JUDGMENT Joymalya Bagchi, J. 1. Three sisters Saira @ Renu (16 years), P.W.1, Sahanaz @ Benu (14 years), P.W.2 and Salma @ Minu (13 years), P.W.3 left their residence in the morning of 15.07.1998 for their respective schools. When Sahanaz (P.W.2) and Salma (P.W.3) left their residence around 10.30 a.m. they found their uncle Sher Ali Sardar @ Rajesh having an altercation with their mother over money. Their uncle for the last couple of months had been misbehaving with their mother and had even tried to throttle her over monetary demands out of the monies sent to the family by their father Raju Sardar, P.W.10, from Japan wherein he was residing. Little did they know that they were seeing their mother for the last time. Sahanaz’s class was given an early holiday as one of her classmate had died. When she prematurely returned from school she found that their room was under lock and key. She felt that her mother had gone to bring Saira from school, as usual, and waited for her in a neighbour’s house. Around 2.00 p.m. her uncle, the appellant herein, returned and opened the padlock of the room. Saira, the elder sister, also returned from school in the meantime. Strangely their mother had not gone to bring Saira back and when the sisters enquired about the whereabouts of their mother, the appellant showed them a letter written in Urdu by their mother. The sisters took the letter to a neighbour and the latter read out the letter to them which stated that their mother had left them. The sisters were surprised since their mother ordinarily did not go outside and that she was not conversant with Urdu. When they went back to their room and to their utter surprise they found that footwear of their mother, i.e. two pair of Chappals were inside the room and the rice set on the fire for boiling was burnt. These signs made sisters suspect that their mother had not voluntarily left the house. Such suspicion was further strengthened by the information they received from the neighbourhood that the appellant was seen going in a rickshaw with a bag in the afternoon on that day. They found that a bag was missing from their room. When they enquired of their uncle as to such facts he became perplexed and was unable to explain the same. 2. They found that a bag was missing from their room. When they enquired of their uncle as to such facts he became perplexed and was unable to explain the same. 2. These circumstances gave rise to a strong suspicion in the mind of the two sisters that their mother had been killed by their uncle and her body was removed in the said bag in order to hush up the crime. With the assistance of the neighbours, particularly, Urusha Begum, P.W.14 Saira @ Renu, P.W.1, reported the incident at Watgunge police station whereupon, P.W.29, the Investigating Officer of the instant case, reduced her complaint into writing and registered Watgunge police station Case No. 153 dated 15.07.1998 under Section 302 IPC against the appellant for investigation. 3. Soon thereafter P.W.29 went to the place of occurrence, and arrested the appellant and brought him to the police station for interrogation. In the course of investigation, the appellant led the investigating agency to a place situated in front of premises no. 3A, Gariahat Road, Kolkata 700 019 where he claimed to have dumped the body. The local people around the place informed that a female dead body had been recovered and was removed by the police personnel attached to Gariahat police station. Thereafter P.W.1 and 2 along with appellant were taken Gariahat police station. P.W.1 and 2 identified the bag and other articles including the ornaments of their mother and the shirt and lungi of the appellant, and, later on, identified the dead body at the morgue as that of their mother. Post-mortem revealed that the said victim had suffered, inter alia, head injury from a hard blunt substance. The serological report also confirmed that the blood was found in the bag and the other articles like ploy sheet, rope, gunny bags, bed-sheet, shirt and lungi which were found inside the said bag. Investigation further revealed that the appellant with the assistance of Abdul Samad, P.W 4, the local rickshaw puller had removed a heavy bag from the premises around 12 noon and the rickshaw puller had taken the appellant with the bag in front of Kwality ice cream factory at Diamond Harbour Road wherefrom the appellant had boarded a taxi along with the said bag. P.W.11 Mehmud Azaz, a neighbour, who was purchasing meat in the locality had also seen the appellant in the rickshaw with a bag. P.W.11 Mehmud Azaz, a neighbour, who was purchasing meat in the locality had also seen the appellant in the rickshaw with a bag. It is further the prosecution case that one Sumita Lal, P.W.5 and her mother-in-law, P.W.6, who were Jhupri (shack) dwellers on the pavement near Telephone Exchange Office at Ballygunge Phari had seen the appellant alighting from the taxi and putting the said bag under a tree and the latter asked P.W.5 to keep watch over the said bag. Since the appellant did not return upto 4 p.m., P.W.5 informed the matter to the local police station i.e. Gariahat Police Station whereupon the police officers attached to Gariahat Police Station being P.W.23, and 27 seized the said bag and recovered the dead body of the victim therefrom along with other incriminating articles. During investigation, P.W.4, 5 and 6, identified the appellant in the test of identification parade. 