case, as the case may be, and to the accused to app date fixed for the case. (4) When the Public Prosecutor or the complainant of the case, as the case may be, and th appear on the date fixed under sub-section (3), the Court shall examine the accused in cam the other party in the case shall not be present, to satisfy itself that the accused has filed the voluntarily and where- (a) the Court is satisfied that the application has been filed by the accused voluntarily, it sh time to the Public Prosecutor or the complainant of the case, as the case may be, and the work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case which may include giving to the vic accused the compensation and other expenses during the case and thereafter fix the date hearing of the case; (b) the Court finds that the application has been filed involuntarily by the accused or he has been convicted by a Court in a case in which he had been charged with the same offen proceed further in accordance with the provisions of this Code from the stage such applicatio filed under sub-section (1). 265C. 265C. Guidelines for mutually satisfactory disposition.-In working out a mutually satisfactory under clause (a) of sub-section (4) of section 265B, the Court shall follow the following namely:- (a) in a case instituted on a police report, the Court shall issue notice to the Public Prosecutor officer who has investigated the case, the accused and the victim of the case to particip meeting to work out a satisfactory disposition of the case: Provided that throughout such process of working out a satisfactory disposition of the case, it s duty of the Court to ensure that the entire process is completed voluntarily by the parties part the meeting: Provided further that the accused may, if he so desires, participate in such meeting with his any, engaged in the case; (b) in a case instituted otherwise than on police report, the Court shall issue notice to the ac the victim of the case to participate in a meeting to work out a satisfactory disposition of the ca Provided that it shall be the duty of the Court to ensure, throughout such process of wo satisfactory disposition of the case, that it is completed voluntarily by the parties participa meeting: Provided further that if the victim of the case or the accused, as the case may be, so desire participate in such meeting with his pleader engaged in the case. 265D. Report of the mutually satisfactory disposition to be submitted before the Court.-W meeting under section 265C, a satisfactory disposition of the case has been worked out, the prepare a report of such disposition which shall be signed by the presiding officer of the Co other persons who participated in the meeting and if no such disposition has been worked ou shall record such observation and proceed further in accordance with the provisions of this the stage the application under sub-section (1) of section 265B has been filed in such case. 265E. 265E. Disposal of the case.-Where a satisfactory disposition of the case has been worked section 265D, the Court shall dispose of the case in the following manner, namely:- (a) the Court shall award the compensation to the victim in accordance with the disposition un 265D and hear the parties on the quantum of the punishment, releasing of the accused on p good conduct or after admonition under section 360 or for dealing with the accused under the of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) or any other law for the time being in follow the procedure specified in the succeeding clauses for imposing the punishment on the a (b) after hearing the parties under clause (a), if the Court is of the view that section 360 or the of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) or any other law for the time being i attracted in the case of the accused, it may release the accused on probation or provide the any such law, as the case may be; (c) after hearing the parties under clause (b), if the Court finds that minimum punishment provided under the law for the offence committed by the accused, it may sentence the accuse such minimum punishment; (d) in case after hearing the parties under clause (b), the Court finds that the offence comm accused is not covered under clause (b) or clause (c), then, it may sentence the accused to on the punishment provided or extendable, as the case may be, for such offence. 265F. Judgment of the Court.-The Court shall deliver its judgment in terms of section 265E i Court and the same shall be signed by the presiding officer of the Court. 265G. Finality of the judgment.-The judgment delivered by the Court under section 265G sh and no appeal (except the special leave petition under article 136 and writ petition under articl 227 of the Constitution) shall lie in any Court against such judgment. 265H. Power of the Court in plea bargaining.-A Court shall have, for the purposes of disc functions under this Chapter, all the powers vested in respect of bail, trial of offences and oth relating to the disposal of a case in such Court under this Code. 265H. Power of the Court in plea bargaining.-A Court shall have, for the purposes of disc functions under this Chapter, all the powers vested in respect of bail, trial of offences and oth relating to the disposal of a case in such Court under this Code. 265-I. Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set off against the sentence of imp The provisions of section 428 shall apply, for setting off the period of detention undergo accused against the sentence of imprisonment imposed under this Chapter, in the same man apply in respect of the imprisonment under other provisions of this Code. 265J. Savings.-The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything i therewith contained in any other provisions of this Code and nothing in such other provisio construed to constrain the meaning of any provision of this Chapter. Explanation.-For the purposes of this Chapter, the expression "Public Prosecutor" has th assigned to it under clause (u) of section 2 and includes an Assistant Public Prosecutor appo section 25. 265K. Statements of accused not to be used.