Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 901 (KER)

Varkey v. Chacko

2012-10-01

THOMAS P.JOSEPH

body2012
JUDGMENT Thomas P. Joseph, J. 1. The following substantial questions of law arise for a decision: 1) Whether the courts below are justified in ignoring the covenants of Ext.B1 the execution of which is found to be admitted ? 2) Are not the findings on issue No2 and 4 hit by Sec. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act ? 3) Whether a plaintiff is entitled to prefer a counter claim against the defendant in answer to the counter claim preferred by the defendant ? 4) Whether the counter claim of the plaintiff in this case is barred under Rule 2(3) of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "the Code") ? 5) Have not the courts below gone wrong in not affording opportunity to the defendants to file written statement in answer to the counter claim of the plaintiff ? 6) Have not the courts below gone wrong in awarding compensation without any basis ? 2. These questions arise for a decision in the second appeal drawn by the defendants from the judgment and decree of the Sub Court, Kattappana in A.S. No. 9 of 1998 confirming the judgment and decree of the Munsiff's Court, Kattappana in O.S. No. 73 of 1996. 3. Respondent/plaintiff filed O.S. No. 73 of 1996 for a decree for prohibitory injunction against the appellants/defendants trespassing into the suit property. The respondent claimed that he is the owner in possession of the suit property, 33.5 cents in survey No.19/1 as per Ext.A1, patta No. 502/93. According to the plaintiff, on 03.03.1994 he borrowed Rs.3000/-from the first defendant who then obtained signed blank stamp paper from him as security for due repayment of the said amount with interest. The plaintiff paid the amount with interest. The defendants attempted to trespass into the suit property. Hence the suit for a decree for prohibitory injunction. 4. The defendants resisted the suit and raised a counter claim. According to them, the 33.5 cents referred to in the plaint schedule originally belonged to Chakrapani from whom the respondent acquired it. Of the said 33.5 cents, 5 cents situated on the southwestern corner was assigned to one Boban. Of the remaining extent, 20 cents was agreed to be sold to the first defendant as per Ext.B1,agreement dated 04.03.1994. The sale consideration, Rs. 8,000/-was paid to the plaintiff on the date of Ext.B1. Of the said 33.5 cents, 5 cents situated on the southwestern corner was assigned to one Boban. Of the remaining extent, 20 cents was agreed to be sold to the first defendant as per Ext.B1,agreement dated 04.03.1994. The sale consideration, Rs. 8,000/-was paid to the plaintiff on the date of Ext.B1. Pursuant to that agreement, plaintiff put the first defendant in possession of the said 20 cents. Since 04.03.1994, defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the said 20 cents. The balance remaining with the plaintiff is only 10.5 cents. The defendants denied that there was any money transaction as claimed by the plaintiff. In the counter claim, they prayed for a decree for specific performance of Ext.B1, agreement for sale concerning the 20 cents. 5. Plaintiff, while resisting the counter claim contended that on 10.03.1996 (after the institution of the suit on 6.03.1996), the defendants trespassed into a portion of the suit property and took forcible possession thereof. They took the yield from that portion of the suit property. Hence the plaintiff made a counter claim against the defendants for recovery of possession of the 20 cents with mesne profits to the tune of Rs.4,500/-. 6. Going through the copy of the B diary of the trial court, I do not find that the trial court gave any separate posting for filing written statement in answer to the counter claim made by the plaintiff. Instead, learned Munsiff framed issues and posted the case for trial. The parties adduced their evidence. Learned Munsiff found that Ext.B1, agreement for sale was executed by the plaintiff but without any intention to assign the 20 cents referred to therein to the first defendant. Learned Munsiff also found that pending the suit, the defendants dispossessed the plaintiff from the 20 cents referred to in the schedule of the counter claims preferred by the defendants and the plaintiff. Learned Munsiff decreed the suit and the counter claim filed by the plaintiff. The counter claim set-up by the defendants was allowed in part allowing the first defendant to realise Rs.8,000/-(referred to in Ext.B1, agreement as the sale consideration) with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of Ext.B1, agreement till the date of realisation from the plaintiff and his assets. 7. The defendants challenged that judgment and decree in A.S. No. 9 of 1998. 7. The defendants challenged that judgment and decree in A.S. No. 9 of 1998. The first appellate court has confirmed the judgement and decree of the trial court. Hence this second appeal. 