4. Upon showing of the appellant, an iron pipe was seized as a weapon of offence. Other incriminating articles like two pair of Chappals of the victim, the Urdu letter, bloodstained napkin and the passport of the victim were also seized. The prosecution sought to implicate one Jahid Sahid as a conspirator to the crime on the premise that he had written the said Urdu letter. 5. In conclusion of investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet under Sections 302, 201, 120 B of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant and the said Jahid Sahid. 6. The case being a sessions triable one was committed to the Court of Sessions and transferred to the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Alipore, South 24-Parganas for trial. The learned trial Judge framed charges under Sections 302/201/120 B of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 120 B read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code against the co-accused, Jahid Sahid. 7. The defence of the appellant was one of innocence and false implication. He however admitted that he used to reside at the house of the victim and was present in the said house on the fateful day. During his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. he took a plea of alibi that he was left for playing Carrom. It was suggested in cross-examination that the victim was of bad character and that her husband P.W.10 may have conspired to kill her. Such suggestions were vigorously denied by the prosecution witnesses. During his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. he took a plea of alibi that he was left for playing Carrom. It was suggested in cross-examination that the victim was of bad character and that her husband P.W.10 may have conspired to kill her. Such suggestions were vigorously denied by the prosecution witnesses. The appellant however did not adduce any defence evidence to probabilise his alibi or any other defence, as suggested in cross-examination. 8. In conclusion of trial, the trial Judge after analysing of the evidence on record came to a finding that the prosecution had been able to prove its case against the appellant and convicted him for commission of offence punishable under Section 302, 201 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to suffer imprisonment for one year more for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and to suffer imprisonment for four years with a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to suffer imprisonment for six months more, for commission of offence punishable under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, both the sentences to run concurrently. The trial Judge however acquitted Jahid Sahid of the charge levelled against him. Assailing such judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 9. The instant case based on circumstantial evidence. An analysis of the prosecution evidence may be apposite for the present appeal. 10. It is an admitted position that the appellant used to reside with the victim along with her children at the house while her husband was away at Japan. On the fateful day, P.W.2 and 3 have claimed that they saw the appellant quarrelling with the victim over money when they left for school. 11. The relation between the victim and the appellant was strained for the last two months and there were quarrel over the demands of money. Once the appellant even tried to throttle the victim and when the children had protested they were also threatened. These facts are proved through the evidence of the children of the victim namely, P.W.2 and 3, the neighbours, P.W.7, 8 and 9 and P.W.12, the brother of the victim. 12. Once the appellant even tried to throttle the victim and when the children had protested they were also threatened. These facts are proved through the evidence of the children of the victim namely, P.W.2 and 3, the neighbours, P.W.7, 8 and 9 and P.W.12, the brother of the victim. 12. P.W.2 in her deposition stated that she came back early and found the house was under lock and key and waited at the house of a neighbour. It is the evidence of P.W.1 that when she returned home around 2.00 p.m. she found that the appellant was climbing the stair towards their room which was padlocked and the appellant opened the lock of the room. The evidence of the P.W.2 and 3 therefore establishes that on the arrival from the school they had found that the room was empty and was locked from outside which was opened by the appellant when he returned to the room at 2.00 p.m. 13. P.W.4 deposed that around 12 noon the appellant hired him and he helped the appellant to remove a heavy bag from the room in his rickshaw. P.W.4 took the appellant with the bag in front of Kwality ice cream factory on Diamond Harbour Road where the appellant loaded the bag in a taxi and left. P.W.4 identified the appellant in Court. P.W.11, a neighbour, saw the appellant with a bag in a rickshaw while he was purchasing meat and the appellant joked with him. 15. P.W.5 and 6 deposed that the appellant had dumped the bag under a tree in front of Premises No. 3A, Gariahat Road near Telephone Exchange Office near Ballygunge Phari and had asked the appellant to keep a watch on the bag. Since the appellant did not return, P.W.5 reported the incident to Gariahat police station. P.W.23 and 27, the police officers attached to Gariahat police station seized the bag and recovered a female dead body covered with bloodstained poly sheet, rope, bed-sheet, gunny bags, a shirt and lungi from the spot. P.W.5 and 6 identified the appellant in Court. 