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any law f being in force, the statements or facts stated by an accused in an application for plea barg under section 265B shall not be used for any other purpose except for the purpose of this Cha 265L. Non-application of the Chapter.-Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to any juvenile defined in clause (k) of section 2 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, The subjects with regard to which objection has been raised are (i) Alternate Dispute Mechanism and Techniques, (ii) Legal Services Authority Act and (iii) Plea bargaining. As fa three subjects are concerned, they are governed by Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure Sections 265-A to 265-L of Code of Criminal Procedure which are extracted above. Apart fr per the said Rules and even according to the learned counsels for the petitioners, under Law P subjects prescribed are Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. to this, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Principles of Pleadings and the Constitution of Ind prescribed. Apart fr per the said Rules and even according to the learned counsels for the petitioners, under Law P subjects prescribed are Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. to this, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Principles of Pleadings and the Constitution of Ind prescribed. As such, when the subjects prescribed under Law Paper III are coming under Co Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure, this argument of the learned counsels for the peti the subjects prescribed under Law Paper III are contrary to the Rules will not hold good. Con we reject this argument of the learned counsels for the petitioners. 23. Yet another submission made by the learned counsels for the petitioners is as far as women candidates is concerned, as per the notification, in the event of non-availability of suit in the quota meant for women, the vacancies will be filled up by eligible male candidates, w injustice done to women candidates. However, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the has fairly submitted that, as on date, a number of women advocates have applied for the post event of their suitability, certainly, the vacancies in the quota for women will be filled up only view of this submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the High Court, we are of that we need not go further into this aspect. 24. As far as the stand of the learned counsels for the petitioners that no age relaxation has to Physically Handicapped Persons is concerned, this argument has been advanced based 38 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Particip 1995. A perusal of Section 38 of the said Act reveals that the word used therein is "ma discretionary power is given to the State. Consequently, the argument of the learned Senior C the High Court that the directions given therein are only directory and not mandatory, has to be As such, we are not inclined to accept this argument of the learned counsels for the petitioners 25. Yet another submission made by the learned counsels for the petitioners is that as far as Civil Judges (Junior Division) is concerned, already, there are 9 backlog vacancies and the been clubbed with the present vacancies, consequently, the present notification is illegal. Yet another submission made by the learned counsels for the petitioners is that as far as Civil Judges (Junior Division) is concerned, already, there are 9 backlog vacancies and the been clubbed with the present vacancies, consequently, the present notification is illegal. In this contention, the learned counsels have relied on paragraph no.27 of the judgment reporte 2 SCC 105, (Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Sangam Nath Pandey and Others), which reads as f "27.) In any recruitment year, it may happen that the candidates belonging to the reserved ca not be available to fill the vacancies falling to the share of the particular reserved catego circumstances, sub-section (2) of Section 3 enables the State to carry forward th vacancy/vacancies to be filled through special recruitment as a separate class of vacancy. Su vacancy cannot be intermingled with the vacancies of the year of recruitment in which it is fi cannot be counted for the purpose of determining of ceiling of 50% reservation of the total va that year. The provision contained in sub-section (2) is, notwithstanding anything to th contained in sub-section (1), which provides for a total 50% reservation for the categories of Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes i.e. 21%, 2% and 27% respectively." As per the counter affidavit filed by the High Court, it is admitted that the number of backlog v nine and the relevant papers relating to this are also produced before this Court. The brea nine backlog vacancies is as hereunder: ST - 5 GT (G Blind) - 1 BC (W Deaf) - 1 MBC/DC (G-Deaf)- 1 SC (G – Blind) - 1 Total 9 According to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court also, as far as these ni vacancies are concerned, as per the roster mentioned above, the same will be filled up fi remaining vacancies will be filled up by following the rule of reservation as well as the other R regard. In view of this submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the High Court, w probe into this further. 26. In view of this submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the High Court, w probe into this further. 