JUDGMENT 1. - This civil misc. appeal is directed against the order dated 03.01.2012 passed by learned District Judge, Jaisalmer in Application No.20/2009 filed under Section 40 of the Civil Procedure Code, whereby the learned trial court allowed the application. 2. The brief facts of the case giving rise to the present appeal are that the respondent No.1 Eklavya Singh filed a suit before the learned District Judge, Jaisalmer. In the suit it was contended by respondent-plaintiff Eklavya Singh that he was partner of the firm M/s. Lakha Granites. It was averred that his partnership was terminated in a fraudulent manner. He sought settlement of his accounts and also sought relief for treating him to be continuing partner of the firm M/s. Lakha Granites. The respondent No.1 Eklavya Singh filed suit in his personal capacity as well as in the name of M/s. Lakha Granites by showing himself to be partner of the firm. The defendants raised objection before the trial court that the suit was not maintainable on behalf of the firm and that too at the behest of Eklavya Singh, who retired way back in the year 2005. 3. Along with the suit, two applications were filed by the plaintiff on 09.07.2009. In the first application bearing No.19/2009, the plaintiff made prayer for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code. The second application under Order 40 Civil Procedure Code was filed for appointment of receiver. 4. The present appellants submitted written statement and denied the contentions raised by the respondent in his plaint. Reply to the applications No.19/2009 and 20/2009 was also filed. The counsel for the appellants also submitted written arguments and judgments in support of the arguments before the trial court. 5. After hearing both the parties, the learned trial court rejected the application for grant of temporary injunction filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code. However, the application filed under Order 40 Civil Procedure Code was allowed vide the impugned order dated 03.01.2012. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present civil misc. appeal has been preferred. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the order dated 03.01.2012 passed by the learned trial court on the application under Order 40 Civil Procedure Code is erroneous, therefore, the same deserves to be set aside on this count alone. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present civil misc. appeal has been preferred. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the order dated 03.01.2012 passed by the learned trial court on the application under Order 40 Civil Procedure Code is erroneous, therefore, the same deserves to be set aside on this count alone. It is submitted that before passing the impugned order, the learned Judge has not properly appreciated the written arguments as well as the judgments placed by the counsel for the appellants and even the arguments raised by the counsel for the appellants were not properly considered before passing the impugned order, thus, the learned trial court has grossly erred in allowing the application for appointment of the receiver. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the application under Order 40 Civil Procedure Code as well as the suit was not maintainable on behalf of the firm M/s. Lakha Granites through its alleged partner Eklavya Singh. Eklavya Singh was not partner of the firm on the date of filing of the suit as well as the application and even learned trial court agreed to this preposition that till the claim of the plaintiff No.2 is settled, he cannot be treated as partner of the firm. That being the position, the learned trial court should not have entertained the suit as well as the application under Order 40 Civil Procedure Code. It is contended that the application suffers from inherent defect of misjoinder of parties, but the learned trial court has not considered this aspect, therefore, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the learned District Judge has passed the impugned order of appointment of receiver without considering the conduct of the respondent. It is contended that the conduct of the parties is one of the most important factor which is to be taken into consideration before passing order on application for appointment of receiver. It is contended that the conduct of the respondent No.1 was not aboveboard. It is contended that the conduct of the parties is one of the most important factor which is to be taken into consideration before passing order on application for appointment of receiver. It is contended that the conduct of the respondent No.1 was not aboveboard. The respondent No.1 after settling his dues left the firm in the year 2005 and after almost four year, when the respondent No.1 came to know that the firm was doing good business, he prepared a concocted story in an attempt to harass the appellants and to pressurise them for settling his illegal demands. Thus, in this background the remedy of appointing the receiver without judging the conduct of the respondent No.1 was not justified. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the learned trial court has not properly appreciated the judgments cited by the counsel for the appellants. The Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as various High Courts have laid down few common ingredients which are required to be satisfied before passing an order for appointment of receiver, but a bare look on the impugned order would show that the learned trial court has allowed the application without satisfaction of the requirement of the basic ingredients before appointing the receiver. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the learned trial court has not taken into consideration the averments of the appellants before giving the finding that the plaintiff No.2 has right to get his accounts settled under Section 37 of the Indian Partnership Act. It is contended that the appellants have specifically stated that the story cooked by the plaintiff No.2 is false and concocted one. The plaintiff though claimed himself to be out of country on 01.04.2005, but this fact is not sufficient enough to satisfy that his retirement was illegal in any manner. The story prepared by the plaintiff is false on the face of it. The plaintiff No.2 could not explain his signature on the hire purchase documents/agreement on the day when he claims himself to be abroad. Even the signatures on the retirement deed cannot be questioned as plaintiff No.2 himself stated to have signed the same, but claiming it to be fraudulently obtained, which is an afterthought and mala fide assertion. The plaintiff No.2 could not explain his signature on the hire purchase documents/agreement on the day when he claims himself to be abroad. Even the signatures on the retirement deed cannot be questioned as plaintiff No.2 himself stated to have signed the same, but claiming it to be fraudulently obtained, which is an afterthought and mala fide assertion. The learned trial court in para 2 of the impugned order has observed that the plaintiff No.2 left for Singapore on 11.01.2005 for two years, but the fact that the respondent No.1 came to India in the intervening period has not been taken into consideration and that apart, he had no reason to remain silent for almost four years. It is contended that the aforesaid facts are sufficient to show that the story put forward by the plaintiff No.2 is false, but the learned trial court has ignored the same while passing the impugned order. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the learned trial court has totally ignored the fact that the accounts of the respondent No.1 were settled before his retirement. The respondent No.1 demanded a Honda City car as full and final consideration for his share in the partnership. As per the desire of plaintiff Eklavya Singh, it was decided that the firm would get the car financed from the Bank and accordingly, the car was purchased and the instalments were paid by the firm. It is submitted that in all a sum of Rs. 8 lacs was paid by the firm to the Bank. The profit of the firm as per audited balance sheet was Rs. 1,68,948/- in the year 2003-2004 and Rs. 2,22,413/- in the year 2004-2005. It is submitted that upto the date of retirement of the plaintiff, i.e. 31.03.2005, the profit of the firm as per audited balance sheet was Rs. 3,91,361/-. Plaintiff Eklavya Singh was having 33.33% share in the firm, thus, his share comes to Rs. 1,30,453/-. However, as a condition for retirement, it was agreed to repay his car loan and in all a sum of Rs. 8 lacs was paid, which is much more than the amount standing in the account of plaintiff Eklavya Singh. This amount includes goodwill and also the investment made by the plaintiff. 1,30,453/-. However, as a condition for retirement, it was agreed to repay his car loan and in all a sum of Rs. 8 lacs was paid, which is much more than the amount standing in the account of plaintiff Eklavya Singh. This amount includes goodwill and also the investment made by the plaintiff. That being the position, it cannot be said that the respondent No.1 retired without being paid his share in the partnership firm. It is contended that in the aforesaid background, the learned trial court has committed serious error in appointing the receiver. 12. The learned counsel for the appellants also contended that the learned trial court has committed serious error in giving the finding that "15. Plaintiff No.2 has thus to the extent shown above prima facie prove his case relating to the facts alleged by him." It is contended that the aforesaid finding is contrary to the finding given by the learned trial court in para 11 of the impugned order. In para 11, it has been stated that the entries in the passport does not necessarily lead to the presumption that the respondent No.1 could not have signed the documents before leaving. It is contended that when the learned trial court was of the opinion that the entries in the passport are not conclusive, then there was no occasion for the learned trial court to have given finding about the prima facie case having been made out by the plaintiff as he had no other document to establish his case. Hence, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 13. The learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the following judgments in support of his contentions:- (i) Metro Marins & Anr. v. Bonus Watch Co. (P) Ltd. & Anr. [ (2004) 7 SCC 478 ] (ii) Kalpana Kothari v. Sudha Yadav & Ors. ] Parasnath Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Sudha Yadav & Ors. ] [ (2002) 1 SCC 203 ] 14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 contended that the while appointing the receiver, the conduct of the respondent No.1 is not of significance because it is corroborative in nature and the degree of its importance would vary from case to case. The learned counsel further contended that the conduct of the appellants themselves is deeply infected with the falsehood and concealment of facts. The learned counsel further contended that the conduct of the appellants themselves is deeply infected with the falsehood and concealment of facts. The learned counsel contended that so far as 5 ingredients applicable for appointment of a receiver is concerned, the said principle is not universally applicable and if it is applied to the present case, the conduct of the respondent No.1 cannot be said to be doubtful. 