ORDER Surya Kant, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order dared 15.07.2011 whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed CWP No. 2348 of 1994 preferred by 1st respondent in terms of a Division Bench judgement dated January 13, 1994 passed in CWP No. 3310 of 1990 with a further direction to the appellant-Corporation that in case the particular industrial plot is not available, the 1st respondent shall be allotted an alternative plot at some other Industrial Focal Point in SAS Nagar Mohali. FACTS The appellant-Corporation issued an advertisement on 23rd January, 1984 inviting applications for allotment of free-hold industrial plots in Phase-IX SAS Nagar Mohali under the Self financing Scheme. The plots were to be allotted at the rate of ` 80/- per sq.yard though the final cost for the eligible entrepreneur, after availing land subsidy, was statedly ` 28/- per sq.yard only. The last date to submit applications was extended till March 31, 1984. The 1st respondent was one of the applicants and in the draw of lots held on 12.09.1987 he emerged successful for allotment of an industrial plot measuring 1 kanal. A formal allotment letter dated 25.09.1987 (Annexure P5) was issued to the 1st respondent allotting plot No. 22 measuring 478 sq.yards on a tentative price of ` 33,240/-. As per clause (i) of the allotment letter the 1st respondent was required to deposit a sum of ` 15,296/- i.e. 40% amount of the tentative price of the plot, within a period of 30 days from the date of allotment letter. The balance amount could be paid either in lump-sum without interest within 60 days or in 5 equated annual instalments along with interest. 2. Meanwhile, the above-mentioned allotments were challenged by unsuccessful allottees in a bunch of writ petitions filed in the years 1987, 1988 & 1989, the first being CWP No. 6698 of 1987. These writ petitions were admitted and finalization of the allotment was stayed. This Court vide an order dated 02.06.1989 allowed these writ petitions and quashed the orders rejecting the name of nor allottees. A direction was issued to invite fresh applications and to reconsider the matter of allotment of plots to different entrepreneurs. 3. These writ petitions were admitted and finalization of the allotment was stayed. This Court vide an order dated 02.06.1989 allowed these writ petitions and quashed the orders rejecting the name of nor allottees. A direction was issued to invite fresh applications and to reconsider the matter of allotment of plots to different entrepreneurs. 3. The 1st respondent meanwhile offered payment of ` 15,296/- i.e. 40% of the balance payment by way of a demand draft dated 17.10.1987 (Annexure P6) though as per the case of the appellant-Corporation, the payment was not accepted and the 1st respondent was requested not to offer any payment as finalization of allotment of the industrial plots had been stayed by this Court in the above-mentioned cases. 4. It appears that the appellant-Corporation accepted the decision dated 22.06.1989 of this Court quashing the 1987 allotments. The Corporation consequently issued a fresh advertisement in the daily newspaper 'The Tribune' on 10th May, 1990 (Annexure R1) and pursuant thereto, made fresh allotments in which plot No. 22 which was earlier allotted to the 1st respondent (writ-petitioner) was allotted to another applicant who had applied in response to the fresh advertisement. 5. The matter, however, did not come to an end here. The fresh advertisement of 1990 by the Corporation prompted some of the 1987 allottees to approach this Court through about 37 writ petitions, the first being 1994 (3) R.R.R. 61 : CWP No. 3310 of 1990 (Nirmal Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.). These writ petitioners sought quashing of the earlier decision of this Court dated 02.06.1989 passed in CWP No. 6698 of 1987 as well as the fresh advertisement issued pursuant thereto. One of the grounds of challenge was that the learned Single Judge who quashed the allotments gave no opportunity of hearing to the allottees. These writ petitions were allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated January 13, 1994, the operative part whereof reads as follows: For the reasons stated above, we allow these writ petitions and hold that judgement dated June 2, 1989 rendered in CWP No. 6698 of 1987 and the connected writ petitions whereby the allotment of industrial plots made in favour of different persons like the petitioners was cancelled will be ineffective so far as the rights of the petitioners are concerned. The Corporation is directed to make allotment of industrial plots to the petitioners as per the terms and conditions mentioned in the letters of allotment. However, it is made clear that the Corporation will be entitled to claim additional price for the plots on account of enhancement of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. In view of the very fair stand taken by the counsel for the Corporation, we make no order as to costs. 