26. As far as the other stand taken by Mr.V. Raghavachari, learned counsel for the pe W.P.Nos.2916 and 3364 of 2012, which have been filed by two associations, whose me employees of this Court as well as subordinate judiciary, is concerned, they have chall notification insofar as it excludes their claim for selection and appointment to the post of C (Junior Division). But, at the outset itself, it has been brought to the notice of this Court by t Advocate General that as far as the exclusion of these employees is concerned, the Gover already issued G.O.Ms. No. 885, Home (Courts-I) Department dated 20.12.2011 and a copy o has also been produced before this Court. But, the stand of the learned counsels for the pe that the Government has already issued a Government Order prior to three months for i service candidates as one of the eligible hands to be considered for selection and appointm post of Civil Judges (Junior Division), but, within a period of 3 months, the above said G Order, viz., G.O. Ms.No.885, Home (Courts-I) Department dated 20.12.2011, has been iss from this, according to the learned counsels for the petitioners, as far as the State of Pon concerned, as per rules, service hands are eligible to appear for selection to the said post an denying the same as far as the ministerial staff of Tamil Nadu Judicial service is con discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 27. As far as this stand is concerned, rightly or wrongly, the Government has issued G.O. M Home (Courts-I) Department dated 20.12.2011 deleting this category from the eligibility criter Rules. Unless this Rule is under challenge before this Court, this Court cannot examine thei at all. Apart from this, on the date of issuing the notification, they are not eligible hands to be i per the Rules. Consequently, their claim need not be examined and need not be entertained a 28. As far as W.P. No. 2566 of 2012 is concerned, it has been filed by an Association by wa Interest Litigation. Apart from this, on the date of issuing the notification, they are not eligible hands to be i per the Rules. Consequently, their claim need not be examined and need not be entertained a 28. As far as W.P. No. 2566 of 2012 is concerned, it has been filed by an Association by wa Interest Litigation. Though many grounds have been raised by the learned Senior Coun petitioner with regard to validity of the relaxation of Rule 5 read with Annexure II of the Rule the method of consultation done by the High Court as well as the TNPSC and the Governme the power of Judiciary, but, unfortunately, this writ petition has been filed by way of a Pub Litigation. As per paragraph nos.14 to 19 of the Judgment reported in (2010) 10 SCC 70 Shrivastava and Others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others), which read as follows: “14.) However, the main argument by the appellants against entertaining WP (C) No. 1520 o WP (C) No. 63 of 2002 is on the ground that a PIL in a service matter is not maintainable. This the opinion that there is considerable merit in that contention. It is common ground that dis case is over selection and appointment which is a service matter. 15.) In Duryodhan Sahu (Dr.) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra a three-Judge Bench of this Court held is not maintainable in service matters. This Court, speaking through Srinivasan, J. explained t of administrative tribunals created under Article 323-A in the backdrop of extraordinary jurisdi High Courts under Articles 226 and 227. This Court held: (SCC p. 281, para 18) “18.) … If public interest litigations at the instance of strangers are allowed to be entertai [Administrative] Tribunal, the very object of speedy disposal of service matters would get defea Same reasoning applies here as a public interest litigation has been filed when the entire disp to selection and appointment. 16.) In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees Court held that in service matters only the non-appointees can assail the legality of the a procedure (see SCC p. 755, para 51 of the Report). 17.) This view was very strongly expressed by this Court in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v Maharashtra by pointing out that despite the decision in Duryodhan Sahu, PILs in servi “continue unabated”. 17.) This view was very strongly expressed by this Court in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v Maharashtra by pointing out that despite the decision in Duryodhan Sahu, PILs in servi “continue unabated”. This Court opined that the High Courts should “throw out” such petitions the decision in Duryodhan Sahu (SCC p. 596, para 16). 18.) Same principles have been reiterated in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. (SCC at p 16). 19.) In a recent decision of this Court delivered on 30-8-2010, in Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahod Mahto, it has been held that except in a case for a writ of “quo warranto”, PIL in a service m maintainable (see SCC para 15).” and as per paragraph nos.15 to 19 and 33 and 34 of the Judgment reported in (2010) 9 SCC Bansh Lal vs. Sahodar Prasad Mahto and Others), which read as follows:- “15.) The above principles make it clear that except for a writ of quo warranto, public interest not maintainable in service matters. Writ of quo warranto 16.) A writ of quo warranto lies only when appointment is contrary to a statutory provision. In of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat (three-Judge Bench) Hon'ble S.B. Sinha, J. with the majority view held: (SCC pp. 730-31, paras 22-23) “22.) The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required to d the outset as to whether a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one. W such a writ, the Court merely makes a public declaration but will not consider the respective im candidates or other factors which may be relevant for issuance of a writ of certiorari. (See R Union of India, SCC para 74.) 23.) A writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the stat (See Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Govt. of Haryana.)” 17.) In Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Govt. of Haryana the following conclusion is relevant: (SCC p. 275) “11.) … The High Court did not exercise its writ jurisdiction in the absence of any averment to that the aforesaid officers had misused their authority and acted in a manner prejudicial to the the appellants. of Haryana.)” 