Judgment Dev Darshan Sud, J. These two appeals arise out of the same judgment and sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Solan. The respondent was convicted for offence under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter ‘IPC’). 2. The respondent was charged under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution case, in brief, was that on 15.12.2008 PW9 Dr. M.P. Singh, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital Kandaghat reported to the police station that one person who sustained injuries on his chest had been brought to the hospital for treatment. He has reported that injuries were sustained pursuant to a fight which had taken place at Chail chowk, Kandaghat. PW13 ASI Gulab Singh along with the police party reached the spot where PW3 Jitender Dhiman had given a statement under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter ‘Cr.P.C.’). that he was an agriculturist and resident of village Dolag, Tehsil and P.S. Kandaghat, District Solan. On 13.12.2008 at around 9/10 PM he, Hitesh PW6, Anuraj, Rajesh and Ajay (son of the respondent) had gone to attend the marriage at Rest House, Kandaghat, where they started dancing in the marriage function, Ajay Sharma barged in where there were a number of girls and started dancing in their midst on which he (the complainant) reprimanded him to behave properly. On this, a quarrel/fight ensued. On 15.12.2008 at around 6.30 PM when he along with Hitesh PW6, Anurag PW4, Rajesh and Vinay Thakur was present at Chail chowk, both accused Rajinder @ Raju and his son Ajay Sharma asked him to accompany them so that they could teach a lesson to the assembled party. Ajay was armed with iron rod. The complainant refused to accompany them and they started beating him as also his friends Anurag, Rajesh and Vinay. The members of the assembled party had informed accused Rajinder that his son Ajay was one of the persons who had misbehaved with them in the marriage function. This enraged the accused Rajinder who took out a knife from his pocket and assaulted Vinay first, who managed to escape. Rajinder then turn around and assaulted Anurag Thakur PW4 by hitting him on the left side of his chest. Anurag fell down on the road. Thereafter the respondent and his son Ajay fled away from the spot. 3. This enraged the accused Rajinder who took out a knife from his pocket and assaulted Vinay first, who managed to escape. Rajinder then turn around and assaulted Anurag Thakur PW4 by hitting him on the left side of his chest. Anurag fell down on the road. Thereafter the respondent and his son Ajay fled away from the spot. 3. The prosecution case further is that on 18.12.2008 mother of Anurag Thakur, PW7 Asha Thakur handed over to the police, the blood stained vest, inner, track suit and one sweater which contained cut marks on the left side near the place of the chest. The clothes were soaked with blood. On 19.12.2008 accused Rajinder made a disclosure statement Ext.PW2/D that he could have the knife recovered from the place where he had thrown it. The prosecution further proceeds that knife etc. was recovered. On the conclusion of the evidence of the prosecution, the learned trial Court concluded that the accused was guilty of offences under Section 324 IPC considering the fact that the simple injury was caused to injured Anurag PW4. He was convicted to undergo imprisonment already undergone and fined Rs.5000/-, failing which to further undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 4. It is undisputed before me that the accused has not challenged his conviction and as a sequel accepts the offence made out by the learned trial Court. It is also undisputed that second accused Ajay Kumar was a minor and has been tried by the Juvenile Court. In these circumstances, two appeals were preferred by the State i.e. Criminal Appeals Nos. 467 of 2011 and 201 and 2012. In Criminal Appeal No. 467 of 2011 the State challenges the acquittal of the respondent under Section 307 IPC and in Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 2012, prays for enhancement of the sentence imposed. 5. Adverting to the question of offence being within the ambit of Section 307 IPC, the learned Additional Advocate General relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Sachin Jana and another vs. State of West Bengal (2008)3 SCC 390 holding: “10. … … … … The above position was highlighted in Girija Shankar vs. State of U.P. (2004)3 SCC 793 , SCC pp.797-98, paras 9-10. 11. “.9 …. Section 307 IPC reads: '307. … … … … The above position was highlighted in Girija Shankar vs. State of U.P. (2004)3 SCC 793 , SCC pp.797-98, paras 9-10. 