JUDGMENT S.A. Khan, J. Nobody appears on behalf of the appellants. Mr. Arun Kumar Tripathi is appointed as Amicus Curiae in this case who is present in Court. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 2.3.2000 passed in Sessions Trial No. 121 of 1989 by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura. 3. The occurrence took place on 16.10.1976 at about mid-night as per the First Information Report. The genesis of the occurrence was that Rs. 65/- was found in the Bazar (Hat). There were two claimants to the money. One was the wife of Sattan Dhanuk and the other was Abul Darzi. There was a panchayati and apparently the money was handed over to Abul Darzi. It is alleged that Sattan Mandal, Goswamy Mandal and several other persons named in the First Information Report were aggrieved by this fact and there was exchange of hot words with the informant Ramdhani Rishideo (P.W. 6). During the hot exchange of words apparently they stole Rs. 400/- belonging to the informant. It is also alleged that the two appellants set the house of the informant on fire. He lost his house hold articles including grains and clothes etc. Villagers assembled and doused the fire. The case was instituted under Sections 147, 323, 379 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code. Out of the 7 accused persons, 5 accused persons have been acquitted by the Sessions Judge in this case finding that there was no common intention, and the story of theft has not been proved by the prosecution. 4. A defence has been raised on behalf of the appellants that there was a compromise between the appellants and the informant and Parmeshwari Rishideo, P.W. 4, who are the two persons who were affected by the said acts of the appellants. In order to prove their case, two witnesses have been examined by the defence. They have exhibited the compromise petition as Exts. A and B during trial. 5. In this case 9 witnesses were examined out of which P.Ws. 2, 7 and 8 were tendered. P.W. 1 proves the genesis of the occurrence, whereas others did not lead evidence regarding the merits of the actual occurrence which is setting the house of P.Ws. 4 and 6 on fire.
A and B during trial. 5. In this case 9 witnesses were examined out of which P.Ws. 2, 7 and 8 were tendered. P.W. 1 proves the genesis of the occurrence, whereas others did not lead evidence regarding the merits of the actual occurrence which is setting the house of P.Ws. 4 and 6 on fire. The Investigating Officer has not been examined in this case to prove the place of occurrence or for that matter to prove that he had visited the spot and recovered or found signs of the house being set on fire. 6. As would appear from the judgment delivered by the Sessions Judge, there are discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses regarding the manner of occurrence. However, P.Ws. 4 and 6 have categorically stated that their house was set on fire and that the compromise was obtained under misrepresentation and, therefore, they have upheld the story made out in the First Information Report. 7. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the Investigating Officer having not been examined and the fact that the case made out by the prosecution under Section 149 (earlier 143 and 379 I.P.C.) has been disbelieved by the Court below, it is not safe for this Court to rely on the evidence of the witnesses regarding the offence under Section 436 of the Indian Penal Code. It is also submitted that the physical features of the place of occurrence showing reminiscence of fire could not be brought in evidence and as such great prejudice has been caused and the appellants and they cannot be held guilty by this count. It is also submitted that even if it is accepted that the appellants had filed a compromise, the offence is not compoundable one, and as such it would not help the appellants in any manner. 8. This Court has noticed that the occurrence took place in the year 1976 and trial remained pending for 21 years, and now the appeal is being heard after another 12 years. As a result, the appellants have been facing criminal prosecution for 33 years. Under these extreme circumstances, this Court dismisses the appeal while modifying the sentence to the period undergone. The appellants are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds furnished earlier in this case.