8. The learned senior Advocate for the defendants has contended that though Rule 6A of Order VIII of the Code permits a defendant in the suit to prefer a counter claim against the plaintiff, the said provision does not permit the plaintiff to file a counter claim against the defendant even in answer to the counter claim made by the defendant. Hence, the counter claim made by the plaintiff was not maintainable. It is argued that the courts below were not right in placing reliance on the decision in Nav Samaj Ltd. Vs. Shamro Tumramji Patel (A.I.R. 1984 Bombay 23). It is further argued that at any rate, reliefs prayed for in the counter claim of the plaintiff could not be allowed since it is barred under Rule 2 (3) of Order II of the Code. According to the learned senior Advocate, as per the averments in paragraph 5 of the plaint, the defendants had, on 15.02.1996 trespassed into the 20 cents, taken forcible possession and taken away the yield from the said property. That, according to the learned senior Advocate is part of the cause of action for the suit. Hence the reliefs of recovery of possession and mesne profits should have been included in the plaint. Having omitted to claim those reliefs in the plaint as originally filed or at least by way of amendment, the plaintiff could not have sought those reliefs in his counter claim in view of Rule 2(3) of order II of the Code. A further argument the learned senior Advocate has advanced is that Ext.B1, agreement for sale recites that possession of the 20 cents was given to the first defendant on the date of that agreement and hence, in view of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act (for short 'the Act'), plaintiff was precluded from adducing evidence against that recital and claim that as on the date of institution of the suit, he was in possession of the 20 cents referred to in the counter claims. 9. 9. It is further argued by the learned counsel that since no opportunity was given to the defendants to file written statement in answer to the counter claim made by the plaintiff, the trial court was not right in granting relief to the plaintiff as prayed for in his counter claim. At any rate, there is no evidence to show that the plaintiff is entitled to get Rs.4,500/-by way of damages as prayed for and awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court. 10. The first question I am to decide is whether a counter claim at the instance of the plaintiff is maintainable under any circumstance? The trial court has referred to the decision in Nav Samaj Ltd., Nagpur V. Shamrao Tuaramji Patle (AIR 1984 Bombay 23) where reliance is made on the decision in Kewal Singh Vs. Lajwanti (A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 161). The apex court was dealing with the scope of Sec.11 and Order II, Rule 2 of the Code. The Bombay High Court in the decision (cited supra) referred to the decision in Ratnakaran V. P.T. Thomas (AIR 1949 PC 78). There also the reference was to the scope of Rule 2 of Order II of the Code. It is held that there is no statutory bar in the plaintiff setting up a counter claim in answer to the counter claim of the defendant. 11. Rules 6A to 6G of Order VIII deals with counter claim and its defence. Rule 6A states that, " a defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set off under Rule 6, set up, by way of counter claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff," either before of after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired. 12. At the first blush it may appear that as per Rule 6A of Order VIII, the right to file a counter claim is provided only to the defendant in a suit and primarily against the plaintiff therein. 12. At the first blush it may appear that as per Rule 6A of Order VIII, the right to file a counter claim is provided only to the defendant in a suit and primarily against the plaintiff therein. Rule 9 of Order VIII of the Code which prevents a pleading subsequent to the written statement of a defendant other than by way of "defence" to set off or counter claim" except with the leave of the court may also indicate so. But a closer look at the relevant provisions persuade me to hold otherwise. 13. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6A of Order VIII makes it abundantly clear that a counter claim (filed by the defendant as stated in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6A) shall have the same effect as a cross suit to enable the court pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter claim. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 6A states that the plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a "written statement" in answer to the counter claim of the defendant. Rule 6G of Order VIII prescribes that the rules relating to a written statement by a defendant shall apply to a written statement filed in answer to a counter claim. As Rule 6D of Order VIII states, the counter claim set-up by the defendant is to proceed notwithstanding that the suit is stayed or discontinued. 