15. Subsequently P.W.1 and 2 identified the said dead body in morgue as that of their mother. They also identified the bag and the other articles inside the bag including the lungi and the shirt as that of the appellant. 16. P.W.5 and 6 identified the appellant in Court. 15. Subsequently P.W.1 and 2 identified the said dead body in morgue as that of their mother. They also identified the bag and the other articles inside the bag including the lungi and the shirt as that of the appellant. 16. P.W.7, 8 and 9 are the co-flat owners of the victim who corroborated the evidence of P.W.1, 2 and 3 with regard to quarrels and altercation between the victim and the appellant. P.W.10 is the husband of the victim who returned from Japan about a month after the incident. In his evidence he deposed that the delay was due to difficulties in getting ticket and other circumstances beyond his control. P.W.12 is the brother of the appellant and P.W.10 and he supported the prosecution case that the appellant used to reside with the victim while P.W.10 was away and the relation of the appellant with the victim was strained over demands of money. P.W.13 is the Judicial Magistrate who held T.I. parade examination of the appellant and deposed that P.W.4, 5 and 6 identified the appellant during such T.I. parade. P.W.14 is a neighbour of the victim who accompanied P.W.1 and 2 to the police station for lodging first information report. P.W.15 is the government examiner of question document who proved that the Urdu letter was written by co-accused Jahid Sahid, since acquitted. P.W.16, 17, 18 and 19 are local flat owners who witnessed the seizure of the weapon of offence namely iron pipe from the room upon showing the appellant, a bloodstained napkin from the bathroom of the house, Urdu letter and two pair of Chappals of the victim and her passport and signed the seizure lists in respect of such seizures. P.W.20 is the plan maker who prepared the plan in respect of the place of occurrence and also the place where the bag and the dead body was recovered. P.W.21 is the photographer who photographed the place of occurrence. P.W.22 is the witness who proved the FSL report which showed human blood in the bag, lungi, shirt, rope bed-sheet which were recovered along with dead body and also blood with Group B on the napkin recovered from the bathroom of the house of the victim. P.W.21 is the photographer who photographed the place of occurrence. P.W.22 is the witness who proved the FSL report which showed human blood in the bag, lungi, shirt, rope bed-sheet which were recovered along with dead body and also blood with Group B on the napkin recovered from the bathroom of the house of the victim. P.W.23 and 27 are the Sub-Inspectors of Police attached to Gariahat Police station who recovered the bag containing the dead body and seized the same along with other articles. They prepared the inquest report and sent the dead body for post-mortem to the morgue. P.W.24 and 25 are the independent seizure witnesses of the bag and the dead body from the footpath near Telephone Exchange Office of Ballygunge Phari. P.W.26 is a Sub-Inspector of Police attached to Watgunge police station who seized incriminating articles from the place of occurrence during investigation. P.W.28 is the post-mortem doctor who deposed that victim had suffered defensive injuries on the hand and also one legature mark around the neck along with a depressed fracture over the left partial bone with severe internal injuries. The P.M. doctor claimed that the head injury might have been caused by a heavy blunt substance. P.W.29 investigated the case. He stated that P.W.1 had come to the police station and her statement was reduced in writing and was registered as first information report in the instant case. He further stated that the appellant led them to the spot from where the dead body had been recovered. He corroborated the evidence of P.W.1 and 2 that the body was identified as that of the victim and that P.W.1 and 2 had also identified the bag, other articles therein including the ornaments of their mother and the shirt and lungi as that of their uncle. P.W.29 further deposed that upon showing of the appellant iron pipe was recovered as the weapon of offence and that during investigation he seized various incriminating articles and post-mortem report, serological report filed the charge-sheet against the said case. 17. In a criminal trial the prosecution may prove its case either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. In a case of direct evidence, oral evidence must prove the facts in issue as provided under Section 60 of the Evidence Act. 17. In a criminal trial the prosecution may prove its case either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. In a case of direct evidence, oral evidence must prove the facts in issue as provided under Section 60 of the Evidence Act. In a case of circumstantial evidence, there must be