Judgment H.G. Ramesh, J. 1. In these writ petitions, the petitioners are challenging the constitutional validity of the amendment to Entry 22 in Part ‘S’ of the Second Schedule of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, by Section 2(24)(xxi) of Karnataka Act No.18 of 1994. By the amendment, the earlier entries relating to Entry 22, was substituted by the following w.e.f. 01.04.1994: “22. Raw silk and silk yarn imported from outside the country Four Percent”. (Emphasis supplied) 2. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent. The sole contention urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned amendment is violative of Articles 301 & 304 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the only question that requires to be examined is as to whether the impugned amendment offends Articles 301 & 304 of the Constitution. 3. Re. Article 301: It is relevant to quote Article 301 which reads as follows: “301. Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse.— Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.” As held by the Supreme Court in several judgments, a fiscal measure is not outside the prohibition of Article 301 but only such taxes which directly or immediately impede the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse will fall within the prohibition of Article 301. However the State Legislature can by law impose any tax on goods imported from other States or Union Territories but without offending Article 304(a). In this context, it is relevant to refer to a five Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam ( AIR 1961 SC 232 ) wherein the Supreme Court has explained the scope of Article 301 of the Constitution. The following observations are relevant: “(51) Thus the intrinsic evidence furnished by some of the Articles of Part XIII shows that taxing laws are not excluded from the operation of Art. 301; which means that tax laws can and do amount to restrictions freedom which is guaranteed to trade under the said Part. Does that mean that all tax laws attract the provisions of Part XIII whether their impact on trade or its movement is direct and immediate or indirect and remote? Does that mean that all tax laws attract the provisions of Part XIII whether their impact on trade or its movement is direct and immediate or indirect and remote? It is precisely because the words used in Art. 301 are very wide, and in a sense vague and indefinite that the problem of construing them and determining their exact width and scope becomes complex and difficult. However, in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution we must always bear in mind that the relevant provision “has to be read not in vacuo but as occurring in a single complex instrument in which one part may throw light on another” (Vide James v. Commonwealth of Australia, (1936) AC 578 at p.613). In construing Art. 301 we must, therefore, have regard to the general scheme of our Constitution as well as the particular provisions in regard to taxing laws. The construction of Art. 301 should not be determined on a purely academic or doctrinaire considerations; in construing the said Article we must adopt a realistic approach and bear in mind the essential features of the separation of powers on which our Constitution rests. It is a federal Constitution which we are interpreting, and so the impact of Art. 301 must be judged accordingly. Besides, it is not irrelevant to remember in this connection that the Article we are construing imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the Parliament and State Legislatures to levy taxes, and generally, but for such limitation, the power of taxation would be presumed to be for public good and would not be subject to judicial review or scrutiny. Thus considered we think it would be reasonable and proper to hold that restrictions, freedom from which is guaranteed by Art. 301, would be such restrictions are directly and immediately restrict or impede the free flow or movement of trade. Taxes may and do amount to restrictions; but it is only such taxes as directly and immediately restrict trade that would fall within the purview of Art. 301. The argument that all taxes should be governed by Art. 301 whether or not their impact on trade is immediate or mediate, direct or remote, adopts, in our opinion, an extreme approach which cannot be upheld. The argument that all taxes should be governed by Art. 301 whether or not their impact on trade is immediate or mediate, direct or remote, adopts, in our opinion, an extreme approach which cannot be upheld. If the said argument is accepted it would mean, for instance, that even a legislative enactment prescribing the minimum wages to industrial employees may fall under Part XIII because in an economic sense an additional wage bill may indirectly affect trade or commerce. We are, therefore, satisfied that in determining the limits of the width and amplitude of the freedom guaranteed by Art. 301 a rational and workable test to apply would be: Does the impugned restriction operate directly or immediately on trade or its movement? It is in the light of this test that we propose to examine the validity of the Act under scrutiny in the present proceedings. (52) We do not think it necessary or expedient to consider what other laws would be affected by the interpretation we are placing on Art. 301 and what other legislative entries would fall under Part XIII. We propose to confine our decision to the Act with which we are concerned. If any other laws are similarly challenged the validity of the challenge will have to be examined in the light of the provisions of those laws. Our conclusion, therefore, is that when Art. 301 provides that trade shall be free throughout the territory of India it means that the flow of trade shall run smooth and unhampered by any restriction either at the boundaries of the States or at any other points inside the States themselves. It is the free movement or the transport of goods from one part of the country to the other that is intended to be saved, and if any Act imposes any direct restrictions on the very movement of such goods it attracts the provisions of Art. 301, and its validity can be sustained only if it satisfies the requirements of Art. 302 or Art. 304 of Part XIII……………………………….” (Underlining supplied) 4. In the light of the above observations made by the Supreme Court relating to the scope of Article 301 of the Constitution, it cannot be said that levy of 4% tax by the impugned amendment, on the sale of raw silk and silk yarn, imported from outside the country, could directly impede the free flow of trade and commerce in the aforesaid goods in the territory of India. Accordingly, the contention that the impugned amendment is violative of Article 301 of the Constitution is devoid of merit. 5. Re. Article 304: In my opinion, the challenge to the impugned amendment as being violative of Article 304 of the Constitution is misconceived. Article 304 reads as follows: “304. Restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse among States.— Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law— (a) Impose on goods imported from other States or the Union Territories any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced; and (b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest; Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President.” The object of Article 304(a) is to prevent discrimination against goods imported from other States within the territory of India by imposing on them a tax higher than that borne by goods produced in the State. A plain reading of Article 304 would show that it does not impose any restrictions on the Legislature of a State to make any law to impose tax on the sale or purchase of goods imported from outside the Country. Hence, the contention that the impugned amendment is violative of Article 304 is also devoid of merit. 6. In the result, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed as being devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed. Petitions dismissed.