14. The above provisions make it clear that a counter claim is to be treated as an independent suit in all respects though to pronounce judgment in the same suit on the original claim and on the counter claim, the counter claim is being treated as a cross suit (see Mohammed Khalil Khan V. Mahbub Ali Mian -1990(2) KLJ 841). The counter claim is to be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaint. That means, the defendant in the suit is in the portion of the plaintiff and the plaintiff against whom the counter claim is set up is in the position of the defendant so far as the counter claim is concerned. That is why the plaintiff who is in the position of a defendant in the counter claim is allowed to file a "written statement" in answer to the counter claim. That is why the plaintiff who is in the position of a defendant in the counter claim is allowed to file a "written statement" in answer to the counter claim. That means, the plaintiff in the suit who is treated as a defendant so far as the counter claim set up against him is concerned is entitled to invoke all the provisions of Rules 6A to 6G of Order VIII provided to the defendant in the suit (plaintiff in the counter claim) subject to the limitations provided therein and other provisions of the Code. Viewed in that line, I must hold that the Code does not prohibit a plaintiff in the suit (defendant in the counter claim) setting up a counter claim in answer to the counter claim set up by the defendant (as plaintiff in the counter claim) against the plaintiff subject to the limitations prescribed by the Code and other laws if any governing it. 15. Rule 2 of Order II of the Code requires the plaintiff to include in his suit the whole of the claim which he is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action (stated in the plaint). Sub-rule (2) of rule 2 states that where the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. Sub-rule (3) of rule 2 states that a person entitled to sue for more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action if omits to do so except with the leave of the court, he shall not sue for such reliefs so omitted. What is prohibited by Sub-rule 3 of Rule 2 of Order II is a relief based on the same cause of action if omitted to be sought for in the former suit. The Privy Council in Ratnakaran Vs. P.T. Thomas (supra) has opined that the correct test in cases falling under Rule 2 of Order II is whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit. 16. The Privy Council in Ratnakaran Vs. P.T. Thomas (supra) has opined that the correct test in cases falling under Rule 2 of Order II is whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit. 16. A conjoint reading of Rules 2 of Order II and Rules 6A to 6G of Order VIII would show that the counter claim the plaintiff (as a defendant in the counter claim set up against him by the defendant in the suit) may set up, has to be in answer to the counter claim set up against him by the defendant. It cannot be with respect to a claim or relief arising out of the cause of action set-up by the plaintiff in his plaint and with respect to which a subsequent suit at his instance is barred under Rule 2 of Order II of the Code. The cause of action set up in the counter claim of the plaintiff shall not be the same as the cause of action he has set up in his plaint. If any further claim or relief based on the cause of action pleaded in the plaint is to be raised, that could not be by a counter claim set up consequent to the counter claim set up by the defendant against the plaintiff but should be by amendment of the plaint if such a course is permissible. 17. In view of what I have stated above, the argument of the learned counsel for the defendants that Rule 9 of Order VIII barred the plaintiff from setting up a counter claim in answer to the counter claim of the defendants also would not be. Rule 9 of Order VIII is subject to the right of the plaintiff to set up a counter claim in answer to the counter claim set up against him by the defendant. 18. A question posed by the learned senior Advocate is that if such a view is adopted, there would be no end for the counter claims the parties to the suit may prefer. For instance, in answer to the counter claim made by the plaintiff as above stated, the defendant may file written statement and set up yet another counter claim. A question posed by the learned senior Advocate is that if such a view is adopted, there would be no end for the counter claims the parties to the suit may prefer. For instance, in answer to the counter claim made by the plaintiff as above stated, the defendant may file written statement and set up yet another counter claim. That may possibly be followed by the plaintiff with a similar counter claim, and so on. Certainly, such a possibility so far as the law does not prohibit counter claims in the circumstances stated above cannot be ruled out. But, I am not inclined to think that in such a situation the court is powerless and should entertain counter claims endlessly. Rule 6C of Order VIII enables the court to exclude counter claim in appropriate cases. Therefore it is within the power of the court in appropriate cases where the process of filing counter claims is repeated, to step in and exclude such counter claims as are not required to be tried along with the suit. 19. In paragraph 5 of the plaint what is averred is that on 15.02.1996 while the plaintiff was out of station the defendants 'trespassed' into the suit property by raising false claims and plucked some pepper and coffee. The plaintiff proceeds on the basis that he is in possession of the suit property. The relief prayed for in the suit is a decree for prohibitory injunction against the defendants trespassing into the suit property or committing waste therein. In paragraph 8 of the plaint it is alleged that the cause of action for the suit arose on 15.02.1996 and continuously thereafter. 