proof of relevant facts beyond reasonable doubt and through a process of logical irresistible inference therefrom the existence of facts in issue or factum probandum must be established. [See Vijay Kumar Arora Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) reported in 2010 (2) SCC 353 ] 18. The age old adage that “witnesses may lie, but circumstances will not” form the jurisprudential basis of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence. The parameters of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence was laid down by the Apex Court more than half of a century ago in the case of Hanumant Vs. State of M.P. reported in AIR 1952 SC 343 in the following wards : “It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established consistent only with hypothesis of guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 19. This principle was approved by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Govinda Reddy Vs. State of Mysore reported in AIR 1960 SC 29 . 20. The five golden principles or “panch sheel” in the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence were enumerated by the Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1984 (4) SCC 116 as follows : 1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The five golden principles or “panch sheel” in the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence were enumerated by the Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1984 (4) SCC 116 as follows : 1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. 2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilt, 3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, 4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and 5) there must be a chain evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 21. Let us now examine whether in the present case the prosecution has been able to establish its case in the light of the aforesaid well settled legal parameters. 22. It is established by the consistent prosecution evidence and the admission of the appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., 1973 that he ordinarily resided with the victim and her children in their house. 23. On the fateful day, i.e. 15.07.1998 at about 10.30 a.m., P.W.2 and 3 saw the appellant in the house altercating with their mother when they left for school. No one else was in the room. Ms. Rituparna De, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the said witnesses merely “heard” the appellant altercating but had not “seen” him there. We are at a loss as to how the appellant cannot be said to be present at the place of occurrence when the said witnesses categorically deposed that he was quarrelling with their mother. Ms. De, further argued that the neighbours have not corroborated such version. The quarrel was taking place inside the room and the inmates of the room have deposed thereto. The neighbours may not have paid attention to the said incident and, hence, their failure to corroborate the version of P.W.2 and 3 is no reason to discard their consistent evidence. Ms. De, further argued that the neighbours have not corroborated such version. The quarrel was taking place inside the room and the inmates of the room have deposed thereto. The neighbours may not have paid attention to the said incident and, hence, their failure to corroborate the version of P.W.2 and 3 is no reason to discard their consistent evidence. Hence it is proved that the appellant was last present alone with the victim in her room at about 10.30 a.m. on 15.07.1998. 24. P.W.4 has proved him a rickshaw puller of the locality and around 12 noon he was hired by the appellant to bring down a bag from the said room and carry the appellant with the bag in his rickshaw to Kwality ice cream factory on Diamond Harbour Road wherefrom the appellant boarded a taxi with the said bag. He identified the appellant in Court. P.W.11, a neighbour, corroborated this fact and deposed that he saw the appellant with a bag on the rickshaw while he was buying meat from a shop and the appellant joked with him. Ms. De submitted that P.W.4 is wholly unreliable witness. He was not examined during investigation and that he did not have a license to ply rickshaw and therefore was at the mercy of the police to carry on his business and hence, was a “pocket witness” of the police. She further argued that the said witness did not state the house number and the date of incident and also did not corroborate the presence of P.W.11. We are unable to accept her submissions. The evidence of P.W.4 when read as a whole shows that the he is a probable witness of truth. He was unshaken in cross-examination relating to the core edifice of the prosecution case. His failure to give the house number or the exact date of incident cannot be a ground to reject his evidence as he was deposing after 2 years of the incident and could not be expected to have noted the house number or date of incident when he was hired. Furthermore, he was negotiating his rickshaw through a narrow congested lane and therefore he failed to the notice the presence of P.W.11, whom he does not know. On the other hand, P.W.11 is a natural and independent witness who corroborates the version of P.W.4 and lends it credibility. Furthermore, he was negotiating his rickshaw through a narrow congested lane and