15. It is contended that the learned trial court has considered the principle of just and convenient because by appointing the receiver, the learned trial court did not deprive the appellants either of the property or of the business and the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss have been considered by the learned trial court and that includes the principle of just and convenient as contained in Order 40 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 further contended that there is justification in appointing the receiver because the learned trial court ordered to deposit the income of the firm deducting the operating expenses, therefore, there is no question or likelihood of closing of the business of the firm and in addition to it, the right to withdraw the money has been reserved with the receiver and the appellant himself has been appointed as receiver of the property. 16. The learned counsel further contended that the respondent No.1 is entitled to get the accounts settled under Section 37 of the Indian Partnership Act because in the written statement filed by the appellants, there is no substantial evidence to prove that the retirement of the respondent No.1 was legal and there are serious disputes regarding the signatures on the retirement deed and the signatures on the hire purchase document and merely remaining silent for four years cannot be a ground to quash the order of the learned trial court which has been passed while exercising the discretionary powers conferred under Order 40 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code. It is contended that the appellants have failed to furnish any evidence of settlement of the accounts either before the trial court or before this court, therefore, the learned trial court was absolutely justified in invoking the provisions of Section 37 of the Indian Partnership Act. 17. It is contended that the appellants have failed to furnish any evidence of settlement of the accounts either before the trial court or before this court, therefore, the learned trial court was absolutely justified in invoking the provisions of Section 37 of the Indian Partnership Act. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 further contended that there are serious contradictions in the dates of execution of the retirement deed, execution of the hypothecation document and other dates and the learned counsel for the appellants tried to explain these contradictions only on the ground of the opinion formed by the Investigating Officer while giving final report in the criminal matter and the opinion of the Investigating Officer cannot be final because the Investigating Officer opined that these contradictions are due to typing mistakes which cannot be taken as absolute truth at this stage. 18. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 further contended that there are serious inherent contradictions and infirmities relating to the co-relation of the car and the alleged settlement, the components of the consideration amount, date of settlement, persons involved in the negotiations for settlement, period of settlement, Initial investment in land, profit amount due to the respondent till the date of settlement, consideration amount, affixing of specific date in the deed of settlement/retirement, legality of the deed of settlement/retirement, documentary evidence, contiguity of document and its legalisation and registration and these inherent contradictions and infirmities shows that serious factual aspects are pending consideration before the trial court. 19. The learned counsel for the respondent drew my attention towards para 9 (f) of the memo of appeal and the statement of the appellants recorded under Section 161 CrPC before the Investigating Officer stating different dates of settlement. 19. The learned counsel for the respondent drew my attention towards para 9 (f) of the memo of appeal and the statement of the appellants recorded under Section 161 CrPC before the Investigating Officer stating different dates of settlement. The learned counsel submitted that in the statement under Section 161 CrPC the date of settlement has been mentioned as 01.04.2004, in the complaint itself the date has been mentioned as 25.01.2005 and in other documents the date of settlement has been mentioned as 27.12.2004 and 10.11.2004 and these infirmities in the dates and other serious disputes regarding the facts are required to be considered by the learned trial court and where such serious questions of fact are to be considered, for management of the partnership firm appointment of the receiver can be made and even if the status of a partner is denied by other partners, the appointment of receiver is still justified. 20. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the following judgments in support of his contentions:- (i) Prahlad Sharma v. Khubi Ram & Anr. [RLW 2004 (1) Raj. 158] (ii) E. Kuttappan v. Mrs. Sarojini Bhaskaran [ AIR 1998 Ker 340 ] (iii) Tilak Chand Jain v. Darshan Lal Jain & Anr. [ AIR 1985 J&K 50 ] (iv) Yusuf v. Hamidulla [1982 WLN 172] (v) Nihalchand L. Jai Narain v. Ram Niwas Munna Lal [ AIR 1968 P&H 523 ] (vi) G. Ramchandrayya v. Nathi Iswarayya [AIR 1952 Hyd 139] 21. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that in the case of G. Ramchandrayya (supra), the court has held as under:- "Appointment of a Receiver is held to be justified when a prima facie case of subsisting partnership is made out and the Court is convinced that one partner has been excluded from the participation in the management of the partnership business and his status also is clouded." 22. I have considered the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record made available by both the parties and also perused the provisions of Order 40 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code. I have also perused the law cited by both the parties. 23. I have considered the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record made available by both the parties and also perused the provisions of Order 40 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code. I have also perused the law cited by both the parties. 