6. Before we advert to the issue raised in this appeal, it would be equally pertinent to mention here that after the Division Bench decision dated January 13, 1994, one Jhujhar Singh s/o Balkar Singh who was also a successful allottee of the year 1987, approached this Court by way of CWP No. 7985 of 1996 claiming parity and same relief as was granted to 37 allottees vide the above-cited Division Bench decision. His writ petition was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 06.11.1996 following the previous Division Bench decision dated January 13, 1994. The appellant-Corporation challenged the said decision dated 06.11.1996 in Civil Appeal No. 1303 of 1998 which was allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on November 6, 2003, holding as follows: From the dates and events mentioned above, it appears to us that the respondent No. 1 was not vigilant and did not approach the High Court seeking remedy within the reasonable time. It appears, he was watching the proceedings in the writ petitions filed by 37 other petitioners. When they got the relief he became active and as claimed, made a representation. Even thereafter, he did not file the writ petition immediately, in other words, the Division Bench pronounced the judgement on 13.1.1994 but filed the writ petition on 10.3.1996, that is after more than two years. Probably the respondent No. 1 wanted to take advantage of the relief granted to other writ petitioners who had approached the High Court early. It is unfortunate that the High Court did not focus its attention on this aspect even when the appellants had specifically pointed out this aspect of delay and laches on the part of respondent No. 1. Probably the respondent No. 1 wanted to take advantage of the relief granted to other writ petitioners who had approached the High Court early. It is unfortunate that the High Court did not focus its attention on this aspect even when the appellants had specifically pointed out this aspect of delay and laches on the part of respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 did not think it necessary or appropriate to approach the High Court early on more than 4 occasions: (i) when the learned Single Judge cancelled the allotment; (ii) when the refund was made; (iii) when the second advertisement was published; and (iv) even immediately after the Division Bench pronounced the judgement. Under the circumstances, the writ petition would have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 7. The claim of the 1st respondent, who is also a successful allottee of 1987 and who approached this Court in the year 1994 for allotment of an industrial plot, has been accepted by the learned Single Judge observing that he had offered 40% of the balance payment in the year 1987 itself though it was not accepted by the Corporation on the pretext of pendency of the writ petitions and since the 1st respondent approached this Court soon after the Division Bench judgement dated January 13, 1994 passed in CWP No. 3310 of 1990, there was no inordinate delay on his part and the Apex Court decision in Jhuihar Singh's case (cited supra) does not help the Corporation. The writ petition has accordingly been allowed in same terms as CWP No. 3310 of 1990 decided on January 13, 1994 and after taking notice of the fact that the plot previously allotted to the 1st respondent/writ-petitioner had already been allotted to a subsequent allottee, the learned Single Judge directed to allot him an alternative plot at some other Industrial Focal Point in SAS Nagar Mohali. CONTENTIONS 8. In the light of the above-stated undisputed facts, it is urged on behalf of the appellant-Corporation that the writ petition preferred by the 1st respondent also suffered from delay and lathes for the same reasons as assigned by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jhuihar Singh's case (supra). CONTENTIONS 8. In the light of the above-stated undisputed facts, it is urged on behalf of the appellant-Corporation that the writ petition preferred by the 1st respondent also suffered from delay and lathes for the same reasons as assigned by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jhuihar Singh's case (supra). Per contra learned counsel for the 1st respondent urged that he was fully vigilant and approached this Court as soon as the Division Bench granted relief to similarly placed allottees vide order dated January 13, 1994. ISSUE INVOLVED 9. The solitary question which arises for our consideration is whether the claim of the 1st respondent/writ-petitioner has been rightly accepted as per the Division Bench decision dated January 13, 1994 in Nirmal Singh and others' case (supra) or is it liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches following the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while rejecting the claim of another allottee in Jhujhar Singh's case (supra)? With more precision, it may be noticed here that the only difference between the case in hand and that of Jhujhar Singh's case is that while the 1st respondent approached this Court in the year 1994, Jhujhar Singh had filed his writ petition in the year 1996. 