17.) In Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Govt. of Haryana the following conclusion is relevant: (SCC p. 275) “11.) … The High Court did not exercise its writ jurisdiction in the absence of any averment to that the aforesaid officers had misused their authority and acted in a manner prejudicial to the the appellants. In our view the High Court should have considered the challenge to the appo the officials concerned as members of the Regional Transport Authority on the ground of statutory provisions. The mere fact that they had not acted in a manner prejudicial to the inte appellant could not lend validity to their appointment, if otherwise, the appointment was in statutory provisions of a mandatory nature. It has, therefore, become necessary for us to co validity of the impugned notification said to have been issued in breach of statutory provision.” 18.) In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees Court held: (SCC p. 754, para 49) “49.) The law is well settled. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of th required to determine, at the outset, as to whether a case has been made out for issuance quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules.” 19.) It is clear from the above decisions that even for issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the has to satisfy that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. In the latter part of our jud would discuss how the appellant herein was considered and appointed as Chairman and w satisfied the relevant statutory provisions. 33.) If we apply the same principles to the appellant, who was appointed as Chairman of the Board by the Chief Minister, after fulfilling the criteria, the said appointment cannot be inte lightly without adequate material about his integrity or inefficiency in service. 34.) From the discussion and analysis, the following principles emerge: (a) Except for a writ of quo warranto, PIL is not maintainable in service matters. (b) For issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the High Court has to satisfy that the appointment to the statutory rules. 34.) From the discussion and analysis, the following principles emerge: (a) Except for a writ of quo warranto, PIL is not maintainable in service matters. (b) For issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the High Court has to satisfy that the appointment to the statutory rules. (c) Suitability or otherwise of a candidate for appointment to a post in government service is t of the appointing authority and not of the court unless the appointment is contrary t provisions/rules.” and also as per paragraph no.31 of the Judgment reported in (2011) 5 SCC 464 , (Bholanath and Others. vs. Ramakrishna Mission V. Centenary College and Ors.)which reads as follows:-"31.) In the alternative, the learned senior counsel submits that the writ petition would have to as public interest litigation. It is, however, settled by this Court that public interest litigation wo maintainable in service law cases. In support of this submission, he relies on the judgments o in the cases of Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors. (1998) 7 SC Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. 2005) 5 SCC 136. Therefore, again no relief can be the writ Petitioners/Appellants." which have been relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the High Court, as far as serv are concerned, Public Interest Litigation cannot be entertained. However, the learned Senior C the petitioner had relied on the following Judgments in support of his contention that in servi Public Interest Litigation is maintainable: (1981) 1 SCC 246 , Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway.) vs. Union of India (paragraph no.62) - "62.) A technical point is taken in the counter-affidavit that Petitioner 1 is an unrecognised and that, therefore, the petitioner to that extent, is not sustainable. It has to be overruled. W petitioners belong to a recognised union or not, the fact remains that a large body of pers common grievance exists and they have approached this Court under Article 32. Our current jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based and people-ori envisions access to justice through “class actions”, “public interest litigation” and “rep proceedings”. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts through proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an aff participative justice in our democracy. Our current jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based and people-ori envisions access to justice through “class actions”, “public interest litigation” and “rep proceedings”. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts through proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an aff participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow “cause of action” and “person aggrieved” and individual litigation is becoming obsolescen jurisdictions. It must fairly be stated that the learned Attorney-General has taken no objectio recognised association maintaining the writ petitions." (1998) 7 SCC 273 , Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Others vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Others nos.18, 20 & 21) "18.) The constitution of Administrative Tribunals was necessitated because of the large pe cases relating to service matters in various courts in the country. It was expected that the se Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively in service matters would go a long way in not on the burden of the courts but also provide to the persons covered by the Tribunals speedy relie of their grievances. The basic idea as evident from the various provisions of the Act is that th should quickly redress the grievances in relation to service matters. The definition of “servic found in Section 3(q) shows that in relation to a person, the expression means all service matt to the conditions of his service. The significance of the word “his” cannot be ignored. Section 3 the word “application” as an application made under Section 19. The latter section refers aggrieved”. In order to bring a matter before the Tribunal, an application has to be made and can be made only by a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jur the Tribunal. We have already seen that the word “order” has been defined in the explanat section (1) of Section 19 so that all matters referred to in Section 3(q) as service matter brought before the Tribunal. If in that context Sections 14 and 15 are read, there is no doubt stranger to the service concerned cannot make an application before the Tribunal. If pub litigations at the instance of strangers are allowed to be entertained by the Tribunal, the ver speedy disposal of service matters would get defeated. If in that context Sections 14 and 15 are read, there is no doubt stranger to the service concerned cannot make an application before the Tribunal. If pub litigations at the instance of strangers are allowed to be entertained by the Tribunal, the ver speedy disposal of service matters would get defeated. 