23. Order 40, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code lays down that where it appears to the court to be just and convenient the court may by order appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after a decree. In order to justify the appointment of receiver, the plaintiff must establish a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff will ultimately succeed in obtaining the relief claimed in the suit. The requirement thus is that he must establish a good prima facie case. It may further be remembered that the appointment of a receiver is, as a general rule, discretionary, and not a matter of right. A court will make an appointment of a receiver with great caution and circumspection. In a case where the remedy of the appointment of a receiver seems necessary to prevent fraud, to protect and preserve the property against an imminent danger of loss or diminution in value, destruction, squandering, wastage or removal from jurisdiction, the court may appoint a receiver. It may further be stated in this connection that a court in exercise of its discretion to appoint or refuse a receiver must take into account all the circumstances and facts of the case, the presence of conditions and grounds justifying the relief, ends of justice, the rights of all the parties interested in the subject matter and the adequacy of other remedies. 24. The learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the order of the trial court on the following grounds:- (1) That the partnership of the respondent No.1 has been dissolved way back in the year 2004 and respondent-plaintiff Eklavya Singh remained mum upto the year 2009 and then file the suit in the year 2009 for rendition of accounts. (2) That respondent-plaintiff Eklavya Singh has no prima facie case in his favour to show that excluded partner of a partnership firm is entitled to get an order of appointment of receiver. (3) That there are no averments in the plaint regarding the misconduct of the appellants in partnership business. (2) That respondent-plaintiff Eklavya Singh has no prima facie case in his favour to show that excluded partner of a partnership firm is entitled to get an order of appointment of receiver. (3) That there are no averments in the plaint regarding the misconduct of the appellants in partnership business. (4) That the impugned order has not been passed in accordance with the provisions of Order 40 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code because the learned trial court did not consider as to how it was just and proper to appoint a receiver. (5) That in the First Information Reports filed by respondent Eklavya Singh, Final Reports have been filed by the Investigating Officer and the Investigating Officer came to the conclusion that FIRs were falsely registered by Eklavya Singh and there was only civil dispute between the parties. 25. Before I proceed to examine the arguments of the parties, it would be appropriate to consider the principle laid down in various judgments regarding the appointment of receiver. 26. Their Lordships of the Privy Council had occasion to consider the question of appointment of receiver on an interim application in Benoy Kirshna v. Satish Chandra A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 49. It was observed there in as follows:- "On an interim application for a receivership such as this, the Court has to consider whether special interference with the possession of a defendant is required, there being a well-founded fear that the property in question will be dissipated, or that other irreparable mischief may be done unless the Court gives its protection. Such an order is discretionary, and the discretion is, in the first instance, that of the Court in which the suit itself is pending. When, as in this case, the order of that Court is altered on appeal it becomes necessary to consider whether the Court below had before it the evidence required to support such an order and considered it in accordance with the principles on which judicial discretion must be exercised. If the Court of review rightly concludes that proper discretion was not used below, it is free to exercise its own discretion in the matter." 27. If the Court of review rightly concludes that proper discretion was not used below, it is free to exercise its own discretion in the matter." 27. After considering the English and Indian decisions, Ramaswami, J, in Krishnaswamy v. Thangavelu [ AIR 1955 Mad 430 ] has stated five principles, which are as under:- (1) The appointment of a receiver pending a suit is a matter resting in the discretion of the Court. (2) The Court should not appoint a receiver except upon proof by the plaintiff that prima facie he has a very excellent chance of succeeding in the suit. (3) Not only must the plaintiff show a case of adverse and conflicting claims to property, but he must show some emergency or danger or loss demanding immediate action and of his own right he must be reasonably clear and free from doubt. The element of danger is an important consideration. (4) An order appointing a receiver will not be made where it has the effect of depriving a defendant of a 'de facto' possession since that might cause irreparable wrong. It would be different where the property is shown to be 'in medio', that is to say, in the enjoyment of no one, And (5) The Court, on the application made for the appointment of a receiver, looks to the conduct of the part who makes the application and will usually refuse to interfere unless his conduct has been free from blame. 