therefore he failed to the notice the presence of P.W.11, whom he does not know. On the other hand, P.W.11 is a natural and independent witness who corroborates the version of P.W.4 and lends it credibility. In view of such corroboration, we are persuaded to accept the version of P.W.4. It is settled law that courts may rely on the evidence of a witness who has not been examined during investigation provided his evidence is otherwise reliable. In view of corroboration from P.W.11, an independent witness, we reject the contention of the defence that P.W.4 is an unreliable pocket witness of the police. Hence, it is proved that appellant around 12 noon brought out a bag from the room and carried the same in a rickshaw to the main road where he boarded a taxi with the said bag. P.W.5 and 6 are pavement dwellers residing in the footpath near Telephone Exchange Office of Ballygunge Phari. In the afternoon of 15.07.1998, they saw the appellant dumped a bag under a tree in the said footpath and requested P.W.5 to keep watch over the same. As the appellant did not return till 4.00 p.m., P.W.5 informed Gariahat police station. Pursuant to such intimation, P.W.23 and 27, police officers attached to Gariahat police station went to the spot and in presence of P.W.5 and 24 (who were seizure list witnesses) opened the bag and found a female dead body inside the bag packed with bloodstained gunny bags, bed-sheets, pillows etc. They also recovered nylon ropes and a shirt and lungi from the said bag. They seized the said articles, prepared inquest report and sent the body for post-mortem examination. Ms. De, learned counsel submitted that P.W.5 and 6 were pavement dwellers and were under the control of the police. They had given no description of the man who dumped the bag and had not stated that he brought out the bag from the dicky of the taxi. There is also inconsistency as to time as stated by P.W.4 as to when the appellant boarded his rickshaw and that given by P.W.5 and 6 as to when he dumped the bag on the footpath in front of 3A, Gariahat Road (South). The contradictions in the evidence of P.W.5 and 6, as highlighted by Ms. There is also inconsistency as to time as stated by P.W.4 as to when the appellant boarded his rickshaw and that given by P.W.5 and 6 as to when he dumped the bag on the footpath in front of 3A, Gariahat Road (South). The contradictions in the evidence of P.W.5 and 6, as highlighted by Ms. De, do not militate against their evidence on record as such contradictions are minor in nature and do not affect the credibility of such witnesses. Furthermore, with regard to the inconsistency as to time between the evidence of P.W.4 on the one hand and that of P.W.5 on the other hand, both of whom claimed to have seen the appellant around 12/12.15 p.m., one must bear in mind that P.W.4 is a rickshaw puller while P.W.5 and 6 are pavement dwellers and therefore it is most likely they did not wear watches and had no occasion of marking time with exactitude of the events they witnessed. They relied on approximation when they deposed relating to time and therefore such apparent inconsistency cannot be utilised to throw out the otherwise reliable and convincing versions of such witnesses. From these evidences it is clear that the appellant had carried a bag containing a female body from the room of the victim and dumped the same in the pavement in front of 3A, Gariahat Road (South) near Ballygunge Phari. 26. Thereafter around 2 p.m., the appellant returned to the room and opened the lock of the room and entered the same. This is proved by P.W.1 and 2. P.W.2 had returned early from school as her class was given a holiday due to the untimely demise of one of her classmates. When she returned she found the room locked and waited in a neighbour’s room hoping her mother who, she thought, had gone to bring her elder sister (P.W.1) back from school would return shortly. However, P.W.1, whose school got off around 1.30 p.m. found their mother had not come and hence, on her own came back from school. Around 2 p.m., when she (P.W.1) was climbing the steps towards their room, she found the appellant was going towards the room which was padlocked and the appellant opened the lock of the room and they entered. No dent has been caused to such prosecution case by the defence in cross-examination. Around 2 p.m., when she (P.W.1) was climbing the steps towards their room, she found the appellant was going towards the room which was padlocked and the appellant opened the lock of the room and they entered. No dent has been caused to such prosecution case by the defence in cross-examination. The appellant also admitted in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he came back to the room at 2 p.m. Hence, it is proved that at 2 p.m. the appellant returned to the locked room of the victim which he unlocked and entered. 