20.) Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta India and read out several passages from the judgment dealing with the question of “standi case, the Court was not concerned with a Tribunal constituted under a statute. It was disc question of “standing” in a proceeding before the High Court or this Court. That ruling cann respondents in the present case. Our attention is also drawn to a judgment in University of C.D. Govinda Rao wherein the scope of a writ of quo warranto has been discussed. That decis apply in the present case as there was no application for issue of a writ of quo warranto Tribunal. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the proceedings before the Trib the nature of quo warranto and it could be filed by any member of the public as he is an person in the sense public interest is affected. We have already pointed out that the applica present case have been filed before the appointment of the petitioner as a Lecturer and th prayers are to quash the creation of the post itself and preventing authorities from app petitioner as a Lecturer. Hence, the applications filed by the respondents cannot be considere warranto. 21.) In the result, we answer the first question in the negative and hold that the Administrativ constituted under the Act cannot entertain a public interest litigation at the instance of a total st 1986 Supp. Hence, the applications filed by the respondents cannot be considere warranto. 21.) In the result, we answer the first question in the negative and hold that the Administrativ constituted under the Act cannot entertain a public interest litigation at the instance of a total st 1986 Supp. SCC 564, Advocates' Association, High Court, Madras and another vs. Sate of T and Others (1993) 4 SCC 441 , Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and Others vs. Union o S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India and (2009) 1 SCC 657 , Shanti Bhushan and another vs. Union of India and another But, unfortunately, as far as this is concerned, as per the principle laid down in the latest Judg Honourable Apex Court which has been relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the Hig referred to above, as far as service matters are concerned, Public Interest Litigation entertained and since that Judgment is binding on us, on the ground of maintainability, we reje petition. Consequently, we do not want to go into the other arguments of the learned Senior C the petitioner in W.P. No. 2566 of 2012. 29. As far as W.P.No.1932 of 2012 is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner has that as per the impugned Government Order, the same has been issued by using the relaxation. But, according to him, that power is traceable to Rule 48 of the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Service Rules. But, there is no whisper in the said Government Order with exercise of the power given under Rule 48. Consequently, according to him, that impugned G Order has been issued not exercising the power of relaxation under Rule 48 of the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Service Rules. 30. Replying to the said stand of the learned counsels for the petitioners, the learned Seni appearing for the High Court had relied on paragraph no.16 of the Judgment reported in AIR 1933, (State of Sikkim vs. Dorjee Tshering Bhutia and Others), which reads as follows:- "16.) The fact that the State Government purported to act under Rule 4(3) of the Rules in impugned notification is of no consequence. When the source of power can be validly trace State action in the exercise of such power cannot be struck down on the ground that it w under a different provision." and also the following portion of the Judgment reported in AIR 1988 SC 1247 , Assistant Comm Commercial Taxes (Assistant), Dharwar and Others vs. Dharmendra Trading Co. etc. etc.: “6.) . . . Again, the mere fact that the order of 30-6-1969 did not specify the power under w issued will make no difference because such a power is clearly there in Section 8-A and source of power under which it is issued is not stated in an order but can be found on the exa the relevant Act, the exercise of the power must be attributed to that source. The second sub the learned counsel for the appellants must, also, therefore, be rejected.” and contended that the mere fact that the impugned Government Order did not specify th under which it was issued, will not invalidate the impugned notification in view of the judgm Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above. 