11. “.9 …. Section 307 IPC reads: '307. Attempt to murder - Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.' To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.” This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v.Balram Bama Patil (1983)2 SCC 28 , SCC p.32, para 9.” (p.393) Similarly in Sagayam vs. State of Karnataka, (2000)4 SCC 454 the Supreme Court rules: “6. To justify conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act foreboding death. To justify conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act foreboding death. It is sufficient in law if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof, such act being proximate to the crime intended and if the attempt has gone so far that it would have been complete but for the extraneous intervention which frustrated its consummation. There are different stages in a crime. First, the intention to commit it; second the preparation to commit it; third, an attempt to commit it. If at the third stage, the attempt falls, the crime is not complete but the law punishes for attempting the same. An attempt to commit crime must be distinguished from an intent to commit it or preparation of its commission.” (p.458) 6. The principle w a s r e iterated and finally in Bir Singh vs. State of H.P. (2006)9 SCC 579 it is held: “3. The injuries sustained by PW1 are as under: 1. An incised wound oblique in direction from inner corner of right eye extending to below right ear. Size 15 cm long 1 cm deep ½ cm wide. 2. An incised wound over right side of head from the side of forehead to upward and backward, 10 cm. long ½ cm wide and ½ cm deep. 3. An incised wound behind right ear obliquely placed 4½ cm long, ½ cm deep and ½ cm wide. 4. An incised wound over right ear, 1 cm long and ½ cm deep. 5. Incised wound between first and second finger, 7 cm long ½ cm long 1 cm deep 1½ inch long. 6. 1 cm long incised wound, ½ cm deep at the base of left thumb, 1½ cm long, ½ cm deep incised wound. 7. On the back of right shoulder there was incised wound of 2 cm long, ½ cm deep vertically placed. 9. PW1 stated in great details as to how he had suffered injuries. The injuries suffered by him stand corroborated by medical evidence. 7. On the back of right shoulder there was incised wound of 2 cm long, ½ cm deep vertically placed. 9. PW1 stated in great details as to how he had suffered injuries. The injuries suffered by him stand corroborated by medical evidence. He categorically stated that he could not even recognize the accused at the time of incident, but, according to him, he came to know later on that two groups which were reported by the accused to have been fighting, had approached him earlier in his capacity as in-charge of police force with a complaint of apprehension of breach of peace and on that basis, a proceeding under Sections 107/151 of the Criminal Procedure Code was initiated by him. (pp.581-582) 7. In opposition, Mr. Satyen Vaidya, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, relies upon the judgment of this Court in State of H.P. vs. Ashwani Kumar and others 2010(3) Shim. L.C. 216 holding: “13. Brief facts of the case are that on 31.5.1991 PW-1 Rakesh Kumar and PW-2 Arun Sharma alias Gola, who were the two injured persons, took meals in “Pehalwan Dhaba” at Bara Chowk, Nahan. After they took their meals they came out from the dhaba. According to the prosecution, all the five accused had formed an unlawful assembly with the intention of committing murder of PW-1 Rakesh Kumar and as soon as Rakesh Kumar and Arun Sharma alias Gola came out of the dhaba, the accused who were armed with deadly weapons attacked them and caused serious injuries to them. Accused Ashwani Kumar was armed with a chopper, accused Abhinash alias Banti was armed with a dagger and the other three accused were armed with iron rods and dandas. 14. On perusal of the evidence, we find that in fact a number of injuries had been caused by a “Palta”, an instrument used for cooking in a restaurant/dhaba. Even a chopper is an instrument used mainly in dhaba. It appears from the evidence that in fact the accused were not armed with these weapons before the act but at the dhaba itself some altercation took place between the two sides, and the accused used the instruments available to attack the injured persons. 15. … … … … … … … … … … 16. After going through the statement of Dr. 15. … … … … … … … … … … 16. After going through the statement of Dr. Deepak Sharma, we find that the injuries caused to PW-2 Arun Sharma and PW-3 Abhinubh Dutta were all simple injuries. However, the injuries were caused with sharp edged weapons. There was one scalp injury on PW-2 which was only a superficial tissue cut. The other injuries were on the legs. As far as PW-3 is concerned, there was one injury on his hand and one injury was on the occipital region but all these injuries are simple. However, two injuries on the person of PW-1 Rakesh Kumar were grievous injuries. These were the fracture of leg and fracture of fore-arm bones. The other injuries were also mainly on the hands and the legs. There were two cut lacerated wounds on the scalp but there was no fracture of the skull. 17. From the medical evidence, it is apparent that the injuries were mainly caused on the lower parts of the body. In a free fight some injuries may have been caused on the head also but it is apparent that the injuries were not caused with so much force so as to cause the death of the injured persons. No doubt the vital parts are involved in some of the injuries but the injuries on the vital parts are simple in nature and the grievous injuries are on the non-vital parts of the body. This shows that the intention of the accused was to thrash the injured persons and give them beatings but not to kill them. Even the opinion of the doctor is not absolutely clear. He has stated that if the injured persons were left unattended the injuries could have caused her death. This may happen in every case of injury. This is different from saying that the injuries in normal course could have caused death. 