27. Inside the room, the appellant gave a false explanation as to the absence of the mother of P.W.1 and 2 and relied on a Urdu letter claiming it was written by her mother. P.W.1 states that her mother was not conversant with Urdu Script and they did not believe the same. The letter was seized by P.W.29, I.O. and P.W.15, the hand writing expert, deposed that the letter was written by Jahid Sahid, the acquitted accused, and not the victim. Hence, it is established that the appellant relied on a fabricated letter to give a false explanation relating to the disappearance of the victim. Furthermore, P.W.1 and 2 noticed that the footwear of the victim (two pair of Chappals) were lying in the room and the rice on the kitchen fire was burnt tell tale signs that the victim, a housewife, had not left her home voluntarily. The defence had not been able to demolish these circumstances which clearly militate against the appellant. 28. The appellant has vehemently argued that the prosecution evidence that he pointed out spot where the body was dumped was inadmissible in evidence. Ms. De submitted that the appellant was in custody at that material point of time and for such statement of the appellant to be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act it must result in discovering of a fact. The dead body having been recovered earlier, such leading statement of the appellant cannot be said to be admissible under the aforesaid provision. Mr. Sengupta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, argued that such act of the appellant is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as conduct of the accused and relied upon State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715 (para 206 and 220) and A.N. Venkatesh Vs. Mr. Sengupta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, argued that such act of the appellant is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as conduct of the accused and relied upon State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715 (para 206 and 220) and A.N. Venkatesh Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 1938 (para 9) in support of his contention. 29. It is true that the dead body was not recovered pursuant to the showing the appellant and hence the statement/conduct of the appellant cannot be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. However, Section 8 of the Evidence Act makes conduct of an accused admissible provided such conduct is relevant. In the instant case, the appellant, independent of the factum of recovery, took P.W.29 (I.O.) to the place from where the body had been dumped. Such conduct of the appellant is therefore relevant and admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The reliance of Mr. Sengupta on the aforesaid decisions are most apt. 30. The other criticism of Ms. De is to the recovery of the iron pipe upon the showing of the appellant. According to her, the disclosure statement is not exhibited and the serologist report does not prove existence of human blood on the said pipe. She relied on 2012 (2) Cr.L.R. (Cal) 172 in support of her submission. Mr. Sengupta refuted the same and relied on 1999 SCC (Cri) 436 (para 25/27) (State Vs. Teja Ram & Ors.). P.W.16 and 29 have proved that the iron pipe was recovered from an almirah in the room of the victim upon the showing of the appellant. It is trite law that the statement of an accused resulting in discovery of a fact need not necessarily to in writing to be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. What is necessary is the discovery of a fact pursuant to the statement of the accused. In the instant case, the prosecution has proved that the iron pipe was recovered upon the showing of the appellant and hence, such evidence is admissible both under Sections 8 and 27 of the Evidence Act. The other argument that the serologist’s report that blood was insufficient on the said pipe does not render the prosecution case improbable. In the instant case, the prosecution has proved that the iron pipe was recovered upon the showing of the appellant and hence, such evidence is admissible both under Sections 8 and 27 of the Evidence Act. The other argument that the serologist’s report that blood was insufficient on the said pipe does not render the prosecution case improbable. It is not an axiomatic proposition of law that human blood must be found on the weapon of assault to make the case reliable. It would depend on the facts of each case. In the facts of the present case, the failure to analyse blood on the weapon of assault due to its insufficiency cannot be a ground to disbelieve the prosecution case altogether. The case relied upon by Ms. De is clearly distinguishable on facts particularly in view of the ratio of the Apex Court in the case reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 436 that mere failure of analyse blood due to disintegration of serum cannot give rise to the conclusion that it is not human blood. 31. With regard to the identification of the appellant, P.W.13, Judicial Magistrate, has deposed that P.W.4, 5 and 6 identified the appellant in T.I. Parade and he further deposed all precautions were taken while holding such T.I. parade. The appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., said he was shown to the witnesses in police lockup. Ms. De argued that identification of appellant by P.W.4, 5 and 6 was doubtful as T.I. parade was belated, no precaution was taken when accused was produced in Court for remand and he was shown to the said witnesses. The suggestion that the accused was shown to the witnesses have been denied by the prosecution witnesses. P.W.4, 5 and 6 have identified the appellant in Court as well as during T.I. parade. All these witnesses had a fair chance of seeing the appellant in day time and hence their identification cannot be doubted in the facts of the case. P.W.13, Judicial Magistrate deposed in cross-examination that it was only after the departure of the witnesses, the appellant had claimed he was shown to the said witnesses in lock up. This clearly shows that the stance of the appellant to dispute his identification was an after thought after he was identified by the said witnesses. 