31. In view of this settled position of the Hon'ble Apex Court, we are of the opinion that this s learned counsel for the petitioner will not hold good at all. 32. Apart from this, according to the learned counsels for the petitioners, as far as the mem Bar are concerned, a number of young advocates are aspiring for this post and consequently has to be given. But, when appointment is governed by the statutory rules and regulatio accordance with the said rules and regulations, each claim can be considered. Though sympathy for them, unfortunately, we are in a helpless position. As far as relaxation of age is it cannot be claimed as a matter of right, unless the same is permissible under the rules as Hon'ble Apex Court in the following judgments: (2011) 11 Scale 226, Jamaluddin vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others – paragraph no "15.) . . . If there is no age relaxation in the rules, the same cannot be brought in by a interpretation. . . If there is no age relaxation in the rules, the same cannot be brought in by a interpretation. In the circumstance we do not find any error in the judgment of the Single Judg the Division Bench" (2007) 9 SCC 461 , Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams vs. K. Jotheeswara Pillai (dead) by LRs (paragraph nos.9 & 10) “9.) The learned Single Judge has also issued a writ of mandamus directing the appellant to c case of Writ Petitioner 5 as to whether he was entitled for exemption from age qualification. mentioned the Rules do not make any provision for granting exemption except to the limited provided in the second para of Rule 11. The principles, on which a writ of mandamus can be well settled and we will refer to only one decision rendered in Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fisher Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh where this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 152, para 15) “[A] writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty impose officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obli chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute a subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal the statute to enforce its performance.” 10.) There being no statutory provision or rule providing for exemption from eligibility cr learned Single Judge clearly erred in issuing a writ of mandamus against the appellant dir consider the case of Writ Petitioner 5 for granting him exemption from the rule providing for limit for fresh appointment.” (2011) 7 SCC 397 , Union of India and another vs. Arulmozhi Iniarasu and Others (paragraph 15) "13.) Thus, in these appeals the first and the foremost question to be examined is whether in of relaxation of age limit, prescribed as eligibility criteria for appointment on a particular principle of law has been laid down in the decision of this Court in Nagendra Chandra's case so, whether it could be applied to the facts of the present case for directing the afore-stated re age limit? 15.) . . . 15.) . . . Therefore, in our opinion, the said observation cannot be said to be an exposition principle of law on the point that a long length of service, dehors the relevant recruitment ru post, is a relevant factor for waiver or relaxation of any eligibility criterion, including age limit regular selections for the post. Obviously, the observation, general in nature, was made by th exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142of the Constitution of India and, therefore, cannot as a binding precedent. It has to be confined to the peculiar facts of that case." 33. As far as the argument of Mr.Radhakrishnan, learned counsel, with regard to inclusion of f is concerned, though this argument seems to be a reasonable one, in view of paragraph n judgment reported in (2002) 4 SCC 247 (cited supra),our hands are tied and we cannot go bey 34. Yet another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that reservation has been mentioned in respect of the general category, whereas, in case of graduates category, rule of reservation has not been mentioned. As far as this is concern reservation, as it is, has to be followed for the entire vacancies. Consequently, we are of the o when the vacancies are filled either under the heading fresh law graduates or under t category, certainly, rule of reservation has to be followed for total number of vacancies and each heading. 35. Further, according to Mr. M. Radhakrishnan, learned counsel, as far as candida candidature has to be considered under the special category viz., fresh law graduates is there is no relaxation of age given with regard to reserved category viz., BC, MBC, SC & ST, general category, such relaxation has been given. 36. As far as the above argument is concerned, the same cannot be accepted for the reas eligibility of a candidate is considered under this heading, based on his talent, ability and m from this, the term used therein is "fresh law graduates". When recruitment is made, based o "fresh law graduates" and the rule also prescribes that within a period of three years, one s completed the course to get the eligibility to consider his candidature under this category, if re given, the purpose of this special category,viz., fresh law graduates, will get defeated. Conseq argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 37. Conseq argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 37. For all these reasons, we are of the considered opinion that no case has been made out with the impugned Government Order and the impugned notification. Hence, we are in situation except to dismiss the writ petitions. Consequently, all the writ petitions are dismissed writ petitions in W.P.Nos.2652, 3302, 3324 and 3449 of 2012. As far as these writ pet W.P.Nos.2652, 3302, 3324 and 3449 of 2012 are concerned, the word "or" used in betwe terms, viz., "must be eligible to be enrolled as an Advocate" and "enrolled as an Advocate" read conjunctively and not distinctively. Consequently, the candidates who had enrolled as ad on the date of the impugned notification dated 21.01.2012 are eligible to apply. Hence, the G and the Administrative Side of the High Court are directed to take stepsto make appropriate a of the concerned rule, forthwith, so as to avoid any ambiguity, at least, in future. 38. As far as W.P. No.2961 of 2012 is concerned, in view of the submission made by the lear Counsel appearing for the High Court that nine backlog vacancies will be filled up first as per as far as this portion of the relief sought in this writ petition is concerned, by recordin submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the High Court, the said writ petiti No.2961 of 2012 is closed. In fine, W.P.Nos.2652, 3302, 3324 and 3449 of 2012 are ordered accordingly and W.P. No.29 is closed and the other writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Connected Miscellaneous P closed.