20. In the counter claim set up by the plaintiff, it is stated in paragraph 5 that the defendants trespassed into a portion of the suit property on 10.03.1996 (after institution of the suit). In paragraph 6, it is stated that from 10.03.1996 onwards, an extent of 20 cents from the suit property is in the illegal possession of the defendants and they took the yield from the said property. The damages suffered by the plaintiff on account of the defendants taking the yield (from 10.03.1996 onwards) is estimated at Rs.4,500/-. 21. True that in paragraphs 5 and 8 of the plaint there is reference to the defendants 'trespassing' into the suit property on 15.02.1996. A mere 'trespass' does not amount to 'dispossession'. The damages suffered by the plaintiff on account of the defendants taking the yield (from 10.03.1996 onwards) is estimated at Rs.4,500/-. 21. True that in paragraphs 5 and 8 of the plaint there is reference to the defendants 'trespassing' into the suit property on 15.02.1996. A mere 'trespass' does not amount to 'dispossession'. An occasional interference with another's property does not constitute 'possession'. "Trespass" signifies passing over or beyond one's right, i.e. a transgression or a wrongful act. "Trespass" is a forcible entry on the land of another with strong hand and against the will of the owner of the land. By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be if so minute, is a trespass and no man can get his foot upon one's ground without his license and the trespass is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing ( Per Camden, LCJ in Entick V. Carrington -((1765) 19 How. St.Tr.1066, quoted by P. Rmanatha Aiyar in the Law Lexicon, 1997 Edn.). Hence the expression 'trespass' need be understood only as an unlawful entry into the land and thus an invasion of the right of the owner. That is distinct from 'possession'. What is "possession" is understood in Anies Vs. Rapai (1986 KLT 1204). It is held that 'possession' means the physical possibility of a person dealing with the property as he likes and it implies some actual power over the object possessed and some amount of will to avail oneself of that power. As per the averments in the plaint, what happened on 15.02.1996 is only an occasional interference with the possession of the plaintiff which does not amount to dispossession of the plaintiff. On 10.03.1996 (after the institution of the suit), as per the averments in the counter claim of the plaintiff, he was forcibly dispossessed from the 20 cents out of the suit property. The cause of action pleaded in the plaint for a decree for prohibitory injunction and in the counter claim of the plaintiff for a decree for recovery of possession and damages are entirely different. The cause of action for the counter claim of the plaintiff arose after the filing of the suit. The counter claim of the plaintiff is in answer to his dispossession from the 20 cents and the relief of specificperformance sought by the defendants in their claim. The cause of action for the counter claim of the plaintiff arose after the filing of the suit. The counter claim of the plaintiff is in answer to his dispossession from the 20 cents and the relief of specificperformance sought by the defendants in their claim. The counter claim of the plaintiff is founded on a cause of action different from the cause of action pleaded in the plaint and which arose after the institution of the suit. Hence the counter claim of the plaintiff is not hit by Rule 2 of Order II of the Code. 22. The next argument of the learned senior Advocate for the defendants is that the plaintiff could not have adduced evidence against the recital in Ext.B1 regarding transfer of possession of the 20 cents in favour of the defendants in view of the bar under Sec.91 and 92 of the Act. 23. Sec.91 of the Act prohibits adducing evidence in proof of the terms of a contract or grant or of any other dispossession of property reduced to the form of a document and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document; except the document itself or secondary evidence is admissible under law subject to the exceptions stated therein. Sec.92 of the Act excludes evidence of any oral agreement or statement against the 'terms' of any such contract, grant or other dispossession of property or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document which is proved as per Sec.91 24. A recital in a deed as to possession is not a 'term' of the contract. Hence oral evidence is admissible to show that as against the recital in the document that possession of the property was transferred, there was no such transfer of possession. Such evidence is not excluded by Sec.91 or 92 of the Act. Nor is evidence excluded to prove that Ext.B1 was not intended to be an agreement for sale of property. The learned senior Advocate has placed reliance on the decision in Alka Gupta V. Narender Kumar Gupta (2010 KHC 4735). Such evidence is not excluded by Sec.91 or 92 of the Act. Nor is evidence excluded to prove that Ext.B1 was not intended to be an agreement for sale of property. The learned senior Advocate has placed reliance on the decision in Alka Gupta V. Narender Kumar Gupta (2010 KHC 4735). There, it is held that even though a particular ground of defence or attack was not actually taken in the earlier suit, it was capable of taken in earlier suit, it become a bar in regard to the said issue being taken in the second suit in view of the principle of constructive res judicata. Here, that question does not arise since I found that as per the averments in the plaint what happened on 15.02.1996 is only an occasional interference with the possession of the plaintiff while on 10.03.1996 as pleaded in the counter claim of the plaintiff, there was a total dispossession of the plaintiff from the 20 cents out of the suit property after the institution of the suit. That is not a matter which the plaintiff could have urged in the plaint filed much before the dispossession on 10.03.1996. 