28. These principles were adopted by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Jugal Kishore v. Mangi Lal [1976 W.L.N. (UC) 64]. As a matter of fact, there is no dispute between the parties regarding the principles which guide the discretion of the court for the appointment of receiver. Keeping these principles in view, let me examine whether any interference with the discretion of the learned trial court appointing a receiver and allowing the application under Order 40 Civil Procedure Code is made out or not. One of the most important question that will arise for determination in the suit will be whether the partnership is still continuing or that it had come to an end on the date as averred in the written statement and new partnership had come into existence as alleged by the contesting defendants.29. One of the most important question that will arise for determination in the suit will be whether the partnership is still continuing or that it had come to an end on the date as averred in the written statement and new partnership had come into existence as alleged by the contesting defendants.29. It is an admitted fact that serious questions of facts are involved in the suit and for proper management of the business of the partnership firm, appellant Devender Kumar, one of the partner, has been appointed as receiver and while appointing the receiver, the learned trial court has considered the question of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, which in my considered view includes the phrase "just and convenient" because while discussing all these three points, the learned trial court decided the fact whether it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver. The learned trial court while appointing the receiver held that until accounts are settled, the rights of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 are required to be secured pending adjudication of material questions of facts. The learned trial court also considered the fact that plaintiff Eklavya singh and the defendants have lost confidence in each other and therefore, to secure a true statement of accounts from the firm, while relying upon the judgments in Kalpana Kothari v. Sudha Yadav AIR 2002 SC 404 (supra) and Prahlad Sharma v. Khubi Ram 2004 (1) RLW 158 (supra), the learned trial court ordered to appoint one of the partner (defendant No.5) as receiver in the case. The learned trial court further ordered that after deducting the operating expenses, the income of the firm may be deposited in a separate bank account of the firm to be opened under the control of the receiver and it was further ordered that the receiver shall inform the court in case of withdrawal of a sum exceeding Rs. 5,00,000/- from this account for directions, if any, in this regard. 5,00,000/- from this account for directions, if any, in this regard. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that this order is an impediment on the business of the firm, but in my considered view, it cannot be said to be impediment on the day to day business of the firm because the learned trial court has considered the convenience of the operating business of the firm and allowed to deducting the operating expenses from the income of the firm before depositing the same in the account of the receiver. There are several factual aspects which are required to be considered by the trial court and during the pendency of the civil suit, the rights of the parties are to be protected, therefore, in my considered opinion, it is just and convenient to appoint the receiver and therefore, the learned trial court has committed no error in appointing the receiver and imposing the conditions as narrated in the last para of the impugned order. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be said to be of any assistance in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and keeping in view the 5 principles laid down in the case of Krishnaswamy (supra), which were adopted by the co-ordinate Bench of this court in the case of Jugal Kishore (supra). Having regard to the nature of the suit and the facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver. This has been so held after giving preliminary consideration to the facts of the case in hand. The learned trial court cannot be said to have committed any error or mistake while passing the impugned order and the same cannot be said to be perverse, illegal or against the material available on record. Whether the plaintiff has been rightly excluded and the question of dissolution of the partnership are disputable questions. From the pleadings of the parties, documents and preliminary facts, the plaintiff-respondent No.1 has a good prima facie case for appointment of receiver. Power to appoint a receiver is discretionary and the appellate court should be slow in interfering with that discretion until and unless it comes to a conclusion that discretion has been arbitrarily or capriciously exercised or it has been exercised on extraneous grounds. Power to appoint a receiver is discretionary and the appellate court should be slow in interfering with that discretion until and unless it comes to a conclusion that discretion has been arbitrarily or capriciously exercised or it has been exercised on extraneous grounds. I am of the view that the learned trial court has not passed the impugned order arbitrarily or capriciously and has not exercised its discretionary powers on extraneous grounds.30. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the appeal filed by the appellants is bereft of any force and the same deserves to be dismissed and the impugned order calls for no interference in this appeal.31. Consequently, this civil misc. appeal is dismissed and the impugned order dated 03.01.2012 passed by learned District Judge, Jaisalmer is maintained. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. However, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial court is directed to decide the suit within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. If the original record of the trial court has been received, the same be sent back forthwith.Appeal dismissed. *******