JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. The brief facts culled out from the records are that the petitioner was appointed on 3.9.1985 on compassionate ground on the post of Hindi typist in pay scale of Rs. 260-400 in the D.R.M. Office of North Central Railway (N.C.R.) Allahabad. Thereafter against a vacancy in operating Branch on the death of one Sri A.N.Kapoor working in the said post there she was posted in the Hindi Section vide order dated 18.11.1985 as typist (Hindi) and worked there up to 12.5.1999. The petitioner was thereafter transferred and relieved for joining in the Safety Department of the Railways. The matter being represented by her before the National Commission for SC/ST by which her transfer order was stayed directing the Railways to pay her salary in compliance of the interim order dated 23.7.1999 by the Commission. 3. The petitioner claims that she was allowed to work and was paid salary for few months but thereafter neither she was allowed to work nor her salary was paid. This compelled her to file Original Application No. 950 of 2003 before the Central Administrative Tribunal Bench at Allahabad ( hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) challenging the relieving/ repatriation order dated 12.5.1999 and 3.6.1999. It appears that Railways was treating her transfer to the safety department as repatriation. It also appears that during the pendency of the Original Application a Misc. Application No. 3644 of 2003 was preferred by the Railways which was served upon the petitioner alongwith a charge-sheet dated 5.5.2003 for unauthorised absence w.e.f. 12.5.1999. According to the petitioner since she had earlier challenged her relieving order dated 12.5.1999, an amendment application was moved by her in the aforesaid Original Application before the Tribunal for quashing the charge-sheet and issuance of interim direction to the respondents for not holding any inquiry during the pendency of the Original Application. The amendment application was allowed but no interim order was granted on her prayer for restraining the department from holding disciplinary proceedings. The charges against the petitioner in the disciplinary proceedings said to have been held ex parte, were found to be proved and she was dismissed from service vide order dated 15.6.2004. The amendment application was allowed but no interim order was granted on her prayer for restraining the department from holding disciplinary proceedings. The charges against the petitioner in the disciplinary proceedings said to have been held ex parte, were found to be proved and she was dismissed from service vide order dated 15.6.2004. As such another amendment application was preferred by the petitioner in Original Application challenging the order of dismissal dated 15.6.2004 on the ground that the inquiry proceedings were ex parte and without reasonable opportunity of being heard, afforded to her. This amendment application was also allowed. The tribunal thereafter after hearing the parties by its judgment and order dated 27.9.2007 held that “In view above, we are of the opinion that O.A. Lacks merit and do not feel there is nay need for this Tribunal to interfere with the dismissal order dated 15.6.2004. On the issue of salary and other consequential benefits, the respondents are directed to consider and dispose of the case of the applicant strictly in accordance with the rules on the subject. O.A. is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.” 4. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the validity and correctness of the order and judgment on the ground that the findings recorded by it which are not based on any document rather they are pervese and illegal. It is also submitted that the departmental inquiry proceedings having been held exparte is in violation of principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed. 5. The judgment impugned is also challenged on the ground that the tribunal has not recorded as to what was the material before it on which it was satisfied that there is no denial of the provisions of natural justice in holding the inquiry as well as the basis for passing of the order of penalty and on the basis of which, the tribunal formed its opinion that there was no need to interfere with the order of dismissal dated 15.6.2004. 6. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that petitioner Smt. Vimla Devi was appointed as typist in Grade II 260-400 on compassionate ground in Hindi Section against a vacancy of operating branch which vacancy became available due to death of Sri A.N. Kapoor. 6. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that petitioner Smt. Vimla Devi was appointed as typist in Grade II 260-400 on compassionate ground in Hindi Section against a vacancy of operating branch which vacancy became available due to death of Sri A.N. Kapoor. A demand was made by the safety branch due to which she was repatriated there but she did not report for duty and instead approached the National Commission for SC/ST. The matter of unauthorised absence was brought by the Railways to the notice of the Commission, requesting for a direction to the petitioner to report for duty and that she was not entitled to any relief on the ground of no work no pay during the period of her unauthorised absence. 7. The petitioner was again asked to resume her duties but instead of complying the order, she remained absent unauthorisedly. In consequence thereof a charge-sheet was issued to her. 8. Regarding, affording of opportunity of hearing, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that she was served with notice to participate in the inquiry. However, despite the knowledge she did not choose to do so. Registered letters were also sent on the address of the petitioner which were received back with the remarks: “ ‘Bar Bar Jate Hai, Par Mulakat Nahi Hoti.’ ‘Makan Chhor Diya Hai, Kahi Aur Chale Gay Hai Jiska Pata Nahni.” 9. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this compelled the department to apprise her of the departmental proceedings through misc. application served upon her in the tribunal. Yet again, she inspite of the information did not contact the office rather threatened to go on hunger strike w.e.f 11.11.2002 and these facts were also communicated to the ADM/ALD/ SO, Police Station, Civil Lines, Allahabad vide letter dated 12.11.2002. The letters were also pasted on the notice board in the presence of two witnesses, regarding the Departmental & Appeal Rules (DAR) inquiry for resuming her duty. All the aforesaid methods failed to persuade her to join her duties. Copy of the concluded inquiry proceedings was sent to her on 12.5.2004. Copy of the punishment order dismissing her from service was also sent to her by registered post on 18.6.2004, which was also pasted on the notice board in presence of witnesses on 21.6.2004. 10. All the aforesaid methods failed to persuade her to join her duties. Copy of the concluded inquiry proceedings was sent to her on 12.5.2004. Copy of the punishment order dismissing her from service was also sent to her by registered post on 18.6.2004, which was also pasted on the notice board in presence of witnesses on 21.6.2004. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention regarding denial of service or information regarding disciplinary proceedings has relied upon the paragraphs 3. 9 and 10 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Union of Inda v. Dinanath Shantaram Kareker, 1998 SCC (L&S) 1837, wherein service by registered post or by publication in newspaper was considered by the Court. In that case a charge-sheet sent by registered post was received back undelivered with postal endorsement “not found”. It was held that single attempt was not sufficient and further efforts should have been made for effecting the service. A show-cause notice published in the news paper without making any earlier effort to serve personally through office peon or by registered post was also found to have vitiated the inquiry for want of actual service of documents on the charged employee for the reason that news paper in which the notice was published was not shown to be a popular newspaper having wide circulation in the area where charge-sheeted employee lived. 11. The Court further held in paragraph 10 of the judgment that where the disciplinary proceedings are intended to be initiated by issuing a charge-sheet, its actual service is essential as the person to whom the charge-sheet is issued is required to submit his reply and, thereafter, to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. So also, when the show-cause notice is issued, the employee is called upon to submit his reply to the action proposed to be taken against him. Since in both the situations, the employee is given an opportunity to submit his reply, the theory of “communication” cannot be invoked and “actual service” must be proved and established. 12. Reliance has been placed by the petitioner also upon the paragraph 11 of the judgment in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SCC 1313, wherein it has been held that the mere passing of an order of dismissal is not effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. 12. Reliance has been placed by the petitioner also upon the paragraph 11 of the judgment in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SCC 1313, wherein it has been held that the mere passing of an order of dismissal is not effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. An order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it does not take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn our attention to paragraphs 18 and 19 of the judgment in Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, 1991 SCC (L&S) 612, wherein it has been held that wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter. 14. He has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and others v. I.S. Singh, 1994 SCC (L&S) 1131, wherein it has been held in paragraph 2 of the judgment the relevant extract of which reads thus: “ ...........However, this is not advisable at this distance of time and also having regard to the nature of the charges levelled against the respondent. We think that the more appropriate course would be to give a quietus to the matter at this stage itself.........” 15. Lastly the petitioner has relied upon paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment in M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. We think that the more appropriate course would be to give a quietus to the matter at this stage itself.........” 15. Lastly the petitioner has relied upon paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment in M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. and anothers v. Jahan Khan, (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 9, wherein it has been held that where there is failure of natural justice or where the impugned orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challened, in that case the impugned order imposing penalty stood vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice and as such, the High Court was right in entertaining the writ petition there against. 16. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and making a perusal of the impugned judgment in the context of the arguments raised by the parties, we find in its paragraphs 15 to 18, which reads thus: “15. The first issue under dispute is regarding the initial appointment order and the section where the applicant was appointed. The counsel for the applicant has made out that the applicant was initially appointed as a Hindi Typist under Operating Section of ‘T’ Branch of D.R.M. Office, Allahabad but she was not posting her to Hindi Section as Hindi Typist on her first appointment. It is seen from the pleadings that the applicant was given 15 days to join vide appointment letter dated 6.11.1985, but when the applicant reported on 18.11.1985 for duty she was temporarily posted as Typist in the Hindi Section in ‘T’ Branch that it was further to office letter dated 6.11.1985 that the applicants posting was being done in the vacancy of Shri A.N. Kapoor, Hindi Typist ‘T’ Branch Allahabad, who died. The respondents also submit that the temporary posting in Hindi Section was necessitated to hand the work of typing the Station Working Rules. It is thus evident that the initial posting of the applicant was to the operating Branch in an existing vacancy hence lien has to be on the said original post, which is in the Operating Branch. In view to this, the basic contention of the applicant that she was posted to the Hindi Section initially cannot be accepted and must be rejected. 16. In view to this, the basic contention of the applicant that she was posted to the Hindi Section initially cannot be accepted and must be rejected. 16. Subsequently at the behest of the Operating Branch requesting the applicant’s repatriation vide their letter dated 7.10.1998, the release of the applicant from the Hindi Section vide repatriation letter dated 12.5.1999 to the Safety department under “T’ Branch approval by the Competent Authority is in order. As mentioned earlier the repatriation order dated 12.5.1999 is an inter Branch posting order issued by the Raj Bhasha Adhikari with the approval of the Competent Authority. The applicant’s contention that no order posting her from the Hindi Section was issued by the D.P.O. In her case hence the question of relief from that Section to join the Safety department does not arise, is without any basis and cannot be accepted. 17. Instead of abiding by the repatriation order, the applicant has been absent from duty unauthorisedly since 12.5.1999 the applicant appears to have been sending numerous represntation to various officers in the Department including the Railway Minister each time, she so asked by the respondents to join at the new duty post. She has besides these representations moved the National Commission for SC/ST, High Court at Allahabad and this Tribunal including a threat to go on a fast unto death, in her effort to get the repatriation order cancelled without much success. Despite a number of letters from the respondents at various senior levels, directing the applicant to join duty the applicant to join duty the applicant continued to be on unauthorised absence. 18. The respondents finally issued a charge-sheet dated 5.5.2003 intimating the intention to institute disciplinary proceedings vide registered letter, which was returned to the office unacknowledged by the applicant. The applicant despite earlier intimation and through Supplementary Objections filed by the respondents did not appear before he Disciplinary Authority and thereby failed to defend her case or the maintainability of the disciplinary proceedings. Left with no alternative the respondents conducted the enquiry ex parte and passed the order of Dismissal from service, which is valid and legal. The applicant despite earlier intimation and through Supplementary Objections filed by the respondents did not appear before he Disciplinary Authority and thereby failed to defend her case or the maintainability of the disciplinary proceedings. Left with no alternative the respondents conducted the enquiry ex parte and passed the order of Dismissal from service, which is valid and legal. Copy of the Enquiry Officer report and the order of dismissal was sent to the applicant by registered post, proof of which has been produced by the respondents as Annexures to M.A. No. 3644 of 2003- objections to interim relief claimed in paragraph 9 of the O.A.. It does appear that the respondents tried all possible procedure for securing the presence of the applicant during the proceedings which however did not bear fruit. The disciplinary proceedings and the findings thereon and consequent order of dismissal are therefore, on legal and valid grounds and does not call for any interference b this Tribunal. The counsel for the applicant has relied on some settled case laws mentioned at para 4 (a) to (g) above. In all these judgments, it is seen that the applicants have all participated in the inquiry proceedings and in these cases they have not been given copies of the Enquiry report and the order of punishment, hence the Court held the order of dismissal as invalid and violative of principles of natural justice. In the present case, disciplinary proceedings, besides there is proof that the enquiry report, the findings and the order of dismissal were sent to the applicant by Registered Post, which were not acknowledged by the applicant. The facts and circumstances of the case being different and distinguishable, the case laws relied on by Sri O.P. Gupta are not applicable in this case.” 17. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the tribunal dismissed the Original Application filed by the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondent has concluded that though the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground, this does not grant her any immunity from disciplinary proceedings and that in the facts and circumstances, the order and judgment impugned passed by the tribunal is just and illegal and in accordance with law. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent has concluded that though the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground, this does not grant her any immunity from disciplinary proceedings and that in the facts and circumstances, the order and judgment impugned passed by the tribunal is just and illegal and in accordance with law. 18. It is lastly submitted by him that even in the proceedings before the disciplinary authority, the petitioner was requested many a times to resume her duty but she neither resumed the duty nor participate in the DNAR proceedings and as such the writ petition is liable to dismissed with costs. 19. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length and on perusal of the record we find that the petitioner has been avoiding service of notice and participation in the inquiry proceedings deliberately. She was not meeting the post man who made an endorsement on the envelop that she has left her house without leaving any forwarding address. 20. In the circumstances, the department was compelled to inform her by misc. application in the Court case, before the Tribunal. Yet the petitioner inspite of information had not participated in the departmental proceedings. In the process the department not only pasted on the notice board the dates of inquiry etc. in the presence of two witnesses but had also informed the police about all the aforesaid facts particularly of threat by the petitioner to go on strike. The inquiry was thereafter concluded. It would be a misnomer to show that the inquiry was conducted exparte for had it been so department would not have informed her about the date time and place of hearing and inquiry proceedings could not have been in the knowledge of the petitioner. Rather the petitioner inspite of the knowledge deliberately and wrongly participated in the inquiry, which is different from ex parte inquiry proceedings, where delinquent employee has no knowledge. The fact that the petitioner has full knowledge of the inquiry proceedings also finds support from the record that petitioner had filed an appeal against the inquiry proceedings before the appellate authority. She did not change her attitude before the appellate authority and allowed the appellate Court proceedings also to culminate in order of punishment. 21. The fact that the petitioner has full knowledge of the inquiry proceedings also finds support from the record that petitioner had filed an appeal against the inquiry proceedings before the appellate authority. She did not change her attitude before the appellate authority and allowed the appellate Court proceedings also to culminate in order of punishment. 21. Therefore we are of the firm opinion that principles of natural justice were not violated either in the department proceedings or by the appellate authority while passing the order impugned. 22. The case of Union of India and others v. Dinanath Shantaram Karekar and others (supra) is clearly distinguishable as in the instant case it was not single occasion that effort was made for service by registered post but repeated efforts were also made by the department for service by affixing notices on notice board and also by means of application filed before the Tribunal informing her of date, time and place of hearing. Not only the petitioner avoided the inquiry but also after filing the appeal did not pursue her defence, which clearly shows that petitioner was all along aware of the proceedings against her. In the above case of Dinanath Shantaram Karekar and others the Apex Court itself has observed thus : “ Ed: Service of charge-sheet and other notices by post is one of the modes of communication recognized by many rules relating to disciplinary enquiry. For example, it is laid down in Rule 30 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, that “every order, notice and other process made or issued under these rules shall be served in person on the Government concerned or communicated to him by registered post.” Similar provision exists in Rule 26 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. For example, it is laid down in Rule 30 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, that “every order, notice and other process made or issued under these rules shall be served in person on the Government concerned or communicated to him by registered post.” Similar provision exists in Rule 26 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. Reference may also be made with some advantage to Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which provides: “Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ‘serve’ or either of the expression ‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.” Charge-sheet is generally served by post when an employee is unauthorisedly absenting himself or absconding or otherwise evading service of charge-sheet. Absconding employees many times are not available at their last known address. Naturally, the charge-sheet or other communications sent to them through office messengers would not be received by them. Documents sent by post would also be returned with postal endorsements like, “not available”, “not found”, “left the place”, etc. Requirement of “actual service” as laid down in this judgment makes it too difficult for the disciplinary authority to proceed against an employee who may himself be evading service of charge-sheet. If an employee is not attending office. Charge-sheet has to be communicated to him at his last known address. Requirement of “actual service” laid down in this judgment does not seem to be in conformity with statutory provisions like Rule 30 or Rule 26 