Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 907 (HP)

Diwan Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2012-12-01

DEV DARSHAN SUD

body2012
Judgment Dev Darshan Sud, J. The appellant challenges his conviction under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter ‘IPC’) sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and fine of Rs.20,000/-, in default of payment of fine, simple imprisonment for a period of six months for offence under section 376 IPC and simple imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.5000/- for offence punishable under Section 506 IPC and in default of payment of fine, simple imprisonment for one month. 2. The genesis of the prosecution case is that Ext.PW1/A, which is First Information Report No. 87 of 2008, filed by Kumari Reena Devi with Police Station Karsog on 22.5.2008 narrating therein that she was 16 years old and residing with her maternal uncle Jhabe Ram and was student of 10th class. About 5-6 days prior to Shivratri, the accused entered the cowshed during the day time where she was watering the cattle and committed rape on her. When she tried to raise a hue and cry to save herself from the clutches of the accused-appellant, he threatened her that in case she disclosed this to anybody he would kill her. It was in these circumstances, due to fear that she never disclosed these facts to her maternal uncle. Prior to the lodging of the report, she was stalked and teased by Durga Dass, elder brother of the accused. He was related to the victim as her mama (maternal uncle). He stated that he wanted to marry her though he was already married. 3. The accused was medically examined on 9th June, 2008 by PW17 Dr. Krishan Kumar, Civil Hospital, Karsog, who opined vide MLC Ext.PW7/A that the accused was normal and capable of performing sexual intercourse. Sample of semen was taken and his clothes were sent for chemical examination. The victim was examined by PW19 Dr. Abhilasha Malhotra, who vide ExtPW19/A opined that she had been “sexually exposed”. Her radiological examination, vide Ext.PW18/A, opined that her radiological age was between 15 to 16 years. 4. The testimony on record consists of prosecutrix PW1 Reena Devi (who at the relevant point of time when she appeared in the witness box was married), PW2 Champa Devi, PW3 Jhabe Ram, PW4 Chhial Singh and PW5 Krishan Lal. The other witnesses are concerned with the record etc. 5. 4. The testimony on record consists of prosecutrix PW1 Reena Devi (who at the relevant point of time when she appeared in the witness box was married), PW2 Champa Devi, PW3 Jhabe Ram, PW4 Chhial Singh and PW5 Krishan Lal. The other witnesses are concerned with the record etc. 5. Adverting to the statement of the prosecutrix, she states that her family consists of four brothers and sisters. She has three sisters and one brother. Her father had died about 11 years ago and in these circumstances she was staying with her mama Jhabe Ram, PW3, as her family was in a state of penury and her maternal uncle was looking after her. She was studying in 10th class. About 5/6 days prior to the Shivratri in 2008, she had gone to water the cattle in the cowshed, the accused had concealed himself there and when she entered, he caught hold of her. When she tried to raise a hue and cry, he gagged her mouth and threatened to kill her. She was thereafter subjected to rape. He stated that the door of the cowshed was closed by him. She did not disclose this fact to her uncle as she was scared of the accused. Durga Dass the brother of the accused told her that he wanted to marry her. On 19.5.2008 when she was going to school, Durga Dass started following her on which her maternal aunt inquired her as to why she had not gone to the school with the other girls. When she questioned her further, she disclosed the entire incident to her. Her maternal uncle Jhabe Ram PW3 called her brother Chhial Singh and thereafter they proceeded to the police station where report Ext.PW1/A was lodged. In cross examination, she admitted that the house of Diwan Chand and Jhabe Ram is common. The cowshed according to her is located at a distance of 30 minutes walking time from the house of Jhabe Ram. She could not remember the date of the incident but stated that Shivratri is in the month of March. The doors of the cowshed did not have any bolt and in these circumstances could not be bolted from inside. She states that she remained in the cowshed for 30 minutes. Her clothes were torn and blood stained. She could not remember the date of the incident but stated that Shivratri is in the month of March. The doors of the cowshed did not have any bolt and in these circumstances could not be bolted from inside. She states that she remained in the cowshed for 30 minutes. Her clothes were torn and blood stained. She does not remember as to how many times she was raped during this half an hour. The house of Narpat Ram is two minutes walking distance from the house of Bodh Raj. Thereafter, she went home, changed her clothes and took a bath, but did not report the matter to anybody and continued to visit the house of the accused. She did not narrate this incident to any person though she admits that Durga Dass had teased her prior to this incident. She had informed the police about the fact that Durga Dass has teased her prior to the incident and used to behave her in indecent manner. Champa maternal aunt of the victim had visited their house before 5/6 days. She had informed her about the behaviour of Durga Dass upon which she was beaten up by Champa. She had shown the torn clothes to her. She did not produce the clothes before the police. 6. PW2 Champa Devi states that Reena is the daughter of her sister. When Reena was going to school, she saw that no girl was accompanying her. Durga Dass followed her sometime and on this she inquired her as to why she had gone to school alone. Thereafter, the prosecutrix disclosed that Durga Dass used to ask her that she should marry him. She also told her that accused had raped her in the cowshed when she was alone and had gone to water the cattle. In cross examination she stated that she is illiterate. The incident happened 3-4 years ago. The victim had shown her torn shirt and salwar but these were not blood stained. 7. PW3 Jhabe Ram only affirmed the facts and that the father of the prosecutrix was a poor person. She was staying with him and he reported the matter to the police when he was informed about the rape. PW4 Chhial Singh brother of the prosecutrix only states about the rape having been committed. 7. PW3 Jhabe Ram only affirmed the facts and that the father of the prosecutrix was a poor person. She was staying with him and he reported the matter to the police when he was informed about the rape. PW4 Chhial Singh brother of the prosecutrix only states about the rape having been committed. This is the entirety of the evidence with respect to the factum as to whether the victim was in fact subjected to rape or not. 8. The learned trial Court on this evidence holds that rape stands conclusively established beyond all reasonable doubt and further holds that testimony of the prosecutrix is duly corroborated by PW19 Dr. Abhilasha who stated that she was exposed to sexual intercourse. 