10. The claim of Jhujhar Singh was turned down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the ground of delay and laches holding that- (i) he was not vigilant and did not approach the High Court within reasonable time; (ii) he kept on watching the proceedings in the writ petitions filed by 37 other writ-petitioners and when they got the relief he became active and as claimed, made a representation; (iii) even thereafter he did not file the writ petition immediately inasmuch as the Division Bench pronounced the judgement on January 13, 1994 but he filed the writ petition on 10.03.1996 after more than 2 years; (iv) he probably wanted to take advantage of the relief granted to the other writ petitioners who had approached the High Court early; (v) he did not think it necessary or appropriate to approach the High Court early on more than four occasions i.e. (a) when the learned Single Judge cancelled the allotment, (b) when the refund was made, (c) when the second advertisement was published, and (d) even after the Division Bench pronounced the judgement. (Emphasis applied) 11. (Emphasis applied) 11. Applying the afore-stated parameters to adjudge the delay and lathes, if any, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it may be seen that the only distinguishable feature is that the 1st respondent did not, wait for two years or more rather he approached this Court soon after the Division Bench judgement dated January 13, 1994. The other factors taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to conclude that Jhujhar Singh was not vigilant and did not approach this Court within reasonable time, apply mutatis mutandis to the 1st respondent as well. CONCLUSION 12. Whether a litigant approached the Court of law within the prescribed period of limitation, if applicable or within a reasonable predominantly a question of fact though to be answered in the light of the law or legal principles governing such issue. The crucial factor to determine whether the 1st respondent in the instant case approached this Court without wasting time, rests upon the question as to when did the cause of action arise in his favour? The 1st respondent cannot be heard to say otherwise that firstly the cause of action for initiating legal action arose when a learned Single Judge quashed the allotments including of the 1st respondent on 02.06.1989. Assuming that he was bona fidely waiting for the Corporation to assail the said decision, the advertisement dated 10th May, 1990 (Annexure R1) removed the doubts as the Corporation had accepted the said decision. The third occasion for the 1st respondent arose when plot No. 22 stood allotted to someone else in the year 1990 pursuant to the subsequent advertisement. Those who felt aggrieved, namely, 37 similarly placed period wherever no such limitation period is prescribed, is allottees, immediately approached this Court in the year 1990. Assuming that the writ petitions of these 37 allottees were to be decided by this Court as per turn, would it be fair and in consonance with the well-known principles oftenly applied while condoning delay to say that the 1st respondent could approach this Court as and when the 1990 cases were decided? The incidental and fortuitous circumstances like early decision of the 1990 case in the year 1994 does not and cannot condone the delay, if any, already occurred during the year 1990 to 1994. The incidental and fortuitous circumstances like early decision of the 1990 case in the year 1994 does not and cannot condone the delay, if any, already occurred during the year 1990 to 1994. The action initiated by the 1st respondent in the year 1994 was clearly an afterthought so as to harvest what the other allottees had sown in the year 1990. It cannot be overlooked that the 1st respondent is an educated urbanite living in Chandigarh yet he kept on awaiting like a fence-seater. There were no economic or social barriers to prevent him from seeking re-dressal of his grievances at the earliest. Had he been a bona fide entrepreneur, he could not have waited for seeing the fate of the cases initiated by other allottees. May be he was keen to seek allotment for speculative considerations like steep hike in the price value of real estate in the tricity of Chandigarh. 13. We are thus of the considered view that the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jhujhar Singh's case shall j-J broadly apply to the instant case also even if the 1st respondent had approached this Court soon after the Division Bench decision dated January 13, 1994, and his claim is also liable to be rejected on the ground of inordinate delay and lathes. 14. For the reasons afore-stated, the appeal is allowed; the order dated 15.07.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 2348 of 1994 is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed, however, no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly. Petition dismissed.