mentioned above. It may be a different matter that in a particular case, the disciplinary authority may act unfairly and deliberately send charge-sheet by registered post at the address where the charged employee is not likely to be available. It may be a different matter that in a particular case, the disciplinary authority may act unfairly and deliberately send charge-sheet by registered post at the address where the charged employee is not likely to be available. Such colourable exercise of power is open to question and Court may be justified in declaring enquiry proceedings vitiated but it does not seem to be justified to lay down a law of vide amplitude that there must be actual service whenever charge-sheet is sent by post.” 23. In this respect therefore observation of the Apex Court in paragraph 10 of the judgment would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the instant case as service by means of an application on the counsel for the petitioner would be deemed to have been actually made on the petitioner and needs no further proof, thereof. 24. The case of the State of Punjab (supra) is also clearly distinguished and has no application in the instant case for the reason that in that case order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority was kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned, which is not so in the instant case. 25. Similarly in the case of Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramjan Khan (supra) the ratio of the case is that copy of the inquiry report submitted by Enquiry Officer to disciplinary authority is necessarily to be supplied to the employee in order to enable him to make representation against it. It was therefore if not furnished to the delinquent would be violative of principles of natural justice. However in the case at hand the petitioner was not only informed on all the stages about the inquiry proceedings, she had also filed appeal against the order of inquiry, therefore, it cannot be said that she was not provided with copy of the inquiry report. 26. As regards the case of Union of India and others v. I.S. Singh, relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner suffice it to note that in that case, the case was decided on the consent of the petitioner, the delinquent was directed to be reinstated without emoluments for intervening period from the date of punishment and date of reinstatement without loss to his seniority. 27. The case of the petitioner is on a different footing, as there is no consent in this case. 27. The case of the petitioner is on a different footing, as there is no consent in this case. Not only, the tribunal has not granted any relief to the petitioner while dismissing the O.A. filed by him on merits and declining to interfere with the order of his dismissal dated 15.6.2004 passed by the respondents but also further directing to consider and dispose of the claim of the applicant with regard to consequential benefits and salary in accordance with rules on the subject. 28. The last case of M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. and others v. Jahan Khan (supra) relied upon by the petitioner is also based on the ground of failure to observe the principles of natural justice. The dominant question in that case was regarding maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or relegation of the petitioner to alternative remedy. In that case, it was held that exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discussion and not of want of compulsion. It is in that context that principles of natural justice were discussed by the Apex Court. However, in the instant case the petitioner has already availed of alternative remedy before the Tribunal. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case the above case law relied upon by the petitioner does not support his case in the present petition. 29. It is apparent from record that post on which the petitioner was appointed was one in the operating branch of the railways on which one Sri A.N. Kapoor was working mainly as typist. This post became vacant on his death. The petitioner was appointed on that post in the operating branch but having been permitted to work in Hindi Section, D.R.M. Office, North Central Railway, Allahabad was rightly considered to be on deputation as her original appointment and posting was in the operating section of the railway on a post of that branch. Her posting order for Hindi Typist in the D.R.M. Office clearly shows that her initial appointment was on a vacancy caused in operating branch and that there was no vacancy in the D.R.M. Office of Hindi (Typist) at the relevant time. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim even regularisation on the said post in the D.R.M. office as there was no vacancy. 30. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim even regularisation on the said post in the D.R.M. office as there was no vacancy. 30. We therefore find no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders in which not only all the facts have been considered in details but the question of principles of natural justice as well has also been dealt with. Therefore, there is no force in the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner. Having recorded out findings that applicant’s appointment vide order dated 6.11.1985 was in the operating branch, in the vacancy caused due to death of Sri A.N. Kapoor, working on that post who had been appointed mainly for the purpose of typing and that the initial appointment of the petitioner was not in the Hindi Section of the D.R.M. Office. The petition deserves to be dismissed. 31. For all these reasons stated above the writ petition is dismissed. ———————