9. The principle of law invoked by the learned trial Court is that the prosecutrix would not lie in which eventuality her statement was accepted as correct in toto which would be sufficient for sustaining conviction. This is the established law but at the same time not in so wide and sweeping terms as the learned trial Court holds. This principle of law has to be invoked on established facts and not in isolation. 10. Adverting to the facts of the present case, (a) there has been an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report. The incident occurred somewhere in the month of March, 2008 and the first information report was lodged on 22nd May, 2008, (b) there is no medical evidence to corroborate the rape though the words “sexually exposed” have been mentioned; (c) the delay in medical examination obviously would not disclose signs of struggle or injuries etc, but at the same time, would also not establish that exposure would be attributable directly to the accused; (d) between the time of the incident and time when the report was lodged, there is nothing on record to suggest that the accused had physically/mentally overpowered the prosecutrix or exercised dominance on her which prevented her from lodging the report; (e) during this period of two months, she was meeting everybody, going to school and interacting with all. There is no evidence to suggest that she was hounded and subjected to any physical or mental trauma. 11. There is no evidence to suggest that she was hounded and subjected to any physical or mental trauma. 11. When she was being teased by Durga Dass brother of the accused and inquired by PW2 Champa Devi as to why the prosecutrix had not gone to school with her friends and accompanied this person, she was supposed to have stated that it was Durga Dass who wanted to marry her. It is this myriad of facts which require consideration sequentially. The name of the accused figures only once and that is when she was supposed to have informed PW2 Champa that she was in fact sexually assaulted. 12. The submission made by learned Additional Advocate General that her statement should be accepted. I can not accept this submission for the reason that the facts in this case are such which require at least the minimal corroboration. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raju and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008)15 SCC 133, where the Supreme Court holds, after reiterating its decision in State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh (1996)2 SCC 384 and Ranjit Hazarika vs. State of Assam (1998)8 SCC 635 , that while evaluating the evidence of the prosecutrix it must be borne in mind that no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a statement against her honour that she has been sexually assaulted which would be a serious cause of humiliation and social ostracism. The Court thereafter proceeds: “10. The aforesaid judgments lay down the basic principle that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a part with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest weight and we respectful agree with them, but at the same time they cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of every case of sexual assault which comes before the court. 11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. 11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration. 12. Reference has been made in Gurmit Singh case to the amendments in 1983 to Section 375 and 376 of the Penal Code making the penal provisions relating to rape more stringent, also to Section 114-A of the Evidence Act with respect to a presumption to be raised with regard to allegations of consensual sex in a case of alleged rape. It is however significant that Section 113-A and 113-B too were inserted in the Evidence Act by the same amendment by which certain presumptions in cases of abetment of suicide and dowry death have been raised against the accused. These two sections, thus, raise a clear presumption in favour of the prosecution but no similar presumption with respect to rape is visualized as the presumption under Section 114-A is extremely restricted in its applicability. This clearly shows that insofar as allegations of rape are concerned, the evidence of a prosecutrix must be examined as that of an injured witness whose presence at the spot is probable but it can never be presumed that her statement should, without exception, be taken as the gospel truth. Additionally, her statement can, at best, be adjudged on the principle that ordinarily no injured witness would tell a lie or implicate a person falsely. We believe that it is under these principles that this case and others, such as this one, need to be examined.” (at p. 141) 15. Learned counsel also submits that in Alamelu and another vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2011)2 SCC 385 the Supreme Court holds:- “51. We believe that it is under these principles that this case and others, such as this one, need to be examined.” (at p. 141) 15. Learned counsel also submits that in Alamelu and another vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2011)2 SCC 385 the Supreme Court holds:- “51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1952 SC 54 declared that corroboration is not the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the aforesaid case, Vivan Bose, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows: (AIR p. 57, para 19) “19…..The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the Judge……The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the Judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand.” 52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence.” (atp.398) 16. Considering the entirety of the facts on record and even accepting that the prosecutrix was minor, though after considering the fact that her radiological age does leave room/error for two years, I find in the facts of the present case that some corroboration was required to establish that the prosecutrix had been subjected to rape. I find it strange that the name of Durga Dass, brother of the accused figures as a person responsible for stalking and teasing her who told that he wanted to marry her, but no attention has been paid to this fact by the learned trial Court or by the prosecution. There is thus merit in this appeal, which is accordingly allowed. There is thus merit in this appeal, which is accordingly allowed. The appellant is directed to be released from the jail forthwith in case he is not required in any other case. The Registry is directed to take follow up action forthwith. Bail bonds furnished by the accused/appellant shall stand discharged.