25. So far as dispossession of the plaintiff after the suit is concerned, the trial court has referred to the report of the Advocate Commissioner. The Advocate Commissioner inspected the property on 11.03.1996 (i.e. after the alleged dispossession on 10.03.1996). He has reported the oldness of the fence and structure found there (in the 20 cents) as one day. He has also reported that access to the house of the plaintiff situated in a portion of the suit property was found blocked at two places by construction of fence. From the above, the trial court came into the conclusion that the plaintiff had possession of the entire suit property on the date of the suit but he lost possession of the 20 cents out of the suit property after the institution of the suit. The trial court for valid reasons also found that Ext.B1 was not intended to be an agreement to sell the 20 cents referred therein (counter claim schedule property) 26. It is contended by the learned senior Advocate that after the plaintiff filing written statement with the counter claim, no opportunity was given to the defendants to file written statement. The trial court for valid reasons also found that Ext.B1 was not intended to be an agreement to sell the 20 cents referred therein (counter claim schedule property) 26. It is contended by the learned senior Advocate that after the plaintiff filing written statement with the counter claim, no opportunity was given to the defendants to file written statement. I have gone through the copy of the B diary of the trial court and find that after the plaintiff filed written statement and counter claim in answer to the counter claim of the defendants, the learned Munsiff posted the case for settlement of issues and thereafter, for trial. There was no posting for filing written statement in answer to the counter claim of the plaintiff. Learned Munsiff ought to have posted the case for the written statement of the defendants in answer to the counter claim of the plaintiff. 27. I find that such a specific ground was taken-up by the defendants in the first appellate court and is taken in the memorandum of second appeal as well. But, the defendants are not seen to have urged that question before the first appellate court and invited a decision. Moreover, though the learned Munsiff had not posted the case for written statement of the defendants in answer to the counter claim of the plaintiff, there was sufficient time during which the defendants could have requested the learned Munsiff to receive their written statement (if any) in answer to the counter claim of the plaintiff. That was not done. 28. Further, I find from the evidence of the first defendant as DW.1 that he has admitted that he has taken the yield from the 20 cents out of the suit property (the counter claim schedule property) for one year. In the circumstances, I am not inclined to think that at this belated stage I must set aside the decree on the counter claim of the plaintiff and order a remand. That, I think, will be in the height of technicality, at this stage. 29. On the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to get Rs.4,500/-by way of damages, what is available is only the evidence of the plaintiff as PW.1. He referred to the price of the produces during the relevant time but no supporting evidence is produced. That, I think, will be in the height of technicality, at this stage. 29. On the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to get Rs.4,500/-by way of damages, what is available is only the evidence of the plaintiff as PW.1. He referred to the price of the produces during the relevant time but no supporting evidence is produced. The first defendant who, as DW.1 admitted that he took the yield for one year, has not made any admission regarding the price of produces. The plaintiff was required to adduce independent evidence regarding the price of produces. Hence I am inclined to think the decree for recovery of Rs.4,500/-by way of damages which the plaintiff claimed is not sustainable. On the other hand, the plaintiff can only get a reasonable amount by way of damages which having regard to the circumstances of the case is fixed as Rs.2,500/-. 30. The substantial questions of law framed are answered as above. Resultantly, The second appeal is allowed in part as under:- 1) Judgment and decree of the learned Sub Judge, Kattappana in A.S. No. 9 of 1998 confirming the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff, Kattappana in O.S. No.73 of 1996 are modified to the extent that the damages payable by the appellants/defendants to the respondent/plaintiff is modified as Rs.2,500/-(Rupees Two thousand five hundred only). 2) In other respects, the judgment and decree of the courts below will stand. 3) It is made clear that it will be open to either of the parties as circumstances warranted to set off the amount they are liable to pay to the opposite party in the amount due to them. 4) Parties shall suffer their respective cost in the second appeal.