18. From the reading of the entire evidence and especially the medical evidence, we are convinced that the accused had no intention of killing any of the injured persons including Rakesh Kumar. Their intention was to beat him up, which they in fact did with dangerous weapons. Since they had also caused grievous injuries and they had caused them with dangerous weapons, they are guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC. 19. Their intention was to beat him up, which they in fact did with dangerous weapons. Since they had also caused grievous injuries and they had caused them with dangerous weapons, they are guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC. 19. In view of the above discussion, the conviction of the accused under Section 307 IPC is set-aside and the accused are convicted of having committed an offence punishable under Section 324 read with Section 149 IPC.”(Emphasis supplied) (pp.220-222) 8. To similar effect is the judgment of this Court in Raj Kumar vs. State of H.P., 2009(1) Shim. L.C.435. 9. One another point which was urged before me is that evidence of PW2 Paras Ram itself makes a case of self defence as the accused tried to protect themselves from the assault of a group which had assembled at the Chail chowk with the premeditated intention of beating them up. Learned counsel Mr. Satyen Vaidya, submits that his (PW2) evidence is clear on the point that both the accused were attacked by a group in retaliation to what had happened in the marriage on the previous day, the fight was witnessed by 25-30 people. It was only to save themselves from the clutches of the gang/party assembled at the spot that the accused were forced to defend themselves. As an adjunct to this argument, learned counsel submits that no independent witnesses have been produced by the prosecution to substantiate its case, more especially, when it is also admitted by complainant PW3 Jitender that 35-40 persons had assembled at the spot and Investigating Officer PW13 ASI Gulab Singh had also not made any effort to associate any one of them in the investigation. 10. Adverting to the last point first, I do find that the submissions can be sustained more especially when I find that statement of the injured has been corroborated by the medical evidence which establishes the assault with a switch blade knife. On the question of partisan evidence, all that I need say is that the law on this point is well settled that merely because the witnesses are known to each other does not by itself render the evidence as untrustworthy or of a nature which cannot be relied upon to sustain conviction. The rule of prudence is that the evidence is subjected to careful scrutiny to eliminate false implication. The rule of prudence is that the evidence is subjected to careful scrutiny to eliminate false implication. Having gone through the evidence of the witnesses in detail I find no such fact having been elicited in their cross examination to discard their testimony. 11. Adverting to the nature of injuries which were inflicted on the injured, the evidence establishes that it was a stab wound on the left nipple of the chest which required immediate medical attention, treatment at the IGMC where he was administered two units of blood and the opinion of the doctor was that the injuries if not treated in time were such which would have caused death in all circumstances. On proved facts, it cannot be said that the injury to the complainant was not inflicted on a vital part of the body. 12. Having held that the appellant was guilty of offence, the question would be that under what provision of law the respondent is required to be sentenced. Section 326 provides: “326. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means-Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, use as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means or any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 13. The learned Court has been remiss in invoking the provision of Section 324 IPC when the facts proved on record clearly attract Section 326 of IPC. I hold accordingly. 14. On the question of sentence, what has been urged before me is that there has been considerable amount of delay both during the trial as also during the pendency of the appeal in this Court and in these circumstances, lenient view be taken. I hold accordingly. 14. On the question of sentence, what has been urged before me is that there has been considerable amount of delay both during the trial as also during the pendency of the appeal in this Court and in these circumstances, lenient view be taken. It is of course unfortunate that delay both on the part of the prosecution as also on the part of the appellant that the cases have been hanging fire for a long period of time but that does not mitigate the severity of the crime. 15. Taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, I sentence the accused to imprisonment for the term already undergone. In addition, the accused shall pay fine of Rs.75,000/- to be deposited with the learned trial Judge within a period of six months from today. On such deposit being made, an amount of Rs.50,000/- from this amount would be paid to the injured and rest amount i.e. Rs.25,000/- shall go to the State. It is clarified that this does not constitute as a precedent in other cases. Appeals stand disposed of.