32. P.W.13, Judicial Magistrate deposed in cross-examination that it was only after the departure of the witnesses, the appellant had claimed he was shown to the said witnesses in lock up. This clearly shows that the stance of the appellant to dispute his identification was an after thought after he was identified by the said witnesses. 32. Moreover, in the facts of the case we are of the opinion that there is no inordinate delay in holding T.I. parade in the instant case. 33. The identification of dead body and other incriminating articles inside the bag including ornaments of the deceased and the bloodstained shirt and lungi of the appellant by P.W.1 and 2 have not been seriously challenged by the appellant. 34. Furthermore, FSL report revealed human blood in poly sheets, pillows, gunny bags, bed sheets used to conceal the dead body in the bag as also on the shirt of the appellant which clearly probabilies the prosecution case. 35. P.W.28 is the post-mortem doctor. He has proved the P.M. report and has deposed that the victim suffered a number of defensive injuries on the dorsum of the hand and the back of forearm. He found a ligature mark round the neck at the level of thyroid bone measuring 14 inch X 1½ inch having no gap with a facture of the hyoid bone. He also found one lacerated wound over the left parietal region measuring 1½ inch X ½ inch X bone deep. All injuries showed evidence of vital reaction. On dissection, he noticed the following internal injuries : Membrane – injuries with defused clotted blood Brain - lacerated with intracranial haemorrhage He further deposed that the head injury was due to the effect of heavy blunt substance. Such medical evidence establishes that the victim struggled before her death with the assailant and she was strangulated and hit on the head by a hard and blunt substance causing extensive head injury. As a result of such injuries she died. Such injuries are compatible with the circumstances which the prosecution has portrayed in the instant case. The iron pipe seized by the investigating agency as the weapon of assault fits with the medical evidence. It is most probable that the victim tried to protect herself from the murderous assault of the appellant and suffered the defensive injuries. Ms. Such injuries are compatible with the circumstances which the prosecution has portrayed in the instant case. The iron pipe seized by the investigating agency as the weapon of assault fits with the medical evidence. It is most probable that the victim tried to protect herself from the murderous assault of the appellant and suffered the defensive injuries. Ms. De, has relied on a singular statement of P.W.28 in cross-examination that the victim did not die before 24 hours from the time of P.M. examination held on 16.07.1998 at 2.20 p.m. to improbabilise the prosecution case. Or in other words, according to P.W.28 the victim died on or after 2.20 p.m. on 15.07.1998, whereas according to the prosecution case the victim died between 10.30 A.M. and 12 noon on 15.07.1998. The difference in time of death as suggested by the P.M. doctor on the one hand and that as derived from other circumstances is not much. Furthermore, such opinion of the doctor is an unreasoned one and is not based on empirical scientific reasoning. Mr. Sengupta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has rightly opposed such argument on the basis that medical science has not perfected itself to such extent as to determine the exact time of death with mathematical precision. Moreso, no reason or scientific basis has been stated by the doctor for his opinion. He relied on the case of Paltipati Venkaiah Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 1985 SCC (Cri) 464 (para 10) wherein it was held as follows : “Medical science is not yet so perfect as to determine the exact time of death nor can the same be determined in a computerized or mathematical fashion so as to accurate to the last second.” 37. Similar view was expressed in Budh Singh Vs. State of M.P. reported in (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 64 (para 14 and 18). Mr. Sengupta also relied on Sidhartha Vashist @ Manu Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in 2010 (2) SCC (Cri) 1385 (para 178). 38. In the instant case, the medical opinion as to time of death is an unreasoned one and the same cannot be binding on the Court. In the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhagirath and others reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 658, the Apex Court held as follows : “The opinion given by a medical witness need not be last word on the subject. In the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhagirath and others reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 658, the Apex Court held as follows : “The opinion given by a medical witness need not be last word on the subject. Such an opinion shall be tested by the Court. If the opinion is bereft of logic or objectivity, the Court is not obliged to go by that opinion.” 39. No objective scientific parameter or reason was given by the medical expert in the instant case in support of his claim as to the time of death. In view of its unreasoned laconic nature and bearing in mind the fact that it is a settled proposition that time of death cannot be ascertained with exactitude. We are unwilling to accept the opinion of the medical expert as a ground to disbelieve the prosecution case. Hence we reject the contention of the appellant that the medical evidence casts a doubt on the prosecution case. In a similar case of circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court dispelled the apparent conflict in time of death as arising from an unreasoned medical opinion to arrive at a finding of guilt based on other circumstances. (See A.N. Venkatesh Vs. State of Karnataka, 2005 SCC (Cri) 1938, para 10) 40. The prosecution witnesses, namely, P.W.1, 7, 8, 9 and 12 have proved that for last two months the appellant was quarrelling with the victim over money and even tried to throttle her. When the children of the victim objected they were also threatened by him. On the fateful day, the appellant was found quarrelling with the victim. It was therefore clear that the relation between the appellant and the victim was strained. This fact is also supported by P.W.12, who is another brother of the appellant. The argument of the appellant that as no valuable were stolen from the house or any ornaments removed from the person of the deceased such motive is not proved is not correct. The continuous quarrels establish beyond doubt that there was bad blood between the appellant and his sister-in-law and the same prompted him to end her life. Having committed the crime, the appellant who was alone with the victim in the house was desperate to dissociate himself from the crime and surreptitiously removed the body. The continuous quarrels establish beyond doubt that there was bad blood between the appellant and his sister-in-law and the same prompted him to end her life. Having committed the crime, the appellant who was alone with the victim in the house was desperate to dissociate himself from the crime and surreptitiously removed the body. Under such circumstances, he naturally did not remove any valuables or ornaments from the person of the deceased lest he should be found in possession of such article belonging to the deceased and be held responsible for her murder. 41. Finally, the plea of alibi taken by the appellant that he had gone out of the house to play Carrom had not been probabilised by him by leading evidence. Such false plea of alibi further strengthens the chain of circumstances assiduously woven by the prosecution in the instant case. Further defence of the appellant that P.W.10 may have conspired to kill his wife, the victim herein, is most desperate. All the members of the family including P.W.12 have unequivocally stated that P.W.10 was staying in Japan for the last 10 to 12 years and was not in the country at the time of occurrence. There is also no evidence of matrimonial disharmony or animosity between the victim and the P.W.10. The defence had argued that P.W.29 (I.O.) did not investigate this angle and did not seize the passport of P.W.10. They also relied on the statement of P.W.8 that P.W.10 and the victim had visited P.W.8 in 1995 or 1996 when he shifted to his flat. We find little substance in such argument of the appellant. As discussed earlier, there was no animosity between the couple and it was clear that P.W.10 was not in the country at the time of occurrence and came back on being informed within a month from the date of occurrence. P.W.10 had also explained reasons for his delayed arrival which is anything but indifference to the deceased. There is also no evidence on record that the victim led an immoral life during the absence of her husband. 42. Alternatively, Ms. De argued that the conviction of the appellant be scaled down to Section 304 I.P.C. She relied on Abdul Nawaz Vs. State of West Bengal reported in 2012 (2) C Cr. L R (SC) 884 in support to her contention. 42. Alternatively, Ms. De argued that the conviction of the appellant be scaled down to Section 304 I.P.C. She relied on Abdul Nawaz Vs. State of West Bengal reported in 2012 (2) C Cr. L R (SC) 884 in support to her contention. In view of the number and extent to injuries suffered by the victim as evident from the post mortem report we are of the opinion that the appellant had the intention of killing her. She was not only strangulated but was hit on the head with a hard blunt substance causing a fatal injury. The intention to kill the victim was therefore evident from the nature, gravity and situs of the injuries. Merely because there was a quarrel between the appellant and the victim and she tried to resist the murderous assault resulting in defensive injuries on her hands the case would not come within the exceptions to Section 300 of the I.P.C. No such argument was also canvassed before the trial court and the same is rejected. The case cited by Ms. De is clearly distinguishable in view of the aforesaid facts. 43. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence of the appellant and dismiss the appeal. J.N. Patel, J.; I agree